SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Canadian
National Railway Company
Appellant
and
McKercher
LLP and Gordon Wallace
Respondents
-
and -
Canadian
Bar Association and
Federation
of Law Societies of Canada
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 68)
|
McLachlin C.J. (LeBel, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. concurring)
|
Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39,
[2013] 2 S.C.R. 649
Canadian National Railway
Company Appellant
v.
McKercher LLP
and Gordon Wallace Respondents
and
Canadian Bar Association and
Federation of Law Societies of
Canada Interveners
Indexed as: Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP
2013 SCC 39
File No.: 34545.
2013: January 24; 2013: July 5.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for saskatchewan
Law
of professions — Barristers and solicitors — Duty of loyalty — Conflict of
interest — Breach of confidence — Whether a law firm can accept a retainer to
act against a current client on a matter unrelated to the client’s existing
files — Whether a law firm can bring a lawsuit against a current client on
behalf of another client and if not, what remedies are available to the client.
McKercher
LLP was acting for CN on several matters when, without CN’s consent or knowledge,
it accepted a retainer to act for the plaintiff in a $1.75 billion
class action against CN. CN first learned that McKercher was acting
against it in the class action when it was served with the statement of claim.
McKercher hastily terminated all retainers with CN, except for one which CN
terminated. CN applied to strike McKercher as the solicitor of record in the
class action due to an alleged conflict of interest. The motion judge granted
the application and disqualified McKercher. The Court of Appeal
overturned the motion judge’s order.
Held: The appeal should be allowed and the matter should be remitted to
the Court of Queen’s Bench for redetermination of a remedy.
A
lawyer’s duty of loyalty has three salient dimensions: a duty to avoid conflicting
interests; a duty of commitment to the client’s cause; and a duty of candour. The
duty to avoid conflicts is mainly concerned with protecting a former or current
client’s confidential information and with ensuring the effective
representation of a current client. The duty of commitment entails that, subject to law society rules, a lawyer or law firm as a general rule
should not summarily drop a client simply to avoid conflicts of interest. The
duty of candour requires disclosure of any factors relevant to the ability to
provide effective representation. A lawyer should advise an existing client
before accepting a retainer that will require him to act against the client.
The
present appeal concerns the risk to effective representation that arises when a
lawyer acts concurrently in different matters for clients whose immediate
interests in those matters are directly adverse. R. v.
Neil, 2002 SCC 70, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631, held that
the general bright line rule is that a lawyer, and by extension a law firm, may
not concurrently represent clients adverse in interest without first obtaining
their consent. When the bright line rule is inapplicable, the question becomes
whether the concurrent representation of clients creates a substantial risk
that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to
another current client, a former client, or a third person. The bright
line rule is based on the inescapable conflict of interest inherent in some
situations of concurrent representation and it reflects the essence of a fiduciary’s
duty of loyalty. The rule cannot be rebutted or otherwise attenuated and it
applies to concurrent representation in both related and unrelated
matters. However, the rule is limited in scope. It applies only where the
immediate interests of clients are directly adverse in the matters on
which the lawyer is acting and it applies only to legal interests, as opposed
to commercial or strategic interests. It cannot be raised tactically. It does
not apply in circumstances where it is unreasonable for a client to expect that
a law firm will not act against it in unrelated matters.
McKercher’s
conduct fell squarely within the scope of the bright line rule. CN and the
class suing CN are adverse in legal interest; CN did not tactically abuse the
bright line rule; and it was reasonable in the circumstances for CN to have expected
that McKercher would not concurrently represent a party suing it
for $1.75 billion. McKercher’s failure to obtain CN’s consent before
accepting the class action retainer breached the bright line rule. McKercher’s
termination of its retainers with CN breached its duty of commitment. Its
failure to advise CN of its intention to represent the class breached its duty
of candour. However, McKercher possessed no relevant confidential information
that could be used to prejudice CN in the class action.
Disqualification
may be required to avoid the risk of improper use of confidential information,
to avoid the risk of impaired representation, or to maintain the repute of the
administration of justice. In this case the only
concern that would warrant disqualification is the protection of the repute of
the administration of justice. While a breach of the bright line rule normally
attracts the remedy of disqualification, factors that may militate against it
must be considered. These factors may include: (i) behaviour
disentitling the complaining party from seeking the removal of counsel, such as
delay in bringing the motion for disqualification; (ii) significant
prejudice to the new client’s interest in retaining its counsel of choice, and
that party’s ability to retain new counsel; and (iii) the fact that the law firm accepted the conflicting retainer in good
faith, reasonably believing that the concurrent representation fell beyond the
scope of the bright line rule or applicable law society rules. As the motion judge did not have the
benefit of these reasons, the matter should be remitted to the Queen’s Bench
for redetermination of the appropriate remedy.
Cases Cited
Referred
to: R. v. Neil, 2002 SCC 70, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631; MacDonald
Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
1235; R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331; Cholmondeley
v. Clinton (1815), 19 Ves. Jun. 261, 34 E.R. 515; Bricheno v. Thorp
(1821), Jacob 300, 37 E.R. 864; Taylor v. Blacklow (1836), 3 Bing. (N.C.)
235, 132 E.R. 401; Rakusen v. Ellis, [1912] 1 Ch. 831; Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc.,
2007 SCC 24, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 177; Bolkiah v. KPMG, [1999] 2 A.C. 222; Moffat
v. Wetstein (1996), 29 O.R. (3d) 371; Canadian Pacific Railway v.
