SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Her
Majesty The Queen
Appellant
and
A.D.H.
Respondent
-
and -
Attorney
General of Ontario
Intervener
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver
and Karakatsanis JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 76)
Reasons
Concurring in Result:
(paras. 77 to 159)
|
Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella and
Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
Moldaver J. (Rothstein J. concurring)
|
R. v. A.D.H., 2013 SCC 28, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 269
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant
v.
A.D.H. Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario Intervener
Indexed as: R. v. A.D.H.
2013 SCC 28
File No.: 34132.
2012: October 11; 2013: May 17.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for saskatchewan
Criminal
law — Child abandonment — Mens rea — Accused gave birth in washroom at retail
store and left newborn in toilet — Accused testified that she had not realized
she was pregnant and that she believed child was born dead — Acquittal entered —
Whether fault element is subjective or objective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C‑46, ss. 214 “‘abandon’ or ‘expose’”, 218.
The
accused, not previously knowing that she was pregnant, gave birth while using
the toilet in a retail store. Thinking the child was dead, she cleaned up as
best she could and left, leaving the child in the toilet. The child was in
fact alive, was quickly attended to by others and transported to the hospital
where he was successfully resuscitated and found to be completely healthy. The
accused was eventually identified as the woman seen entering and leaving the
washroom at the time in question. When contacted by police, she cooperated
fully and confirmed that she was the mother of the child. She was charged with
unlawfully abandoning a child under the age of 10 years old and thereby endangering
his life contrary to s. 218 of the Criminal Code .
The
trial judge noted that the accused acknowledged that she had left her child in
the toilet, thereby committing the actus reus of the s. 218
offence. As for the mens rea, the trial judge decided that subjective
fault was required and found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused intended to abandon her child. She had not known she
was pregnant and truly believed she had delivered a dead child. Her fear and
confusion explained her subsequent behaviour. The trial judge accordingly
found the accused not guilty and dismissed the charge. The majority of the
Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that s. 218 of the Criminal
Code requires subjective fault.
Held:
The appeal should be dismissed.
Per
McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.: The
text of s. 218 of the Criminal Code does not expressly set out a
fault requirement, but when read in light of its full context, it supports the
conclusion that subjective fault is required. An important part of the context
in which we must interpret s. 218 is the presumption that Parliament
intends crimes to have a subjective fault element. There is nothing in the
text or context of the child abandonment offence to suggest that Parliament
intended to depart from requiring subjective fault. The text, scheme and
purpose of the provision support this conclusion, and to the extent that
Parliament’s intent is unclear, the presumption of subjective fault ought to
have its full operation in this case. The legislative evolution of the child
abandonment offence is, if anything, more supportive than not of this
conclusion.
There
is no doubt that the purpose of the abandonment offence is the protection of
children from risk even when no harm occurs. Viewed in the light of the broad
scope of potential liability under s. 218 of the Criminal Code , the
requirement for subjective fault serves an important purpose of ensuring that
the reach of the criminal law does not extend too far. While the conduct and
people that fall within s. 218 are broadly defined, the requirement for
subjective fault ensures that only those with a guilty mind are punished.
The
words “abandon”, “expose” and “wilful” all suggest a subjective fault
requirement. The first two of these words involve more than just leaving a
child alone or failing to take care of it: they denote awareness of the risk
involved and, as defined in s. 214 of the Criminal Code , they
suggest a requirement for knowledge of the consequences flowing from the
prohibited acts of abandonment or exposure. As for the word “wilful”, it is
used only in the non‑exhaustive definition of the words “abandon” and
“expose” in relation to omissions, and a wilful omission is the antithesis of a
crime involving a mere failure to act in accordance with some minimum level of
behaviour. Likewise, the use of the word “likely” in both ss. 214 and 218
does not suggest an objective fault requirement given that it is simply aimed
at criminalizing the creation of risk.
Conversely,
what is absent from the text of s. 218 of the Criminal Code and the
broader scheme in which it appears strongly suggest that subjective fault is
required. The text of the child abandonment provision does not contain any of
the language typically employed by Parliament when it intends to create an
offence of objective fault. The prohibition applies to everyone, not just to a
particular group engaged in a regulated activity or standing in a particular,
defined relationship with the alleged victim. Nothing in the text suggests an
intention to impose a minimum and uniform standard of care. There are no
references in the text to “dangerous”, “careless” or “reasonable” conduct or
any requirement to take “reasonable precautions”. There is no predicate
offence and no actual harm is required by the provision, and it does not
create, define or impose a duty to do anything other than in the sense that all
criminal offences could be considered to create a duty not to commit them. While
failure to perform a duty imposed by law on persons in particular relationships
is the essence of the necessaries of life offence created by s. 215 , this
is not at all the case with respect to the child abandonment offence under
s. 218 .
The
text, context and purpose of s. 218 of the Criminal Code show that
subjective fault is required. It follows that the trial judge did not err in
acquitting the respondent on the basis that this subjective fault requirement
had not been proved. The Court of Appeal was correct to uphold the acquittal.
Per
Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.: Section 218 is child protection
legislation. It targets three limited classes of people faced with a situation
where a child under 10 is or is likely to be at risk of death or permanent
injury. A common sense approach dictates that the offence is duty‑based
and that penal negligence is the level of fault required to establish guilt as
regards the proscribed consequences. Further support for this view is found in
a review of the provision’s language, its placement in the Criminal Code ,
relevant scholarly opinion, its legislative evolution and history and the
gravity and social stigma associated with the offence.
Once
it is accepted that in enacting s. 218 Parliament intended to guard
against dangerous conduct that any reasonable person would foresee is likely to
endanger a child’s life or expose it to permanent injury, common sense suggests
that Parliament would not provide accused persons with a host of defences based
on their individual characteristics. Doing so would effectively defeat the provision’s
purpose of imposing a societal minimum standard of conduct, since crimes of
subjective fault require an assessment of personal characteristics to the
extent that they tend to prove or disprove an element of the offence.
The
recognition that s. 218 sweeps within its ambit persons who are already
duty‑bound to protect a child leads to the central difficulty with
holding that s. 218 is, in its entirety, a subjective mens rea offence.
If the great bulk of people to whom the provision applies have a pre‑existing
and ongoing legal duty to take charge of children who fall below the age of 10,
it hardly seems reasonable that they should be judged against a subjective mens
rea standard when the very same people who run afoul of the duty‑based
provision next door (s. 215 (failure to provide necessaries)) are judged
on a penal negligence standard in light of this Court’s decision in R. v.
Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122. The result would be a double standard — an
objective standard under s. 215 and a subjective standard under s. 218 —
for provisions that serve similar, if not identical, purposes.
Section 218
can be read purposefully and harmoniously, such that it applies only to persons
who are cloaked with a duty, whether pre‑existing and ongoing or
situational, to protect a particular child under the age of 10 from death or
permanent injury, all of whom are properly subject to an objective
standard with respect to the consequences element of s. 218 . The s. 214
definition should be restricted in scope as applying only to persons falling
into the following three categories: (1) those with a pre‑existing
and ongoing legal duty to the child; (2) those who come to the aid of the
child who is or is likely to be at risk of death or permanent injury, and; (3) those
who actually place the child in that situation. Interpreting the scope of
s. 218 in this way goes a long way toward addressing concerns about the
broad scope of potential liability under the provision.
Section 218
finds its place in Part VIII of the Criminal Code under the heading
“Duties Tending to Preservation of Life”. It is one of two offences located
under that heading — the other being s. 215 . This provides some
indication that Parliament intended that s. 218 be construed as a duty‑based
offence. It seems anomalous that Parliament would insert a non‑duty‑based
offence into a thicket of duty‑related provisions. The scenario becomes
even more remarkable when one appreciates that s. 218 is concerned with
inherently dangerous conduct that places or is likely to place the lives and
safety of helpless young children at risk. This is the very type of situation
which requires a societal minimum standard of conduct and calls out for a
standard of fault based on objective foreseeability. Likewise, the plain
language of s. 218 — supported by the place of situational duties in
Canadian criminal law, the offence’s placement among other duty‑based
provisions in the Criminal Code and the scholarship on s. 218 —
leads to the conclusion that the offence of child abandonment is duty‑based.
The
legislative history of s. 218 further supports the conclusion that the
fault element for s. 218 is penal negligence. The provision has never
included words of subjective intention, as confirmed by the early English interpretation
of the offence. Furthermore, neither the social stigma associated with it nor
the gravity of the offence of child abandonment require it to be treated
differently than its sister provision s. 215 (failure to provide
necessaries), where penal negligence was found to be the requisite fault
element.
Under
a penal negligence standard, a mistake of fact that is both honest and
reasonable affords a complete defence. Thus, an objective mens rea
standard does not punish the morally blameless. In the present
circumstances, the trial judge found that the respondent honestly believed that
her child was dead at birth and that this belief was objectively reasonable.
As such, she was entitled to be acquitted based on the defence of honest and
reasonable mistake of fact.
Cases Cited
By Cromwell J.
Considered:
R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122; referred to: R. v.
Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63; R. v. L.M., [2000] O.J. No. 5284
(QL); R. v. C.C.D., [1998] O.J. No. 4875 (QL); R. v. Reedy (No. 2)
(1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 104; R. v. McIntosh, [2008] O.J. No. 5742
(QL); R. v. Bokane‑Haraszt, 2007 ONCJ 228 (CanLII); R. v.
Christiansen, [1997] O.J. No. 5733 (QL); R. v. R. (J.), 2000
CarswellOnt 5325; R. v. Gosset, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76; Rizzo & Rizzo
Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980]
2 S.C.R. 120; Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132; Watts v. The Queen,
[1953] 1 S.C.R. 505; R. v. Rees, [1956] S.C.R. 640; Beaver v. The
Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531; R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
1299; R. v. Prue, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547; R. v. Bernard, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 833; R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633; R. v. Théroux,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 5; R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439; R. v. Beatty,
2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49; Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471; R. v. White
(1871), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311; R. v. Downes (1875), 1 Q.B.D. 25; R. v.
Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; R. v. Renshaw (1847), 2 Cox C.C. 285; R.
v. Hogan (1851), 2 Den. 277; R. v. Falkingham (1870), L.R. 1 C.C.R.
222; R. v. Boulden (1957), 41 Cr. App. R. 105; Re Davis
(1909), 18 O.L.R. 384; R. v. Buzzanga (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 705; R. v.
L.B., 2011 ONCA 153, 274 O.A.C. 365, leave to appeal refused, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
x; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; R. v. Hundal, [1993] 1
S.C.R. 867; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60; R. v. Finlay,
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 103; R. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944; R. v.
Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864; R.
v. Anderson, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. J.F., 2008 SCC 60, [2008] 3
S.C.R. 215; R. v. Holzer (1988), 63 C.R. (3d) 301.
By Moldaver J.
Considered:
R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122; referred to: R. v. Hinchey,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128; R. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944; R. v.
Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Lohnes, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 167; R.
v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606; R. v. Browne
(1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 775; R. v. Nicholls (1874), 13 Cox C.C. 75; R.
v. Instan, [1893] 1 Q.B. 450; R. v. Salmon (1880), 6 Q.B.D. 79; R.
v. Coyne (1958), 124 C.C.C. 176; R. v. Miller, [1983] 1 All E.R.
978; R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439; R. v. White (1871), L.R. 1
C.C.R. 311; R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49; R. v. Roy,
2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60; R. v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; R.
v. Buzzanga (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 705; R. v. L.B., 2011 ONCA 153, 274
O.A.C. 365, leave to appeal refused, [2011] 3 S.C.R. x; Leary v. The Queen,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 29; R. v. George, [1960] S.C.R. 871; R. v. Daviault,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63; R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting Offences against the Person, R.S.C. 1886, c. 162, s. 20.
Act respecting Offences against the Person, S.C. 1869, c. 20, ss. 25, 26.
Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable
persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 2005,
c. 32, ss. 11 , 12 .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46,
ss. 33.1 , Part VIII, 214 “‘abandon’ or ‘expose’”, 215, 216, 217, 217.1, 218,
219, 220, 221, 266, 269, 298, 300.
Criminal Code, S.C. 1953‑54,
c. 51, s. 185 “‘abandon’ or ‘expose’”.
Criminal
Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, ss. 209 to 211, 216.
Offences against the Person Act, 1861
(U.K.), 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 27.
Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868 (U.K.), 31
& 32 Vict., c. 122, s. 37.
Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act, 1889 (U.K.), 52 & 53 Vict., c. 44, ss. 1, 18.
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894 (U.K.), 57 & 58 Vict., c. 41, s. 1.
Authors Cited
Colvin, Eric, and Sanjeev Anand. Principles of Criminal Law,
3rd ed. Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007.
Côté,
Pierre‑André, in collaboration with Stéphane Beaulac and Mathieu Devinat.
The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2011.
Cross, Rupert. Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed. by John
Bell and George Engle. London: Butterworths, 1995.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed.
Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Manning, Morris, and Peter Sankoff. Manning, Mewett &
Sankoff: Criminal Law, 4th ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2009.
Ormerod, David. Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed.,
rev. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, “abandon”, “desert”, “expose”.
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
Roach, Kent. “Common Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue Between Courts
and Legislatures” (2005), 55 U.T.L.J. 733.
Roach, Kent. Criminal Law, 5th ed. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012.
Stuart, Don. Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 6th ed. Scarborough,
Ont.: Carswell, 2011.
Sullivan, Ruth. Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of
Statutes, 4th ed. Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002.
Sullivan, Ruth. Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th
ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (Richards, Smith and
Ottenbreit JJ.A.), 2011 SKCA 6,
366 Sask. R. 123, 266 C.C.C. (3d) 101, 81 C.R. (6th) 303, [2011] 6 W.W.R. 10, 506
W.A.C. 123, [2011] S.J. No. 5 (QL), 2011 CarswellSask 10, affirming the
acquittal entered by Gabrielson J., 2009 SKQB 261, 335 Sask. R. 173, 68 C.R.
(6th) 74, [2009] S.J. No. 362 (QL), 2009 CarswellSask 388. Appeal dismissed.
Beverly L. Klatt and W. Dean Sinclair, for the appellant.
Valerie N. Harvey, for the respondent.
Gillian Roberts and Jamie
Klukach, for the intervener.
The judgment of McLachlin
C.J. and Fish, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. was delivered by
Cromwell J. —
I. Overview and Issue
[1]
Criminal offences generally consist of
prohibited conduct (the actus reus) which is committed with a required
element of fault (the mens rea). This appeal concerns the offence of
child abandonment under s. 218 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46 (“Code ”). The provision prohibits abandoning or exposing a
child under the age of 10 years so that the child’s life is (or is likely to
be) endangered, or its health is (or is likely to be) permanently injured. (The
full text of the provision is found in the Appendix.) The question on appeal
concerns the fault element of the offence: Is the fault element to be assessed
subjectively or objectively?
[2]
The issue arises out of a heart-rending story
which, fortunately, has a happy ending. The respondent, not previously knowing
that she was pregnant, gave birth to a baby boy while using the toilet in a
Wal-Mart store. Thinking the child was dead, she cleaned up as best she could
and left, leaving the child in the toilet. The child was in fact alive, was
quickly attended to by others and, by all reports, is now a healthy little boy.
The trial judge believed the respondent’s claim that she was not aware of her
pregnancy until the child appeared and that she believed the child was dead
when she left him. Thus, whether the fault element is assessed according to
what the respondent actually knew or by what a reasonable person would have
known and done is an important issue in this case.
[3]
In general terms, when a fault element is
assessed subjectively, the focus is on what the accused actually knew: Did the
accused know that abandoning the child would put the child’s life or health at
risk? If, as the respondent believed, the child was dead when she abandoned
him, she would not know that her abandonment of him risked putting his life or
health at risk. Again to speak generally, when assessed objectively, the focus
is not on what the accused actually knew, but on whether a reasonable person in
those circumstances would have seen the risk and whether the accused’s conduct
is a marked departure from what a reasonable person would have done. If a court
were persuaded that a reasonable person would have seen the risk of abandoning
the child in these circumstances and concluded that the accused’s conduct was a
marked departure from that expected of a reasonable person, the fault element
would be established even though the accused in fact did not see the risk.
[4]
It follows that the issue for decision is this:
• Does s. 218 of the Code require proof that the
accused knew that the acts of alleged abandonment or exposure of a child were
such that the abandoned child’s life was or was likely to be endangered or his
or her health permanently injured, as the respondent contends? Or, as the appellant
Crown contends, is the fault element established by proof that the accused’s
conduct constituted a marked departure from that expected of a reasonable
person in the same circumstances and that the risk to the child’s life or
health would have been a foreseeable result by such a person?
[5]
As I will explain, I agree with the respondent
that the trial judge and the majority judges of the Court of Appeal were
correct to require subjective fault. I would therefore dismiss the Crown’s
appeal.
II. Facts and Proceedings
A. Overview of the Facts
[6]
On May 21, 2007, users of the washroom at a
Wal-Mart store discovered a puddle of blood on the floor of one of the stalls
and heard the sounds of a young woman who we know now to have been the
respondent struggling inside. The customers alerted the store staff, but when
an assistant manager asked the young woman if she was all right, she responded
from inside the stall that she was fine.
[7]
Shortly thereafter, a customer reported that she
had discovered a baby’s arm sticking out of the toilet bowl of the stall where
the young woman had been. Other customers had seen the baby by that point, but
all of them thought it was dead. When the store manager went into the bathroom
to see what was happening, he observed that the baby’s leg had started
twitching. He pulled the baby out of the toilet. An emergency response team was
called and the baby, A.J.H., was transported to the hospital where he was
successfully resuscitated and found to be completely healthy.
[8]
Police gave video surveillance tapes of the
store to various media outlets and the respondent was eventually identified as
the woman seen entering and leaving the washroom at the time in question. When
contacted by police, she cooperated fully and confirmed that she was the mother
of the child. She was charged with unlawfully abandoning a child under the age
of 10 years and thereby endangering his life contrary to s. 218 of the Code .
[9]
At her trial, the respondent testified. She was
22 years of age by that time and was living with her boyfriend and their baby,
S.K. Prior to the birth of A.J.H., she had been gaining weight and so she had
taken three home pregnancy tests, all of which were negative. She did not
believe she was pregnant because she had been getting her period every month
prior to the birth. When she arrived at the Wal-Mart store, she was not feeling
well and so she went to the bathroom, where she gave birth a minute or two
later. She was surprised by the birth. She did not try to pick the baby up
because it was all blue and she thought it was dead. She did not respond to
offers for help or tell anyone what had happened because she was afraid. She
tried to clean up the blood on the floor and then returned to her friend’s car.
[10]
When she heard the police were looking for her,
the respondent told her mother she was the one that had given birth to the baby
in the store. When she found out the baby was alive, she was eager to see him. He
now lives with the respondent’s mother and the respondent visits him almost
every day. A.D.H. testified that it took her five or six months to realize that
she was pregnant with her second child, S.K.
B. Court of Queen’s Bench, 2009 SKQB 261, 335 Sask. R. 173 (Gabrielson J.)
[11]
The trial judge noted that the respondent
acknowledged that she had left her child in the toilet at the Wal-Mart store,
thereby committing the actus reus of the s. 218 offence. As for the
fault element, the trial judge decided that subjective fault was required. He
therefore expressed the issue he had to decide as follows: “. . . whether the
accused . . . intended to abandon the child, A.J.H., or did so recklessly with
full knowledge of the facts and circumstances or was wilfully blind in respect
to them” (para. 15).
[12]
The trial judge answered this question in the
negative and found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the respondent intended to abandon her child (paras. 23-26). The accused had
been credible in her testimony. She had not known she was pregnant and truly
believed she had delivered a dead child. Her fear and confusion explained her
subsequent behaviour. The trial judge also relied on the evidence of Dr.
Simpson, who testified that, “[u]nder these circumstances of an unknown
pregnancy and a premature, precipitous birth, it is understandable that the
accused thought the child was not alive and that she would be scared or
panicked, not request help and immediately leave the scene of the birth” (para.
24). Thus, the trial judge found the respondent not guilty and dismissed the
charge (para. 26).
C. Court
of Appeal, 2011 SKCA 6, 366 Sask. R. 123
(Richards, Smith and Ottenbreit JJ.A.)
[13]
Richards J.A. (Smith J.A. concurring) agreed
with the trial judge that s. 218 of the Code requires subjective fault. He
supported his conclusion with a detailed analysis of the text and context of
the provision. On the other hand, Ottenbreit J.A. concluded that s. 218 only
requires an objective fault element, but that an honest and reasonable mistake
of fact could be a defence. He found that the respondent had acted on the
basis of the mistaken but reasonable belief that her child was dead and
concluded that the trial judge’s verdict of acquittal should be upheld on that
basis.
III. Brief Summary of the Positions
of the Parties
[14]
The appellant Crown submits that the fault
element of the child abandonment offence should be assessed “objectively”
according to what has been called the “penal negligence” standard, whereas the
respondent submits that the fault element should be assessed subjectively,
adopting the position taken by the trial judge and a majority of the Court of
Appeal.
[15]
In this case, a penal negligence standard means
that the Crown must prove two things to establish the fault element: first,
that the risk to the child resulting from the respondent’s acts would have been
foreseeable by a reasonable person in the same circumstances and, second, that
her conduct was a marked departure from the conduct expected of a reasonable
person in those circumstances. Penal negligence is the fault element that
applies to the offence of failing to provide a child with the necessaries of
life under s. 215 of the Code and the Crown submits that the same
standard of fault should apply here.
[16]
On the other hand, a subjective standard means,
in the context of an offence under s. 218 of the Code , that the fault
element requires proof at least of recklessness, in other words that the
accused persisted in a course of conduct knowing of the risk which it
created. Subjective fault, of course, may also refer to other states of
mind. It includes intention to bring about certain consequences; actual knowledge
that the consequences will occur; or wilful blindness — that is, knowledge of the need to inquire
as to the consequences and deliberate failure to do so. But here, the element
of risk (“is likely to”) is part of the definition of the prohibited
consequences: the prohibited consequences under s. 218 are that the child’s
life “is or is likely to be” endangered or its health “is or is likely to be”
permanently injured. It is because the definition of the offence
incorporates the notion of risk to life or health that a subjective fault
element would require the Crown to show at least recklessness, that is, that
the accused actually knew of the risk to the child’s life or health. (Wilful blindness
would also suffice, but was not argued in this case. I also note that
self-induced intoxication is not relevant here and was not argued. I do not
find it either necessary or desirable to speculate about the various issues
that would arise if it were raised in the context of this general intent
offence. Simply by way of example, one would have to consider among other
things issues such as whether the ratio of R. v. Daviault, [1994]
3 S.C.R. 63, applies, whether its application would or should be any different
depending on whether the offence requires subjective or objective fault and
whether the child abandonment offence falls within the exclusion from the
self-induced intoxication defence set out in s. 33.1(3) of the Code relating
to offences that include as an element any interference or threat of
interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another person.)
[17]
The respondent also submits, in the alternative,
that even if the required fault element is objective, the appeal should
nonetheless be dismissed because she acted on the basis of a reasonable mistake
of fact, that is, that the child was dead when she left him. I do not need to
address this submission as I conclude that the fault element is subjective and
therefore that the trial judge did not err in acquitting the respondent on the
basis that the fault element had not been proved.
IV. Analysis
A. Introduction
[18]
This Court has never addressed the fault element
for the child abandonment offence and the relatively scant jurisprudence in
other courts is inconclusive on this issue. Some cases have applied a
subjective standard of fault: R. v. L.M., [2000] O.J. No. 5284 (QL) (Ct.
J.), at para. 49; R. v. C.C.D., [1998] O.J. No. 4875 (QL) (Ct. J. (Prov.
Div.)), at paras. 24-30; R. v. Reedy (No. 2) (1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 104
(Ont. D.C.J.C.C.), at pp. 106-8. Others have either applied an objective
standard or been unclear about the standard: R. v. McIntosh, [2008] O.J.
No. 5742 (QL) (Ct. J.), at paras. 32-33; R. v. Bokane-Haraszt, 2007 ONCJ
228 (CanLII), at paras. 25-26; R. v. Christiansen, [1997] O.J. No. 5733
(QL) (Ct. J. (Prov. Div.)), at paras. 8 and 18-19; R. v. R. (J.), 2000
CarswellOnt 5325 (Ct. J.).
[19]
Given that existing case law does not settle the
question, our task is to “discern the intent of Parliament, having regard to
the purpose of the section and the applicable principles of statutory
construction”: R. v. Gosset, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76, at p. 89. We must,
therefore, read the words of the statute in their entire context, in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the statute, its
objective and the intention of Parliament: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at p. 41 (quoting E. Driedger, Construction of Statutes
(2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87).
B. Statutory Interpretation and Fault Requirements
[20]
Discerning parliamentary intent in relation to
the fault element of crimes is often not an easy task. Offences that have long
been held to have subjective fault requirements do not expressly say so and
even when Parliament decides to expressly set out fault requirements, it does
not use language consistently: M. Manning and P. Sankoff, Manning, Mewett
& Sankoff: Criminal Law (4th ed. 2009), at pp. 148-49. As a
result, the courts must, and often do, infer the fault element: see, e.g., Pappajohn
v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, per Dickson J. (as he then was),
at p. 146; Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132 (H.L.), per Lord
Reid, at p. 148; K. Roach, Criminal Law (5th ed. 2012), at
pp. 163-64.
[21]
In my view, this is such a case. The text of
the provision does not expressly set out a fault requirement, but the text read
in light of its full context supports the conclusion that subjective fault is
required. I will begin my analysis by touching on an important presumption of
parliamentary intent that applies here and then turn to the purpose, text and
scheme of the provision. In the course of that analysis, I will explain why,
in my opinion, the Crown’s position that this is an offence of penal negligence
must be rejected.
