Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 816,
2002 SCC 54
Norman
Sterriah, on behalf of all members of the
Ross River
Dena Council Band, and the
Ross River Dena Development Corporation Appellants
v.
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada
and the Government of Yukon Respondents
and
The Attorney General of British Columbia and the
Coalition of B.C. First Nations Interveners
Indexed as: Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada
Neutral citation: 2002 SCC
54.
File No.: 27762.
2001: December 11; 2002: June 20.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier,
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for the yukon territory
Indians — Reserves — Creation of reserves in
non-treaty context — Indian Band occupying lands in Yukon Territory since 1950s
— Lands set aside by officials — Legal requirements for establishment of a
reserve — Whether lands set aside have reserve status — Indian Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. I-5, s. 2(1) “reserve” — Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 263,
s. 18(d).
Following a claim for the refund of taxes paid on
tobacco sold in an Indian village in the Yukon, a dispute arose concerning the
status of the village. If it was a reserve, an exemption from the tax could
rightfully be claimed. The respondents maintained that a reserve had never
been created there. In the 1950s, members of the appellant Band, which is
recognized as a band under the Indian Act , were allowed to settle on the
site of what is now their village, there being no treaty governing the lands.
Various administrative discussions and actions with respect to the status of
the community took place between 1953 and 1965. In 1965, the Chief of the
Resources Division in the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources
advised the Indian Affairs Branch of the then Department of Citizenship and
Immigration that the village site had been reserved for the Branch. The letter
was entered in the Reserve Land Register under the Indian Act . On a
motion by the appellants, the chambers judge declared the lands occupied by the
Band to be a reserve. The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, allowed the
respondents’ appeal.
Held: The appeal
should be dismissed.
Per Gonthier,
Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.: Given the absence of intention
to create a reserve on the part of persons having the authority to bind the
Crown, no reserve was legally created. In the Yukon Territory, as well as
elsewhere in Canada, there appears to be no single procedure for creating
reserves, although an Order-in-Council has been the most common and undoubtedly
best and clearest procedure used to create reserves. Whatever method is employed,
the Crown must have had an intention to create a reserve. This intention must
be possessed by Crown agents holding sufficient authority to bind the Crown.
For example, this intention may be evidenced either by an exercise of executive
authority such as an Order-in-Council, or on the basis of specific statutory
provisions creating a particular reserve. Steps must be taken in order to set
apart land. The setting apart must occur for the benefit of Indians. The Band
concerned must have accepted the setting apart and must have started to make
use of the lands so set apart. The statutory framework for reserve creation in
the Yukon Territory has limited, but not entirely ousted, the royal
prerogative. In any case, whether the authority to create a reserve is derived
from the royal prerogative or from statute, the Governor in Council is the
holder of the power in both cases.
In this case, land was set aside but there was no
intention to create a reserve on the part of persons having the authority to
bind the Crown. The facts demonstrate that Crown agents never made
representations to the members of the Band that the Crown had decided to create
a reserve for them, nor did any person having the authority to bind the Crown
ever agree to the setting up of a reserve at the site in question. Those Crown
officials who did advocate the creation of a reserve never had the authority to
set apart the lands and create a reserve. While lands were set aside for the
Band, they do not have the status of a reserve.
Per McLachlin C.J. and
L’Heureux-Dubé and Bastarache JJ.: LeBel J.’s conclusion that the Crown
never intended to establish a reserve in this case was agreed with. However,
the royal prerogative to set aside or apart lands for Aboriginal peoples has
not been limited by statute, either expressly or by necessary implication. The
Indian Act does not provide any formal mechanism for the creation of
reserves. The definition of “reserve” in s. 2(1) of the Act does not limit the
Crown’s ability to deal with lands for the use of aboriginal peoples. It
simply serves to identify which lands have been set apart as reserves within
the meaning of the Act. Nor does s. 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial
Lands Act place limits on the Crown’s prerogative with respect to the
creation of reserves. This section is not directed at the creation of reserves
per se, but rather permits the Governor in Council to protect from
disposition those Crown lands for which other use is contemplated. While
s. 18(d) provides a mechanism to set apart lands for the creation
of a reserve, it is merely one avenue to achieve this result. It has not
placed any conditions or limitations on the Crown’s prerogative to create a
reserve.
Cases Cited
By LeBel J.
Applied: R. v.
Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025; referred to: R. v. Marshall,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd.,
[1920] A.C. 508; Town of Hay River v. The Queen, [1980] 1 F.C. 262; Canadian
Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654; St. Mary’s Indian Band v.
Cranbrook (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657.