Aikins, MacAulay & Thorvaldson (1998), 23 C.P.C. (4th) 55; De Beers
Canada Inc. v. Shore Gold Inc., 2006 SKQB 101, 278 Sask. R. 171; Toddglen
Construction Ltd. v. Concord Adex Developments Corp. (2004), 34 C.L.R.
(3d) 111.
Authors Cited
American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law, Third: The Law
Governing Lawyers, vol. 2. St. Paul, Minn.: American Law
Institute Publishers, 2000.
Dodek, Adam. “Conflicted Identities: The Battle over the Duty of
Loyalty in Canada” (2011), 14 Legal Ethics 193.
Law Society of Alberta. Code of Conduct, version 2013_V1, r. 2.01(2),
Commentary (online: http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com).
Law Society of Saskatchewan. Code of Professional Conduct. Regina:
The Society, 1991 (online: http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca).
Law Society of Upper Canada. Rules of Professional Conduct,
updated January 24, 2013, r. 2.02(6.1), (6.2) (online:
http://www.lsuc.on.ca).
Nightingale, J. Report of the Proceedings before the House of
Lords, on a Bill of Pains and Penalties against Her Majesty, Caroline Amelia
Elizabeth, Queen of Great Britain, and Consort of King George the Fourth, vol. II.
London: J. Robins, 1821.
Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society. Code of Professional Conduct,
updated February 22, 2013, rr. 3.2‑1A, 7.2‑6A (online:
http://nsbs.org).
Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed.
by Donovan W. M. Waters, Mark R. Gillen and Lionel D.
Smith, eds. Toronto: Carswell, 2012.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (Lane, Ottenbreit and
Caldwell JJ.A.), 2011 SKCA 108, 375 Sask. R. 218, 340 D.L.R. (4th) 402,
[2012] 1 W.W.R. 251, 9 C.P.C. (7th) 292, 525 W.A.C. 218, [2011] S.J. No. 589
(QL), 2011 CarswellSask 625, setting aside a decision of Popescul J., 2009
SKQB 369, 344 Sask. R. 3, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 157, 77 C.P.C. (6th) 24, [2009] S.J.
No. 549 (QL), 2009 CarswellSask 610 (sub nom. Wallace v. Canadian
Pacific Railway). Appeal allowed.
Douglas C.
Hodson, Q.C., Vanessa Monar Enweani
and C. Ryan Lepage, for the appellant.
Gavin
MacKenzie and Lauren Wihak, for the
respondents.
Malcolm M.
Mercer, Eric S. Block and Brendan
Brammall, for the intervener the Canadian Bar Association.
John J. L.
Hunter, Q.C., and Stanley Martin, for
the intervener the Federation of Law Societies of Canada.
The
judgment of the Court was delivered by
[1]
The Chief
Justice — Can a law firm accept
a retainer to act against a current client on a matter unrelated to the
client’s existing files? More specifically, can a firm bring a lawsuit against
a current client on behalf of another client? If not, what remedies are
available to the client whose lawyer has brought suit against it? These are the
questions raised by this appeal.
I. Background
[2]
McKercher LLP (“McKercher”) is a large law firm
in Saskatchewan. The Canadian National Railway Company (“CN”) retained
McKercher to act for it on a variety of matters. In late 2008, McKercher was
acting for CN on three ongoing matters: a personal injury claim concerning a
rail yard incident in which children had been injured; the purchase of real
estate; and the representation of CN’s interests as a creditor in a
receivership. As well, two of its partners held power of attorney from CN for
service of process in Saskatchewan.
[3]
At the same time, the McKercher firm accepted a
retainer from Gordon Wallace (“Wallace”) to act against CN in a $1.75 billion
class action based on allegations that CN had illegally overcharged Western
Canadian farmers for grain transportation. It is not contested on appeal that
the Wallace action was legally and factually unrelated to the ongoing CN
retainers.
[4]
The McKercher firm did not advise CN that it intended to accept the
Wallace retainer. CN learned this only when it was served with the statement of
claim on January 9, 2009. Between December 5, 2008, and January 15, 2009,
various McKercher partners hastily terminated their retainers with CN, except
on the real estate file, which was terminated by CN.
[5]
Following receipt of the statement of claim, CN applied for an order
removing McKercher as solicitor of record for Wallace in the class action
against it, on the grounds that the McKercher firm had breached its duty of
loyalty to CN by placing itself in a conflict of interest, had improperly
terminated its existing CN retainers, and might misuse confidential information
gained in the course of the solicitor-client relationship.
[6]
The motion judge granted the application, and disqualified McKercher
from acting on the Wallace litigation: 2009 SKQB 369, 344 Sask. R. 3. He
found that the firm had breached the duty of loyalty it owed CN, placing itself
in a conflict of interest by accepting the Wallace retainer while acting for CN
on other matters. In his view, CN felt an understandable sense of betrayal,
which substantially impaired the McKercher firm’s ability to represent CN in
the ongoing retainers. Moreover, McKercher had received a unique understanding
of the litigation strengths, weaknesses and attitudes of CN; this understanding
constituted relevant confidential information. The motion judge concluded that
McKercher’s violation of the duty of loyalty, in addition to the possession of
relevant confidential information, made disqualification of McKercher as
counsel on the Wallace action an appropriate remedy.