C. The Broader Context
[22]
I will review three elements of the broader
context of the child abandonment provision: the presumption of legislative
intent in favour of subjective fault, the provision’s legislative evolution and
finally its purpose.
1. Presumed
Legislative Intent
[23]
An important part of the context in which we
must interpret s. 218 is the presumption that Parliament intends crimes to have
a subjective fault element. The Court has stated and relied on this
interpretative principle on many occasions: see, e.g., Watts v. The Queen,
[1953] 1 S.C.R. 505, at p. 511; R. v. Rees, [1956] S.C.R. 640, at p.
652; Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531, at pp. 542-43; R. v.
Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, at pp. 1303 and 1309-10; R. v.
Prue, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547, at pp. 551 and 553; R. v. Bernard, [1988]
2 S.C.R. 833, at p. 871; R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at p. 645;
R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, at p. 18; R. v. Lucas, [1998]
1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 64. Perhaps the classic statement is that of Dickson J. (as
he then was) for the Court in Sault Ste. Marie:
In the case of true crimes
there is a presumption that a person should not be held liable for the
wrongfulness of his act if that act is without mens rea . . . .
. .
. Where the offence is criminal, the Crown must establish a mental element,
namely, that the accused who committed the prohibited act did so intentionally
or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts constituting the offence, or with
wilful blindness toward them. Mere negligence is excluded from the concept of the
mental element required for conviction. Within the context of a criminal
prosecution a person who fails to make such enquiries as a reasonable and
prudent person would make, or who fails to know facts he should have known, is
innocent in the eyes of the law. [Citations omitted; pp. 1303 and 1309-10.]
[24]
Notwithstanding these many statements, the Crown
in effect submits that there is no such presumption of legislative intent
because it has not always been applied. The Crown notes that there are many
offences in the Code that do not require subjective fault and further
that there is no absolute rule requiring complete symmetry between the fault
element and the prohibited consequences of the offence. In my view, however,
these points do not negate the existence of the presumption of legislative
intent. They show merely that the presumption does not invariably determine the
outcome of a full contextual and purposive interpretation of a particular
provision.
[25]
Presumptions of legislative intent are not
self-applying rules. They are instead principles of interpretation. They do
not, on their own, prescribe the outcome of interpretation, but rather set out
broad principles that ought to inform it. As Professor Sullivan has observed,
presumptions of legislative intent, such as this one, serve as a way in which
the courts recognize and incorporate important values into the legal context in
which legislation is drafted and should be interpreted. These values both
inform judicial understanding of legislation and play an important role in
assessing competing interpretations: R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on
the Construction of Statutes (4th ed. 2002), at p. 365.
[26]
Professor Côté has described how these
presumptions may inform the legal context in which legislation is drafted. He
put it this way: “In some sense, presumptions of intent form part of the
enactment’s context, as they reflect ideas which can be assumed to have been both
present in the mind of the legislature and sufficiently current as to render
their explicit mention unnecessary”: P.-A. Côté, in collaboration with S.
Beaulac and M. Devinat, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (4th
ed. 2011), at p. 470; see also R. Cross, Statutory Interpretation (3rd
ed. 1995), by J. Bell and G. Engle, at pp. 165-67, and K. Roach, “Common
Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (2005), 55 U.T.L.J.
733. Parliament must be understood to know that this presumption will likely be
applied unless some contrary intention is evident in the legislation.
[27]
As for the role of the presumption of subjective
fault in assessing competing interpretations, it sets out an important value
underlying our criminal law. It has been aptly termed one of the “presumptive principles
of criminal justice”: R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, per
Charron J., at paras. 22-23. While the presumption must — and often does — give way to clear expressions of a
different legislative intent, it nonetheless incorporates an important value in
our criminal law, that the morally innocent should not be punished. This has
perhaps never been better expressed than it was by Dickson J. in Pappajohn,
at pp. 138-39:
There rests
now, at the foundation of our system of criminal justice, the precept that a
man cannot be adjudged guilty and subjected to punishment, unless the
commission of the crime was voluntarily directed by a willing mind. . . .
Parliament can, of course, by express words, create criminal offences for which
a guilty intention is not an essential ingredient. Equally, mens rea is
not requisite in a wide category of statutory offences which are concerned with
public welfare, health and safety. Subject to these exceptions, mens rea,
consisting of some positive states of mind, such as evil intention, or
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, or reckless disregard of consequences,
must be proved by the prosecution.
[28]
Viewed in this way, the presumption of subjective fault is not an
outdated rule of construction which is at odds with the modern approach to
statutory interpretation repeatedly endorsed by the Court. On the contrary, the
presumption forms part of the context which the modern approach requires to be
considered.
[29]
As I will explain, there is nothing in the text
or context of the child abandonment offence to suggest that Parliament intended
to depart from requiring subjective fault. In fact, the text, scheme and
purpose of the provision support the view that subjective fault is required. To
the extent that Parliament’s intent is unclear, the presumption of subjective
fault ought to have its full operation in this case.
2. Legislative Evolution
[30]
Legislative evolution and history may often be
important parts of the context within which to conduct the modern approach to
statutory interpretation: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, at para. 43.
The Crown has been diligent in providing us with a detailed picture of the
English origins and Canadian evolution of what is now s. 218 . I will touch on
this only briefly, however, because as I see it, this information sheds little
real light on the issue at hand.
[31]
It seems that from the beginning, there were two
strands of prohibitions, one addressing abandoning or exposing a child to risk
to its life or health and the other in relation to the breach of a duty by people
in certain relationships to provide the necessaries of life.
[32]
The origin of the abandonment offence appears to
be in the English The Offences against the Person Act, 1861, 24
& 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 27, which created the misdemeanor of unlawfully
abandoning or exposing any child under the age of two “whereby the life of such
child shall be endangered, or the health of such child shall have been or shall
be likely to be permanently injured”. The early case law is unclear as to
whether subjective or objective fault was required although there is some
support for the view that subjective fault is required: see, e.g., R. v.
White (1871), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311, per Bovill C.J., at p. 313, and per
Blackburn J., at p. 314.
[33]
The necessaries offence appears to have its
origins in the English The Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868, 31 & 32
Vict., c. 122. Section 37 of that Act made it an offence for any parent to
“wilfully neglect to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid, or lodging
for his child, being in his custody, under the age of fourteen years, whereby
the health of such child shall have been or shall be likely to be seriously
injured”. The fault element for this offence appears
to have been objective: R. v. Downes (1875), 1 Q.B.D. 25, per
Bramwell B., at p. 30.
[34]
The two offences appear to have come closer
together in England with the enactment of s. 1 of the Prevention of Cruelty
to, and Protection of, Children Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 44, a
provision that replaced s. 37 of The Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868.
(The latter provision was repealed by s. 18 of the 1889 Act.) Section 1 made it
a misdemeanor for anyone over 16 who had the custody, control, or charge of a
boy under 14 or a girl under 16 to “wilfully” ill-treat, neglect, abandon or
expose such child in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary suffering
or injury to its health. Again, the fault element is not very clear. In R.
v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283, the court approved jury instructions that
seemed to describe both an objective and a subjective requirement.
[35]
In Canada, the abandonment offence and the
necessaries of life offence have been kept distinct. The child abandonment
offence was first enacted in 1869: An Act respecting Offences against the
Person, S.C. 1869, c. 20, s. 26. The offence of failing to provide the
necessaries of life was found in s. 25 of the same Act, and applied to
individuals who were “legally liable” towards others. From 1869 to 1892, the
child abandonment offence did not include any reference to duty: An Act
respecting Offences against the Person (1869), s. 26; An Act respecting
Offences against the Person, R.S.C. 1886, c. 162, s. 20. Thus, the
provision’s early legislative evolution shows clearly that it was not conceived
of as a duty-based offence, and suggests that a subjective intent was required.
[36]
In 1892, both offences were included in the
first Code (The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29).
The abandonment offence was found in s. 216 while the necessaries offence was
found in ss. 209 to 211. The abandonment offence was then similar to the
current provision. It applied, however, only to children under two and
required actual danger to life or permanent injury to health as opposed to the
risk of those things occurring as under the current provision. A
non-exhaustive definition of “abandon” and “expose” was added in 1892. For the
first time, a reference to duty was added, but only in the context of
omissions. The definition provided that “abandon” and “expose” included “a wilful
omission to take charge of the child on the part of a person legally bound to
do so”.
[37]
The non-exhaustive definition added in 1892 also
included “any mode of dealing with [the child] calculated to leave it
exposed to risk without protection”. While I would not attach much weight to
the use of the word “calculated”, I note that, if anything, it suggests a
subjective fault requirement. This is consistent with the fact that the
English case of White, mentioned earlier, appears to have required
subjective fault for the English equivalent of the abandonment offence. In
1954, the words “calculated to” were replaced by “likely to” in the
non-exhaustive definition so that the provision read as it does today: Criminal
Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 185. I would not attach much weight to this
amendment. The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989) suggests that,
particularly in the 18th and 19th centuries, “calculated to” and “likely to”
could be used as synonyms. In any event, both “calculated to” and “likely to”
are consistent with legislative intent to require subjective fault, albeit
“calculated to” could be viewed as requiring specific intent, while “likely to”
suggests that general intent is required.
[38]
All things considered, my view is that the
legislative evolution of the child abandonment offence is, if anything, more
supportive than not of the view that subjective fault is required.
3. Purpose
and Breadth of the Offence
[39]
There is no doubt that the purpose of the
abandonment offence is the protection of children from risk even when no harm
occurs. Prior to the enactment of the offence of child abandonment in 1861,
the offence required actual harm: R. v. Renshaw (1847), 2 Cox C.C. 285; R.
v. Hogan (1851), 2 Den. 277. The new crime of child abandonment filled a
perceived gap by punishing those who placed children in positions of risk: R.
v. Falkingham (1870), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 222; White.
[40]
It follows that the scope of potential liability
under s. 218 of the Code is very broad, encompassing a wide range of
persons and conduct. Liability is not restricted to those who are related to
the child, or who have any duties in relation to the child or even to those who
are in charge of the child at the time. In addition, a very wide range of
conduct falls within the words “abandon” and “expose”. These are broad words
that are not exhaustively defined under the Code .
[41]
Viewed in the light of the broad scope of
potential liability under s. 218 of the Code , the requirement for
subjective fault serves an important purpose of ensuring that the reach of the
criminal law does not extend too far. While the conduct and
people that fall within s. 218 of the Code are broadly defined, the
requirement for subjective fault ensures that only those with a guilty mind are
punished.
D. The Text of the Provisions
[42]
The text of the provisions is found in the
Appendix. There are three main points which emerge from a careful study of the
text and scheme of these provisions. First, the words “abandon”, “expose” and
“wilful” suggest a subjective fault requirement. Second, the use of the word
“likely” in this context does not suggest an objective fault requirement.
Third, what is absent from the text of s. 218 of the Code and the
broader scheme in which it appears strongly suggest that subjective fault is
required.
1. “Abandon”, “Expose” and “Wilful”
Suggest Subjective Fault
[43]
The words “abandon” and “expose” are not given an
exhaustive definition in s. 214 the Code and therefore their ordinary
grammatical meanings remain relevant to their interpretation. Both words
suggest actions taken with knowledge of their consequences. The Oxford
Dictionary of English (2nd ed. rev. 2005), for example, defines
“abandon” as “cease to support or look after (someone);
desert”.
[44]
The same dictionary defines “expose” (in the
sense of “expose someone to”) as “cause someone to be vulnerable
or at risk” or “leave (a child) in the open to die”.
[45]
The definition of “desert” is also helpful: “[A]bandon (a person, cause, or organization) in a way considered
disloyal or treacherous . . . .”
[46]
I agree with Richards J.A. that the words
“abandon” and “expose” on their face, and standing alone, are indicative of
subjective fault: C.A., at para. 59. They involve more than just leaving a
child alone or failing to take care of it: they denote awareness of the risk
involved. This view is also perfectly consistent with the statutory
non-exhaustive definition of “abandon” or “expose” in s. 214 of the Code which,
as noted earlier, suggests a requirement for knowledge of the consequences
flowing from the prohibited acts of abandonment or exposure. This is also
reflected in the jurisprudence. As noted in L.M., abandon means
“leaving the child to its fate” which suggests an act accompanied by knowledge
of or recklessness as to the consequences: paras. 28 and 47; see also, e.g., R.
v. Boulden (1957), 41 Cr. App. R. 105 , at p. 110; Re Davis (1909),
18 O.L.R. 384, at p. 387. This is one of the factors that led the court in Reedy
(No. 2), to imply a subjective fault requirement (p. 107).
[47]
The Crown, in support of its position that the
fault element is objective, argued that the non-exhaustive definition of
“abandon” and “expose” included in the Code in 1892 (now in s. 214 )
likely came from the English decisions of Falkingham and White.