By Bastarache J.
Referred to: R. v.
Operation Dismantle Inc., [1983] 1 F.C. 745, aff’d [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; Attorney-General
v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508; R. v. Eldorado
Nuclear Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 551; Sparling v. Quebec (Caisse de dépôt
et placement du Québec), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1015.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act providing for the
organisation of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the
management of Indian and Ordnance Lands, S.C. 1868,
c. 42.
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) .
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35 .
Dominion Lands Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 113 [rep. 1950, c. 22, s. 26], s.
74.
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149, s. 21.
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, ss. 2(1) “band”, “reserve” [rep. &
sub. c. 17 (4th Supp.), s. 1(1) ], “designated lands” [ad. idem,
s. 1(2) ], (2), 18(1), (2), 20 to 25, 28, 36 to 38, 42, 44, 46, 48 to 51,
58, 60, 87(1).
Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18, s. 3(6).
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 17 .
Letters Patent constituting the
office of Governor General of Canada (1947). In Canada
Gazette, Part I, vol. 81, p. 3014 [reproduced in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 31].
Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 263, s. 18 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. T-7,
s. 23 ].
Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-7, s. 23 (d) [repl. 1994, c. 26, s.
68].
Tobacco Tax Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 170.
Authors Cited
Bartlett, Richard H. Indian
Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in Canada: A Homeland — A Study in Law and
History. Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 1990.
Canada. Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
vol. 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back, and vol. 2, Restructuring
the Relationship, Part 2. Ottawa: The Commission, 1996.
Evatt, Herbert Vere. The Royal
Prerogative. Sydney, Australia: The Law Book Co., 1987.
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional
Law of Canada, vol. 1, loose-leaf ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell
(loose-leaf updated 2001, release 1).
Hogg, Peter W., and Patrick J.
Monahan. Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell,
2000.
Lordon, Paul. Crown Law.
Toronto: Butterworths, 1991.
Woodward, Jack. Native Law.
Toronto: Carswell (loose-leaf updated 2001, release 2).
APPEAL from a judgment of the Yukon Territory Court of
Appeal (1999), 182 D.L.R. (4th) 116, 131 B.C.A.C. 219, 72 B.C.L.R. (3d) 292,
[2000] 4 W.W.R. 390, [2000] 2 C.N.L.R. 293, [1999] Y.J. No. 121 (QL), 1999 BCCA
750, setting aside a decision of the Yukon Territory Supreme Court, [1998] 3
C.N.L.R. 284, [1998] Y.J. No. 63 (QL), declaring a tract of land an Indian
reserve within the meaning of the Indian Act . Appeal dismissed.
Brian A. Crane, Q.C.,
and Ritu Gambhir, for the appellants.
Brian R. Evernden and Jeffrey
A. Hutchinson, for the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.
Penelope Gawn and Lesley
McCullough, for the respondent the Government of Yukon.
Richard J. M. Fyfe, Paul
E. Yearwood and Patrick G. Foy, Q.C., for the intervener the
Attorney General of British Columbia.
Leslie J. Pinder, for
the intervener the Coalition of B.C. First Nations.
The reasons of McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé and
Bastarache JJ. were delivered by
1
Bastarache J. – I have had
the opportunity to read the reasons of my colleague and I agree that no reserve
was created in this case. As noted by my colleague, the essential conditions
for the creation of a reserve within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Indian
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 , include an act by the Crown to set aside
Crown land for the use of an Indian band combined with an intention to create a
reserve on the part of persons having authority to bind the Crown. The evidence
in this case reveals that the Crown never intended to establish a reserve
within the meaning of the Act.
2
Though I agree with the disposition, I respectfully disagree with my
colleague’s assertion that the royal prerogative to create reserves has been
limited by s. 18(d) of the Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.
263. In addition, I think it is important to state clearly the
interaction between the Crown prerogative and s. 2(1) of the Indian Act .
Section 2(1) does not constrain the Crown’s prerogative to deal with lands for
the use of Indians, but rather provides a definition of “reserve” for the
purposes of the Act. Section 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial
Lands Act gives the Governor in Council a discretionary power to protect
Crown lands from disposal for a wide range of public purposes, including the
welfare of Indians. In my view, neither provision, either expressly or by
necessary implication, limits the scope of the Crown’s prerogative to set aside
or apart lands for Aboriginal peoples.
