Date: 20091204
Docket: A‑632‑08
Citation:
2009 FCA 357
CORAM: BLAIS, C.J.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NOËL J.A.
BETWEEN:
ASSOCIATION
DES CRABIERS ACADIENS INC., a company duly
incorporated
under the laws of New Brunswick, JEAN‑GILLES CHIASSON,
on
his own behalf and in his capacity as President of the Association des crabiers
acadiens
inc., ASSOCIATION DES CRABIERS GASPÉSIENS INC., an incorporated
association
registered under the laws of Quebec, MARC COUTURE, on his own behalf
and
in his capacity as Administrator of the Association des crabiers gaspésiens
inc.,
ASSOCIATION
DES CRABIERS DE LA BAIE, an unincorporated association
registered
under the laws of Quebec, DANIEL DESBOIS, on his own behalf
and
in his capacity as Administrator of the Association des crabiers de la Baie,
and
ROBERT
F. HACHÉ
Appellants
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUGEMENT
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
[1]
I have included a table of contents to assist in
accessing and understanding the reasons.
Table of Contents
Para.
Issues and grounds for appeal
2
Relevant legislation 11
Factual and procedural background 12
Context, purpose and objectives of
subsections 18(3), 18.4(1) and 18.4(2) of the Act 26
Analysis of the decision under appeal and
of the appellants’ arguments 40
1. Application for conversion
into an action 40
(a) Nature of the
challenge at issue 41
(b) Nature of the
impugned decision 42
(c) Insufficiency
of affidavit evidence 57
(d) Need to
facilitate access to justice and avoid unnecessary cost and delay 60
(e) Conclusion 64
2. Consolidation of
proceedings 65
Conclusion 66
Issues and
grounds for appeal
[2]
The appellants are challenging a decision of Justice Shore of the Federal Court (judge)
(Assoc. des crabiers acadiens inc. v. Canada (Procureur général), 2008 CF 1358). In
that decision, the judge confirmed the decision by Prothonotary Morneau
(prothonotary): see Assoc. des crabiers acadiens inc. v. Canada (Procureur général), 2008 CF 519.
[3]
Based on the tests established in the case law, did
the prothonotary and the judge err in refusing the appellants’ application to
have their application for judicial review of a snow crab harvesting management
plan adopted in 2007 by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Minister)
converted into an action?
[4]
Should a conversion be granted, the appellants also
asked the prothonotary and the judge to have their action consolidated with the
action in damages instituted in Federal Court file T‑1271‑07: Anglehart
et al. v. Attorney General of Canada.
[5]
Although upon concluding as they did, the
prothonotary and the judge did not have to rule on that second question, they
did so in obiter. The prothonotary and the judge would have dismissed
the request for consolidation of the two proceedings in the event of
conversion.
[6]
The appellants raised several grounds for appeal
of the judge’s decision. While it is not necessary for me to analyze all of
them, I will summarize those grounds. Some of the criticisms of the judge’s
decision may appear to have merit; however, I believe, for reasons I will state
later on, that the judge and the prothonotary came to the right conclusion. But
first: the grounds for appeal.
[7]
First of all, the appellants submit that the judge
applied the wrong standard of review to the prothonotary’s decision. According
to them, the prothonotary’s decision dealt with a question vital to the final
issue of the dispute. They state that the judge erred in concluding, to the
contrary, that the question had to be one likely to bring the dispute to an end.
In so doing, he distorted the test developed by the courts.
[8]
Second, the appellants argue that the judge
confused the purposes of an application for conversion under subsection 18.4(2)
of the Federal Courts Act, R.S., 1985, c. F‑7 (Act) with the
purpose of a request for disclosure of materials under rule 317 of the Federal
Courts Rules, SOR/98‑106 (Rules). They add that this confusion caused
the judge to find a bar to their arguments that they need to obtain additional
information and, therefore, proceed by action rather than by way of judicial
review.
[9]
Third, the appellants take issue with the
analysis of their conversion application. In that regard, the alleged error is
twofold. The appellants submit that both the prothonotary and the judge who dealt
with their conversion application misinterpreted the case law pertaining to
such applications, leading them to apply improperly certain analytical tests
developed by this Court. They also allegedly neglected to consider certain
other relevant tests, which, had they been taken into account, would have led
them to grant the appellants’ application for conversion rather than dismiss
it.
