[2]
In brief,
the Regulations create a scheme for screening workers employed in security-sensitive
positions at ports in Canada. Employees must provide
biographical and other information about themselves and their spouse or partner
which is used to determine whether they represent a security threat to marine
transportation emanating from terrorism or organized crime. If the Minister of
Transport determines that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an
applicant poses such a risk, a security clearance may be refused. A refusal may
reduce the applicant’s opportunities for work.
[3]
The principal
question at issue in this reference is whether the Regulations breach the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an unreasonable intrusion into the
privacy of employees, as a result of which their employment may be jeopardized
and their liberty compromised by the potential disclosure to a foreign
government of the information collected about them. In my view, it has not been
established that the Regulations violate the constitutional rights of the
employees to whom they apply.
B. BACKGROUND TO THE PROCEEDING
[4]
The
respondents to the reference are the International Longshore and Warehouse
Union of Canada and four of its Locals, 500, 502, 514, and 517 (collectively
“ILWU”). ILWU members are employed in various roles in marine transportation in
British Columbia, primarily in the Port of Metro
Vancouver. Most
of the approximately 4,600 employees who belong to these Locals are affected by
the Regulations.
[5]
The
Vancouver Fraser Port Authority is also a respondent and, while taking no
position on the merits of the issues, it has put before the Court factual
information about the nature and scale of the business of the Port. It is
concerned that a decision declaring the Regulations to be invalid, in whole or
in part, would undermine potential users’ confidence in the security of its
ports, and thus have an adverse impact on business. The British Columbia
Maritime Employers Association (“BCMEA”) is also a respondent, but neither filed
a memorandum of fact and law, nor made oral submissions.
[6]
ILWU first
mounted a legal challenge to the Regulations before a labour grievance
arbitrator, alleging that the terminal operators were in breach of the
collective agreement by, among other things, failing adequately to consult on
the restricted areas and positions to be covered by the Regulations, and by
requiring employees to apply for security clearance. ILWU argued also that the
Regulations were invalid because they violated employees’ Charter and other
privacy rights. However, at the urging of the Attorney General and BCMEA, the arbitrator
adjourned the proceeding, pending a determination of the validity of the
Regulations by the Canada Industrial Relations Board (“Board”) or a court: British
Columbia Maritime Employers Assn. v. International Longshore and Warehouse
Union-Canada (2007), 168 L.A.C. (4th) 418.
[7]
Before the
Board, BCMEA sought a declaration under section 91 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, that
the concerted refusal to apply for security clearances constituted an unlawful
strike. The union replied that it did not and that, in any event, the
Regulations were invalid. Before the hearing started, the Attorney General announced
that he was referring to this Court the issues concerning the constitutional validity
of the Regulations. After determining that a reference by the Attorney General
under subsection 18.3(2) of the Federal Courts Act removed the
constitutional issues from its jurisdiction, the Board concluded that, leaving
aside the validity of the Regulations, ILWU’s instruction to its members not to
apply for security clearances constituted an unlawful strike in breach of the
Code: British Columbia Maritime Employers Assn (Re), [2007] C.I.R.B. No.
397.
[8]
The Court
decided to proceed with the hearing, as the parties wished, after inviting
submissions from counsel on the appropriateness of the reference, especially in
light of the disputed factual questions which it appeared that the Court might
have to determine, largely in the context of a section 1 inquiry, on the basis
of a large record. While the Court has jurisdiction to determine a reference
under subsection 18.3(2), even though it may require the Court to make findings
of disputed fact (Watt v. Liebelt, [1999] 2 F.C. 455 at paras. 26-27
(C.A.)), it would have been preferable, in the view of the panel, if the
Attorney General had permitted the matter to proceed before the Board, which
could have made findings of fact on the basis of both documentary and, if
required, viva voce evidence. We also agree with the submission of ILWU
that the Board’s labour relations expertise would have provided a useful
context in which it could have considered if the Regulations violated the
Charter.
[9]
Because
subsection 18.3(2) of the Federal Courts Act confines references by the
Attorney General to the “constitutional validity, operability and
applicability” of the Regulations, the Court determined that it would hear
submissions only on the questions in the reference relating to the Charter, and
not the “quasi-constitutional” statutes relied on by ILWU in its
memorandum, namely, the Canadian Bill of Rights, Canadian Human
Rights Act, and Privacy Act.
[10]
The
Charter sections in issue in this reference are sections 2, 7, 8, and 15. If
the union establishes a prima facie breach of any of these provisions,
the government has the burden of satisfying the Court that the breach is
justifiable under section 1. The questions referred to the Court by the
Attorney General are set out in Appendix “B” to these reasons.
C. THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
CLEARANCE PROGRAM
1. Statutory Scheme
[11]
The program
is part of a security review process initiated by Transport Canada in 2002,
partly in response to the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. The purposes of
the program are to enable the Minister to gather sufficient information to
establish the identities of workers employed in security-sensitive positions in
ports and to ensure that they do not pose an unacceptable security risk to
marine transportation. The scheme is intended to deter security risks from
applying for clearance, and to screen out unacceptably high security risks who
do apply.
[12]
The full
text of all the impugned sections of the Regulations and the relevant sections
of the Charter are set out in Appendix “A” to these reasons. In this part of my
reasons, I describe the principal elements of the statutory security clearance scheme,
especially those on which ILWU has focussed its attack.
[13]
Section
503 defines the positions for which a security clearance is required. A clearance
is required for a security-sensitive location in a port designated as “a
restricted area two”. At present, these are mainly in the cruise ship and
container terminals, and areas containing central controls for security and
surveillance equipment, and the central lighting system. However, ILWU fears
that they may be extended in the future to other locations at ports.
[14]
Section
503 provides that security clearances are necessary for, among others:
(i)
persons
whose work requires them to have access to either a restricted area two, or to
a cruise ship that interfaces with a restricted area two in order to provide
services, supplies or equipment to the ship (paragraphs (a) and (f));
(ii)
persons
who are involved with specified aspects of the security clearance process, or
have other security responsibilities (paragraphs (d) and (e)); and
(iii)
persons
who, as a result of being assigned to certain specified duties, could
jeopardize security by causing a preventive measure to fail, delaying the
response to a security incident, or affecting the recovery from such an
incident (paragraph (g)).
[15]
Section
506 describes the information that an applicant for a security clearance must
provide on a form supplied by the Minister pursuant to section 507. It includes
the following.
(i)
identity: names, date of birth, gender,
height, weight, colours of eyes and hair, birth certificate (if born in
Canada), place of birth, port and date of entry, citizenship or permanent
residence or evidence of other immigration status (if born out of Canada),
passport number (if any), fingerprints and facial image (paragraphs (2)(a)-(e));
(ii)
residence: addresses of all locations at
which the applicant has lived in the previous five years (paragraph (2)(g));
(iii)
activities: these include the names and
addresses of employers and post-secondary educational institutions attended in
the last five years (paragraph (2)(h));
(iv)
travel: details of travel outside
Canada and the United
States of more
than 90 days (paragraph (2)(i));
(v)
spouse
or common-law partner (present and former): identity information and present
address (if known) (paragraph (2)(f) and subsection (3)).
[16]
Section 508
describes subsequent checks and verification of the information undertaken by
the Minister in order to determine whether the applicant is a risk to the
security of marine transportation. These include: a criminal record check; a
check of law enforcement files, including intelligence gathered for law
enforcement purposes; a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) indices
check and, if necessary, a CSIS security assessment; and a check of the
applicant’s citizenship and immigration status.
[17]
In
addition to disclosing an applicant’s information to domestic law enforcement
and intelligence agencies, the Minister may share it, together with the results
of the checks and verifications described above, with the government of a foreign
state when the Minister is of the opinion that the public interest in such
disclosure clearly outweighs the invasion of privacy resulting from the
disclosure. Otherwise, the Minister is prohibited from disclosing the
information to a foreign government without the written consent of the
applicant. See subsection 506(5). The application form supplied by the Minister
contains a space where applicants can sign their consent to the release of
personal information to foreign governments. The form warns that failure to
sign may lead to the rejection of the application.