3
All of the parties agree that the power to create reserves was
originally based on the royal prerogative. The power is thought to be part of
the Crown’s prerogative to administer and dispose of public property including
Crown lands (see P. Lordon, Q.C., Crown Law (1991), at p. 96). The
appellants nonetheless contend that this power has long been regulated by
statute, including the successive Indian Acts which date back to Confederation
as well as various statutes governing the disposition and management of Crown
lands. They assert in particular that the right to establish reserves in the
Yukon Territory is found in the Indian Act and the Territorial Lands
Act which have replaced the prerogative. My colleague disagrees with the
appellants that the prerogative has been displaced, but concedes that it has
been limited.
4
There is no doubt that a royal prerogative can be abolished or limited
by clear and express statutory provision: see R. v. Operation Dismantle Inc.,
[1983] 1 F.C. 745, at p. 780, aff’d [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at p. 464. It is
less certain whether in Canada the prerogative may be abolished or limited by
necessary implication. Although this doctrine seems well established in the
English courts (see Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal
Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.)), this Court has questioned its
application as an exception to Crown immunity (see R. v. Eldorado Nuclear
Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 551, at p. 558; Sparling v. Quebec (Caisse de
dépôt et placement du Québec), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1015, at pp.
1022-23). Assuming that prerogative powers may be removed or curtailed by
necessary implication, what is meant by “necessary implication”? H. V. Evatt
explains the doctrine as follows:
Where Parliament provides by statute for powers previously within
the Prerogative being exercised subject to conditions and limitations contained
in the statute, there is an implied intention on the part of Parliament
that those powers can only be exercised in accordance with the statute.
“Otherwise,” says Swinfen-Eady M.R., “what use would there be in imposing limitations
if the Crown could at its pleasure disregard them and fall back on
Prerogative?” [Emphasis added.]
(H. V. Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (1987), at p. 44)
5
In my view, s. 2(1) of the Indian Act , which sets out the
definition of “reserve”, does not in any way “provid[e] by statute for powers
previously within the Prerogative being exercised subject to conditions and
limitations contained in the statute”. It is well established that the Indian
Act does not provide any formal mechanism for the creation of reserves. The
Act is, and always has been, confined to the management and protection
of existing reserves, many of which were established long before the federal
government assumed jurisdiction over Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 (see R. H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in
Canada: A Homeland – A Study in Law and History (1990), at pp. 24-25).
6
In the past, the Crown exercised its prerogative to create reserves in a
number of ways. Although some lands set apart for Indian bands constitute
“reserves” within the meaning of the Indian Act , other lands have been
set apart or aside for the use of Indian bands, yet are not recognized as
“reserves” under the Act. For example, in this case, the Crown exercised its
prerogative to “reserve” or set aside lands for the use of the Ross River Band,
but did not manifest an intention to create a “reserve” within the meaning of
s. 2(1) of the Indian Act . In my view, the definition of “reserve” in s.
2(1) serves to identify which lands have been set apart as “reserves” within
the meaning of the Act; the definition does not limit the Crown’s ability to
deal with lands for the use of aboriginal peoples. A “reserve” is defined as “a
tract of land, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, that has been
set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band”. The legislation
does not indicate precisely when land will be considered to have been “set
apart” for the use and benefit of a band, nor does it indicate the steps
necessary for a “setting apart” of land to have occurred. This is, essentially,
the issue that is before us here. As I stated earlier, we have determined that
for land to have been “set apart” within the meaning of the Act, there must, at
the very least, exist an act by the Crown to set apart land for the use of the
band combined with an intention to create a reserve on the part of persons
having authority to bind the Crown.
7
My colleague asserts that the definition of “reserve” in s. 2(1) limits
the royal prerogative to create reserves in that it precludes the possibility
of transferring the title to the land from the Crown to the First Nation (since
the definition provides that legal title is “vested in Her Majesty”). I agree with
him that if a tract of land meets the definition of “reserve” under the Indian
Act , the title must remain in the Crown and the land must be dealt with
subject to the Act. However, I do not see how the definition otherwise limits
the royal prerogative to set aside or apart land for Aboriginal peoples. In
other words, it merely defines with greater specificity which of these lands
will be considered “reserves” for the purposes of the Act. In my opinion, the
Crown is still free to deal with its land in any other manner it wishes,
including, as noted by my colleague, the transfer of title by sale, grant or
gift to a First Nation or some of its members, though that land would not then
constitute an Indian Act “reserve”.
8
Nor do I agree that s. 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial
Lands Act has placed limits on the Crown’s prerogative with respect to the
creation of reserves. Section 18 (the predecessor to the current s. 23 (d))
finds its origin in the Dominion Lands Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 113. That
Act allowed for entry onto vacant Crown lands for agricultural purposes.
