Date: 20100505
Docket: A-268-09
Citation:
2010 FCA 117
CORAM: LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NADON J.A.
PELLETIER J.A.
BETWEEN:
GILBERT L’ÉCUYER
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
[1]
The appellant, who is not represented by counsel,
is appealing a decision of Justice Shore of the Federal Court (judge). In that decision dated
May 28, 2009, the judge dismissed an application for judicial review filed
by the appellant against a decision of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
Public Complaints Commission (Commission).
[2]
Applying the “reasonableness” standard of
review, the judge found that the Commission Chair’s decision was reasonable.
[3]
In essence, the appellant is asking us to review
the findings and inferences of fact made by the Commission and to substitute
our assessment of the facts for that of the Commission.
[4]
The binding case law that guides us is clear on
this aspect of the standard for reviewing questions of fact or inferences of
fact: be it on appeal or judicial review, “deference [must be] given [by the
reviewing judge] on questions [and inferences] of fact because of the ‘signal
advantage’ enjoyed by the primary finder of fact”: see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
at paragraph 53; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at paragraph 37; Housen v. Nikolaisen,
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at paragraphs 10 to 25.
[5]
At paragraph 25 of Housen, Justices Iacobucci
and Major wrote the following:
[25] Although the trial judge will always be in a distinctly
privileged position when it comes to assessing the credibility of witnesses,
this is not the only area where the trial judge has an advantage over
appellate judges. Advantages enjoyed by the trial judge with respect to the
drawing of factual inferences include the trial judge’s relative expertise with
respect to the weighing and assessing of evidence, and the trial judge’s
inimitable familiarity with the often vast quantities of evidence. This
extensive exposure to the entire factual nexus of a case will be of invaluable
assistance when it comes to drawing factual conclusions. In addition, concerns
with respect to cost, number and length of appeals apply equally to inferences
of fact and findings of fact, and support a deferential approach towards both.
[6]
At the hearing, the appellant reiterated his
complaint that the RCMP and the Commission had failed to conduct an adequate
investigation into the police harassment he had allegedly suffered in countries
where he had vacationed, in particular, in Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, France and Switzerland. He claimed that the cause for this
harassment could be traced back to Canada: see Appeal Book, Vol. 1, at page 95.
[7]
In support of his complaint to the Commission, he
wrote the following in the Appeal Book, Volume 1, page 97, at paragraphs 8
and 9:
[translation]
8. I have reason to believe that the file, which
may have been compiled initially against an individual with the same name, was
manipulated so that the contents could be used against me and maybe other
fictitious evidence planted to implicate me in tales that would otherwise have
been unlikely.
In this respect, consideration should be given
to the fact that, from 1993 to 1996, I was harassed at work, and senior Quebec officials tried to ascribe certain
acts of misconduct to me that had nothing to do with me.
They very likely succeeded, through political
machinations, in recording false charges against me in a file and, using their
influence with the police, through the RCMP, managed to send it to Interpol; this
could be the cause of all my problems in Europe in 2006.
9. As for the rest, agents of the RCMP and/or CSIS,
or persons associated one way or another with one of these agencies, may have
also sought to settle accounts after I blew the whistle on some questionable
misconduct in the RCMP and in political institutions.
[8]
Lastly, still in that context, he submits that
the Commission imposed a disproportionate burden of proof on him by requiring
that he produce convincing and concrete evidence to support his complaint. He
adds that, in response to his request, the RCMP was obligated to help him in
his dealings with foreign police forces, in particular Interpol, to determine
whether he was being investigated by those police forces.
[9]
The Commission considered the appellant’s allegations
of harassment and found that there was no convincing and concrete evidence to
support the allegations. In his final report (see Appeal Book, Vol. 1, at page 37),
the Commission Chair wrote the following:
[translation]
In my opinion, the arguments made by Mr. L’Écuyer to support his
theory are illogical. He refers to a range of routine events that occurred
during his trip abroad and that, in my opinion, are unrelated to one another.
He thought that police forces both in Canada and abroad had a file on him, but in fact no such file exists. He
took the necessary steps to determine whether such a file existed by submitting
access to information requests to various police agencies, which confirmed to
him that no file exists. Mr. L’Écuyer learned that no file exists thanks to
Corporal Beaulieu’s recommendations. Moreover, I believe that the RCMP had
enough information to determine that the complaint was not supported by
convincing and concrete evidence. In conducting my own analysis of the evidence
submitted by Mr. L’Écuyer, I have reached the same conclusion as the RCMP. It
should be noted that the agencies dealing with the access to information
requests all categorically stated that there was no file on Mr. L’Écuyer. In
conclusion, there is no evidence showing that the police in Canada put together a file against
Mr. L’Écuyer or that information about Mr. L’Écuyer was sent to Interpol or
foreign police forces.
(Emphasis added)
[10]
I need not rule on the obligation, if any, of a
Canadian police force to help citizens in any dealings they wish to have with
foreign police forces, and I refrain from doing so. That said, with respect, I
do not agree that citizens may mobilize Canadian police forces and require them
to investigate foreign police forces, on the basis of mere impressions and in
the absence of any evidence whatsoever that, objectively, lends at least an air
of likeliness or reality to their allegations of harassment at the hands of the
foreign police.
[11]
After reviewing the issues, the decision of the
judge and that of the Commission, as well as the parties’ memoranda, I am
satisfied that the judge made no reviewable error, either in determining the
applicable standard of review or in applying it in the review of the
Commission’s decision.
[12]
The appellant asked to be exempted from payment
of costs on the ground that he had raised new questions of general interest and
importance. Given the unequivocal findings of the Commission and the judge, I
do not agree that there is any reason for departing from the general rule in
this regard, which is to grant costs in the appeal.
[13]
For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal
with costs.
“Gilles Létourneau”
“I agree.
M. Nadon J.A.”
“I agree.
J.D. Denis
Pelletier J.A.”
Certified true
translation
Tu-Quynh Trinh
Email this Content