[18]
Section
509 requires the Minister to determine whether the information supplied by the
applicant, and that resulting from the checks and verifications, is sufficient
for a decision to be made on the extent to which the applicant represents a
security threat. If it is, the Minister will decide whether to issue a security
clearance on the basis of an evaluation of the factors listed in section 509.
These include:
(i)
the
relevance of any criminal record to the security of marine transportation
(paragraph (a));
(ii)
whether it
is known or there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the applicant is or has
been
(a) involved
in or contributed to activities directed to the misuse of the transportation
infrastructure to commit criminal offences or acts of violence against persons
or property, taking into account the relevance of these factors to the security
of marine transportation (subparagraph (b)(i));
(b) a
member of or involved with a terrorist group or criminal organization within
the meaning of sections 83.01 and 467.1 of the Criminal Code, or with a
group that is reasonably suspected of being involved in or of contributing to
acts of violence against persons or property, taking into account the relevance
of these factors to the security of marine transportation (subparagraphs (b)(ii),
(iii), and (iv)); or
(c) associated
with an individual who is known to come, or is reasonably suspected of coming, within
any of the above descriptions (subparagraph (b)(v));
(iii)
whether
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the applicant may be in a position
to be suborned to commit an act that might endanger marine transportation
security (paragraph (c)); and
(iv)
whether
the applicant has had a restricted area pass for a port, marine facility or
airport removed for cause, or has filed false or misleading information in
connection with his or her security clearance application (paragraphs (d)
and (e))
[19]
Before
refusing a clearance, the Minister is required by section 511 to notify an
applicant of the basis of the Minister’s doubt as to whether a security
clearance should be issued, and to permit the applicant to respond.
[20]
Section
515 authorizes the Minister to suspend a security clearance on the receipt of information
that could change the Minister’s decision under section 509. The individual
must be told the basis of the suspension and given an opportunity to make
written submissions. The Minister may then reinstate or cancel the security
clearance after deciding whether the individual poses a threat to the security
of marine transportation on the basis of the factors set out in section 509.
[21]
Section
517 provides for reconsideration by the Minister of a refusal or a cancellation
of a security clearance, after the applicant has had an opportunity to make
representations.
2. Operation of the Scheme
[22]
ILWU
emphasizes that, unlike airport workers, its members at the Vancouver Fraser Ports comprise a stable workforce.
Some of these employees have expressed serious concern that, after many years
of employment, they are now regarded as potential security risks, and are
subject to extensive background checks which intrude on their privacy and, if
the information is shared with foreign governments that have poor human rights
records, may also expose them to grave personal danger.
[23]
Apparently,
only the United
States and Australia have comparable background
checking systems for port employees. These kinds of checks on employees are not
required by either the International Labour Organization or the International Maritime
Organization, which are responsible for setting international labour and
maritime standards, or by the International Ship and Port Security Code. ILWU also
points out that, as in other countries, ports in Canada already have physical security measures in
place, such as fencing, lighting, patrols, and x-ray and radiation screening.
However, the Attorney General notes that it is always possible for an “insider”
to subvert these measures.
[24]
Criminal
record and law enforcement agency checks conducted on applicants include not
only criminal convictions, but also criminal charges that did not lead to a
conviction. The so-called indices checks by CSIS are more extensive. An
applicant’s information is put through a computer program, which compares it with
that in CSIS’s operational data banks by weighing the various fields according
to their relative importance in identifying security risks. The indices of risk
may be found in, for example, associations, education, time spent outside Canada, and place of residence. A
profile match will register as a “hit” and identify a security concern. “Hits”
are examined by CSIS officials to determine if they are real threats. If they
are, the applicant will be interviewed by CSIS. ILWU fears that information
collected about its members who have applied for security clearance may be
retained by CSIS in their operational data holdings and disclosed to foreign
governments.
[25]
Employees
who are denied a security clearance will not necessarily lose their job.
Rather, depending on their seniority and the particular work that they do, they
may have fewer hours available to them in areas of the port for which a
security clearance is not required. Failure to complete an application form in
full may lead to the refusal of a security clearance, if the Minister cannot be
satisfied that the person is not an unacceptable security risk on the basis of
the information supplied. Thus, while a security clearance may not be a
requirement of employment, the scheme cannot be described as voluntary either.
[26]
According
to information provided at the hearing by counsel for the Attorney General,
most of the approximately 5,000 security clearance applications submitted have
been processed. Ten applicants have been refused in Vancouver, of whom seven
are longshoremen. Four others (not longshoremen) have been refused for
incomplete information. All these negative decisions are subject to
reconsideration.
D. CHARTER ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
[27]
In his
oral submissions, Mr Danay, counsel for the Attorney General, correctly emphasized
three points that should frame an analysis of the allegations that the
Regulations infringe the Charter rights of ILWU members.
[28]
First, as
the party alleging Charter violations, ILWU has the burden of proving a prima
facie breach, even when the section of the Charter in question requires a
contextual balancing of the right against competing interests, such as sections
7 (principles of fundamental justice) and 8 (unreasonable search). Second, when
the issue is whether impugned state action has the effect of infringing a
Charter right, ILWU, as the party alleging that it does, must adduce evidence to
prove it, unless it is obvious. Third, it is important to distinguish an attack
on the validity of the Regulations, such as that by ILWU, from an attack on an
individual decision made under them. Regulations are not invalidated merely
because they may be applied in an unconstitutional manner in individual cases.
It is always open to an individual refused a security clearance to challenge
the refusal as an unconstitutional exercise of the decision-making power
delegated to the Minister by the Regulations: Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69, [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120.
[29]
To some
extent, ILWU’s Charter arguments overlap. Sometimes, its argument is focussed
on particular provisions of the Regulations, while, at others, it is aimed at
their cumulative effect. Moreover, in both its memorandum and oral
submissions, ILWU adopts what is perhaps best described as a broad brush
approach to an analysis of the Charter violations alleged. Nonetheless, I shall
endeavour to capture what I understand to be the essence of the arguments made
under each section.
Issue 1: Do the
Regulations breach employees’ freedom of religion, thought, belief, expression
and association protected by section 2 of the Charter?
[30]
ILWU
argues that the information that employees are required to give under section
506, and the checks and verifications subsequently made by law enforcement
agencies (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) in particular) and CSIS,
may enable an applicant’s religion or political opinions to be identified. Although
applicants are not asked by the application form to disclose their religion or
political opinions, they may be inferred from, for example, the educational institutions
attended, time and activities out of Canada,
or organizations to which an applicant has belonged. Counsel argues that, since
the Minister may use this information to refuse a security clearance, and thus
adversely affect an applicant’s employment, the Regulations will have a
chilling effect on constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
[31]
In my view,
it is not so obvious that the Regulations have a chilling effect on the rights
relied on by ILWU that such an effect can be assumed as a matter of common
sense. Neither the Regulations, nor the security clearance application form
used by the Minister, require applicants to disclose their religious or
political opinions. Whether they can be inferred from the information supplied
by any given individual is a matter of speculation. ILWU has not adduced
evidence to establish that the Regulations have a chilling effect on members’ practice
of religion or the expression of their political views.
[32]
An
analogous scheme for screening airport workers has been in place in Canada since the Air India bombing
in 1985 and no evidence has been adduced of complaints that it has had a
chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights. This at least
suggests that it cannot be assumed as a matter of “common sense” that the
Regulations under consideration here will have this effect.
[33]
ILWU
relies on R. v. Khawaja (2006), 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (“Khawaja”) to support
its attack on subparagraph 509(b)(ii). This provision makes the fact that
an applicant is involved with a terrorist group, as defined by subsection
83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, a basis on which the Minister may form a
reasonable ground to suspect that an applicant is a security threat and should
not be granted a security clearance.