[7]
The Court of Appeal overturned the motion judge’s order
disqualifying McKercher: 2011 SKCA 108, 375 Sask. R. 218. The Court of Appeal
found that a general understanding of CN’s litigation strengths and weaknesses
did not constitute relevant confidential information warranting
disqualification. Moreover, it found that McKercher had not breached its duty
of loyalty by accepting to act concurrently for Wallace. CN was a large
corporate client that was not in a position of vulnerability or dependency with
respect to McKercher. As such, its implied consent to McKercher acting
for an opposing party in unrelated legal matters could be inferred. However,
the Court of Appeal found that McKercher had breached its duty of loyalty
towards CN by peremptorily terminating the solicitor-client relationship on its
existing files for CN. Nevertheless, disqualification was not an appropriate
remedy in this case, since McKercher’s continued representation of Wallace
created no risk of prejudice to CN. Indeed, the termination of the
lawyer-client relationship had effectively put an end to any possibility of
prejudice.
[8]
The case at hand requires this Court to examine
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to his client, and in particular the requirement
that a lawyer avoid conflicts of interest. As we held in R. v. Neil,
2002 SCC 70, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631, the general “bright line” rule is that a
lawyer, and by extension a law firm, may not concurrently represent clients
adverse in interest without obtaining their consent — regardless of whether the
client matters are related or unrelated: para. 29. However, when the bright
line rule is inapplicable, the question becomes whether the concurrent
representation of clients creates a “substantial risk that the lawyer’s
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the
lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to another current client, a
former client, or a third person”: Neil, at para. 31. This appeal turns
on the scope of the bright line rule: Did it apply to McKercher’s concurrent
representation of CN and Wallace? Or is the applicable test instead whether the
concurrent representation of CN and Wallace created a substantial risk of
impaired representation?
[9]
In these reasons, I conclude that McKercher’s
concurrent representation of CN and Wallace fell squarely within the scope of
the bright line rule. The bright line rule was engaged by the facts of this
case: CN and Wallace were adverse in legal interests; CN has not attempted to
tactically abuse the bright line rule; and it was reasonable in the
circumstances for CN to expect that McKercher would not concurrently represent
a party suing it for $1.75 billion. McKercher failed to obtain CN’s consent to
the concurrent representation of Wallace, and consequently breached the bright
line rule when it accepted the Wallace retainer.
[10]
In addition to its duty to avoid conflicts of interest,
a law firm is under a duty of commitment to the client’s cause which prevents
it from summarily and unexpectedly dropping a client in order to circumvent
conflict of interest rules, and a duty of candour which requires the law firm
to advise its existing client of all matters relevant to the retainer. I
conclude that McKercher’s termination of its existing retainers with CN
breached its duty of commitment to its client’s cause, and its failure to
advise CN of its intention to accept the Wallace retainer breached its duty of
candour to its client. However, McKercher possessed no relevant confidential
information that could be used to prejudice CN.
[11]
As regards the appropriate remedy to McKercher’s
breaches, I conclude that the only concern that would warrant disqualification
in this case is the protection of the repute of the administration of justice.
A breach of the bright line rule normally attracts the remedy of
disqualification. This remains true even if the lawyer-client relationship is
terminated subsequent to the breach. However, certain factors may militate
against disqualification, and they must be taken into consideration. As the
motion judge did not have the benefit of these reasons, I would remit the
matter to the Queen’s Bench for redetermination in accordance with them.
II. Issues
[12]
The appeal raises the following issues:
A. The
Role of the Courts in Resolving Conflicts Issues
B. The
Governing Principles
C. Application
of the Principles
D. The
Appropriate Remedy
III. Analysis
A. The
Role of the Courts in Resolving Conflicts Issues
[13]
Courts of inherent jurisdiction have supervisory power
over litigation brought before them. Lawyers are officers of the court and are
bound to conduct their business as the court directs. When issues arise as to
whether a lawyer may act for a particular client in litigation, it falls to the
court to resolve those issues. The courts’ purpose in exercising their
supervisory powers over lawyers has traditionally been to protect clients from
prejudice and to preserve the repute of the administration of justice, not to
discipline or punish lawyers.
[14]
In addition to their supervisory role over court proceedings, courts
develop the fiduciary principles that govern lawyers in their duties to
clients. Solicitor-client privilege has been a frequent subject of court
consideration, for example.
[15]
The inherent power of courts to resolve issues
of conflicts in cases that may come before them is not to be confused with the
powers that the legislatures confer on law societies to establish regulations
for their members, who form a self-governing profession: MacDonald
Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, at p. 1244. The purpose of law
society regulation is to establish general rules applicable to all members to
ensure ethical conduct, protect the public and discipline lawyers who breach
the rules — in short, the good governance of the profession.
[16]
Both the courts and law societies are involved
in resolving issues relating to conflicts of interest — the courts from the
perspective of the proper administration of justice, the law societies from the
perspective of good governance of the profession: see R. v. Cunningham,
2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331. In exercising their respective powers, each
may properly have regard for the other’s views. Yet each must discharge its
unique role. Law societies are not prevented from adopting stricter rules than
those applied by the courts in their supervisory role. Nor are courts in their
supervisory role bound by the letter of law society rules, although “an
expression of a professional standard in a code of ethics . . . should be
considered an important statement of public policy”: Martin, at p. 1246.
[17]
In recent years the Canadian Bar Association and
the Federation of Law Societies of Canada have worked toward common conflict
rules applicable across Canada. However, they have been unable to agree on
their precise form: see, for example, A. Dodek, “Conflicted Identities:
The Battle over the Duty of Loyalty in Canada” (2011), 14 Legal Ethics 193. That debate was transported into the proceedings before us, each
of these interveners asking this Court to endorse their approach. While the
court is properly informed by views put forward, the role of this Court is not
to mediate the debate. Ours is the more modest task of determining which
principles should apply in a case such as this, from the perspective of what is
required for the proper administration of justice.