While those cases may well be the origin of the Code definition, this
does not advance the Crown’s position. In both cases, there was evidence of
subjective fault. In White, there was clear evidence that the accused
intentionally and knowingly abandoned and exposed the child and was aware of
the risk. In Falkingham, there was evidence of at least recklessness or
wilful blindness: a mother, with the knowledge and connivance of another woman
who was also charged with child abandonment, had put her child in a hamper and
sent it by train to the child’s father without indicating to the railway
employees that a child was in the package. The accused had been cautious in
“packaging” the child, the mother indicated to the railway clerk to be very
careful with it and wrote on the hamper “with care, to be delivered
immediately” (p. 223). This indicated awareness of the risk.
[48]
What emerges from both the ordinary meaning and
the non-exhaustive statutory definition of the words “abandon” and “expose” is
the notion of awareness of or recklessness in relation to risk.
[49]
That brings me to the word “wilful” found in the
s. 214 definition of the terms “abandon” and “expose”. Richards J.A. for the
majority of the Court of Appeal placed considerable weight on s. 214 ’s use of
the word “wilful” in concluding that subjective fault was required. The word
“wilful” is often (although not always) a strong indication that intention is
required: see, e.g., the discussion in R. v. Buzzanga (1979), 25 O.R.
(2d) 705 (C.A.), at pp. 715-17; R. v. L.B., 2011 ONCA 153, 274
O.A.C. 365, at paras. 108-9, leave to appeal refused, [2011] 3 S.C.R. x; Manning,
Mewett & Sankoff: Criminal Law, at pp. 149-50. While the word is used
here only in the non-exhaustive definition of the words “abandon” and “expose”
and only in relation to omissions, I agree with Richards J.A. that a wilful
omission is the antithesis of a crime involving a mere failure to act in accordance
with some minimum level of behaviour. If Parliament had meant to include in the
terms “abandon” and “expose” situations in which there is no more than a
failure to meet a standard of reasonable conduct, it would not make sense to
require that omissions to observe that standard would have to be “wilful”: C.A.,
at paras. 66-67.
2. The
Word “Likely” Does Not Suggest Objective Fault
[50]
Ottenbreit J.A., in deciding that only objective
fault was required, placed considerable weight on the use of the word “likely”
in the non-exhaustive definition of the terms “abandon” or “expose” in s. 214 :
para. (b) of definition —
that is, “dealing with a child in a manner that is likely to leave that child
exposed to risk”. As he put it, “[t]he terms ‘in a manner . . . likely . . .’ .
. . speak of the societal rather than a personal standard of conduct” (para.
32). However, I do not think that the word “likely” in this context is an
indication of legislative intent to require only objective fault, for two
reasons.
[51]
The French version of the s. 214 definition uses
the terms “pouvant l’exposer” and the French version of the s. 218
offence uses the terms “exposée à l’être”. The French wording suggests
that the focus is on the outcome of the conduct rather than on the standard of
care. This makes it clear that the English word “likely” serves the same
purpose. Moreover, as I have discussed, the purpose of the child abandonment
offence is to criminalize the creation of the risk of harm; it makes it an
offence to expose or abandon a child such that its life or health is put at
serious risk even if no harm actually results. This is consistent with the
well-established view that the criminal law may properly be aimed at preventing
the risk of serious harm: see, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 776; Lucas, at para. 83. The word “likely”, as it
is used in both the s. 214 definition and in the offence provision itself (s.
218 ), is consistent with this preventive purpose. This purpose of criminalizing
the creation of a serious risk of harm is not at all inconsistent with a requirement
of subjective fault —
that is, actual knowledge of the risk of harm — as is clear from the Court’s decision in
Lucas.
[52]
Lucas concerned
the fault element of publishing a defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Code .
A defamatory libel is defined in s. 298 to be a “matter published . . . that is
likely to injure the reputation of any person”. The Court held that the fault
element of the offence requires proof that the accused knew that the published
material was defamatory, in other words, that it was “likely to injure the
reputation of any person”, per Cory J., at paras. 30 and 67-68. Thus,
the term “likely to injure the reputation” was found to require proof of
subjective fault, i.e. that the accused actually knew of the risk of injury to
reputation.
[53]
I therefore conclude that the use of the word
“likely” in s. 214 (and s. 218 ) does not suggest an objective fault element; it
does not, as I see it, speak of a societal rather than a personal standard of
conduct. As in Lucas, the use of the word “likely” is simply aimed at
criminalizing the creation of risk and, as in Lucas, the fault element
may require knowledge of that risk.
3. What Is Not
in the Text and the Scheme of the Code Suggest Subjective Fault
[54]
In my view, what is not in the text of
the provision and what surrounds it suggest that a subjective fault element
should be implied.
(a) What Is Not Found in the Text
[55]
There is no doubt that Parliament can and does
create criminal offences that require objective rather than subjective fault.
How those provisions are drafted sheds some light on the sorts of language used
when that is the intent. As I see it, the text of the child abandonment
provision does not contain any of the language typically employed by Parliament
when it intends to create an offence of objective fault.
[56]
I will briefly review five main types of
objective fault offences in the Code in order to explain why, in my view,
a comparison of the way they are drafted with the text of s. 218 supports the
inference that the latter requires subjective fault. This will lead me to
explain why I reject the Crown’s position that penal negligence should apply to
the s. 218 offence because it applies to the s. 215 offence of failing to
provide the necessaries of life.
[57]
We come first to offences defined in terms of
dangerous conduct. In R. v. Hundal, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, the Court found
that the fault element of the offence of dangerous driving was a manner of
driving which constituted a “marked departure” from that expected of a
reasonable person in the same circumstances. (See also, more recently, Beatty
and R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60.) Several factors
justified adopting an objective rather than a subjective fault requirement:
driving is a regulated activity in which people choose to engage; driving is
automatic and reflexive in nature; and the text of the offence focuses on the
manner of driving, all of which suggest that the offence seeks to impose a
minimum uniform standard of care. Cory J. noted, for example, that “[l]icensed
drivers choose to engage in the regulated activity of driving. They place
themselves in a position of responsibility to other members of the public
who use the roads”: Hundal, at p. 884 (emphasis added). With respect to
the text of the provision, Cory J. observed that it creates an offence of
driving “in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the
circumstances” and this suggests an objective standard: “The ‘manner of
driving’ can only be compared to a standard of reasonable conduct” (p. 885). So
in the case of dangerous driving both the text and nature of the provision, as
well as other factors, provided strong support for an objective fault element.
None of those factors is present in the s. 218 offence.
[58]
Next, there are offences which are expressed in
terms of careless conduct, such as the careless storage of firearms. In R.
v. Finlay, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103, the Court concluded that the carelessness
targeted by the offence is not consistent with subjective fault. The provision
required the Crown to establish that a firearm was used, carried, handled,
shipped or stored “in a careless manner or without reasonable precautions for
the safety of other persons”. The use of the word “careless” and the reference
to “reasonable precautions” were clear markers of objectively assessed fault (pp.
114-15). There is no similar language in s. 218 .
[59]
A third category relates to so-called predicate
offences. These are offences such as unlawful act manslaughter and unlawfully
causing bodily harm which require the commission of an underlying unlawful
act. They have been found to require the mental element for the underlying
offence but only objective foresight of harm flowing from it: see, e.g., R.
v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (unlawfully causing bodily harm); R. v.
Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (unlawful act manslaughter). Without
reiterating the detailed reasons given in those cases, I simply underline that
these offences are ones in which the commission of the predicate or underlying
offence has actual and serious consequences. As Sopinka J. said in DeSousa
(at p. 967) and McLachlin J. repeated in Creighton (at p. 55): “The
implicit rationale of the law in this area is that it is acceptable to
distinguish between criminal responsibility for equally reprehensible acts on
the basis of the harm that is actually caused.” This rationale has no
application to s. 218 ; there is neither a predicate offence nor any need to
show that actual harm resulted from the conduct in the child abandonment
offence.
[60]
On that point, I note that at the court of
appeal level, the Crown suggested that the word “unlawfully” in s. 218 was
intended to imply that a violation of s. 215 constituted a predicate offence to
child abandonment. I disagree. Rather, I agree with Richards J.A. that the word
“unlawfully” in s. 218 is mere surplusage that was left from the original text
in An Act respecting Offences against the Person (1869), s. 26: see, e.g., R. v. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864, at pp. 886-87.
The commission of a s. 215 offence, or any other offence, is not required for
purposes of a child abandonment conviction. Section 218 has a broader
application than s. 215 , which only applies to specific individuals. To hold
that a conviction under s. 218 is dependent upon a conviction under s. 215
would overlook the words “[e]very one” in s. 218 , would void para. (b)
of the s. 214 definition of meaning, and would render s. 218 redundant, as it
would serve the exact same purpose as s. 215 . Section 218 does not provide for
a greater sentence and therefore it is not merely an enhanced form of s. 215 ,
in the way that, for example, unlawfully causing bodily harm (s. 269, maximum
sentence of 10 years) is an enhanced version of assault (s. 266, maximum
sentence of 5 years).
[61]
I should also refer to the offences based on
criminal negligence: see, e.g., ss. 219, 220 and 221. Criminal negligence is
defined as conduct that “shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or
safety of other persons” (s. 219). The text of this provision has fueled much
debate about the required fault element. The use of the word “negligence” in
the name of the offence suggests an objectively defined standard consistent
with the meaning of the word “negligence” in the common law of torts. On the
other hand, the words “wanton and reckless disregard” could be taken as
describing actual knowledge of the risk created by the conduct and therefore a
subjective fault element: see R. v. Anderson, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 265, at pp.
269-70. Ultimately, the Court decided that proof of intention or actual
foresight of a prohibited consequence is not required. Rather, criminal
negligence requires a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a
reasonably prudent person in circumstances in which the accused either
recognized and ran an obvious and serious risk or, alternatively, gave no
thought to that risk: R. v. J.F., 2008 SCC 60, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 215, at paras.
7-11.
[62]
This approach to the fault element in the
criminal negligence offences does not in my view suggest that a similar,
objective fault approach should be taken to the child abandonment provision
that concerns us in this case. Unlike the criminal negligence offences, the
s. 218 offence is not described as being concerned with conduct that is
governed by a community standard rather than an individual appreciation of the
circumstances.
[63]
I turn to a fifth and final category, one
strongly relied on by the Crown in its submissions. That category consists of
the duty-based offence in s. 215 of the Code . Consideration of this
category and of this submission requires a closer look at the scheme of the Code
and the Court’s decision in R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122.
(b) The Scheme of the Code
[64]
Various legal duties are set out in ss. 215, 216,
217 and 217.1, including duties to provide the necessaries of life and to use
reasonable knowledge, skill and care in administering surgical or medical
treatment. However, s. 215 is the only provision that creates an offence, that
of failing to provide the necessaries of life. The Court in Naglik held
that this offence is one of objective fault and the Crown appellant submits
that the same reasoning should apply to the abandonment offence under s. 218 .
[65]
Respectfully, this submission is not persuasive.
The s. 215 offence is structured entirely differently than the s. 218 offence
that concerns us here and the reasoning of Naglik is not applicable to
the s. 218 offence. That reasoning in fact supports the view that subjective
fault is required in s. 218 . Finally, the different purposes served by both
offences also support that view.
[66]
Consider first the differences in the text of
the two provisions. Unlike the s. 218 child abandonment offence, the s. 215
necessaries of life offence considered in Naglik is defined in terms of
failure to perform specified legal duties. What is more, these specified legal
duties arise out of specified relationships between the person owing the duty
and the person to whom the duty is owed. (The text of s. 215 is found in the
Appendix.)
[67]
The essence of the s. 215 offence, then, is that
it imposes legal duties arising out of defined relationships. It is clear that
the decision in Naglik was based on that premise. Lamer C.J. writes, in Naglik:
With respect to the wording of s. 215,
while there is no language in s. 215 such as “ought to have known” indicating
that Parliament intended an objective standard of fault, the language of s. 215
referring to the failure to perform a “duty” suggests that the accused’s
conduct in a particular circumstance is to be determined on an objective, or
community, standard. The concept of a duty indicates a societal minimum which
has been established for conduct: as in the law of civil negligence, a duty
would be meaningless if every individual defined its content for him- or
herself according to his or her subjective beliefs and priorities. Therefore,
the conduct of the accused should be measured against an objective, societal
standard to give effect to the concept of “duty” employed by Parliament. [p.
141]
[68]
The Crown submits that this reasoning applies
equally to s. 218 because that offence, too, may be committed by a person who
fails in a legal duty to take charge of a child. I do not accept this
position. While failure to perform a duty imposed by law on persons in
particular relationships is the essence of the offence created by s. 215, this
is not at all the case with respect to child abandonment under s. 218 . This is
why the reasoning of Naglik cannot apply to s. 218 . The child
abandonment offence may be committed by “[e]very one”; it is not restricted to
persons in particular relationships or under specified, statutorily created
legal duties. The concept of duty in the child abandonment offence becomes
relevant only in relation to an omission and is found in the non-exhaustive
definition of “abandon” or “expose”. Those terms include “a wilful omission to
take charge of a child by a person who is under a legal duty to do so”: para. (a)
of the s. 214 definition. In my opinion, the reference to “legal duty” in
relation to omissions in this section simply gives effect to the common law
principle that criminal responsibility generally does not arise from an
omission unless there is a pre-existing legal duty to act: see, e.g., Roach
(2012), at p. 115; D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (6th ed.