[34]
In Khawaja,
the Court invalidated the part of the definition of “terrorist activity” in
subsection 83.01(1) which requires that the act be committed with a “political,
religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause”. An irony of Khawaja is
that the invalidation of the “motive clause” had the effect of broadening the
definition of the activities included in the subsection.
[35]
Be that as
it may, Khawaja was not followed in two other cases decided in the
Ontario Superior Court, where it was held that common sense alone did not
support the view that the “motive clause” had a chilling effect on the exercise
of section 2 freedoms. Evidence was required: see R. v. Ahmad (31 March,
2009); Toronto CRIMJ (F) 2025/07
(Ont Sup. Ct.) (subject to a publication ban) and United
States of America v. Nadarajah [2009] O.J. No. 946 (QL). I agree with the
view expressed in Ahmad (at para. 133) that any chilling effect on religious
freedom is more likely the result of public stereotyping of, and hostility
towards certain religious and ethnic minorities, than of the “motive clause” in
subsection 83.01(1).
[36]
The
argument respecting freedom of association is somewhat different, because of the
factors to be considered by the Minister under section 509 when determining to
what extent an applicant poses a threat to the security of marine transportation.
These include several forms of association, such as terrorist groups and
criminal organizations organized as defined by the Criminal Code, and
organizations engaged in or supporting activities directed towards the use of
violence. Admittedly, these definitions are broad. However, section 2 does not
protect the freedom to associate in order to engage in or promote violent,
terrorist or other criminal activities of the kind described in section 509: Suresh
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3, at paras. 107-8.
[37]
Nonetheless,
a particular problem is created by subparagraph 509(b)(v), which
provides that the Minister may consider an applicant’s association with a
person who is involved with any of the groups considered in the previous
paragraph. As counsel for ILWU pointed out, an applicant’s association with
such a person may be entirely innocent, whether or not the applicant was aware
of the person’s criminal or terrorist activities.
[38]
In this
context, it is important to recall that none of the associations described in
the previous paragraph will necessarily jeopardize an applicant, although they
may create sufficient suspicion as to warrant an interview, at which an
applicant could provide an explanation. The association must be relevant to
threats to the security of marine transportation from terrorists and criminal
organizations, when considered together with all the factors listed in section
509. Innocent associations will not normally warrant the denial of a security
clearance, as when, for example, an applicant was unaware that some members of
an essentially peaceful political group had engaged in violent activities, or
that a friend or family member was involved with a criminal organization or
terrorist group.
[39]
In these
circumstances, it is not obvious as a matter of “common sense” that an
applicant would be deterred from associating with others for lawful purposes,
and ILWU has provided no evidence to support its allegation that the Regulations
have a chilling effect on applicants’ freedom of association under paragraph 2(d)
of the Charter.
[40]
Finally,
an applicant who is refused a security clearance by the Minister, and whose
request for a reconsideration is unsuccessful, may apply to the Federal Court
to review the decision on the ground that it was made in violation of the
freedoms protected by section 2 of the Charter.
[41]
In my
opinion, the Regulations do not violate employees’ Charter rights under section
2.
Issue 2: Do the
Regulations violate employees’ rights under section 7?
[42]
ILWU’s
principal argument on section 7 is that the Regulations breach employees’ right
not to be deprived of security of the person other than in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. It argues that section 7 is violated because
subsection 506(5) authorizes the Minister to share information about an
applicant with a foreign government when the public interest in such disclosure
“clearly outweighs” the invasion of privacy. ILWU says that the provision
enables the Minister to disclose to a foreign government with a poor human
rights record who may use the information to inflict harm on the applicant.
[43]
The Maher Arar
affair is a salutary reminder that sharing intelligence with foreign
governments can have very serious consequences for an individual, particularly,
of course, if the information turns out to be false. Nonetheless, such
instances appear to be sufficiently rare that the possibility that a decision
by the Minister to disclose, in the limited circumstances permitted by
subsection 506(5), will endanger the personal safety of an employee is too
remote and speculative to constitute a breach of section 7. The marine
transportation security clearance program is sufficiently new that there is
little evidence about its operation. However, concerns about the potentially
dangerous consequences of information sharing seem not to have arisen from the analogous
and well established security clearance scheme at airports. The speculative
nature of any harm to employees who are refused security clearance would also
be applicable to a challenge based on paragraph 1(a) of the Canadian
Bill of Rights.
[44]
ILWU makes
two other points on section 7. First, it argues that the extensive personal
information that an applicant must disclose on the application form is an
invasion of privacy, an interest protected by section 7. In my view, because
section 8 deals specifically with the protection of privacy from unreasonable
search and seizure, this concern is not appropriately considered under section
7. Thus, in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 88, it was said that
if a search and seizure is reasonable within the meaning of section 8, it is,
by definition, “consistent with the principles of fundamental justice” for the
purpose of section 7.
[45]
Second,
ILWU submits that the potential loss of employment by employees who do not
obtain a security clearance attracts section 7 because loss of employment is a
deprivation of liberty. I disagree.
[46]
First, the
consequences for an employee who is refused a security clearance are uncertain.
ILWU stated that employees in this situation may lose hours of work, especially
if they lack seniority. However, whether anyone would actually lose their job
is speculative. The same consideration would apply to defeat an argument based
on paragraph 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
[47]
Second,
since section 7 does not protect property or other predominantly economic
interests, it would not cover any potentially adverse impact that a refusal of
security clearance might have on an employee’s employment: Mussani v.
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2004), 74 O.R. (3d) 1
at paras. 41-43 (C.A.) (right to practise a
profession not protected by section 7).
Issue 3: Do the
Regulations breach employees’ right not to be subject to an unreasonable search
and seizure contrary to section 8?
[48]
For the
purpose of this reference, I shall assume that the Regulations constitute a
search, in that employees are asked for personal information in a context where
a refusal to provide it may jeopardize their employment. I agree with ILWU that
the fact that the security clearance form supplied by the Minister under
subsection 507(1) contains a space for applicants to consent to verification
and disclosure is of little legal significance, especially since a refusal to
sign may lead the Minister to reject the application on the ground that there
is insufficient information to conclude that the applicant is not a security
threat.
[49]
The
question is whether the search authorized by the Regulations is unreasonable, an
inquiry which requires the Court to balance employees’ interest in privacy
against the public interests served by the statutory scheme. This balancing
must take into account the following considerations.
(i) contextual factors
[50]
First, the
Court must determine the strength of the privacy interests at stake. In my
view, because they are part of a regulated workforce, members of the ILWU have
a relatively low expectation of privacy with respect to personal information
that is reasonably related to an assessment of the extent to which they pose a
threat to the security of marine transportation: Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la
chemise v. Potash; Comité
paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Sélection Milton, [1994] 2 S.C.R.
406 at 418-21 (“Comité paritaire”).
[51]
Second,
the manner of the search is relevant. Being required by the state to fill out a
form is a lesser intrusion on privacy than, for example, a physical search of a
person’s home or business premises: compare Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1
S.C.R. 416 at 443.
[52]
Third,
administrative searches are generally regarded as less intrusive than those
conducted in the course of a criminal investigation: Thomson Newspapers Ltd.
Canada (Director of Investigation and
Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 at 507‑08.
[53]
Fourth, a
court must consider how pressing is the public interest served by the statutory
scheme authorizing the search and to what extent the information sought is likely
to further that purpose. In this case, national security is the relevant public
interest, which is regarded as of grave concern: R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 495 at 528. In determining whether individual items of information are
relevant to that interest, a court should be prepared to allow government a
margin of appreciation.
[54]
With these
considerations in mind, I turn now to ILWU’s arguments that the search
authorized by the Regulations is unreasonable.