[18]
Against this backdrop, I now turn to examine the
principles that govern this appeal.
B. The Governing Principles
[19]
A lawyer, and by extension a law firm, owes a
duty of loyalty to clients. This duty has three salient dimensions: (1) a duty
to avoid conflicting interests; (2) a duty of commitment to the client’s cause;
and (3) a duty of candour: Neil, at para. 19. I will consider each in
turn.
1. Avoiding
Conflicts of Interest
(a) English
Origins
[20]
Canada’s law of conflicts as administered by the courts is based on
precedents rooted in the English jurisprudence. Traditionally, the main concern
was that clients not suffer prejudice from a lawyer’s representation — at the
same time or sequentially — of parties adverse in interest. Disqualification of
a lawyer from a case was reserved for situations where there was a real risk of
harm to the client, as opposed to a theoretical possibility of harm: see, for
example, Cholmondeley v. Clinton (1815), 19 Ves. Jun. 261, 34 E.R. 515; Bricheno v. Thorp (1821),
Jacob 300, 37 E.R. 864; Taylor v. Blacklow (1836), 3 Bing. (N.C.) 235,
132 E.R. 401. The rule was not absolute or “bright line”, but
pragmatic. Courts looked to the circumstances of each case and sought to
determine whether it was realistic to conclude that the client would suffer
some form of harm. Fletcher Moulton L.J.’s statement in Rakusen v. Ellis,
[1912] 1 Ch. 831 (C.A.), catches the flavour of the English common law
approach:
As a
general rule the Court will not interfere unless there be a case where mischief
is rightly anticipated. . . . [W]here there is such a probability of mischief
that the Court feels that, in its duty as holding the balance between the high
standard of behaviour which it requires of its officers and the practical
necessities of life, it ought to interfere and say that a solicitor shall not
act. Now in the present case there is an absolute absence of any reasonable
probability of any mischief whatever. [p. 841]
(b) The
Martin Test: A Focus on Risk of Prejudice and Balancing of Values
[21]
In the Martin case, this Court (per Sopinka J.) adopted
the English common law’s focus on protecting the client from real risks of
harm, although it diverged from some of the English case law with respect to
the exact level of risk that should attract the conflicts rule. The issue in Martin
was whether a law firm should be disqualified from acting against a party
because a lawyer in the firm had received relevant confidential information in
the course of her prior work for that party. As will be discussed further
below, the Court held that a firm cannot be disqualified unless there is a risk
of prejudice to the client, although in some cases the client benefits from a
presumption of risk of prejudice: pp. 1260-61.
[22]
In addition to retaining an emphasis on risk of prejudice to the client,
the Court concluded in Martin that an effective and
fair conflicts rule must strike an appropriate balance between conflicting
values. On the one hand stands the high repute of the legal profession and the
administration of justice. On the other hand stand the values of allowing the
client’s choice of counsel and permitting reasonable mobility in the legal
profession. The realities of large law firms and litigants who pick and choose
between them must be factored into the balance. As was the case in the English
common law, the Court declined to endorse broad rules that are not
context-sensitive.
(c) Types
of Prejudice Addressed by Conflict of Interest Rules
[23]
The law of conflicts is mainly concerned with two types of prejudice:
prejudice as a result of the lawyer’s misuse of confidential information
obtained from a client; and prejudice arising where the lawyer “soft peddles”
his representation of a client in order to serve his own interests, those of
another client, or those of a third person. As regards these concerns, the law
distinguishes between former clients and current clients. The lawyer’s main
duty to a former client is to refrain from misusing confidential information.
With respect to a current client, for whom representation is ongoing, the
lawyer must neither misuse confidential information, nor place himself in a
situation that jeopardizes effective representation. I will examine each of
these aspects of the conflicts rule in turn.
(d) Confidential
Information
[24]
The first major concern addressed by the duty to avoid conflicting
interests is the misuse of confidential information. The duty to avoid
conflicts reinforces the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality — which is a distinct
duty — by preventing situations that carry a heightened risk of a breach of
confidentiality. A lawyer cannot act in a matter where he may use confidential
information obtained from a former or current client to the detriment of that
client. A two-part test is applied to determine whether the new matter will
place the lawyer in a conflict of interest: (1) Did the lawyer
receive confidential information attributable to a solicitor and client
relationship relevant to the matter at hand? (2) Is there a risk that it will
be used to the prejudice of that client?: Martin, at p. 1260. If the
lawyer’s new retainer is “sufficiently related” to the matters on which he or
she worked for the former client, a rebuttable presumption arises that the
lawyer possesses confidential information that raises a risk of prejudice: p.
1260.
(e) Effective
Representation
[25]
The second main concern, which arises with respect to current clients,
is that the lawyer be an effective representative — that he serve as a zealous
advocate for the interests of his client. The lawyer must refrain “from being
in a position where it will be systematically unclear whether he performed his
fiduciary duty to act in what he perceived to be the best interests” of his
client: D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., Waters’ Law of
Trusts in Canada (4th ed. 2012), at p. 968. As the oft-cited Lord Brougham
said, “an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client”: Trial of Queen Caroline
(1821), by J. Nightingale, vol. II, The Defence, Part I, at p. 8.
[26]
Effective representation may be threatened in situations where the
lawyer is tempted to prefer other interests over those of his client: the lawyer’s
own interests, those of a current client, of a former client, or of a third
person: Neil, at para. 31. This appeal concerns the risk to effective
representation that arises when a lawyer acts concurrently in different matters
for clients whose immediate interests in those matters are directly adverse.