2011), at p. 95. Therefore, the effect of the reference to duty in para. (a)
of the s. 214 definition is to ensure that the offence applies to omissions by
those with a legal duty towards a child. However, the child abandonment
offence does not impose any such duties and people with no duty may be liable,
but only for positive acts captured, for example, by the words “dealing with”
in para. (b) of the s. 214 definition.
[69]
The brief comments about the child abandonment
offence in both Stuart, at p. 96, and Roach (2012), at p. 116, do not support
the view that the fault element of the offence is objective. Rather they point
out, as I have just discussed, that the concept of duty appears in this offence
only in relation to omissions. As for the Manning and Sankoff treatise, it
expresses the view the s. 218 offence is “entirely superfluous” (p. 826) — a conclusion with which I
disagree for the reasons I have already set out. I note that some of the case
law cited by Manning and Sankoff involved parents who were convicted of child
abandonment for having knowingly left their child in risky
circumstances: p. 827, notes 155-56; Christiansen, at para. 8; R. v.
Holzer (1988), 63 C.R. (3d) 301 (Alta. Q.B.), at p. 303.
[70]
Further, it seems to me that the clearly
different structures of the text of s. 218 on one hand, and the duty-based
offence in s. 215 on the other, support the view that the s. 218 offence is
different. Where Parliament intended to base an offence on violation of a duty,
s. 215 shows that it could find the language to do so clearly. None of this
sort of language appears in s. 218 .
[71]
The distinct structure and wording of the child
abandonment offence also counter any suggestion that its placement in the same
part of the Code with the sections creating legal duties (i.e. ss. 215
to 217.1 ) informs the nature of the required fault element. The placement of a
provision within the Code or the elements of other offences in the same
part of the Code do not often assist in determining the nature of its
fault requirement and are particularly unhelpful here: see, e.g., Pappajohn,
at p. 146. While the provision is placed under the heading “Duties Tending
to Preservation of Life”, the marginal note of s. 218 , “Abandoning child” is
the only one of the five sections under this heading which does not have
the word “duty” in its marginal note. If anything, this tends to underline that
it is different from the other provisions.
[72]
The child abandonment offence has the same range
of possible punishments as does the objective fault offence of failing to
provide necessaries in s. 215. However, the range of punishments says little
about the required fault element. To take a stark example, criminal negligence
causing death, with a possible punishment of life in prison, has an objective
fault element requirement. Theft under five thousand dollars, which may be
prosecuted by summary conviction, is an offence not only requiring subjective
fault but specific intent. I do not find any help in defining the fault
requirement of the child abandonment offence that other offences which may be
punished with the same or even greater periods of imprisonment require only
objective fault.
(c) Conclusion on the Text of the Provision and Scheme of the
Code
[73]
To sum up, none of the considerations that
persuaded the Court to adopt an objective fault standard in the categories of offences
I have just reviewed is present in the child abandonment offence under s. 218 .
The prohibition applies to everyone, not just to a particular group engaged in
a regulated activity or standing in a particular, defined relationship with the
alleged victim. Nothing in the text suggests an intention to impose a minimum
and uniform standard of care. There are no references in the text to
“dangerous”, “careless” or “reasonable” conduct or any requirement to take
“reasonable precautions”. There is no predicate offence and no actual harm is
required by the provision. The provision does not create, define or impose a
duty to do anything other than in the sense that all criminal offences could be
considered to create a duty not to commit them.
[74]
I conclude that both what is present in s. 218
of the Code and its related provisions and what is absent from it
strongly support the view that a subjective fault element is required.
E. Conclusion
[75]
In my view, the text, context and purpose of s.
218 of the Code show that subjective fault is required. It follows that
the trial judge did not err in acquitting the respondent on the basis that this
subjective fault requirement had not been proved. The Court of Appeal was
correct to uphold the acquittal.
V. Disposition
[76]
I would dismiss the appeal.
The reasons of Rothstein and
Moldaver JJ. were delivered by
Moldaver J. —
I. Introduction
[77]
Section 218 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46 (“Code ”), makes it an offence to abandon or expose a child
under the age of 10 so that the child’s life is or is likely to be endangered
or its health is or is likely to be permanently injured. The question
presented in this appeal concerns the mental element, or mens rea, that
applies to the proscribed consequences of abandonment or exposure, namely, the
risk of death or permanent injury to the child’s health. Specifically, is
fault to be judged subjectively, which is to say, focusing on whether the
accused actually knew that abandoning the child would put its life or health in
danger? Or is it to be judged objectively, focusing on whether a reasonable
person in the same circumstances would have known that abandoning the child
would put its life or health in danger? Notwithstanding this crime’s ancient
lineage — and the vital purpose it serves in protecting the most vulnerable
among us — it is a question about which this Court has not spoken.
[78]
The facts and judgments below have been set out
by Cromwell J. for the majority, whose reasons I have had the opportunity of
reading. Like the majority, I too would uphold the respondent’s acquittal, but
for reasons that differ from those of Justice Cromwell.
[79]
My colleague concludes that s. 218 requires
subjective foreseeability of the consequences that follow or are likely to
follow upon the child being abandoned or exposed. Under this approach, to
sustain a conviction, the Crown would be required to prove, among other things,
that upon abandoning or exposing the child, the accused foresaw that his or her
conduct placed or was likely to place the child at risk of death or permanent
injury, and went ahead anyway, reckless as to the consequences.
[80]
Respectfully, I do not read the provision as
requiring such a high degree of fault in respect of the proscribed
consequences. Nor do I believe that such an interpretation reflects
Parliament’s will.
[81]
In its essence, s. 218 is child protection
legislation. It seeks to protect a limited class of people (children under the
age of 10) from two defined risks (death or permanent injury) that occur or are
likely to occur from abandoning or exposing the child. And, as I will explain,
the section is aimed at three limited classes of people faced with a situation
where a child under 10 is or is likely to be at risk of death or permanent
injury: (1) those who have a pre-existing and an ongoing legal duty to take
charge of the child; (2) those who choose to come to the aid of the child in
that situation; and (3) those who place the child in that situation.
[82]
Construed this way, as I believe s. 218 is meant
to be, penal negligence is sufficient to satisfy the fault component of the
provision as it relates to the consequences of abandoning or exposing a child.
To prove penal negligence, the Crown must establish that a reasonable person
would have foreseen that his or her conduct placed, or was likely to place, the
child at risk of death or permanent injury and that the accused’s conduct
constituted a marked departure from that expected of a reasonable person in the
circumstances.
[83]
The recognized tools of statutory interpretation
support the conclusion that penal negligence is the requisite fault element for
the proscribed consequences in s. 218 of the Code . In what follows, I
propose to canvass the plain language of the provision, its legislative
history, relevant scholarly opinion, and this Court’s precedents in an attempt
to establish as much. But I also propose to rely on some common sense.
Indeed, when one steps back from the mechanistic and often result-driven
application of the seemingly endless and at times contradictory tools of
statutory interpretation, common sense may, and generally will, prove to be the
best guide to statutory interpretation. It certainly is here, as I will explain.
II. Analysis
A. Understanding the Elements of the Offence of Child
Abandonment
[84]
As with all offences, to secure a conviction
under s. 218 , the Crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct
of the accused satisfies every element of the offence. For convenience, I set
out the provision in its entirety:
218. [Abandoning child] Every one
who unlawfully abandons or exposes a child who is under the age of ten years,
so that its life is or is likely to be endangered or its health is or is likely
to be permanently injured,
(a) is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years; or
(b) is
guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months.
Section 214 of the Code
defines the words “abandon” and “expose” for the purposes of s. 218 , and
reads as follows:
214. In this Part,
“abandon” or “expose”
includes
(a)
a wilful omission to take charge of a child by a person who is under a legal
duty to do so, and
(b)
dealing with a child in a manner that is likely to leave that child exposed to
risk without protection;
[85]
It bears noting that the offence under s. 218 is
not concerned with an act of abandonment or exposure in the abstract, or even
the act of abandoning or exposing any child. Rather, it is concerned with an
act of abandoning or exposing a child under 10 so that the child is subject to
certain risks. There are thus three distinct elements, as follows:
1. an act
of abandonment or exposure,
2. of a
child under the age of 10,
3. so that
the child’s life is or is likely to be endangered or its health is or is
likely to be permanently injured.
[86]
These three elements have been termed “acts”, “circumstances” and
“consequences”. See D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th
ed. 2011), at p. 56. The act — here, abandonment or exposure — speaks to the
conduct that, on its own or because of its consequences, the law seeks to
punish. The circumstances — here, a child under 10 — bring more specificity to
the conduct by identifying certain facts or conditions that must be present.
Finally, the consequences — here, the risk to the child’s life or health — are
the result that the law seeks to prevent. Breaking an offence down into its
various parts is important because, as Professor Ormerod observes, “the law may
require different mental elements for the various constituents” (p. 56). This
is true with respect to s. 218 and, for reasons I will explain, care must thus
be taken to distinguish between the act, its circumstances and its consequences
in assessing the requisite mens rea for the offence.
[87]
The mens rea of an offence “does not
exist in the air or in the abstract but must be related to certain consequences
or circumstances” (K. Roach, Criminal Law (5th ed. 2012), at p. 164).
As a general rule, a mental element, whether subjective or objective, will
accompany each physical element of a crime, be it the act, its circumstances or
its consequences. For example, as the third element in s. 218 requires that
the child’s life or health is or is likely to be placed at risk, absent an
exception to the rule, there must be an accompanying mental element of some
kind, whether subjective or objective, that addresses the accused’s state of
mind in respect of the risk to the child.
[88]
Furthermore, it is worth recalling that a
particular offence may well have some mental elements that are assessed
subjectively and others that are assessed objectively. In R. v.
Hinchey, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 80, L’Heureux-Dubé J., for
the majority, refused to accept that “an offence must be either subjective or
objective with no possible middle ground”. In her view,
the mens rea of a particular
offence is composed of the totality of its component fault elements. The mere
fact that most criminal offences require some subjective component does
not mean that every element of the offence requires such a state of mind.
[Emphasis in original; para. 80.]
With that point in mind,
one must be careful not to speak of a crime as requiring simply subjective or
objective mens rea. Such conclusions “tel[l] only part of the story”,
and a “more precise approach” requires identifying each mental element in
relation to its coordinate physical element (Roach, at p. 164). Accordingly,
the task before us is to identify the mental element for each of the
three physical elements of the offence of child abandonment — the act, the
circumstances and the consequences.
[89]
That brings me to the presumption that
Parliament intends crimes to have a subjective fault element. My colleague
does a thorough analysis of the subject and concludes that
the presumption of subjective fault is
not an outdated rule of construction which is at odds with the modern approach
to statutory interpretation repeatedly endorsed by the Court. On the contrary,
the presumption forms part of the context which the modern approach requires to
be considered. [para. 28]
[90]
I do not take issue with that observation. Care
must be taken, however, to keep the presumption in its proper perspective. As
Morris Manning and Peter Sankoff observe in their treatise:
While
generally correct, even [the presumption of subjective mens rea] runs
the possibility of being misinterpreted. Although subjective fault is clearly
the preferred standard, this has not always extended to every element of the
offence, and it is particularly controversial in relation to the mental
foresight required for particular consequences. [Emphasis added.]
(Manning,
Mewett & Sankoff: Criminal Law (4th ed. 2009), at p. 153)
[91]
The authors’ caution is well founded. A line of
decisions from this Court, beginning with R. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, have made clear that criminal
law may justifiably “distinguish between criminal responsibility for equally
reprehensible acts on the basis of the harm that is actually caused” (p. 967).
Thus, for so-called “predicate” offences, the law requires subjective mens
rea only for the underlying act, while accepting objective mens rea for
the consequences that flow from that act. As McLachlin J. (as she then
was) aptly put it in R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 3, at p. 54,
“[c]onsequences can be important.”
[92]
More broadly, however, the adoption of objective
mens rea for the consequences of a particular act is not confined to
predicate offences. Such a narrow approach would “not [be] consistent
with the way in which this Court has defined standards of fault” (Hinchey,
at para. 81). In the end, “the question of which crimes can legitimately
possess objective fault elements . . . will often depend on the wording of a
particular section as well as its legislative purpose and context” (para. 83).
Bearing that observation in mind, this Court has concluded in certain cases
other than those dealing with predicate offences that objective mens rea is
the appropriate standard with respect to the consequences of particular acts.