(ii) prior authorization and
post-decision review
[55]
ILWU
argues that the scheme is fatally flawed because it lacks any adequate checks
to prevent the abuse of the power to obtain and use information about an
employee. In particular, prior independent authorization is not required, and
an employee who has been refused a security clearance has no right of review by
an independent decision-maker. Hence, any “search” under the Regulations is
unreasonable.
[56]
Counsel
relies on Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and
Research) v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (“Hunter”),
for the proposition that, even when undertaken as part of a regulatory scheme,
a search will normally not be reasonable for the purpose of section 8 without
prior authorization by an independent person capable of acting in a judicial
manner.
[57]
I
disagree. In my opinion, Hunter cannot be applied to the scheme under
consideration here. For one thing, to require prior authorization before an
employee completes a security clearance application would serve no purpose because
all employees complete the same form. The complaint in this case is not to
abuses in the way that forms are administered to different employees, but to
the form itself.
[58]
Further,
cases in which prior authorization has been required have invariably arisen in
contexts where criminal and quasi-criminal offences are being
investigated and where the expectation of privacy is highest. Here, in
contrast, existing and future employees who wish to work in security-sensitive
positions in marine transportation, a highly regulated activity giving rise to a
much lower expectation of privacy, may be refused a security clearance, which
may adversely affect their employment opportunities. See Comité paritaire at 419-20.
[59]
To the
extent that ILWU argues that authorization is required before the information
provided by an employee is checked and verified by law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, its argument is equally flawed. It would be
impracticable to require prior authorization before the information provided by
thousands of port employees across the country could be processed. Nor is it clear
to me what purpose would be served by such an exercise, since it will often not
be possible to identify potential security risks until background checks have
been conducted.
[60]
As for the
complaint that there is no independent body to hear appeals from refusals of
security clearances, there is no constitutional right to such an appeal. Reconsiderations
of negative decisions are undertaken by the Minister pursuant to section 517,
on the basis of a fair and participatory process and with the advice of experts
in security. After exhausting the administrative remedies, an applicant may
challenge the refusal of a security clearance in an application for judicial
review in the Federal Court.
(iii) degree of intrusion into privacy
and pressing nature of the public interest
[61]
Demands
for personal information, a photograph and fingerprints are among the least
intrusive forms of search: R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 413. Nonetheless,
ILWU says that the form that applicants must complete demands more information
than is reasonably necessary given the objects of the statutory scheme. Its
principal examples from the application form include: information about spouses
and partners (past and present), the fact that applicants must supply information
going back five years, and that the information sought about their encounters
with criminal justice are not limited to the record of their convictions.
[62]
The
argument is supported by an affidavit by an ILWU expert witness, Professor
Wesley Wark, to the effect that employees working at ports have never been
responsible for terrorist incidents and do not pose a security threat. However,
on cross-examination, he conceded that home-grown terrorism is an issue in Canada, and one that it is difficult
for intelligence services to stay on top of. In addition, Professor Wark does
not have expertise in conducting risk assessments and claims no knowledge of
the operation of maritime ports and their security.
[63]
Moreover,
Professor Wark’s view was contradicted in an affidavit by one of the Attorney
General’s experts, Ms Margaret Purdy, whom Professor Wark recognized as a
forthcoming and open-minded expert in national security issues. She said that home-grown
terrorism poses security risks and noted, in particular, the existence of links
between terrorists and organized crime. In her opinion, these risks warrant
background screening of employees working in security-sensitive areas of ports.
Another expert, Mr Ted Flanigan, who has extensive national security experience
as a senior official with CSIS, supported Ms Purdy’s opinion that the
Regulations are properly responsive to potential threats to the security of Canada’s ports.
[64]
The fact that
employees have not been the source of terrorist activities in the past is no
guarantee that some may not be in the future. In this context, it is important
to recall that the Regulations are also intended to protect against threats
from organized crime which, for a price, may offer its services to terrorists
by aiding them in, for example, smuggling weapons, explosives or operatives
into Canada in containers.
[65]
In my
view, the evidence taken as a whole establishes that the Government is right to
take seriously the possibility that port security could be endangered from the
inside by employees acting from ideological or mercenary motives. Nor is it
implausible, as Professor Wark agreed, that an employee could be influenced by
a spouse or partner, present or past, to engage in such activities.
[66]
The fact
that Canada may have the world’s most rigorous system for conducting background
checks on port employees does not in itself render it unreasonable. Canada’s
long coast line and many ports, its substantial economic dependence on
international trade in goods transported by sea in and out of Canada and, to a
lesser degree, on cruise line business, its ability to fund security measures,
and its proximity to the United States, are all factors that provide a rational
explanation of why Canada has instituted the present security clearance system.
[67]
These
considerations also indicate the substantial and pressing nature of the public
interest that the Regulations are designed to advance: protection from threats
to public safety and the economy from the activities of terrorist groups and
organized crime.
[68]
It is, of
course, always possible that errors will occur and that an employee may become
the object of suspicion on the basis of erroneous information used for
background screening. For example, doubts have been expressed by the Auditor
General about the reliability of information held by the RCMP in exempt data
banks. However, an employee has an opportunity to correct an error in
representations made to the Minister after being advised of the basis on which
the Minister is considering refusing a security clearance. It would be open to
an employee to apply for judicial review of a refusal of a security clearance
for breach of the duty of fairness on the ground, for instance, of inadequate
disclosure of the basis of the refusal.
[69]
I am not
persuaded that, in view of the potentially grave nature of the threats to the
security of maritime transportation from terrorists and organized crime, the information
required by the Regulations can be said to be overly intrusive and
insufficiently tailored to the perceived risks. Accordingly, the search
authorized by the Regulations is not unreasonable and does not violate section
8.
Issue 4: Does the
requirement that employees are required to provide information about their
spouse or partner breach their right to equality under section 15?
[70]
ILWU says
that an employee may not have access to all the personal information required
about a former spouse or partner, who may be unwilling to provide it. As a
result, an employee may be refused a security clearance for failing to provide
sufficient information to enable the Minister to evaluate whether the employee
is an unacceptable security risk. In addition, employees may be refused a
security clearance because of the activities or associations of their spouse.
[71]
The
argument here is that, in view of the adverse consequences for an applicant’s
employment, the demand for information about spouses and partners constitutes discrimination
on the ground of marital status, a ground analogous to those specifically
mentioned in section 15. An employee who is not and has not been in a spousal
relationship cannot be refused a security clearance for the above reasons.
[72]
I do not
agree. In order to establish a breach of section 15, a claimant must establish not
only that the impugned law makes a distinction on a listed or analogous ground,
but also that the distinction creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or
negative stereotyping: R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at
para. 17. ILWU has adduced no evidence to prove that the Regulations perpetuate
prejudice or stereotyping because they enable the Minister to consider whether
a spouse or partner makes an employee a threat to the security of marine transportation.
E. CONCLUSIONS
[73]
In view of
the above conclusions, a section 1 analysis is not necessary.
[74]
For all these
reasons, I would answer the questions posed by the Attorney General on the
constitutional validity of the Marine Transportation Security Regulations
by finding that they do not breach the Charter rights of ILWU’s members, and
award the Attorney General his costs.
“John M. Evans”
“I
agree
Robert
Décary J.A.”
“I
agree
A.M.
Linden J.A.”
APPENDIX
“A”
Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7
|
Reference
by Attorney General of Canada
18.3 (2) The
Attorney General of Canada may, at any stage of the proceedings of a federal
board, commission or other tribunal, other than a service tribunal within the
meaning of the National Defence Act, refer any question or issue of
the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of an Act of
Parliament or of regulations made under an Act of Parliament to the Federal
Court for hearing and determination.
|
Renvoi du procureur général
18.3 (2) Le procureur général du Canada peut, à
tout stade des procédures d’un office fédéral, sauf s’il s’agit d’un tribunal
militaire au sens de la Loi sur la défense nationale, renvoyer devant
la Cour fédérale pour audition et jugement toute question portant sur la
validité, l’applicabilité ou l’effet, sur le plan constitutionnel, d’une loi
fédérale ou de ses textes d’application.
|
Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11
|
2.
