SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Caplin v. Canada (Justice), 2015 SCC 32, [2015] 2 S.C.R.
570
|
Date: 20150529
Docket: 35527
|
Between:
David
Caplin
Appellant
and
Minister
of Justice of Canada
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Côté JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 4)
|
The Court
|
Appeal heard and
judgment rendered: April 23, 2015
Reasons delivered: May
29, 2015
Caplin v. Canada (Justice), 2015 SCC
32, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 570
David Caplin Appellant
v.
Minister of Justice of Canada Respondent
Indexed as: Caplin v.
Canada (Justice)
2015 SCC 32
File No.: 35527.
Hearing and
judgment: April 23, 2015.
Reasons delivered: May 29, 2015.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Côté JJ.
on appeal from the court
of appeal for quebec
Extradition
— Surrender order — Judicial review — Minister of Justice
surrendering accused to U.S. on charges of murder — Whether
Minister’s decision to order surrender was reasonable.
The
Minister of Justice ordered the surrender of C and a co-accused, B, to the U.S.
on charges of first and second degree murder. C was charged on those offences
in 1990, but has never been tried. In 2010, the New Hampshire State authorities
reopened the investigation into the alleged crimes and in 2011, evidence seized
from the crime scene was submitted for DNA testing using techniques that were
not available at the time of the initial investigation. C’s profile was
identified. On judicial review, the Court of Appeal of Quebec concluded that
there were no grounds for interfering in the Minister’s decision to extradite C
to the United States.
Held:
The appeal should be dismissed.
The
Court of Appeal did not err in concluding that it was reasonable for the
Minister of Justice to order surrender. The fundamental issue for the Minister
was whether surrendering C to the “particular treatment” that awaits him in New
Hampshire would be contrary to Canadian principles of fundamental justice. The
Minister examined all of the relevant circumstances, including the importance
of international cooperation in the extradition context. In light of all of
these considerations, it was reasonable for him to conclude that it would not
offend Canadian principles of fundamental justice or be otherwise unjust or
oppressive to leave the decision about whether there should be a trial to the
New Hampshire court.
Cases Cited
Referred
to: Canada (Attorney General) v. Barnaby, 2015 SCC 31, [2015] 2 S.C.R.
563; United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; Argentina
v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
s. 7 .
Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, s. 44(1) .
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Duval Hesler C.J. and Levesque
and Savard JJ.A.), 2013 QCCA 1305, [2013] AZ-50991418, [2013] Q.J. No. 8752
(QL), 2013 CarswellQue 7615 (WL Can.), dismissing an application for judicial
review from a surrender order made by the Minister of Justice. Appeal
dismissed.
Véronique Courtecuisse and Patrick Cozannet, for the appellant.
Marc Ribeiro and Ginette Gobeil, for the respondent.
The following is the judgment
delivered by
[1]
The Court — To satisfy the Minister that extradition should be refused, Mr.
Caplin must show that his surrender would “shock the conscience” and thereby
violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , or
be “unjust or oppressive” under s. 44(1) of the Extradition Act, S.C.
1999, c. 18 . In our view, the Court of Appeal did not err in concluding that it
was reasonable for the Minister to order surrender (2013 QCCA 1305). As we
explain in the companion appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v. Barnaby,
2015 SCC 31, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 563, the fundamental issue for the Minister was whether
surrendering Mr. Caplin to the “particular treatment” that awaits him in New
Hampshire is contrary to Canadian principles of fundamental justice: United
States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, at para. 69. It appears
from the material that the New Hampshire courts will decide whether Mr.
Caplin’s trial, in all of the circumstances, is fair and just in accordance
with principles that are broadly similar to those that would be applied in
Canada if the issue arose here. This is not contrary to our sense of
fundamental justice, but rather consistent with it.
[2]
Mr. Caplin suggests that there is no new
evidence. He raises arguments about alleged weaknesses in the DNA analysis and
submits that, in reality, the testimonial evidence is not new. He further
submits that, in any event, the “new” evidence is of limited probative value
because it does not conclusively establish his guilt. He also argues that the
passage of time has caused prejudice that would justify denying extradition.
[3]
We are not persuaded by these arguments. In our
view, it was reasonable for the Minister to conclude that it would not shock
the conscience or be otherwise unjust or oppressive to allow the New Hampshire
courts to address these concerns, rather than to preclude them from doing so by
refusing surrender. Concerns about due process — including arguments related to
delay — are generally a matter for the foreign court. As this Court held in Argentina
v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, at p. 558:
Matters of due process generally are to
be left for the courts to determine at the trial there as they would be if [the
accused] were to be tried here. Attempts to pre-empt decisions on such matters,
whether arising through delay or otherwise, would directly conflict with the
principles of comity on which extradition is based . . . .
[4]
The Minister examined all of the relevant
circumstances, including the importance of international cooperation in the
extradition context. In light of all of these considerations, it was reasonable
for him to conclude that it would not offend Canadian principles of fundamental
justice or be otherwise unjust or oppressive to leave the decision about
whether there should be a trial to the New Hampshire court. We would therefore
uphold the Court of Appeal’s decision to affirm the surrender order. The appeal
is dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
Solicitors for the
appellant: Véronique Courtecuisse, Montréal; Patrick Cozannet, Longueuil.
Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of Canada, Montréal.