See, e.g., R. v. Lohnes, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 167 (causing a
disturbance); R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (conspiracy to prevent or lessen competition
unduly); R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122 (failing to provide the
necessaries of life).
[93]
The same logic applies here. For reasons I will
develop, the wording of s. 218 , its legislative purpose and its context lead to
the conclusion that objective mens rea is the standard against which the
third element of the offence — the consequences of abandoning or exposing a
child — is to be measured.
B. Some Common Sense About Child Abandonment
[94]
As Professor Don Stuart has observed, “[m]ore
ink has been spilt over the guilty mind concept than any other substantive
criminal law topic” (Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (6th ed. 2011),
at p. 167). The cases and commentary are muddled by a “bewildering variety of
terminology” and “semantic acrobatics” (p. 167). Regrettably, the case at hand
is no exception. Before turning to the task of statutory interpretation, then,
I think it important to pause and reflect on the offence we are tasked with
interpreting.
[95]
As mentioned, s. 218 is child protection
legislation. It seeks to protect children under the age of 10 who cannot fend
for themselves and who, for that reason, are among society’s most vulnerable
members. To be sure, abandoning or exposing a child under the age of 10 is a
risky matter. No reasonable person would suggest otherwise. Given the
inherent danger of abandoning or exposing a helpless child, Parliament has
chosen to criminalize such conduct, but only to the extent that it places or is
likely to place the child at risk of death or permanent injury. To put the
matter somewhat differently, s. 218 reflects an effort by Parliament to require
certain individuals to take care of a young child in certain situations that
threaten its life or health. In the interests of protecting the child, the
provision thus imposes a societal minimum standard of conduct.
[96]
Once it is accepted that in enacting s. 218
Parliament intended to guard against dangerous conduct that any reasonable
person would foresee is likely to endanger a child’s life or expose it to
permanent injury, I fail to see why Parliament would turn around and provide
accused persons with a host of defences based on their individual
characteristics. Doing so would effectively defeat the provision’s purpose of
imposing a societal minimum standard of conduct, since crimes of subjective
fault require an assessment of personal characteristics to the extent that they
tend to prove or disprove an element of the offence (Creighton, at p.
63). Age, temperament, mental development, experience, sophistication and education
would all factor into the determination of whether a particular accused
appreciated the risk of harm resulting from the inherently dangerous conduct of
abandoning or exposing a helpless child. Of particular concern, such an
approach would provide a defence to the errant parent or irresponsible
caregiver who, by virtue of intoxication, could not or did not foresee the
likely consequences of his or her dangerous conduct, whether it be locking a
child in a car on a hot summer’s day or exposing a child to the elements on a
cold winter’s night.
[97]
I do not accept that Parliament, in enacting s.
218 , contemplated such a self-defeating regime. Common sense suggests that
Parliament would not treat the lives and safety of innocent children with such
indifference.
[98]
These observations are neither new nor novel.
One need only look back to the last time this Court addressed the fault
requirements of a child protection measure in the Criminal Code to find
support for an objective standard in this context. In Naglik, the Court
interpreted the fault requirements for s. 215 — a sister provision to s. 218
that punishes a failure to provide the necessaries of life. No member of the Naglik
Court questioned the need for an objective standard. Indeed, every member
of the Court recognized that anything other than an objective standard would
undermine the provision’s purpose. Even Lamer C.J., who would have allowed for
some personal characteristics, was unequivocal that a subjective standard was
untenable in this context:
Section 215 is aimed at establishing a
uniform minimum level of care to be provided for those to whom it applies, and this
can only be achieved if those under the duty are held to a societal, rather
than a personal, standard of conduct. [Emphasis added; emphasis in
original deleted; p. 141.]
Justice McLachlin (as she
then was), speaking for the majority on this issue, went further, holding that
personal factors such as “youth, experience, [and] education” have no place in
adjudicating fault for this kind of offence (p. 148). With respect, I believe
the same holds true for s. 218 .
C. Section 218 Is a Duty-Based Offence
[99]
Turning then to the heart of the matter, in my
view, s. 218 is a duty-based offence — no less so than its sister provision s.
215. Admittedly, the wording of s. 218 is not as explicit as the wording of s.
215 and more work is needed to uncover the true purpose of s. 218 and the
individuals it targets. However, if s. 218 is duty-based, then the reasoning
that led this Court in Naglik to conclude that penal negligence
satisfies the fault element in s. 215 applies with equal force to s. 218 as a
matter of principle and precedent. It is really as simple as that.
[100]
As indicated, I am satisfied that s. 218 targets
three limited classes of people faced with a situation where a child under 10
is or is likely to be at risk of death or permanent injury:
1. those
who have a pre-existing and an ongoing legal duty to take charge of the child;
2. those
who choose to come to the aid of the child in that situation; and
3. those
who place the child in that situation.
I explain my thinking in
what follows.
(1) The Language of Sections 214 and 218
[101]
Turning to the first group mentioned above,
while s. 218 of the Code does not itself refer to persons who have a
legal duty to take charge of a child under the age of 10 years, s. 214 , which
provides a non-exhaustive definition of the terms “abandon” and “expose” as
used in s. 218 , incorporates such persons expressly. Paragraph (a) of
the definition includes within the meaning of “abandon” or “expose” “a wilful
omission to take charge of a child by a person who is under a legal duty to
do so”.
[102]
As a consequence of this language, s. 218
plainly takes in a large swath of people who owe a legal duty to take
charge of a child under the age of 10 — including parents, foster parents and
guardians, the people most likely to run afoul of the provision by virtue of
being the central figures in a child’s life. Once that is accepted, as I think
it must be, I fail to see how or why the provision should not be characterized
as “duty-based”.
[103]
The recognition that s. 218 sweeps within its
ambit persons who are already duty-bound to protect a child leads to the
central difficulty with holding that s. 218 is, in its entirety, a subjective mens
rea offence. Put simply, if the great bulk of people to whom the provision
applies have a pre-existing and ongoing legal duty to take charge of children
who fall below the age of 10, it hardly seems reasonable, or right, that they
should be judged against a subjective mens rea standard when the very
same people who run afoul of the duty-based provision next door (s. 215) are
judged on a penal negligence standard (see Naglik). Self-evidently,
the result would be a double standard — an objective standard under s. 215 and
a subjective standard under s. 218 — for provisions that serve similar, if not
identical, purposes: protecting the same children, imposing a duty on the same
people, guarding against the same consequences.
[104]
One might be inclined to justify such a double
standard on the basis of a key difference in s. 218 , namely that it applies to
people who have a pre-existing and ongoing legal duty to children under the age
of 10 and to those who do not have such a duty, by virtue of para.
(b) of the definition of “abandon” or “expose” in s. 214 . That part of
the definition includes persons “dealing with a child in a manner that is
likely to leave that child exposed to risk without protection”, which at first
blush could be read as sweeping in a large number of people who have no
pre-existing duty to the child.
[105]
If one were inclined to argue that para. (b)
makes a critical difference, one might reason that Parliament picked the better
of only two options before it with respect to mens rea. Parliament
could have identified an objective mens rea standard in s. 218 for those
with a pre-existing and ongoing duty (to achieve harmony with s. 215) and a
subjective mens rea standard for the others captured by para. (b)
(to restrict the scope of criminal liability). However, this result — a single
crime that contemplates different mental standards for different persons
engaging in the same culpable acts — is entirely foreign to our criminal law.
Surely, Parliament did not intend this. The only remaining option, then, might
be to allow persons with a pre-existing and ongoing duty to reap the benefit of
the subjective higher standard, even if that created a double standard for
them. Such a result, it might be argued, would ensure that those additional
individuals caught by para. (b) of the s. 214 definition are not
unjustly branded as criminals. That is the approach the majority adopts.
[106]
Respectfully, I would prefer not to endorse such
a stark double standard — and, fortunately, I need not do so. There is a third
option. Section 218 can, and in my view should, be read purposefully and
harmoniously, such that it applies only to persons who are cloaked with a duty,
whether pre-existing and ongoing or situational, to protect a particular
child under the age of 10 from death or permanent injury, all of whom are
properly subject to an objective standard with respect to the consequences
element of s. 218 . Let me explain.
[107]
Manifestly, the language of para. (b) of
the s. 214 definition is broad. The plain language of the words “dealing with
a child” can connote much; the question is how much. In my view, they are
meant to capture those people who take active steps to alleviate a situation or
who place a child in a situation that will, or is likely to, endanger the
child’s life or cause it permanent injury — the second and third groups to
which I referred above. Such persons are cloaked with a situational duty
to take reasonable steps to preserve and protect the life and safety of the
child during the course of their limited involvement with the child.
[108]
The facts of the present case provide a fitting
example. The store manager became duty-bound to the child, A.J.H., when he
removed him from the toilet. Having taken active steps to come to the child’s
aid, he was cloaked with a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the child
from further harm. No such duty attached to the assistant store manager or the
store patrons, however, as they did not choose to become directly involved with
the child. Consequently, they did not “dea[l] with” the child within the
meaning of s. 214 .
[109]
Situational duties of the kind I describe here
are far from foreign to the Code . I gain comfort in the case at hand
from ss. 216 , 217 and 217.1 of the Code , each of which contemplate a
duty imposed by law on an individual who undertakes to do something by virtue
of positive actions. Section 217 , for example, provides:
217. Every one who undertakes to do an act is under a legal duty to do it
if an omission to do the act is or may be dangerous to life.
[110]
Much like the language in para. (b) of
the s. 214 definition of “abandon” or “expose”, the language of “undertak[ing]
to do an act” in s. 217 is capable of a sweeping definition. But that is not
the path the criminal law has followed — and wisely so. As Abella J.A. (as she
then was) observed in R. v. Browne (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 775 (C.A.) :
There is no doubt that the definition
embraces an interpretive continuum ranging from an assertion to a promise. But
it seems to me that when we are deciding whether conduct is caught by the web
of criminal liability, the threshold definition we apply must justify penal
sanctions. . . . The word “undertaking” in s. 217 must be interpreted in this
context. The threshold definition must be sufficiently high to justify such
serious penal consequences. The mere expression of words indicating a
willingness to do an act cannot trigger the legal duty. There must be something
in the nature of a commitment, generally, though not necessarily, upon which
reliance can reasonably be said to have been placed. [Emphasis added; pp.
779-80.]
[111]
In my view, Justice Abella’s conclusion with
respect to s. 217 points to the proper construction of para. (b) of the
s. 214 definition as cloaking with a duty to act reasonably only those people
who by active steps undertake to preserve and protect a child from death or
permanent injury (the second group mentioned above). By the same token, it
does not require a leap of logic to conclude that “dealing with” a child within
the meaning of para. (b) of the s. 214 definition must similarly be
restricted in scope to those who actually place the child in a situation in
which it is put at risk of death or permanent injury (the third group).
[112]
When one steps back to look at the broader
picture, the understanding that one’s positive actions can give rise to a
situational duty is a principle well known to the common law. As Professors
Colvin and Anand have noted, historically there have been “three reasonably
well-established categories of duty to act” (Principles of Criminal Law
(3rd ed. 2007), at p. 141). The first is well known and concerns “general
relationships of care and protection”, such as those captured by para. (a)
of the s. 214 definition. The second concerns “specific undertakings to act”
(see, e.g., R. v. Nicholls (1874), 13 Cox C.C. 75; R. v. Instan,
[1893] 1 Q.B. 450) and the third concerns duties arising from “causal
responsibility for dangerous situations” (see, e.g., R. v. Salmon (1880),
6 Q.B.D. 79; R. v. Coyne (1958), 124 C.C.C. 176 (N.B.S.C. (App. Div.)); R.
v. Miller, [1983] 1 All E.R. 978 (H.L.)). See also Ormerod, at pp. 70-75
(including “[p]arents and other relations”, “[v]oluntary undertakings”, and
“[c]reating a dangerous situation” as categories). These three categories map
precisely to the three groups of individuals who I conclude come within the
ambit of s. 218 . While it is, of course, true that our criminal law does not
include common law offences, in my view, the wording of para. (b) of the
s. 214 definition reflects a specific statutory instantiation
of the second and third of these long-standing common law principles — much
like ss. 216 , 217 and 217.1 do — in this case with respect to young children.
[113]
Interpreting the scope of s. 218 in this way, as
I believe it was meant to be, goes a long way toward addressing concerns about
the broad scope of potential liability under the provision. The spectre of
criminal liability under the offence is not overly broad. Indeed, the
interpretation I favour may be narrower than that endorsed in the
majority position, which does not delineate the type of conduct that would
amount to “dealing with” a child. All else being equal, I thus cannot accept
that the scope of this offence is a valid ground to require subjective
foresight of the consequences proscribed by s. 218 .
(2) The Statutory Scheme
[114]
I also note that s. 218 finds its place in Part
VIII of the Code under the heading “Duties Tending to Preservation of
Life”. It is one of two offences located under that heading — the other being
s. 215 . In my view, this provides some indication that Parliament intended
that s. 218 be construed as a duty-based offence.