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience
and religion;
(b) freedom of thought,
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
media of communication;
…
(d) freedom of
association.
7.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
8.
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
|
2.
Chacun a les libertés fondamentales suivantes :
a) liberté de conscience et de religion;
b) liberté de pensée, de croyance, d’opinion et
d’expression, y compris la liberté de la presse et des autres moyens de
communication;
[…]
d) liberté d’association.
7.
Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne
peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les principes de
justice fondamentale.
8.
Chacun a droit à la protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les
saisies abusives.
|
Marine Transportation Security Regulations, SOR/2004-144
|
Security Clearance
503. Every person shall be
a holder of a security clearance if they
(a) require access to a restricted area two and cannot enter
the area under any of paragraphs 380(1)(b) to (f) or subsection
380(2) or (3);
(b) are a licensed ship’s pilot;
(c) are a harbour master or wharfinger appointed under
subsection 69(1) of the Canada Marine Act;
(d) have security responsibilities, including authorized screening
and security guard functions;
(e) take applications for security clearances and the
applicants’ fingerprints and facial images, which functions are performed on
behalf of the Minister and for the purposes of this Part;
(f) have access to a cruise ship that is interfacing with a
restricted area two to provide services, supplies or equipment to the cruise
ship or a member of the complement of the cruise ship;
(g) could cause the failure of a preventive measure, delay the
response to a security incident or adversely affect the recovery from a
security incident as a result of being assigned or performing any of the
following duties, responsibilities or functions:
(i) access to security information at the marine facility or port,
(ii) the supervision of marine facility operations,
(iii) the creation, alteration, control or maintenance of cargo
documentation or crew or passenger lists by a person who
(A) is present at the marine facility or port, or
(B) has advance access to the documentation or lists, or
(iv) the planning or
directing of the movement of cargo or containers at a container terminal,
including their loading and unloading into and from vessels; or
(h) are a
seafarer who has submitted an application for a Seafarer’s Identification Document.
Application Requirements
506. (1) In this section, "common-law partner" means any person who is cohabiting with the
applicant in a relationship of a conjugal nature and has done so for a period
of at least one year.
(2) An
application for a security clearance shall include the following information
and documentation, to be used only for the purposes of sections 508 and 509:
(a) the applicant’s usual given name used, other given names,
surname, all other names used and details of any name changes;
(b) the applicant’s date of birth, gender, height, weight, and
eye and hair colour;
(c) if the applicant was born in Canada, the
number and province of issue of their birth certificate, as well as the
original of that certificate;
(d) if the applicant was born outside Canada, their place of
birth, the port and date of entry, and, in the case of a naturalized Canadian
or permanent resident, the number and the original of the applicable
certificate issued under the Citizenship Actor the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act;
(e) in the case of a foreign national, the original of any
document that is evidence of their status;
(f) the applicant’s passport number, including the country of
issue and expiry date, or an indication that the applicant does not have a
passport;
(g) the addresses of all locations at which the applicant
resided during the five years preceding the application;
(h) an identification of the applicant’s activities during the
five years preceding the application, including the names and street
addresses of the applicant’s employers and any post-secondary educational
institutions attended;
(i) the dates, destination and purpose of any travel of more
than 90 days outside Canada or the United
States, excluding travel for
government business, during the five years preceding the application;
(j) the information referred to in subsection (3) respecting
the applicant’s spouse or common-law partner, any former spouses or
common-law partners;
(k) the applicant’s fingerprints, taken by or on behalf of the
Minister;
(l) a facial image of the applicant for identification
purposes, taken by or on behalf of the Minister;
(m) a statement signed by the marine facility operator or port
administration certifying that the applicant requires or will require a
security clearance and specifying the reasons for that requirement; and
(n) a statement signed by the person responsible for taking
the fingerprints of the applicant certifying that they have confirmed the
identity of the applicant in accordance with paragraph 384(3)(a) at
the time of the taking of the fingerprints.
(3) The
information required with respect to any of the persons referred to in
paragraph (2)(j) shall be
(a) in the case of the spouse or common-law partner of the
applicant, the following information:
(i) their gender, full given name, surname and, if applicable, maiden
name,
(ii) their date and place of birth and, if applicable, date of death,
(iii) if born in Canada, the
number and province of issue of their birth certificate,
(iv) if born outside Canada, their place of birth, their nationality and the
port and date of entry into Canada, and
(v)
their present address, if known; and
(b) in the case of former spouses and common-law partners with
whom the relationship ended within the preceding five years, the information
referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i), (ii) and (v).
(4) The
application for a security clearance shall be valid only if signed by the
applicant or, in the case of an applicant who is a minor under the laws of the
province where they reside, by a parent or guardian or tutor.
(5) Personal
information that is provided in the application for the security clearance
and that resulting from the checks and verifications shall not, without the
written consent of the individual to whom it relates, be disclosed by the
Minister to the government of a foreign state except
(a) where, in the opinion of the Minister, the public interest
in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result
from the disclosure; or
(b) for the
purpose of complying with a subpoena or warrant issued or order made by a
court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of
information or for the purpose of complying with rules of court relating to
the production of information.
Submission of Application
507. (1) Subject to subsection (2), every application for
a security clearance shall be submitted on the form supplied by the Minister
to the port administration at the port where the applicant works or is a
candidate for work or to which the applicant otherwise requires access.
(2) If
the port administration is not able to transmit the application in accordance
with subsection (3), the application shall be submitted to an official of an
office
(a) managed by or for an airport authority and that is
responsible for the control of the airport’s passes, where the airport
authority is able to transmit the application in accordance with a document
that evidences the understanding to that effect with the Minister; or
(b) operated by the Department of Transport.
(3) The
port administration or official shall collect the applicant’s information on
behalf of the Minister and shall transmit it to the Minister in accordance
with the document that evidences the understanding to that effect with the
Minister.
Checks and Verifications
508. On receipt of a fully completed application for a
security clearance, the Minister shall conduct the following checks and
verifications for the purpose of assessing whether an applicant poses a risk
to the security of marine transportation:
(a) a criminal
record check;
(b) a check of the relevant files of law enforcement agencies,
including intelligence gathered for law enforcement purposes;
(c) a Canadian Security Intelligence Service indices check
and, if necessary, a Canadian Security Intelligence Service security
assessment; and
(d) a check of the applicant’s immigration and citizenship
status.
Minister’s Decision
509. The Minister may grant
a security clearance if, in the opinion of the Minister, the information
provided by the applicant and that resulting from the checks and
verifications is verifiable and reliable and is sufficient for the Minister
to determine, by an evaluation of the following factors, to what extent the
applicant poses a risk to the security of marine transportation:
(a) the relevance of any criminal convictions to the security
of marine transportation, including a consideration of the type,
circumstances and seriousness of the offence, the number and frequency of convictions,
the length of time between offences, the date of the last offence and the
sentence or disposition;
(b) whether it is known or there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that the applicant
(i) is or has been involved in, or contributes or has contributed to,
activities directed toward or in support of the misuse of the transportation
infrastructure to commit criminal offences or the use of acts of violence
against persons or property, taking into account the relevance of those
activities to the security of marine transportation,
(ii) is or has been a member of a terrorist group within the meaning
of subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, or is or has been
involved in, or contributes or has contributed to, the activities of such a
group,
(iii) is or has been a member of a criminal organization as defined
in subsection 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code, or participates or has
participated in, or contributes or has contributed to, the activities of such
a group as referred to in subsection 467.11(1) of the Criminal Code
taking into account the relevance of these factors to the security of marine
transportation,
(iv) is or has been a member of an organization that is known to be
involved in or to contribute to — or in respect of which there are reasonable
grounds to suspect involvement in or contribution to — activities directed
toward or in support of the threat of or the use of, acts of violence against
persons or property, or is or has been involved in, or is contributing to or
has contributed to, the activities of such a group, taking into account the
relevance of those factors to the security of marine transportation, or
(v) is or has been associated with an individual who is known to be
involved in or to contribute to — or in respect of whom there are reasonable
grounds to suspect involvement in or contribution to — activities referred to
in subparagraph (i), or is a member of an organization or group referred to
in any of subparagraphs (ii) to (iv), taking into account the relevance of
those factors to the security of marine transportation;
(c) whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the
applicant is in a position in which there is a risk that they be suborned to
commit an act or to assist or abet any person to commit an act that might
constitute a risk to marine transportation security;
(d) whether the applicant has had a restricted area pass for a
marine facility, port or aerodrome removed for cause; and
(e) whether the applicant has filed fraudulent, false or
misleading information relating to their application for a security
clearance.