This Court has held that concurrent representation of clients directly adverse
in interest attracts a clear prohibition: the bright line rule.
(f) The
Bright Line Rule
[27]
In Neil, this Court (per Binnie J.) stated that a lawyer
may not represent a client in one matter while representing that client’s
adversary in another matter, unless both clients provide their informed
consent. Binnie J. articulated the rule thus:
The
bright line is provided by the general rule that a lawyer may not represent one
client whose interests are directly adverse to the immediate interests of
another current client — even if the two mandates are unrelated — unless
both clients consent after receiving full disclosure (and preferably
independent legal advice), and the lawyer reasonably believes that he or she is
able to represent each client without adversely affecting the other. [Emphasis
in original; para. 29]
[28]
The rule expressly applies to both related and unrelated matters.
It is possible to argue that a blanket prohibition against concurrent
representation is not warranted with respect to unrelated matters, where the
concrete duties owed by the lawyer to each client may not actually enter into
conflict. However, the rule provides a number of advantages. It is clear. It
recognizes that it is difficult — often impossible — for a lawyer or law firm
to neatly compartmentalize the interests of different clients when those
interests are fundamentally adverse. Finally, it reflects the fact that the
lawyer-client relationship is a relationship based on trust. The reality is
that “the client’s faith in the lawyer’s loyalty to the client’s interests will
be severely tried whenever the lawyer must be loyal to another client whose interests
are materially adverse”: Restatement of the Law, Third:
The Law Governing Lawyers (2000), vol. 2, § 128(2),
at p. 339.
[29]
The parties and interveners to this appeal disagreed
over the substance of the bright line rule. It was variously suggested that the
bright line rule is only a rebuttable presumption of conflict, that it does not
apply to unrelated matters, and that it attracts a balancing of various
circumstantial factors that may give rise to a conflict. These suggestions must
be rejected. Where applicable, the bright line rule prohibits concurrent
representation. It does not invite further considerations. As Binnie J. stated
in Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 24, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 177,
“[t]he ‘bright line’ rule is the product of the balancing of interests not the
gateway to further internal balancing”: para. 51. To turn the rule into a
rebuttable presumption or a balancing exercise would be tantamount to
overruling Neil and Strother. I am not persuaded that it would be
appropriate here to depart from the rule of precedent.
[30]
However, the bright line rule is not a rule of unlimited application.
The real issue raised by this appeal is the scope of the rule. I now turn to
this issue.
(g) The
Scope of the Bright Line Rule
[31]
The bright line rule holds that a law firm cannot act for a client whose
interests are adverse to those of another existing client, unless both clients
consent. It applies regardless of whether the client matters are related or
unrelated. The rule is based on “the inescapable conflict of interest which is
inherent” in some situations of concurrent representation: Bolkiah v. KPMG,
[1999] 2 A.C. 222 (H.L.), at p. 235, cited in Neil, at para. 27. It
reflects the essence of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty: “. . . a fiduciary
cannot act at the same time both for and against the same client, and his firm
is in no better position”: Bolkiah, at p. 234.
[32]
However, Neil and Strother make it clear that the scope of
the rule is not unlimited. The rule applies where the immediate legal interests
of clients are directly adverse. It does not apply to condone tactical
abuses. And it does not apply in circumstances where it is unreasonable to
expect that the lawyer will not concurrently represent adverse parties in
unrelated legal matters. The limited scope of application of the rule is
illustrated by Neil and Strother. This Court found the bright
line rule to be inapplicable to the facts of both of those cases, and instead
examined whether there was a substantial risk of impaired representation: Neil,
at para. 31; Strother, at para. 54.
[33]
First, the bright line rule applies only where the immediate interests
of clients are directly adverse in the matters on which the lawyer is
acting. In Neil, a law firm was concurrently representing Mr. Neil in criminal
proceedings and Ms. Lambert in divorce proceedings, when it was foreseeable
that Lambert would eventually become Neil’s co-accused in the criminal
proceedings. The lawyer representing Lambert in the divorce proceedings began
to gather information that he could eventually use against Neil. The law firm
also encouraged another one of its clients, Mr. Doblanko, to report criminal
actions by Neil to the police. The goal was to mount a “cut-throat” defence for
Lambert in the criminal case, painting her as an innocent dupe who had been
manipulated by Neil.
[34]
This Court did not apply the bright line rule to the facts in Neil,
because of the nature of the conflict. Neither Neil and Lambert, nor Neil and
Doblanko, were directly adverse to one another in the legal matters on
which the law firm represented them. Neil was not a party to Lambert’s divorce,
nor to any action in which Doblanko was involved. The adversity of interests
was indirect: it stemmed from the strategic linkage between the matters,
rather than from Neil being directly pitted against Lambert or Doblanko in
either of the matters.
[35]
Second, the bright line rule applies only when clients are adverse in legal
interest. The main area of application of the bright line rule is in civil
and criminal proceedings. Neil and Strother illustrate this
limitation. The interests in Neil were not legal, but rather strategic.
In Strother, they were commercial:
.
. . the conflict of interest principles do not generally preclude a law firm or
lawyer from acting concurrently for different clients who are in the same line
of business, or who compete with each other for business. . . .
The
clients’ respective “interests” that require the protection of the duty of
loyalty have to do with the practice of law, not commercial prosperity. Here
the alleged “adversity” between concurrent clients related to business
matters. [paras. 54-55, per Binnie J.]