[10]
Last, with regard to the consolidation of the
actions in damages, the appellants again allege that the judge failed to
consider all of the analytical factors he listed and was mistaken about some of
the factors that he did analyze.
Relevant
legislation
[11]
I hasten to reproduce the relevant legislation
in this case, namely section 18.4 of the Act and Federal Courts Rules 105,
317 and 318:
|
18.4 (1)
Subject to subsection (2), an application or reference to the Federal Court
under any of sections 18.1 to 18.3 shall be heard and determined without
delay and in a summary way.
(2) The Federal Court may, if it
considers it appropriate, direct that an application for judicial review be
treated and proceeded with as an action.
105. The
Court may order, in respect of two or more proceedings,
(a) hat they be consolidated,
heard together or heard one immediately after the other;
(b) that one proceeding be stayed
until another proceeding is determined; or
(c) that one of the proceedings be
asserted as a counterclaim or cross‑appeal in another proceeding.
317. (1) A
party may request material relevant to an application that is in the
possession of a tribunal whose order is the subject of the application and
not in the possession of the party by serving on the tribunal and filing a
written request, identifying the material requested.
(2) An applicant may include a request
under subsection (1) in its notice of application.
(3) If an applicant does not include a
request under subsection (1) in its notice of application, the applicant
shall serve the request on the other parties.
318. (1)
Within 20 days after service of a request under rule 317, the tribunal shall
transmit
(a) a certified copy of the
requested material to the Registry and to the party making the request; or
(b) where the material cannot be
reproduced, the original material to the Registry.
(2) Where a tribunal or party objects to
a request under rule 317, the tribunal or the party shall inform all parties
and the Administrator, in writing, of the reasons for the objection.
(3) The Court may give directions to the
parties and to a tribunal as to the procedure for making submissions with
respect to an objection under subsection (2).
(4) The Court may, after hearing
submissions with respect to an objection under subsection (2), order that a
certified copy, or the original, of all or part of the material requested be
forwarded to the Registry.
|
18.4 (1)
Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), la Cour fédérale statue à bref délai et selon
une procédure sommaire sur les demandes et les renvois qui lui sont présentés
dans le cadre des articles 18.1 à 18.3.
(2) Elle peut, si elle l’estime indiqué,
ordonner qu’une demande de contrôle judiciaire soit instruite comme s’il s’agissait
d’une action.
105. La
Cour peut ordonner, à l’égard de deux ou plusieurs instances :
a) qu’elles
soient réunies, instruites conjointement ou instruites successivement;
b) qu’il
soit sursis à une instance jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit rendue à l’égard d’une
autre instance;
c) que l’une
d’elles fasse l’objet d’une demande reconventionnelle ou d’un appel incident
dans une autre instance.
317. (1)
Toute partie peut demander la transmission des documents ou des éléments
matériels pertinents quant à la demande, qu’elle n’a pas mais qui sont en la
possession de l’office fédéral dont l’ordonnance fait l’objet de la demande,
en signifiant à l’office une requête à cet effet puis en la déposant. La
requête précise les documents ou les éléments matériels demandés.
(2) Un demandeur peut inclure sa demande
de transmission de documents dans son avis de demande.
(3) Si le demandeur n’inclut pas sa
demande de transmission de documents dans son avis de demande, il est tenu de
signifier cette demande aux autres parties.
318. (1)
Dans les 20 jours suivant la signification de la demande de transmission
visée à la règle 317, l’office fédéral transmet :
a) au
greffe et à la partie qui en a fait la demande une copie certifiée conforme
des documents en cause;
b) au
greffe les documents qui ne se prêtent pas à la reproduction et les éléments
matériels en cause.
(2) Si l’office fédéral ou une partie s’opposent
à la demande de transmission, ils informent par écrit toutes les parties et l’administrateur
des motifs de leur opposition.
(3) La Cour peut donner aux parties et à
l’office fédéral des directives sur la façon de procéder pour présenter des
observations au sujet d’une opposition à la demande de transmission.