511. (1) If the Minister intends to refuse to grant a
security clearance, the Minister shall advise the applicant in writing to
that effect.
(2) The
notice shall set out the basis for the Minister’s intention and fix a period
of time for the applicant to make written representations to the Minister,
which period of time shall start on the day on which the notice is served or
sent and shall be not less than 20 days from that day.
(3) The
Minister shall not refuse to grant a security clearance until the written
representations have been received and considered or before the period of
time fixed in the notice has expired, whichever comes first. The Minister
shall advise the applicant in writing of any refusal.
515. (1) The Minister
may suspend a security clearance on receipt of information that could change
the Minister’s determination made under section 509.
(2) Immediately
after suspending a security clearance, the Minister shall advise the holder in
writing of the suspension.
(3) The
notice shall set out the basis for the suspension and shall fix a period of
time for the holder to make written representations to the Minister, which
period of time shall start on the day on which the notice is served or sent
and shall be not less than 20 days from that day.
(4) The
Minister may reinstate the security clearance if the Minister determines
under section 509 that the holder does not pose a risk to marine
transportation security.
(5) The
Minister may cancel the security clearance if the Minister determines under
section 509 that the holder may pose a risk to marine transportation security
or that the security clearance is no longer required. The Minister shall
advise the holder in writing of any cancellation.
(6) The
Minister shall not cancel a security clearance until the written
representations have been received and considered or before the time period
fixed in the notice has expired, whichever comes first.
Reconsideration
517. (1) An applicant or a holder may request that the
Minister reconsider a decision to refuse to grant or to cancel a security
clearance within 30 days after the day of the service or sending of the
notice advising them of the decision.
(2) The
request shall be in writing and shall set out the following:
(a) the decision that is the subject of the request;
(b) the grounds for the request, including any new information
that the applicant or holder wishes the Minister to consider; and
(c) the name, address, and telephone and facsimile numbers of
the applicant or holder.
(3) On
receipt of a request made in accordance with this section, the Minister, in
order to determine the matter in a fair, informal and expeditious manner,
shall give the applicant or holder
(a) where the situation warrants, the opportunity to make
representations orally or in any other manner; and
(b) in any other case, a reasonable opportunity to make
written representations.
(4) After
representations have been made or a reasonable opportunity to do so has been
provided, the Minister shall reconsider the decision in accordance with
section 509 and shall subsequently confirm or change the decision.
(5) The
Minister may engage the services of persons with appropriate expertise in
security matters to advise the Minister.
(6) The
Minister shall advise the applicant or holder in writing of the decision made
following the reconsideration.
|
Habilitation de sécurité
503. Les personnes ci-après sont tenues d’être titulaires d’une
habilitation de sécurité :
a)
celles qui ont besoin d’avoir accès à une zone réglementée deux et qui ne
peuvent y entrer en vertu de l’un des alinéas 380(1)b) à f) ou
des paragraphes 380(2) ou (3);
b)
celles qui sont des pilotes brevetés de navire;
c)
celles qui sont des directeurs de port ou des gardiens de quai nommés en
vertu du paragraphe 69(1) de la Loi maritime du Canada;
d)
celles qui ont des responsabilités en matière de sûreté, y compris le
contrôle et les fonctions d’agent de sécurité;
e)
celles qui reçoivent des demandes d’habilitation de sécurité et prennent les
empreintes digitales et les images du visage des demandeurs, lesquelles
fonctions sont exercées au nom du ministre et pour l’application de la
présente partie;
f)
celles qui ont accès à un navire de croisière qui est en interface avec une
zone réglementée deux pour fournir des services, des provisions ou de
l’équipement à celui-ci ou à un membre de son effectif;
g)
celles qui pourraient entraîner l’échec d’une mesure préventive, retarder la
réaction à un incident de sûreté ou nuire à tout rétablissement à la suite de
cet incident, en raison des attributions ci-après qui leurs ont été confiées
ou qu’elles exercent :
(i) l’accès à des renseignements de sûreté à
l’installation maritime ou au port,
(ii) la supervision des opérations de l’installation
maritime,
(iii) l’établissement, la tenue à jour, le contrôle
ou la modification des documents relatifs aux cargaisons ou des listes de
passagers ou de membres d’équipage par une personne qui, selon le cas :
(A) se trouve à l’installation maritime ou au port,
(B) a accès au préalable à ces documents ou à ces
listes,
(iv) dans un terminal pour conteneurs, la
planification ou la direction des mouvements des cargaisons ou des conteneurs
ou leur acheminement, y compris leur chargement à bord de bâtiments et leur
déchargement;
h)
celles qui sont des navigants qui ont présenté une demande visant à obtenir
un Document d’identité des gens de mer.
Exigences relatives à la demande
506. (1) Dans le présent article, « conjoint de fait » s’entend de toute personne qui vit avec
le demandeur dans une union de type conjugal depuis au moins un an.
(2) La demande d’habilitation de sécurité comprend les
renseignements et documents suivants à utiliser exclusivement pour
l’application des articles 508 et 509 :
a)
le prénom usuel, les autres prénoms, le nom de famille, les autres noms
utilisés et le détail de tout changement de nom du demandeur;
b)
la date de naissance, le sexe, la taille, le poids et la couleur des cheveux
et des yeux du demandeur;
c)
si le demandeur est né au Canada, le numéro et la province d’émission de son
certificat de naissance, ainsi que l’original de ce certificat;
d)
si le demandeur est né à l’extérieur du Canada, le lieu de naissance,
le point d’entrée et la date d’arrivée au Canada et, dans le cas d’un citoyen
naturalisé canadien ou d’un résident permanent, le numéro et l’original du
certificat applicable délivré aux termes de la Loi sur la citoyennetéou
de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés et sa date
de délivrance;
e)
dans le cas d’un étranger, l’original de tout document attestant son statut;
f)
le numéro du passeport du demandeur, y compris le pays de délivrance et la
date d’expiration, ou une mention indiquant qu’il n’a pas de passeport;
g) les adresses des endroits où le
demandeur a demeuré au cours des cinq années précédant la date de la demande;
h)
la mention des activités du demandeur durant les cinq années précédant la
date de la demande, y compris le nom et l’adresse municipale de ses employeurs
et des établissements d’enseignement post-secondaire fréquentés par le
demandeur;
i)
les dates, la destination et le but de tout voyage de plus de 90 jours à
l’extérieur du Canada ou des États-Unis, à l’exclusion des voyages pour
affaires officielles, durant les cinq années précédant la date de la demande;
j)
les renseignements visés au paragraphe (3) en ce qui concerne l’époux ou le
conjoint de fait du demandeur et, le cas échéant, les ex-époux ou les anciens
conjoints de fait du demandeur;
k)
les empreintes digitales du demandeur, prises par le ministre ou une personne
agissant en son nom;
l)
une image du visage du demandeur aux fins d’établissement de son identité,
prise par le ministre ou une personne agissant en son nom;
m)
une déclaration signée par l’exploitant de l’installation maritime ou
l’organisme portuaire attestant que le demandeur est tenu ou sera tenu
d’avoir une habilitation de sécurité et précisant les raisons à l’appui de
cette exigence;
n)
une déclaration signée par la personne chargée de prendre les empreintes
digitales du demandeur attestant qu’elle a confirmé, conformément à l’alinéa
384(3)a), l’identité de ce dernier au moment de la prise.