[36]
Third, the bright line rule cannot be successfully raised by a party who
seeks to abuse it. In some circumstances, a party may seek to rely on the
bright line rule in a manner that is “tactical rather than principled”: Neil,
at para. 28. The possibility of tactical abuse is especially high in the case
of institutional clients dealing with large national law firms. Indeed,
institutional clients have the resources to retain a significant number of
firms, and the retention of a single partner in any Canadian city can
disqualify all other lawyers within the firm nation-wide from acting against that
client. As Binnie J. remarked,
[i]n an
era of national firms and a rising turnover of lawyers, especially at the less
senior levels, the imposition of exaggerated and unnecessary client loyalty
demands, spread across many offices and lawyers who in fact have no knowledge
whatsoever of the client or its particular affairs, may promote form at the
expense of substance, and tactical advantage instead of legitimate
protection. [Emphasis added; para. 15.]
Thus, clients who intentionally create situations
that will engage the bright line rule, as a means of depriving adversaries of
their choice of counsel, forfeit the benefit of the rule. Indeed, institutional
clients should not spread their retainers among scores of leading law firms in
a purposeful attempt to create potential conflicts.
[37]
Finally, the bright line rule does not apply in circumstances where it
is unreasonable for a client to expect that its law firm will not act against
it in unrelated matters. In Neil, Binnie J. gave the example of
“professional litigants” whose consent to concurrent representation of adverse
legal interests can be inferred:
In
exceptional cases, consent of the client may be inferred. For example,
governments generally accept that private practitioners who do their civil or
criminal work will act against them in unrelated matters, and a contrary
position in a particular case may, depending on the circumstances, be seen as
tactical rather than principled. Chartered banks and entities that could be
described as professional litigants may have a similarly broad-minded attitude
where the matters are sufficiently unrelated that there is no danger of
confidential information being abused. These exceptional cases are explained by
the notion of informed consent, express or implied. [para. 28]
In some cases, it is simply not reasonable for a
client to claim that it expected a law firm to owe it exclusive loyalty and to
refrain from acting against it in unrelated matters. As Binnie J. stated in Neil,
these cases are the exception, rather than the norm. Factors such as the nature
of the relationship between the law firm and the client, the terms of the
retainer, as well as the types of matters involved, may be relevant to consider
when determining whether there was a reasonable expectation that the law firm
would not act against the client in unrelated matters. Ultimately, courts must
conduct a case-by-case assessment, and set aside the bright line rule when it
appears that a client could not reasonably expect its application.
(h) The
Substantial Risk Principle
[38]
When a situation falls outside the scope of the bright line rule for any
of the reasons discussed above, the question becomes whether the concurrent
representation of clients creates a substantial risk that the lawyer’s
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected. The
determination of whether there exists a conflict becomes more contextual, and
looks to whether the situation is “liable to create conflicting pressures on
judgment” as a result of “the presence of factors which may reasonably be perceived
as affecting judgment”: Waters, Gillen and Smith, at p. 968. In addition, the
onus falls upon the client to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the
existence of a conflict — there is only a deemed conflict of interest if the
bright line rule applies.
(i) Practical
Implications
[39]
When a law firm is asked to act against an existing client on an
unrelated matter, it must determine whether accepting the retainer will breach
the bright line rule. It must ask itself whether (i) the immediate legal interests
of the new client are directly adverse to those of the existing client, (ii)
the existing client has sought to exploit the bright line rule in a tactical
manner; and (iii) the existing client can reasonably expect that the law firm
will not act against it in unrelated matters. In most cases, simultaneously
acting for and against a client in legal matters will result in a breach of the
bright line rule, with the result that the law firm cannot accept the new
retainer unless the clients involved grant their informed consent.
[40]
If the law firm concludes that the bright line rule is inapplicable, it
must then ask itself whether accepting the new retainer will create a
substantial risk of impaired representation. If the answer is no, then the law
firm may accept the retainer. In the event that the existing client disagrees
with the law firm’s assessment, the client may bring a motion before the courts
to prevent the firm from continuing to represent the adverse party. In this
manner, the courts will be called upon to further develop the contours of the
bright line rule, and to ensure that lawyers do not act in matters where they
cannot exercise their professional judgment free of conflicting pressures.
(j) Summary
[41]
The bright line rule is precisely what its name implies: a bright line
rule. It cannot be rebutted or otherwise attenuated. It applies to concurrent
representation in both related and unrelated matters. However, the rule
is limited in scope. It applies only where the immediate interests of
clients are directly adverse in the matters on which the lawyer is
acting. It applies only to legal — as opposed to commercial or strategic —
interests. It cannot be raised tactically. And it does not apply in
circumstances where it is unreasonable for a client to expect that a law firm
will not act against it in unrelated matters. If a situation falls outside the
scope of the rule, the applicable test is whether there is a substantial risk
that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially and adversely
affected.
[42]
I now turn to the other dimensions of the duty of loyalty which are
relevant to the present appeal.
2. The Duty of Commitment to the
Client’s Cause
[43]
The duty of commitment is closely related to the duty to avoid
conflicting interests. In fact, the lawyer must avoid conflicting interests
precisely so that he can remain committed to the client. Together,
these duties ensure “that a divided loyalty does not cause the lawyer to ‘soft
peddle’ his or her [representation] of a client out of concern for another
client”: Neil, at para. 19.
[44]
The duty of commitment prevents the lawyer from
undermining the lawyer-client relationship. As a general rule, a lawyer or law
firm should not summarily and unexpectedly drop a client simply in order to
avoid conflicts of interest with existing or future clients. This is subject
to law society rules, which may, for example, allow law firms to end their
involvement in a case under the terms of a limited scope retainer: see, for
example, Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct
(online), r. 2.02(6.1) and (6.2); Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct
(online), Commentary to r. 2.01(2); Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, Code of
Professional Conduct (online), rr. 3.2-1A and 7.2-6A.
