Date: 20010206
Docket: A-549-99
Neutral citation: 2001 FCA 5
CORAM: RICHARD C.J.
ROTHSTEIN J.A.
MALONE J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
PEGGY MCLEAN
Respondent
Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on Thursday, February 1, 2001.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on Tuesday, February 6, 2001.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: RICHARD C.J.
CONCURRED IN BY: ROTHSTEIN J.A.
MALONE J.A.
Date: 20010206
Docket: A-549-99
Neutral citation: 2001 FCA 5
CORAM: RICHARD C.J.
ROTHSTEIN J.A.
MALONE J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
PEGGY MCLEAN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RICHARD C.J.
[1] This is an application for an order to set aside the decision of the Umpire, dated June 18, 1999, referred to as CUB 45255.
[2] Following an investigation of the respondent's claim for benefits, the Commission determined that there was a discrepancy between the earnings declared by the respondent and the earnings received by the respondent during her benefit period.
[3] The Commission concluded in November 1998, based on all facts on file, that the claimant had falsely reported her earnings and imposed a penalty.
[4] Originally the penalty was assessed at $3,345.00; 7 false statements X $403 benefit rate X 200 % = $5,642.00, then reduced to $3,345.00 to keep in line with the overpayment of $3,502.00. This was reviewed on November 18, 1998 and the penalty was reduced to $2,821.00 due to the fact that the claimant had not received any of her mail and was not aware of a previous penalty; therefore the penalty was recalculated at 100% of the benefit rate; 7 false statements X $403 benefit rate X 100% - $2,821.00.
[5] In its representations to the Board of Referees, which upheld its decision, the Commission stated that the penalty had been recalculated since the respondent had moved and had not received correspondence from the Commission and due to the difficult period in her life at the time of the undeclared earnings.
[6] On the opening of the appeal before the Umpire, counsel for the Commission indicated that the Commission was prepared to reduce the penalty 50 percent again from $2,821.00 to $1,410.50.
[7] The Umpire found that it was clear from the evidence in the file that the respondent had been under a great deal of stress due to the breakup of her marriage and the financial situation which she has endured because of her husband leaving her with debts.
[8] On the issue of whether the respondent knowingly made false statements, the Umpire found that there was evidence before the Board upon which they could reach their decision and such finding was not unreasonable.
[9] Accordingly, the appeal with respect to whether the respondent made a false statement was dismissed.
[10] With respect to the penalty, the Umpire recognized that the Commission had attempted to act fairly and that it had recognized the stress and difficulties the claimant had been undergoing and that it was prepared to reduce the penalty by a further 50 percent.
[11] However, the Umpire further reduced the penalty to $750.00
[12] It is this part of the order that the applicant seeks to set aside.
[13] In support of that decision, the Umpire stated:
With respect to the penalty, I am satisfied that the Commission has attempted to act fairly throughout. However, in imposing the penalty, the Commission failed to consider the particular circumstances of this appellant and imposed a penalty based on a formula. In my view, the application of a percentage formula is not the exercise of a judicial discretion. It is arbitrary and must be set aside.
[14] Where extenuating circumstances come to the attention of the Commission, it has a duty to consider the particular circumstances of the claimant. It follows that any penalty which is imposed must reflect those circumstances. This may be done by a percentage adjustment.
[15] We are satisfied that the Commission did consider the particular circumstances of the respondent and that there was not an unreasonable exercise by the Commission of its discretionary power to impose a penalty.
[16] In these circumstances, the Umpire had no grounds to substitute a lesser penalty.
[17] The application is allowed and the decision of the Umpire is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Chief Umpire or his delegate for a new determination on the basis that the Commission's reduced penalty of $1,410.50 be reinstated.
"J. Richard"
Chief Justice
"I agree
Marshall Rothstein"
"I agree
B. Malone"
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