(4) La Cour peut, après avoir entendu les
observations sur l’opposition, ordonner qu’une copie certifiée conforme ou l’original
des documents ou que les éléments matériels soient transmis, en totalité ou
en partie, au greffe.
|
Factual and procedural background
[12]
The appellants engage in commercial snow crab fishing
in the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence. On their own behalf and as administrators of their respective crab
fishing associations, they challenged the Snow Crab Management Plan (Plan) by
way of judicial review. The Minister announced the Plan on or around April 25,
2007.
[13]
As the judge stated at paragraph 4 of his
reasons for decision, the appellants challenged the following four aspects of
the Plan:
[translation]
(1) Separate fishing
season imposed for a particular sector of Area 12;
(2) Distribution of the total
allowable catch among the various groups of fishers;
(3) Minister’s allocation
of part of the total allowable catch to certain groups of fishers; and
(4) Traps having a
mesh size exceeding seventy‑five (75) millimetres banned in certain areas
beginning in 2008.
[14]
According to the appellants, the Minister based
his decision on grounds that are unrelated to the Fisheries Act, R.S.,
1985, c. F‑14. To prove that, they wish to establish the existence
and origin of agreements between the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Minister)
and crab fishers, particularly the agreement reached in 1990.
[15]
In broadening access to the resource by granting
additional licences, the Minister allegedly broke that agreement, which limited
the number of licences in circulation to 130 for Area 12. This was also in
breach of the part of the agreement setting up a program of individual catch
quotas, to be permanently distributed among 130 traditional fishers: see Robert
Haché’s affidavit, Appeal Book, Volume 1, at pages 69 to 73.
[16]
In the years following the 1990 agreement, the
crab fishers, anxious to rebuild and increase snow crab stocks in Area 12,
invested, according to their allegations, over $10 million in funding for
research, protection and management activities for this resource. They
allegedly invested considerable sums in their respective fishing businesses: ibid.,
at page 74.
[17]
The very existence and the contents of the 1990 agreement,
which the Minister allegedly breached for reasons unrelated to the Fisheries
Act, are the cornerstone of the appellants’ legal proceedings. However, the
respondent objects to those two components: ibid., see paragraph 8
of the Rhéal Vienneau’s affidavit, at page 99.
[18]
The 1990 agreement was followed by subsequent
agreements until the challenged adoption of the 2007 Management Plan. According
to the appellants, the considerations taken into account by the Minister [translation] “are considerations
related to the political impact of his decisions on larger groups of fishers with
more political clout than the traditional crab fishers”: ibid., at
page 84. In doing so, the Minister allegedly exceeded his jurisdiction.
[19]
In a letter to the Minister and the deputy
minister, the Area 19 crab fishers requested that fishing be prohibited in
part of Area 12 (the appellants’ fishing area) or that the opening of the
fishing season there be delayed. Without further detail, a directive was issued
by the Minister’s deputy minister, requiring staff to implement the Area 19
fishers’ request.
[20]
The Minister’s decision was to delay the start
of fishing in part of Area 12, as can be seen from the Management Plan
approved by the Minister: see Appeal Book, Volume 2, at Tab G,
memorandum submitted to the Minister for decision and endorsed by the Minister.
[21]
By way of a preliminary motion, the appellants filed
a request for disclosure of evidence in the Federal Court under rule 317.
Since the documents sought not were not part of the file on which the Minister
based his decision, the prothonotary refused the request: see Assoc. des
crabiers acadiens inc. v. Canada (Procureur général), 2007 CF 781, 68
Admin. L.R. (4th) 217. That decision was not appealed.
[22]
However, we were informed during the hearing
that there is an appeal before our Court for 2008. That appeal seeks to
determine the contents of the file that was the basis for the Minister’s decision
and, thus, the extent of the appellants’ right of access to the documents that
supported that decision. That appeal is at the requisition for hearing stage: Assoc.
des crabiers acadiens inc. et al. v. Procureur général du Canada, A‑285‑09.
[23]
The respondent as well refused to give the
appellants access to the correspondence exchanged between the Area 19
fishers and the Minister or his representatives. The appellants state that if
they had access to this correspondence, they would know the nature of the arguments
raised by the fishers and the Minister’s grounds for acting on them.
[24]
This is the alleged factual background in which
the appellants filed their conversion application, stating, among other things,
that they were unable to access the information they needed to prove the merits
of their allegations or receive appropriate procedural safeguards to obtain the
declaratory judgment sought by way of judicial review.