[115]
In her text, Sullivan on the Construction of
Statutes (5th ed. 2008), Professor Ruth Sullivan, a leading authority on
the construction of statutes, observes that “headings are a valid indicator of
legislative meaning and may be taken into account in interpretation” (p. 394).
See also R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 47. Of particular
note, in discussing the relationship between provisions grouped under the same
heading, she writes:
When
provisions are grouped together under a heading it is presumed that they are
related to one another in some particular way, that there is a shared
subject or object or a common feature to the provisions. [Emphasis added; p.
396.]
[116]
While I do not place undue weight on it, I think
some significance can be attached to the fact that s. 218 is coupled with one
other offence, s. 215, which is clearly duty-based. And as I have just noted,
s. 218 is grouped with other provisions (ss. 216 , 217 and 217.1 ) that speak to
the creation of legal duties in particular circumstances. Manifestly, s. 218
is embedded in a number of provisions which have, as their common denominator,
the concept of “duty”. That being so, it seems anomalous that Parliament
would, for no apparent reason, insert a non-duty-based offence into a thicket
of duty-related provisions. The scenario becomes even more remarkable when one
appreciates that s. 218 is concerned with inherently dangerous conduct that is
or is likely to put the lives and safety of helpless young children at risk —
the very type of situation which, in my view, requires a societal minimum
standard of conduct and calls out for a standard of fault based on objective
foreseeability.
[117]
The reason, in my view, why the word “duty” is
not found in s. 218 is because s. 218 deals primarily with acts of commission,
whereas s. 215 deals with acts of omission. We do not speak of parents failing
“not to abandon” their children or failing “not to expose” them to the risk of
death or permanent injury. The gravamen of s. 218 lies not in the failure of
an accused to do that which he or she is legally obliged to do (although para. (a)
of the s. 214 definition accounts for such a situation) but rather, the doing
of something that is inherently dangerous — abandoning or exposing a helpless
child to the risk of death or permanent injury.
(3) Scholarly Opinion
[118]
Finally, I note that scholarly opinion on the
offence of abandoning or exposing a child under s. 218 of the Code is
sparse, but that which there is suggests the offence is duty-based.
[119]
In his treatise, Professor Stuart indicates that
the offence of child abandonment is a duty-based offence, although not one
where the duty is stated within the offence. He places it in the category of
“[o]ffences that extend to omissions but do not create a legal duty to act so a
legal duty outside the offence must be found” (p. 96). According to Professor
Stuart, this category describes two types of offences, the first of which encompasses
child abandonment:
The first is
where the Code offences refer to a duty without defining it. Examples occur in
the case of the offences of permitting an escape by failing to perform “a legal
duty” (section 146 (a)), committing a common nuisance by failing to
discharge “a legal duty” (section 180 ), and abandoning a child by omitting
to take charge of it when under “a legal duty to do so” (sections 214 and
218 ). [Emphasis added; p. 96.]
[120]
As I have explained, narrowing the scope of the
offence under s. 218 exclusively to those who have a pre-existing and ongoing
duty cannot be supported by the plain text of the provision in light of para. (b)
of the s. 214 definition of “abandon” or “expose”. Nonetheless, I would take
Professor Stuart as making the more modest point that s. 218 at least in part
looks to those with such pre-existing and ongoing duties and, as such, is
properly characterized as duty-based.
[121]
Likewise, Professor Roach, at pp. 115-16 of his
text, explains that although an omission will not generally constitute the actus
reus of an offence, a failure to act will suffice where an individual has a
“specific legal duty to act”. He then includes child abandonment in his list
of duty-based offences:
There is a duty to use reasonable care when providing medical
treatment or other lawful acts that may endanger the life of others. This duty
was breached by a person who donated blood that he knew was infected with HIV.
It is also an offence not to use reasonable care in handling explosives; to
disobey a court order; to fail to assist a peace officer when requested; to
abandon a child; not to obtain assistance in child-birth; to fail to stop
when your vehicle is involved in an accident; to neglect animals; and to fail
to take steps to protect holes in ice or open excavations. [Footnotes omitted;
emphasis added; p. 116.]
[122]
Finally, Manning and Sankoff, at p. 826 of their
treatise, take a glum view of s. 218 , calling it “entirely superfluous” on the
basis that “there does not appear to be a conceivable situation in which
abandonment would not also constitute a failure to provide the necessaries of
life [under s. 215]”. Again, I note that this analysis neglects to take any
account of para. (b) of the s. 214 definition of “abandon” or “expose”
and I do not comment on their thesis that s. 218 is superfluous. But setting
those matters aside, in saying that s. 218 is entirely subsumed by s. 215 —
which everyone agrees is a duty-based offence — these authors must be taken as
accepting that s. 218 is likewise a duty-based offence.
(4) Conclusion on the Duty-Based Nature
of Section 218
[123]
To sum up, the plain language of s. 218 —
supported by the place of situational duties in Canadian criminal law, the
offence’s placement among other duty-based provisions in the Code and
the scholarship on s. 218 — leads to the conclusion that the offence of child
abandonment is duty-based. It is targeted at three distinct groups faced with
a situation where a child under 10 is or is likely to be at risk of death or
permanent injury: first, by virtue of para. (a) of the s. 214
definition, those with a pre-existing and ongoing duty to take charge of the
child; second, by virtue of para. (b), those who “dea[l] with” the child
by undertaking positive steps to come to its aid in that situation; and third,
again by virtue of para. (b), those who “dea[l] with” the child by
placing it in that situation.
[124]
With this in mind, I turn again to the wording
of s. 218 , and particularly the language employed with respect to the
consequences, the mental element of which forms the crux of this case:
218. Every one who unlawfully
abandons or exposes a child who is under the age of ten years, so that its
life is or is likely to be endangered or its health is or is likely to be
permanently injured . . . .
[125]
This language, which we are tasked with
interpreting today, is strikingly similar to that which this Court explained in
the context of s. 215, the sister provision to s. 218 concerning a failure to
provide the necessaries of life. As I have already mentioned, this Court held
in Naglik that the mens rea for s. 215 is in relevant part
satisfied on an objective basis. In an opinion unanimous on this issue,
Lamer C.J., at p. 143, asked rhetorically, “What parts of the offence must be objectively
foreseeable?” and then identified the subparagraph in s. 215 that I emphasize
below:
(2)
Every one commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within the meaning
of subsection (1), fails without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on him,
to perform that duty, if
(a) with respect to a duty imposed . .
.
(ii)
the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the
duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered
permanently . . . .
[126]
As is apparent, the relevant language in both
provisions is strikingly similar. If s. 218 is duty-based, as I have attempted
to show it is, then this should be the end of the matter — there is no basis
in principle or precedent for departing from the rule announced in Naglik.
This Court’s reasoning with respect to s. 215 applies with equal force to s.
218, and it does not stand to reason that the mental element for the risk
element of child abandonment is anything other than objective. But if that is
not enough, there is more.
D. The Legislative History Confirms an Objective Standard for
the Proscribed Consequences
[127]
The legislative history of s. 218 is traceable
to The Offences against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict.,
c. 100. The forerunner to what is now s. 218 is found in s. 27 of that Act,
accompanied by the following marginal note: “Exposing Children whereby Life
endangered”. The provision, in its relevant part, reads as follows:
27. Whosoever shall unlawfully abandon or expose any child, being under
the age of two years, whereby the life of such child shall be
endangered, or the health of such child shall have been or shall be likely to
be permanently injured, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
[128]
I have emphasized the word “whereby” which I
take to mean “in consequence of” — hardly words one normally associates with
subjective foresight. To be sure, this was no oversight. Words such as
“knowingly”, “maliciously” and “with intent”, commonly understood as indicating
a requirement of subjective mens rea, are used throughout the Act.
[129]
In 1869, Canada’s Parliament enacted An Act
respecting Offences against the Person, S.C. 1869, c. 20.
Section 26 of that Act tracked the wording of s. 27 of the English statute in
all material respects:
26. Whosoever unlawfully abandons or exposes any child being under the
age of two years, whereby the life of such child is endangered, or the
health of such child has been, or is likely to be permanently injured, is
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
[130]
In 1893, Canada’s first Criminal Code
came into force (The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29). Under the
heading “Duties Tending to the Preservation of Life”, Parliament created
several duty-based offences. Embedded in them was s. 216 , accompanied by the
following marginal note: “Abandoning children under two years of age”.
Section 216 provided as follows:
216. Every one is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to three years’ imprisonment who unlawfully
abandons or exposes any child under the age of two years, whereby its life is
endangered, or its health is permanently injured.
2. The words “abandon” and “expose” include a wilful omission to
take charge of the child on the part of a person legally bound to do so, and
any mode of dealing with it calculated to leave it exposed to risk without
protection.
[131]
As is self-evident, the first part of the
provision essentially tracks the language of s. 26 of An Act respecting Offences
against the Person. The second part is new and very much resembles what is
now paras. (a) and (b) of the s. 214 definition of “abandon” or
“expose” — with one notable exception. The second half of s. 216(2) reads “any
mode of dealing with [the child] calculated to leave it exposed to risk
without protection”, whereas para. (b) of the s. 214 definition reads
“dealing with a child in a manner that is likely to leave that child
exposed to risk without protection”. In short, the words “calculated to leave”
were replaced by the words “likely to leave”. Though the change may appear
highly meaningful to modern eyes, care must be taken not to confuse obsolete
and current meanings of those words. As the majority observes, in the 18th and
19th centuries, “calculated to” and “likely to” were synonyms. This change occurred
with the adoption of a new Code (Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c.
51, s. 185) and thus is perhaps best explained as an attempt to update
language to reflect current usage. As Professor Sullivan notes, such a statutory
revision can serve “to ensure the clarity, consistency and readability” of the
revised act, as a result of which “outdated terminology may be modernized” (pp.
653-54). The wording of the provisions creating the offence of abandonment,
now ss. 214 and 218 , has not been amended since.
[132]
The plain language of the provision aside, early
judicial interpretations of the child abandonment provision can be helpful in
interpreting the modern-day s. 218. In the leading English authority of R.
v. White (1871), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311, a father failed to take custody of his
nine-month-old child. The child was left on the road in front of the father’s
home by his estranged wife, who demanded that he take the child. The father
was charged and convicted under s. 27 of The Offences against the Person
Act, 1861, and the conviction was upheld on appeal.
[133]
The White decision makes no mention of
subjective mens rea as being required to make out the offence of
abandonment. Indeed, it suggests the opposite, as evidenced by the following
passage from Chief Justice Bovill’s opinion, to which the remaining four
justices subscribed:
Instead of protecting and providing for
the child, as it was his duty to do, [the father] allowed it to remain lying,
first at his door, and afterwards in the road, insufficiently clothed, and at a
time of year when the result was likely to be the child’s death.
[Emphasis added; p. 313.]
In my view, the language
used by Bovill C.J. is the language of objective foreseeability (death was the
likely result) and not the language of subjective foreseeability (he knew
that death was likely to result).
[134]
I acknowledge that in a separate opinion written
by Blackburn J., language is used from which one might conclude that he viewed
the crime of abandonment as requiring subjective foresight:
. . . upon
[the father] there is a strict legal duty to protect the child. And when the
child is left in a position of danger of which he knows, and from which he has
full power to remove it, and he neglects his duty of protection, and lets the
child remain in danger, I think this is an exposure and abandonment by him. [p.
314]
I do not read that
passage as indicating that subjective foresight is required to make out the
offence of abandonment. Rather, on Justice Blackburn’s assessment of the
facts, the father clearly knew that the child’s life was imperilled and yet did
nothing about it. I would not, and do not, suggest that a person who in fact
subjectively foresees a risk of death or permanent injury to the child cannot
be convicted under s. 218. But that is different from holding that subjective
foreseeability is an essential ingredient of the crime. Where an offence is
satisfied — at a minimum — on an objective standard, subjective proof will
obviously suffice to sustain a conviction. See R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC
5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, at para. 47; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2
S.C.R. 60, at para. 38.
[135]
To conclude on this point, the fact that the
provision contains no words that can be read as requiring subjective foresight
of the proscribed consequences is significant. As mentioned, the words
“calculated to leave” were removed in the 1953-54 Criminal Code and
replaced by the words “likely to leave”. At the same time, the age of
protected children was raised from two years to ten years and the word
“whereby” was replaced with the synonymous words “so that”. If Parliament had
wanted to make it clear that subjective foreseeability was the requisite fault
element, it could have done so when revising the language of the provision by
using the words “knowing that” instead of “so that” in s. 218 and by changing
the words “calculated to leave” to “he knows is or is likely to leave” in para.
(b) of the s. 214 definition. As Professor Sullivan notes,
“[i]t is presumed that in so far as possible legislatures will adopt a simple,
straightforward and concise way of expressing themselves” (p. 207). But
instead of making what would have been a straightforward change, Parliament
preserved the original meaning of the provision which, as I have attempted to
show, was understood as requiring objective, not subjective, foreseeability of
the prohibited consequences.