Section 74 of the Dominion Lands Act authorized the Governor in Council
to keep lands reserved for Indians outside of the scheme of the Act so that the
lands would be protected from disposition. The provision also permitted the
Governor in Council to protect lands from entry for various other public
purposes, including “places of public worship, burial grounds, schools and
benevolent institutions”. Section 18 of the 1952 Territorial Lands Act consolidates
and continues the Dominion Lands Act powers. Similar to the Dominion
Lands Act, it authorizes the Governor in Council to set apart areas of land
for the welfare of Indians, and also permits the Crown to protect Crown lands
from disposal for a wide range of public purposes.
9
It seems clear from the above that s. 18 of the 1952 Territorial
Lands Act is not directed at the creation of reserves per se but
rather permits the Governor in Council to protect from disposition those Crown
lands for which other use is contemplated. As my colleague points out, the
setting apart of Crown lands which might otherwise be disposed of pursuant to
s. 18 of the Act does not in and of itself imply that a “reserve” within the
meaning of the Indian Act has been created since the Crown must also
manifest an intent to make the land a reserve under the Act. Where,
however, evidence of this intention is present, the setting apart of land under
s. 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial Lands Act would certainly
suffice as the formal act by which the Crown sets apart land for the use and
benefit of an Indian band.
10
Though I agree that the setting apart of land under s. 18(d) of
the 1952 Territorial Lands Act would be sufficient to establish an Indian
Act reserve if the necessary intention on the part of the Crown to do so
were present, I cannot see how s. 18 (d) has placed any conditions or
limitations on the Crown prerogative to create reserves. Historically, a wide
array of formal and informal instruments has been used to set apart lands as Indian
Act reserves. In my view, any one of these instruments may be sufficient to
constitute the action by which the land is set apart so long as intention on
the part of the Crown to create a reserve under the Indian Act is also
present. I think that there is a danger in saying that s. 18(d) of the
1952 Territorial Lands Act has somehow limited the Crown’s prerogative
to create reserves since this implies that only an application under the Act
will suffice as the formal action to set apart the lands as a reserve.
While s. 18(d) provides one mechanism to set apart lands for the
creation of a reserve, it is not the only mechanism available to the Crown for
this purpose and I would not wish to imply this as a necessary condition for
the creation of a reserve. If the setting apart of land under s. 18 (d)
is not a necessary condition for the creation of a reserve but merely one
avenue to achieve this result, then I cannot see how the authority to set apart
lands for a reserve under s. 18 (d) limits the Crown’s prerogative to
create a reserve.
The judgment of Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel
JJ. was delivered by
LeBel J. —
I. Introduction
11
This appeal raises the issue of how Indian Act reserves were
created in the Yukon Territory, in a non-treaty context. The appellants claim
that the Government of Canada created a reserve by setting aside land for the
Ross River Band. The federal government answers that, although land was set
aside, no reserve was ever created; no intention to create it has been
established on the evidence. For the reasons which follow, I conclude that no
reserve was created and that the appeal should fail.
II. Background
of the Litigation
12
This case arose out of a claim for a refund of tobacco tax from a store
in a small village in the Yukon. According to the appellants, this village is
a reserve; hence, an exemption was claimed. The respondents disputed this
claim, saying that a reserve had never been created in this place. What began
as a tax problem has become a question of aboriginal law which, in turn,
requires a survey of the historical background to the procedure governing the
creation of reserves in the Yukon Territory. The particular facts of the long
history of the dealings of the Ross River Band with the Department of Indian
Affairs must also be reviewed.
13
The Ross River Dena Council Band (the “Band”) is recognized as a band
within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 . It is now
located at Ross River, in the Yukon, on lands which it claims are a reserve.
Norman Sterriah is the chief of the Band. In 1982, the Band incorporated the
appellant, Ross River Dena Development Corporation. The Corporation was set up
to provide services for the benefit of Band members and to carry on business as
their agent. Despite the dispute about the legal status of the community, it
is at least agreed that there is a village at Ross River and that Band members
have been living there for a number of years.
14
After a long history of being shifted or pushed from place to place
since the predecessors of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (“DIAND”) took them under its wing, in the 1950s, at long last, the
members of the Ross River First Nation were allowed to settle down on the site
of what is now their village, located at the junction of the Pelly and Ross
Rivers. The lands in dispute in this case are not governed by treaty, as the
Yukon Territory belongs to those regions of Canada where the treaty-making
process with First Nations had very little practical impact, particularly in
respect of the creation of reserves. (See Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (1996), vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship,
Part 2, at pp. 479-84.)