[25]
As previously stated, the application for
conversion of the application for judicial review into an action was dismissed
by the prothonotary and the judge, as was the request for consolidation of the
appellants’ action, if the conversion was allowed, with the action in damages
in Anglehart et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, F.C. T‑1271‑07.
Context, purpose and objectives of subsections 18(3), 18.4(1) and
18.4(2) of the Act
[26]
To better inform the reasons to follow, it is
useful to recall the context, purpose and objectives of subsections 18(3),
18.4(1) and 18.4(2) of the Act.
[27]
In Canada v. Grenier, 2005 FCA 348,
[2006] 2 F.C.R. 287 and Manuge v. Canada, 2009 FCA 29 (the latter
decision waiting to be heard on the merits by the Supreme Court of Canada),
this Court approved Parliament’s clear and unequivocal intention to entrust the
Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal with the authority to perform
judicial review of decisions made under federal administrative law. This
intention was expressed in the context of the reconsolidation of federal
administrative law, which had become dysfunctional as a result of being spread
among the provincial courts.
[28]
This reform of administrative law begun in the
early 1970s was required to meet the demands for justice, equity, efficiency,
legal security and finality of administrative decisions in the public interest:
see Grenier at paragraph 24 and Manuge at paragraph 49.
[29]
The accepted procedural vehicle for challenges to
federal administrative decisions was and is the application for judicial
review.
[30]
As subsection 18.4(2) makes clear, judicial
review is meant to be a timely, summary proceeding allowing the administration
to implement its administrative decision with no or little delay if the
decision is challenged and deemed to be lawful or, if it is deemed to be
unlawful, to quickly make the corrective measures required for it to comply
with the law and take effect.
[31]
The rights and obligations of citizens are also
determined within a short time. If the lawfulness of the decision is confirmed,
the citizen must comply with it. If, however, the decision is found to be
unlawful, the citizen may, where applicable, bring an action in liability
against the administration.
[32]
I do say where applicable because, let us
recall, an unlawful administrative decision does not inevitably trigger
liability. It may be unlawful in a purely technical sense, without having been
caused by a wrongful act. Or it may be the result of a mistake made in good
faith, a reasonable mistake or an invincible mistake. It may also have had no
consequences. Finally, there may be no relationship of cause and effect between
the unlawful decision and the resulting damage. Consequently, grounds for an
action in damages do not necessarily arise from the mere fact that the decision
was unlawful. The judicial review proceeding is therefore generally the appropriate
remedy to determine the lawfulness of a decision.
[33]
Conversely, a lawful decision does not
necessarily trigger or guarantee immunity. The decision may have been performed
so wrongfully, negligently or abusively that it will engage the liability of
the person who made it and the person who implemented it. In such a case, an
action in damages is the appropriate proceeding since the lawfulness of the
decision is not being challenged.
[34]
Nonetheless, Parliament did provide an exception
to judicial review at subsection 18.4(2) of the Act. This measure
overrides the usual procedure and allows judicial review applicants to have
their existing application for judicial review converted into an action.
[35]
The conversion into an action is not effected by
operation of law. It is submitted to the Federal Court for review and must be
justified. The Court is vested with the discretionary authority to accept an
application for conversion “if it considers it appropriate”.
[36]
The proceedings that citizens may use to
challenge administrative decisions, namely, the application for judicial review
and its conversion into an action when judicial review is applied for in the
Federal Court, are ultimately aimed at attaining and meting out administrative
justice that is timely, efficient and equitable, both for citizens and the
administration.
[37]
The courts have developed certain analysis
factors that apply to an application for conversion so as to better frame the
exercise of the discretion set out at subsection 18.4(2). It goes without
saying that each case involving an application for conversion turns on its own
distinct facts and circumstances. And, depending on those facts and
circumstances, the individual or collective weight of the factors may vary. We
will now go over those factors.
[38]
The conversion mechanism makes it possible,
where necessary, to blunt the effect of the restrictions and constraints
resulting from the summary and expeditious nature of judicial review. These
are, for example, far more limited disclosure of evidence, affidavit evidence
instead of oral testimony, and different and less advantageous rules for cross‑examination
on affidavit than for examination on discovery (see Merck Frosst Canada Inc.
v. Canada (Minister of Health) (1998), 146 F.T.R. 249 (F.C.)).