(3) Les renseignements exigés à l’égard des personnes
visées à l’alinéa (2)j) sont :
a) dans le cas de l’époux ou du conjoint
de fait du demandeur, les renseignements suivants :
(i) le sexe, les prénoms au complet, le nom de
famille et, le cas échéant, le nom de jeune fille,
(ii) la date et le lieu de naissance et, le cas
échéant, la date du décès,
(iii) si la personne est née au Canada, le numéro et
la province d’émission de son certificat de naissance,
(iv) si la personne est née à l’extérieur du Canada,
le lieu de naissance, la nationalité et le point d’entrée et la date
d’arrivée au Canada,
(v) son adresse actuelle, si elle est connue;
b)
dans le cas des ex-époux et des conjoints de fait avec lesquels la relation a
pris fin au cours des cinq dernières années, les renseignements visés aux
sous-alinéas a)(i), (ii) et (v).
(4) La demande d’habilitation de sécurité n’est valide
que si elle est signée par le demandeur ou, dans le cas d’un demandeur qui
est mineur en vertu du droit de la province où il réside, par son père, sa
mère ou son tuteur.
(5) Sauf avec le consentement écrit de l’individu qu’ils
concernent, les renseignements personnels inclus dans une demande
d’habilitation de sécurité et ceux recueillis lors des vérifications reliées
au traitement d’une telle demande ne seront communiqués par le ministre au
gouvernement d’un État étranger :
a)
d’une part, que si, de l’avis du ministre, des raisons d’intérêt public
justifient nettement une éventuelle violation de la vie privée;
b)
d’autre part, que si leur communication est exigée par subpoena, mandat ou
ordonnance d’un tribunal, d’une personne ou d’un organisme ayant le pouvoir
de contraindre à la production de renseignements ou exigée par des règles de
procédure se rapportant à la production de renseignements.
Présentation d’une demande
507. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), la
demande d’habilitation de sécurité est présentée sur le formulaire fourni par
le ministre à l’organisme portuaire du port où le demandeur travaille ou a
postulé un emploi, ou auquel il a besoin d’avoir accès pour une autre raison.
(2) Si l’organisme portuaire n’est pas en mesure de
transmettre la demande conformément au paragraphe (3), la demande est
présentée à un représentant d’un bureau qui, selon le cas :
a)
est géré par ou pour une autorité aéroportuaire et responsable d’effectuer le
contrôle des laissez-passer de l’aéroport, lorsque cette autorité
aéroportuaire est en mesure de transmettre la demande conformément à tout
document qui témoigne de l’arrangement à cet égard avec le ministre;
b)
est exploité par le ministère des Transports.
(3) L’organisme portuaire ou le représentant recueille
les renseignements concernant le demandeur au nom du ministre et les lui
transmet conformément au document qui témoigne de l’arrangement à cet égard
avec le ministre.
Vérifications
508. Sur réception d’une demande d’habilitation de sécurité dûment
remplie, le ministre effectue les vérifications ci-après pour établir si le
demandeur ne pose pas de risque pour la sûreté du transport maritime :
a)
une vérification pour savoir s’il a un casier judiciaire;
b)
une vérification des dossiers pertinents des organismes chargés de faire
respecter la Loi, y compris les renseignements recueillis dans le cadre de
l’application de la Loi;
c)
une vérification des fichiers du Service canadien du renseignement de
sécurité et, au besoin, une évaluation de sécurité effectuée par le Service;
d)
une vérification de son statut d’immigrant et de citoyen.
Décision du ministre
509. Le ministre peut accorder une habilitation de sécurité si, de l’avis
du ministre, les renseignements fournis par le demandeur et ceux obtenus par
les vérifications sont vérifiables et fiables et s’ils sont suffisants pour
lui permettre d’établir, par une évaluation des facteurs ci-après, dans
quelle mesure le demandeur pose un risque pour la sûreté du transport
maritime :
a)
la pertinence de toute condamnation criminelle du demandeur par rapport à la
sûreté du transport maritime, y compris la prise en compte du type, de la
gravité et des circonstances de l’infraction, le nombre et la fréquence des
condamnations, le temps écoulé entre les infractions, la date de la dernière
infraction et la peine ou la décision;
b)
s’il est connu ou qu’il y a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner que le
demandeur :
(i) participe ou contribue, ou a participé ou a
contribué, à des activités visant ou soutenant une utilisation malveillante
de l’infrastructure de transport afin de commettre des crimes ou l’exécution
d’actes de violence contre des personnes ou des biens et la pertinence de ces
activités, compte tenu de la pertinence de ces facteurs par rapport à la
sûreté du transport maritime,
(ii) est ou a été membre d’un groupe terroriste au
sens du paragraphe 83.01(1) du Code criminel, ou participe ou
contribue, ou a participé ou a contribué, à des activités d’un tel groupe,
(iii) est ou a été membre d’une organisation
criminelle au sens du paragraphe 467.1(1) du Code criminel ou
participe ou contribue, ou a participé ou a contribué, aux activités d’un tel
groupe tel qu’il est mentionné au paragraphe 467.11(1) du Code criminel,
compte tenu de la pertinence de ces facteurs par rapport à la sûreté du
transport maritime,
(iv) est ou a été un membre d’une organisation qui
est connue pour sa participation ou sa contribution — ou à l’égard de
laquelle il y a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner sa participation ou sa
contribution — à des activités qui visent ou favorisent la menace ou
l’exécution d’actes de violence contre des personnes ou des biens, ou
participe ou contribue, ou a participé ou a contribué, aux activités d’une telle
organisation, compte tenu de la pertinence de ces facteurs par rapport à la
sûreté du transport maritime,
(v) est ou a été associé à un individu qui est connu
pour sa participation ou sa contribution — ou à l’égard duquel il y a des
motifs raisonnables de soupçonner sa participation ou sa contribution — à des
activités visées au sous-alinéa (i), ou est membre d’un groupe ou d’une
organisation visés à l’un des sous-alinéas (ii) à (iv), compte tenu de la
pertinence de ces facteurs par rapport à la sûreté du transport maritime;
c)
s’il y a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner que le demandeur est dans une
position où il risque d’être suborné afin de commettre un acte ou d’aider ou
d’encourager toute personne à commettre un acte qui pourrait poser un risque
pour la sûreté du transport maritime;
d)
le demandeur s’est vu retirer pour motifs valables un laissez-passer de zone
réglementée pour une installation maritime, un port ou un aérodrome;
e) le demandeur a présenté une demande
comportant des renseignements frauduleux, faux ou trompeurs en vue d’obtenir
une habilitation de sécurité.
511. (1) Le ministre avise par écrit le
demandeur de son intention de refuser d’accorder l’habilitation de sécurité.
(2) L’avis indique les motifs de son intention et le
délai dans lequel le demandeur peut présenter par écrit au ministre des
observations, lequel délai commence le jour au cours duquel l’avis est
signifié ou acheminé et ne peut être inférieur à 20 jours suivant ce jour.
(3) Le ministre ne peut refuser d’accorder
l’habilitation de sécurité avant la réception et la prise en considération
des observations écrites ou avant que ne soit écoulé le délai indiqué dans
l’avis, selon la première de ces éventualités à survenir. Le ministre avise
par écrit le demandeur dans le cas d’un refus.
515. (1) Le ministre peut suspendre une
habilitation de sécurité lorsqu’il reçoit des renseignements qui pourraient
modifier sa décision prise en application de l’article 509.
(2) Immédiatement après avoir suspendu l’habilitation de
sécurité, le ministre en avise par écrit le titulaire.