E. The Social Stigma and Gravity
of the Offence Support an Objective Standard for the Proscribed Consequences
[136]
I touch, finally, on two other factors that
support the conclusion that the fault element for s. 218 is penal negligence:
the social stigma attached to the crime of child abandonment and the gravity of
the crime. As McLachlin J., for the majority, observed in Creighton, at
p. 46, the mens rea of an offence should reflect the gravity of the
crime. Both the social stigma associated with its commission and the penalty
provided by Parliament afford a measure of that gravity.
[137]
The social stigma associated with the offence of
child abandonment cannot — and in my view should not — be treated differently
than the social stigma associated with its sister provision s. 215 (failure to
provide necessaries) where penal negligence was found to be the requisite fault
element. Indeed, as I noted earlier, in their treatise, at p. 826, Manning and
Sankoff write that the offence of child abandonment is “entirely superfluous”
given its overlap with the offence of failing to provide the necessaries of
life under s. 215 of the Code :
Given that the “necessaries of life”
include shelter and protection from harm, there does not appear to be a conceivable
situation in which abandonment would not also constitute a failure to provide
the necessaries of life.
[138]
Whether that statement is entirely accurate or
not, it leads me to conclude that ss. 215 and 218 should be ranked equally on
the social stigma scale. They certainly rank equally in terms of their
gravity. Both offences are punishable by a maximum penalty of five years’
imprisonment (if the Crown proceeds by way of indictment) and 18 months’
imprisonment (if the Crown proceeds by way of summary conviction).
[139]
Put differently, if Parliament had intended to
build subjective foreseeability into s. 218, the degree of moral
blameworthiness would necessarily be higher than that required to sustain a
conviction under s. 215 , which requires only objective foreseeability. If that
were the case, one could reasonably expect, in my view, that the higher level
of moral culpability would be reflected by a more severe punishment. But this
is not so.
And that leads me to conclude that the two provisions encompass the same degree
of blameworthiness and thus require the same degree of mental fault.
[140]
Finally, without wishing to minimize the nature
and severity of the punishments available under ss. 215 and 218 , they are
significantly removed from other crimes which this Court has held to be crimes
involving objective foresight, including manslaughter and certain instances of
dangerous driving causing death — both of which attract maximum punishments of
life imprisonment.
F. The Remaining Elements of the Offence
[141]
As explained earlier, there are three distinct
elements to the offence of child abandonment: the act (abandonment or
exposure), the circumstances (a child under 10), and the consequences (the risk
of harm to the child). The focus of my analysis thus far has been the third
element. I turn now to the first and second elements, taking each in turn.
(1) “Abandon”
or “Expose” — And the “Wilful” Red Herring
[142]
Although there are no words of subjective intent
in s. 218, the word “wilful” is used in para. (a) of the s. 214
definition of “abandon” or “expose” to modify the word “omission”. Much of the
focus on the word, unfortunately, has served as a red herring, distracting from
its actual function in the language of s. 218. Whatever meaning attaches to
“wilful”, it speaks to the interpretation to be given to the act in the first
element of the offence (abandoning or exposing). It offers little, if any,
assistance in interpreting the third element (risk to the child).
[143]
As far back as 1898, in the case of R. v.
Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283, Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. considered the
meaning of the word “wilfully” in s. 1 of the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 41, which among other
things, made it an offence to “wilfully” assault, ill-treat, neglect, abandon
or expose a child under the age of 16 “in a manner likely to cause such child
unnecessary suffering, or injury to its health”. At pp. 290-91, the Chief
Justice stated:
Whether the words in the statute,
“wilfully neglects,” are taken together, or, as the learned judge did in
directing the jury, are taken separately, the meaning is very clear. “Wilfully”
means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or
inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it.
[Emphasis added.]
[144]
Modern-day authorities have accepted that the
word “wilful” may be used to indicate a voluntary or deliberate act, one that
the mind “goes with”. See, e.g., R. v. Buzzanga (1979), 25 O.R. (2d)
705 (C.A.), at pp. 715-17; R. v. L.B., 2011 ONCA 153, 274 O.A.C. 365, at
paras. 108-9, leave to appeal refused, [2011] 3 S.C.R. x; and Manning and
Sankoff, at pp. 149-50.
[145]
In my view, a fair reading of the provision
establishes that the word “wilful” in s. 214 does not connote an intention to
bring about the proscribed consequences identified in s. 218. Rather, it
modifies “omission” in para. (a) of the definition of “abandon” or
“expose” and connotes, as Lord Russell C.J. described it, an act “done
deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence”.
[146]
To put the matter in more contemporary terms,
basic intent or voluntariness is all that is required to satisfy the minimum
mental element for the act of abandonment or exposure. That conclusion sits
independently from — and is entirely harmonious with — the separate conclusion
that penal negligence is the proper mental standard for the third element in s.
218. It would be a mistake to confuse the two.
(2) The Age of the Child
[147]
Lastly, I turn to the second element of the
offence, the age of the child. This element was not an issue in this appeal,
as it was self-evident and undisputed that A.D.H.’s newborn baby was under the
age of 10. Nevertheless, mindful that the age of the child is a question of
circumstances and not consequences of the offence, and absent any indicators
that Parliament intended an objective standard for this element, I would be
inclined to hold that this element should be established on the basis of
subjective fault. However, as this matter is not before us, I need not say
more about it.
G. Some Thoughts on Intoxication as a Defence
[148]
Earlier in these reasons, I voiced my concern
that an interpretation of s. 218 that requires subjective foresight of
consequences would provide a defence to the errant parent or irresponsible
caregiver who, by virtue of intoxication, could not or did not foresee the
likely consequences of his or her dangerous conduct. While it is true that
none of the parties raised this point in their arguments, I believe that the
ramifications that flow from interpreting a statutory provision in one way or
another are a necessary part of the overall contextual analysis with which we
are engaged. That context cannot — and should not — be overlooked on the basis
that a relevant issue does not arise on the facts of a particular case.
[149]
The majority concludes that s. 218 is a “general
intent” offence (para. 16). I would have thought, however, that this Court’s
decision in Hinchey has pointed us beyond the binary fiction of specific
versus general intent offences.
This case underscores the merit of that approach because the nub of the
difficulty is that s. 218, whether under the majority’s approach or mine, does
not — indeed, it cannot — fit neatly into either the general or specific intent
boxes. To attempt to do so is to do what courts have for too long done —
broad-brush offences in a way that at once over-generalizes and
over-simplifies.
[150]
The majority’s invocation of R. v. Daviault,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63, and s. 33.1 of the Code is no answer to the concerns
I raise. First, Daviault speaks only to the basic intent or voluntariness
needed to commit an intentional act — what Cory J. described as “the minimal
mental element required for a general intent offence” (p. 87 (emphasis
added)). Our later decision in R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3
S.C.R. 523, confirms that a so-called Daviault defence of “extreme
intoxication” relates only to intoxication which “negates voluntariness
and thus is a complete defence to criminal responsibility” (para. 43 (emphasis
added)). Daviault thus says nothing about whether intoxication short of
automatism could raise a reasonable doubt about an accused’s subjective
foresight of consequences, as the majority requires of s. 218 .
[151]
Second, s. 33.1 of the Code , if it is
applicable to s. 218 , provides a statutory override of a Daviault defence
— but only to the extent that the accused “lacked the general intent or the
voluntariness required to commit the offence”. Assuming for the sake of
argument that s. 33.1 does apply to s. 218 , it says nothing about
intoxication as a defence in relation to the subjective foresight of
consequences. As I have said, Daviault was only concerned with the basic
intent or voluntariness required for an intentional act. Thus, whether s. 33.1
does or does not apply to s. 218 is, in my respectful view, irrelevant.
H. Conclusion
[152]
Section 218 is child protection legislation. It
targets three limited classes of people faced with a situation where a child
under 10 is or is likely to be at risk of death or permanent injury. A review
of the provision’s language, its legislative evolution and history, the gravity
of the crime and the social stigma associated with it confirm that the offence
is duty-based and that penal negligence is the level of fault required to
establish guilt as regards the proscribed consequences.
[153]
Having so concluded, I hasten to point out that
penal negligence involves a very real level of fault. This is emphatically not
a matter of punishing the “morally blameless”. And while it may not reach the
level of subjective fault in respect of each and every element of a particular
crime, it does not punish people for acts of simple negligence. As Charron J.
observed in Beatty, at para. 34:
If every departure from the civil norm
is to be criminalized, regardless of the degree, we risk casting the net too
widely and branding as criminals persons who are in reality not morally
blameworthy.
For that reason, an
objective test “requires proof of a marked departure from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in all the circumstances”: ibid.,
at para. 36 (emphasis in original).
[154]
Nor does an objective standard punish those who
act under an honest but mistaken belief that their conduct is not dangerous in
the circumstances — so long as the belief is reasonably held. Justice Charron
put the matter succinctly in Beatty, at paras. 37-38:
However, because the accused’s
mental state is relevant in a criminal setting, the objective test must be
modified to give the accused the benefit of any reasonable doubt about whether
the reasonable person would have appreciated the risk or could and would have
done something to avoid creating the danger. . . .
. .
. In the same vein, a reasonably held mistake of fact may provide a complete
defence if, based on the accused’s reasonable perception of the facts, the
conduct measured up to the requisite standard of care.
[155]
What the test does not do is take into account
the personal attributes of the accused, short of incapacity to appreciate the
risk. Nor will it allow people who are drunk or high on drugs to escape
liability on the basis that they were not capable of foreseeing, or did not
foresee, the likely consequences of their actions. That, with respect, is how
it should be. And the circumstances of this case serve to exemplify how the
penal negligence standard works to spare the morally blameless from criminal
liability.
III. Application to the Facts
[156]
The trial judge found that the respondent,
A.D.H., honestly believed that her child was dead at birth. In so concluding,
he accepted that the birth was precipitous and the baby was born premature. He
also accepted that A.D.H. was confused and frightened at the time and that the
baby, after birth, was blue and motionless. The trial judge found objective
support for A.D.H.’s belief in the evidence of Dr. Simpson and that of various
bystanders who likewise believed the child was dead (2009 SKQB 261, 335 Sask.
R. 173).
[157]
Based on the trial judge’s findings of fact,
Ottenbreit J.A. concluded that A.D.H. was entitled to be acquitted. In his
view, her belief that the child was dead at birth “was not only honestly held
but reasonable in the context of the situation” (2011 SKCA 6, 366 Sask. R. 123,
at para. 38). I agree.
[158]
In all the circumstances, A.D.H.’s conduct in
abandoning her child and leaving him exposed to the risk of death or permanent
injury was not morally blameworthy. As such, she was entitled to be acquitted.
[159]
Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
APPENDIX
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46
214. In
this Part,
“abandon” or “expose” includes
(a) a wilful omission to take charge of a child by a person who
is under a legal duty to do so, and
(b) dealing with a child in a manner that is likely to leave that
child exposed to risk without protection;
. . .
215.
(1) [Duty of persons to provide necessaries] Every one is under a legal duty
(a) as a parent, foster parent,
guardian or head of a family, to provide necessaries of life for a child under
the age of sixteen years;
(b) to provide necessaries of
life to their spouse or common-law partner; and
(c) to provide necessaries of
life to a person under his charge if that person
(i) is unable, by reason of
detention, age, illness, mental disorder or other cause, to withdraw himself
from that charge, and
(ii) is unable to provide
himself with necessaries of life.
(2)
[Offence] Every one commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within the
meaning of subsection (1), fails without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies
on him, to perform that duty, if
(a) with respect to a duty
imposed by paragraph (1)(a) or (b),
(i) the person to whom the duty
is owed is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, or
(ii) the failure to perform the
duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is
likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered permanently; or
(b) with respect to a duty
imposed by paragraph (1)(c), the failure to perform the duty endangers
the life of the person to whom the duty is owed or causes or is likely to cause
the health of that person to be injured permanently.
(3)
[Punishment] Every one who commits an offence under subsection (2)
(a) is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months.
(4)
[Presumptions] For the purpose of proceedings under this section,
(a) [Repealed, 2000, c. 12, s.
93]
(b) evidence that a person has
in any way recognized a child as being his child is, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, proof that the child is his child;
(c) evidence that a person has
failed for a period of one month to make provision for the maintenance of any
child of theirs under the age of sixteen years is, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, proof that the person has failed without lawful
excuse to provide necessaries of life for the child; and
(d) the fact that a spouse or
common-law partner or child is receiving or has received necessaries of life
from another person who is not under a legal duty to provide them is not a
defence.
. . .
218. [Abandoning child] Every one who unlawfully abandons or
exposes a child who is under the age of ten years, so that its life is or is
likely to be endangered or its health is or is likely to be permanently
injured,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months.
Appeal
dismissed.
Solicitor
for the appellant: Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Regina.
Solicitor
for the respondent: Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission, Prince
Albert.
Solicitor for the
intervener: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.