[39]
Therefore, conversion is possible (a) when an
application for judicial review does not provide appropriate procedural
safeguards where declaratory relief is sought (Haig v. Canada, [1992] 3
F.C. 611 (F.C.A.)), (b) when the facts allowing the Court to made a decision
cannot be satisfactorily established through mere affidavit evidence (Macinnis
v. Canada, [1994] 2 F.C. 464 (F.C.A.)), (c) when it is desirable to
facilitate access to justice and avoid unnecessary cost and delay (Drapeau
v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), [1995] F.C.J. No. 536 (F.C.A.))
and (d) when it is necessary to address the remedial inadequacies of judicial
review, such as the award of damages (Hinton v. Canada, [2009] 1 F.C.R.
476).
Analysis of the decision under appeal and of the appellants’
arguments
1. Application for conversion into an action
[40]
The way is now paved, with regard to conversion,
for the analysis of the decision under appeal and of some of the appellants’
arguments. I will begin with the nature of the challenge at issue.
(a) Nature of the challenge at issue
[41]
This is a classic case involving a challenge to
the legality of a discretionary administrative decision, which should normally
be carried out by way of judicial review and, therefore, be dealt with in a
summary and timely way in the interests of the parties.
(b) Nature of the impugned decision
[42]
The appellants acknowledge that the Minister’s
decision was the result of the exercise of his discretion. However, they submit
that they are unaware of the actual considerations that led to the Minister’s
decision. The appellants add that the decision does not contain any grounds
explaining the reasons for which the Minister granted the Area 19 crab
fishers’ request. That is the basis for their allegation that the decision was
made on grounds unrelated to the Fisheries Act.
[43]
Last, the appellants state that since the matter
concerns a ministerial decision, the record is not as complete as a record that
a court would use to make its decision. In the latter case, it would contain
the parties’ submissions, and the reasons for the court’s decision would be set
out. All of these shortcomings allegedly justify conversion of their
application for judicial review into an action.
[44]
If, as the appellants allege, there was a lack of
grounds for the Minister’s decision, they may easily argue that point on
judicial review. There is no need to transform that proceeding into an action.
Either there are grounds for the decision or there are not. The filing of the
decision and affidavit evidence into the record may very well establish that
fact. The judge ruling on the application for judicial review will be able to
ascertain that fact and draw the resulting conclusion as to the lawfulness of
the decision.
[45]
The debate at the hearing as to whether there
were grounds for the Minister’s decision could have been cut short had the
respondent emphasized Exhibit “G”, found at page 464, Volume 2
of the Appeal Book, and carefully reviewed its contents.
[46]
Exhibit “G” is a memorandum to the
Minister, which, as is typical, contains an analysis of the situation, negative
and positive comments on methods for resolving conflicts and a range of
possible solutions, including the status quo, with a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of the various options proposed.
[47]
This memorandum contains the recommendations
that the appellants are challenging. It is this memorandum that was approved
and signed by the Minister and that became the Minister’s decision and the 2007
Management Plan. The appellants received a copy of that Plan.
[48]
The memorandum contains a statement of the
problems that the Area 19 fishers have been making known for a number of
years, which are the result of fishing activity near the boundary line
separating their area from Area 12 and the fact that the fishing season in
Area 12 opens earlier than in Area 19. The memorandum shows the four
solutions proposed by the Area 19 fishers, followed by an analysis of the
crab migration from one area to the next, an observation that there was an
increase in the number of fishing vessels in the area in dispute and that the
catch volumes fluctuated over the years, but did not follow any particular
trend.
[49]
Last, the document remarks on the inevitable
complaints from one group of fishers or another, whatever the decision made.
Attached to this document are the appellants’ submissions to the Minister about
the management of snow crab fishing.
[50]
The 2007 Management Plan shows that the problem
involving Areas 12 and 19 is nothing new and is part of a continuum of discussions,
submissions and analysis to which the appellants are no strangers.
[51]
With respect, I do not believe that it can be
said that there are no grounds set out in the Minister’s decision.