3. The Duty of Candour
[45]
A lawyer or law firm owes a duty of candour to
the client. This requires the law firm to disclose any factors relevant to the
lawyer’s ability to provide effective representation. As Binnie J. stated in Strother,
at para. 55: “The thing the lawyer must not do is keep the client in the dark
about matters he or she knows to be relevant to the retainer” (emphasis
deleted).
[46]
It follows that as a general rule a lawyer
should advise an existing client before accepting a retainer that will require
him to act against the client, even if he considers the situation to fall
outside the scope of the bright line rule. At the very least, the existing
client may feel that the personal relationship with the lawyer has been damaged
and may wish to take its business elsewhere.
[47]
I add this. The lawyer’s duty of candour towards
the existing client must be reconciled with the lawyer’s obligation of
confidentiality towards his new client. In order to provide full disclosure to
the existing client, the lawyer must first obtain the consent of the new client
to disclose the existence, nature and scope of the new retainer. If the new
client refuses to grant this consent, the lawyer will be unable to fulfill his
duty of candour and, consequently, must decline to act for the new client.
C. Application of the Principles
[48]
All three of the duties that flow from the lawyer’s
duty of loyalty are engaged in this case: the duty to avoid conflicting
interests; the duty of commitment to the client’s cause; and the duty of
candour to the client. I will deal with each in turn.
1. The Duty to Avoid Conflicting
Interests
[49]
The question here is whether McKercher’s concurrent representation of CN
and Wallace fell within the scope of the bright line rule. I conclude that it
did.
[50]
The bright line rule prevents the concurrent representation of clients
whose immediate legal interests are directly adverse, subject to the
limitations discussed in these reasons. The fact that the Wallace and CN
retainers were legally and factually unrelated does not prevent the application
of the bright line rule.
[51]
Here, the bright line rule is applicable. The immediate interests of CN
and Wallace were directly adverse, and those interests were legal in nature.
Indeed, McKercher helped Wallace bring a class action directly against CN. In
addition, there is no evidence on the record that CN is seeking to use the
bright line rule tactically. Nothing suggests that CN has been purposefully
spreading out its legal work across Saskatchewan law firms in an attempt to
prevent Wallace or other litigants from retaining effective legal counsel. The
motion judge accepted the testimony of CN’s general counsel and concluded that
CN was acting “on a principled basis, and not merely for tactical reasons”:
para. 62. I find no palpable and overriding error in this conclusion.
[52]
Finally, it was reasonable in these circumstances for CN to expect that
McKercher would not act for Wallace. I agree with the motion judge’s findings
on this point:
The
solicitor and client had a longstanding relationship. CN used the McKercher
Firm as the “go to” firm. Although there were at least two other firms in
Saskatchewan that also did CN’s legal work, I accept the testimony of Mr.
Chouc, that the McKercher Firm was its primary firm within this province. . .
. The lawsuit commenced seeks huge damages against CN and alleges both
aggravated and punitive damages, which connote a degree of moral turpitude on
the part of CN. Simply put, it is hard to imagine a situation that would strike
more deeply at the loyalty component of the solicitor-client relationship.
[para. 56]
In other words, it was reasonable for CN to be
surprised and dismayed when its primary legal counsel in the province of
Saskatchewan sued it for $1.75 billion.
[53]
Consequently, the facts of this appeal fall within the scope of the
bright line rule. McKercher breached the rule, and by extension its duty to
avoid conflicting interests, when it accepted to represent Wallace without
first obtaining CN’s informed consent.
[54]
However, I cannot agree that this is a situation where there also
exists a risk of misuse of confidential information. CN’s contention that
McKercher obtained confidential information that might assist it on the Wallace
matter — namely, a general understanding of CN’s litigation philosophy — does
not withstand scrutiny. “[M]erely . .
. making a bald assertion that the past relationship has provided the solicitor
with access to . . . litigation philosophy” does not suffice: Moffat v. Wetstein
(1996), 29 O.R. (3d) 371 (Gen. Div.), at p. 401. “There is a distinction
between possessing information that is relevant to the matter at issue and
having an understanding of the corporate philosophy” of a previous client: Canadian
Pacific Railway v. Aikins, MacAulay & Thorvaldson (1998), 23 C.P.C.
(4th) 55 (Man. C.A.), at para. 26. The information must be capable of being
used against the client in some tangible manner. In the present case, the real
estate, insolvency, and personal injury files on which McKercher worked were
entirely unrelated to the Wallace action, and CN has failed to show how they or
other matters on which McKercher acted could have yielded relevant confidential
information that could be used against it.
2. The Duty of
Commitment to the Client’s Cause
[55]
The duty of commitment to the client’s cause
suggests that a law firm should not summarily and unexpectedly terminate a
retainer as a means of circumventing conflict of interest rules. The
McKercher firm had committed itself to act loyally for CN on the personal
injury, real estate and receivership matters. McKercher was bound to complete
those retainers, unless the client discharged it or acted in a way that gave
McKercher cause to terminate the retainers. McKercher breached its duty of
commitment to CN’s causes when it terminated its retainer with CN on two of
these files. It is clear that a law firm cannot terminate a client
relationship purely in an attempt to circumvent its duty of loyalty to that
client: De Beers Canada Inc. v. Shore Gold Inc., 2006 SKQB 101, 278
Sask. R. 171, at para. 17; Toddglen Construction Ltd. v. Concord Adex
Developments Corp. (2004), 34 C.L.R. (3d) 111 (Ont. S.C.J., per Master
Sandler).