(3) L’avis indique les motifs de la suspension et le
délai dans lequel le titulaire peut présenter par écrit au ministre des
observations, lequel délai commence le jour au cours duquel l’avis est signifié
ou acheminé et ne peut être inférieur à 20 jours suivant ce jour.
(4) Le ministre peut rétablir l’habilitation de sécurité
s’il établit, en application de l’article 509, que le titulaire de
l’habilitation ne pose pas de risque pour la sûreté du transport maritime.
(5) Le ministre peut annuler l’habilitation de sécurité
s’il établit, en application de l’article 509, que le titulaire de
l’habilitation de sécurité peut poser un risque pour la sûreté du transport
maritime ou que l’habilitation n’est plus exigée. Il avise par écrit le
titulaire dans le cas d’une annulation.
(6) Le ministre ne peut annuler l’habilitation de
sécurité avant la réception et la prise en considération des observations
écrites ou avant que ne soit écoulé le délai indiqué dans l’avis, selon le
premier de ces événements à survenir.
Réexamen
517. (1) Tout demandeur ou tout titulaire
peut demander au ministre de réexaminer une décision de refuser ou d’annuler
une habilitation de sécurité dans les 30 jours suivant le jour de la signification
ou de l’envoi de l’avis l’informant de la décision.
(2) La demande est présentée par écrit et comprend ce
qui suit :
a)
la décision qui fait l’objet de la demande;
b)
les motifs de la demande, y compris tout nouveau renseignement qu’il désire
que le ministre examine;
c)
le nom, l’adresse et les numéros de téléphone et de télécopieur du demandeur
ou du titulaire.
(3) Sur réception de la demande présentée conformément
au présent article, le ministre accorde au demandeur ou au titulaire, de
manière à trancher les questions de façon équitable, informelle et rapide, la
possibilité :
a)
lorsque les circonstances le justifient, de présenter des observations
oralement ou de toute autre manière;
b)
dans tout autre cas, de lui présenter par écrit des observations.
(4) Après que des observations ont été présentées ou que
la possibilité de le faire a été accordée, le ministre réexamine la décision
conformément à l’article 509 et, par la suite, confirme ou modifie la
décision.
(5) Le ministre peut retenir les services de personnes
qui possèdent la compétence pertinente en matière de sûreté pour le
conseiller.
(6) Le ministre avise par écrit le demandeur ou le
titulaire de sa décision à la suite du réexamen.
|
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46
|
Definitions
83.01 (1) The following
definitions apply in this Part.
…
"terrorist activity"
« activité
terroriste »
"terrorist activity" means
…
(b) an act or omission, in or outside Canada,
(i) that is committed
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological
purpose, objective or cause, and
(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the
public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including
its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or
an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether
the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside
Canada, and
(ii) that intentionally
(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of
violence,
(B) endangers a person’s life,
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or
any segment of the public,
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private
property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm
referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or
(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an
essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than
as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not
intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A)
to (C),
and includes a
conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act or omission, or being an
accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to any such act or
omission, but, for greater certainty, does not include an act or omission
that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the
place of its commission, is in accordance with customary international law or
conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities
undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official
duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by other rules of
international law.
…
"terrorist group"
« groupe terroriste »
"terrorist group" means
(a) an entity that has as one of its
purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity,
or
(b) a listed entity,
and includes an association of such entities.
|
Définitions
83.01 (1) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente partie.
[…]
« activité terroriste »
"terrorist activity"
« activité terroriste »
[…]
b) soit un acte — action ou omission, commise au
Canada ou à l’étranger :
(i) d’une part, commis à la fois :
(A) au nom — exclusivement ou non — d’un but, d’un
objectif ou d’une cause de nature politique, religieuse ou idéologique,
(B) en vue — exclusivement ou non — d’intimider tout
ou partie de la population quant à sa sécurité, entre autres sur le plan
économique, ou de contraindre une personne, un gouvernement ou une
organisation nationale ou internationale à accomplir un acte ou à s’en
abstenir, que la personne, la population, le gouvernement ou l’organisation
soit ou non au Canada,
(ii) d’autre part, qui intentionnellement, selon le
cas :
(A) cause des blessures graves à une personne ou la
mort de celle-ci, par l’usage de la violence,
(B) met en danger la vie d’une personne,
(C) compromet gravement la santé ou la sécurité de
tout ou partie de la population,
(D) cause des dommages matériels considérables, que
les biens visés soient publics ou privés, dans des circonstances telles qu’il
est probable que l’une des situations mentionnées aux divisions (A) à (C) en
résultera,
(E) perturbe gravement ou paralyse des services,
installations ou systèmes essentiels, publics ou privés, sauf dans le cadre
de revendications, de protestations ou de manifestations d’un désaccord ou
d’un arrêt de travail qui n’ont pas pour but de provoquer l’une des situations
mentionnées aux divisions (A) à (C).
Sont visés par la présente définition, relativement
à un tel acte, le complot, la tentative, la menace, la complicité après le
fait et l’encouragement à la perpétration; il est entendu que sont exclus de
la présente définition l’acte — action ou omission — commis au cours d’un
conflit armé et conforme, au moment et au lieu de la perpétration, au droit
international coutumier ou au droit international conventionnel applicable au
conflit ainsi que les activités menées par les forces armées d’un État dans
l’exercice de leurs fonctions officielles, dans la mesure où ces activités
sont régies par d’autres règles de droit international.
[…]
« groupe terroriste »
"terrorist group"
« groupe terroriste »
a) Soit une entité dont l’un des objets ou l’une des
activités est de se livrer à des activités terroristes ou de les faciliter;
b) soit une entité inscrite.
Est assimilé à un groupe terroriste un groupe ou une
association formé de groupes terroristes au sens de la présente définition
|
APPENDIX
“B”
Questions
Referred by the Attorney General of Canada
1.
Are the rights of affected maritime port workers
under any or all of sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(d), 7, 8, or 15
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) violated by
sections 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 515 or 517 of Part 5 of the Marine
Transportation Security Regulations SOR/2004-144 (Regulations), enacted
under section 5 of the Marine transportation Security Act, S.C. 1994, c.
40 (MTSA)?
2.
If the answer to Question
1 is yes, are such violations saved by section 1 of the Charter?
3.
If the answer to
Question 2 is no, what is the effect of the violation(s) on the validity,
applicability or operability of the affected section(s) of the Regulations?
4.
Are the rights of
affected maritime port workers under any or all of subsections 1(a), 1(b),
or 1(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1969, c. 44 violated by
sections 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 515 or 517 of the Regulations?
5.
If the answer to
Question 4 is yes, what is the effect of the violation(s) on the validity,
applicability or operability of the affected section(s) of the Regulations?
6.
Are the rights of
affected maritime port workers under sections 3 and/or 7 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act, R.S. 1985, c. H-6 violated by sections 503, 506, 507,
508, 509, 515 or 517 of the Regulations?
7.
If the answer to
Question 6 is yes, what is the effect of the violation(s) on the validity,
applicability or operability of the affected section(s) of the Regulations?
8.
Are the rights of
affected maritime port workers under section 4 of the Privacy Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 violated by sections 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 515 or 517
of the Regulations?
9.
If the answer to
Question 8 is yes, what is the effect of the violation on the validity, applicability
or operability of the affected suction(s) of the Regulations?
10.
Were the Regulations
and/or the MTSA promulgated or enacted in violation of section 3 of the Canadian
Bill of Rights Examination Regulations, C.R.C., c. 394?
11.
If the answer to Question
10 is yes, what is the effect of the such violation on the validity,
applicability or operability of the Regulations or the MTSA?
12.
Are sections 503,
506, 507, 508, 509, 515 or 517 or the Regulations ultra vires on the
basis that section 5 of the MTSA does not authorize the promulgation of
regulations that could cause a loss of employment or a change in work duties on
the part of affected maritime port workers?
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