[52]
I note that at paragraph 96 of Mr. Haché’s
affidavit, filed in support of the appellants’ application (Appeal Book, Volume 1,
page 90), Mr. Haché states that the documents he was sent by counsel
for the Minister [translation]
“do not contain any scientific data that can justify the decision of DFO” (Department
of Fisheries and Oceans) “to delay the opening of the fishing season in the
corridor of Area 12 (having a width of one nautical mile) that borders Area 19”.
[53]
To the extent that the appellants are in fact
taking issue with the sufficiency, rather than the total lack, of grounds in
support of the decision, this is a question that will be up to the judge
sitting in judicial review to assess, all the while bearing in mind, as is the
judge’s duty, that this is an administrative, discretionary and polycentric
decision that must be afforded considerable deference. As I stated previously
regarding the lack of grounds, I do not believe that the question of whether or
not those grounds are sufficient warrants converting the application for
judicial review into an action.
[54]
At paragraph 97 of his affidavit in support
of the appellants’ claims, Mr. Haché states the opinion that upon reading
the documents he was sent by counsel for the Minister, he believes that the
temporary closure of Area 12 [translation]
“is, in fact, just the result of political pressure applied by the Area 19
fishers”.
[55]
That is evidence of an opinion that the reviewing
judge will have to weigh against the considerations related to the Fisheries
Act found in the 2007 Management Plan, including those related to
protecting, rebuilding and developing the resource.
[56]
Once again, I do not believe that the opinion of
a witness is a factor warranting the requested conversion.
(c) Insufficiency of affidavit evidence
[57]
The appellants wish to provide evidence of the history
of agreements possibly reached with the Minister and that the Minister failed
to honour. The appellants conclude that affidavit evidence would be far too
cumbersome to collect and administer, and practically impossible for the judge
to assess.
[58]
I do not disagree with that conclusion. However,
the evidence to be adduced must be relevant to deciding the issue. In this
case, it is a matter of determining whether the Minister had the authority to
make the decision he did concerning the 2007 Management Plan, and whether he
did so in accordance with the powers conferred on him and the obligations
imposed on him by the Fisheries Act.
[59]
Like the prothonotary and the judge, in the
context of this judicial review proceeding and taking into account the issue as
defined, I fail to see the relevance of the history of the development of the
snow crab fishery or the existence and validity of possible agreements reached
by the parties in 1990, 1997 and 2002.
(d) Need to facilitate access to justice and avoid
unnecessary cost and delay
[60]
It seems clear to me that this factor weighs decidedly
against the appellants and their application for conversion.
[61]
The application for judicial review in this case
is ready to be heard on the merits. Converting it into an action would result
in additional delays. It would also result in a considerable increase in cost
in comparison to judicial review, considering the extensive body of
controversial evidence that the appellants wish to adduce.
[62]
This increase in cost and added delay would be
all the greater since the appellants wish to have their action consolidated
with the action in damages in file T‑1271‑07: Anglehart et al. v.
Attorney General of Canada.
[63]
First of all, there are a considerable number of
applicants in that action (100 corporations and over 200 applicant
individuals). Second, the dispute in that action is not limited to 2007 as in
the case at bar. The challenge pertains to each of the years from 2003 to 2008
and raises a number of grounds, except for the ground of the lawfulness of the
2007 Management Plan (see Attorney General of Canada v. Anglehart et al.,
2009 FCA 241, at paragraph 10), whereas that is the only ground for challenge
in this case. The result would introduce an undue and unnecessary complication
into the management of the appellants’ case and its contents on a single,
narrow issue that is well defined and very easy to deal with upon judicial
review.
(e) Conclusion
[64]
Like the prothonotary and the judge, I am of the
opinion that this application for conversion into an action does not meet the
established tests for conversion.
2. Consolidation
of proceedings
[65]
Without conversion, the question of consolidation
of the proceedings is moot and requires no answer. I will, however, state the
following: the significant differences in the applicant parties, grounds for
challenge, years in issue and conclusions sought are, if not overriding, then
at least very serious objections to the consolidation of proceedings sought.
Conclusion
[66]
For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal
with costs.
“Gilles Létourneau”
“I agree.
Pierre
Blais, C.J.”
“I agree.
Marc Noël, J.A.”
Certified true
translation
Sarah Burns
Email this Content