[56]
The conclusion on this point is supported by the
obligation imposed on McKercher by its Law Society that it not withdraw its
services from a client without good cause and appropriate notice: see the
ethical rules applicable at the relevant time, Law Society of Saskatchewan, Code
of Professional Conduct (1991), c. XII, at p. 47. The desire to accept a
new, potentially lucrative client did not provide good cause to withdraw
services from CN.
3. The Duty of Candour
[57]
The McKercher firm breached its duty of candour
to CN by failing to disclose to CN its intention to accept the Wallace
retainer.
[58]
It bears repeating: a lawyer must not “keep the
client in the dark about matters he or she knows to be relevant to the
retainer”: Strother, at para. 55. As discussed, this rule must be
broadly construed to give the client an opportunity to judge for itself whether
the proposed concurrent representation risks prejudicing its interests and if
so, to take appropriate action.
[59]
CN should have been given the opportunity to
assess McKercher’s intention to represent Wallace and to make an appropriate
decision in response — whether to terminate its existing retainers, continue
those retainers, or take other action. Instead, CN only learned that it was
being sued by its own lawyer when it received a statement of claim. This is
precisely the type of situation that the duty of candour is meant to prevent.
D. The Appropriate Remedy
[60]
I have concluded that accepting the Wallace
retainer placed McKercher in a conflict of interest, and that McKercher
breached its duties of commitment and candour to CN. The question is whether
McKercher should be disqualified from representing the Wallace plaintiffs
because its acceptance of the Wallace retainer breached the duty of loyalty it
owed CN.
[61]
As discussed, the courts in the exercise of
their supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of justice in the courts
have inherent jurisdiction to remove law firms from pending litigation.
Disqualification may be required: (1) to avoid the risk of improper use of
confidential information; (2) to avoid the risk of impaired representation;
and/or (3) to maintain the repute of the administration of justice.
[62]
Where there is a need to prevent misuse of
confidential information, as set out in Martin, disqualification is
generally the only appropriate remedy, subject to the use of mechanisms that
alleviate this risk as permitted by law society rules. Similarly, where the
concern is risk of impaired representation as set out in these reasons, disqualification
will normally be required if the law firm continues to concurrently act for
both clients.
[63]
The third purpose that may be served by
disqualification is to protect the integrity and repute of the administration
of justice. Disqualification may be required to send a message that the
disloyal conduct involved in the law firm’s breach is not condoned by the
courts, thereby protecting public confidence in lawyers and deterring other law
firms from similar practices.
[64]
In assessing whether disqualification is
required on this ground alone, all relevant circumstances should be
considered. On the one hand, acting for a client in breach of the bright line
rule is always a serious matter that on its face supports disqualification. The
termination of the client retainers — whether through lawyer withdrawal or
through a client firing his lawyer after learning of a breach — does not
necessarily suffice to remove all concerns that the lawyer’s conduct has harmed
the repute of the administration of justice.
[65]
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that
in circumstances where the lawyer-client relationship has been terminated and
there is no risk of misuse of confidential information, there is generally no
longer a concern of ongoing prejudice to the complaining party. In light of
this reality, courts faced with a motion for disqualification on this third
ground should consider certain factors that may point the other way. Such
factors may include: (i) behaviour disentitling the complaining party from
seeking the removal of counsel, such as delay in bringing the motion for
disqualification; (ii) significant prejudice to the new client’s interest in
retaining its counsel of choice, and that party’s ability to retain new
counsel; and (iii) the fact that the law firm accepted
the conflicting retainer in good faith, reasonably believing that the
concurrent representation fell beyond the scope of the bright line rule and
applicable law society restrictions.
[66]
Against this background, I return to this
appeal. The motion judge concluded that the appropriate remedy was to
disqualify McKercher from the Wallace action. He based this conclusion on a
variety of factors — in particular, he focused on what he perceived to be CN’s
justified sense of betrayal, the impairment of McKercher’s ability to continue
to represent CN on the ongoing retainers, and the risk of misuse of
confidential information. Some of these considerations were not relevant. Here,
disqualification is not required to prevent the misuse of confidential information.
Nor is it required to avoid the risk of impaired representation. Indeed, the
termination of the CN retainers that McKercher was working on ended the
representation. The only question, therefore, is whether disqualification is
required to maintain public confidence in the justice system.
[67]
As discussed, a violation of the bright line
rule on its face supports disqualification, even where the lawyer-client
relationship has been terminated as a result of the breach. However, it is also
necessary to weigh the factors identified above, which may suggest that
disqualification is inappropriate in the circumstances. The motion judge did
not have the benefit of these reasons, and obviously could not consider all of
the factors just discussed that are relevant to the issue of disqualification.
These reasons recast the legal framework for judging McKercher’s conduct and
determining the appropriate remedy. Fairness suggests that the issue of remedy
should be remitted to the court for consideration in accordance with them.
IV. Conclusion
[68]
I would allow the appeal and remit the matter to
the Queen’s Bench to be decided in accordance with these reasons. I would award
costs to the appellant, CN.
Appeal
allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the
appellant: MacPherson Leslie & Tyerman, Saskatoon.
Solicitors for the
respondents: Heenan Blaikie, Toronto.
Solicitors for the
intervener the Canadian Bar Association: McCarthy Tétrault, Toronto.
Solicitors for the
intervener the Federation of Law Societies of Canada: Hunter
Litigation Chambers, Vancouver; Fasken Martineau DuMoulin, Vancouver.