15
Despite the absence of a treaty, the agents of the Department in the
1950s knew that the Band was living on the shores of the Ross River. The
acknowledgement of this fact triggered a process of administrative discussion
and action which led or not to the creation of a reserve on this site. By
letter dated October 21, 1953, the Superintendent of the Yukon Agency sought
the permission of the Indian Commissioner for British Columbia to establish an
Indian reserve for the use of the Ross River Indians. By letter dated November
10, 1953, the Indian Commissioner for British Columbia supported the
recommendation. On April 1, 1954, the Superintendent of the Yukon Agency
wrote to the Dominion Lands Agent in Whitehorse to advise that tentative
arrangements had been made to apply for a tract of land for an Indian reserve
at Ross River; Ottawa did not act on the request.
16
On May 4, 1955, the federal Cabinet issued a procedural directive
entitled Circular No. 27 which set out an internal government procedure for
reserving lands in the territories for the use of a government department or
agency. In 1957, the federal government decided to dismiss the recommendation
to establish 10 reserves. On November 27, 1962, the Superintendent of the
Yukon Agency applied to the Indian Affairs Branch (then in the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration) to reserve approximately 66 acres of land under s.
18 of the Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 263, to be used for the
Ross River Indian Band Village site. Correspondence was then exchanged over
the following three years with respect to the proposed size and location of the
site. On January 26, 1965, the Chief of the Resources Division in the
Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources advised the Indian
Affairs Branch that the site had been reserved for the Indian Affairs Branch.
The letter was entered in the Reserve Land Register pursuant to s. 21 of the Indian
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149. It was also recorded in the Yukon Territory Land
Registry of the Lands Division of the former Department of Northern Affairs and
National Resources.
17
The Band takes the view that this administrative process, combined with
the actual setting aside of land for its benefit, created a reserve within the
meaning of the Indian Act . It appears that this opinion was not shared
either by the Yukon territorial government or the Indian Affairs Branch. The
dispute may have remained dormant for a while. It broke into the open and reached
the courts on the occasion of a problem concerning the applicability of tobacco
taxes.
18
The respondent Government of Yukon had imposed taxes on the Band under
the Tobacco Tax Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 170. The Band claimed an exemption
and asked for a refund of taxes already paid on tobacco sold in the village.
It asserted that the Government of Yukon was taxing personal property of an
Indian or of a band on a reserve, which was exempt pursuant to s. 87(1) of the Indian
Act . The Government of Yukon refused to make the refund because it did not
recognize that the Band occupied a reserve. According to the Yukon government,
the Band was merely located on lands which had been “set aside” for its benefit
by the Crown in right of Canada. The federal government gave full support to
this position and subsequently fought the claim of the appellants as to the
existence of a reserve.
19
In the meantime, negotiations were taking place in the Yukon with
respect to the land claims and rights of First Nations. An agreement known as
the “Umbrella Final Agreement” was entered into by the Council for Yukon
Indians, the Government of Yukon and the Government of Canada in 1993. It is a
framework agreement which provides for its terms to be incorporated into
subsequent agreements with individual First Nations. According to the Yukon
government, seven of these agreements are now in force, dealing, among other
topics, with land “set aside” and not part of a reserve. The Band chose to
remain outside this process of treaty negotiation pending a decision from the
courts regarding whether a reserve was created pursuant to the Indian Act .
III. Judicial
History
A. Yukon
Territory Supreme Court, [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 284
20
The appellants filed a motion in the Yukon Territory Supreme Court
asking for a declaration that the lands the Band occupied at the Ross River
site constitute a reserve within the meaning of the Indian Act . The
federal government replied that the land had only been set aside for the Indian
Affairs Branch on behalf of the Band. There had been no intent to create a
reserve. Moreover, the creation of a reserve in the Yukon required an
Order-in-Council, under the royal prerogative. This step had never been taken
in the case of the Ross River Band.
21
Maddison J. declared the tract of land in question “to be an Indian
Reserve within the meaning of the Indian Act ” (para. 33). Maddison J.
held that the definition of “reserve” in s. 2 of the Indian Act does not
require any particular form of proclamation, conveyance, notification,
transfer, order or grant; rather, the statutory definition emphasizes the act
of “setting apart”. He recognized that there was no Order-in-Council or other
such official instrument creating or recognizing the Ross River lands as an
Indian reserve, but he found that such formal recognition was not necessary to
bring the lands within the definition of “reserve” in the Indian Act .
Maddison J. found, at para. 29, that:
The area reserved on January 26, 1965, was a tract
of land that was (and is) vested in her Majesty. It had been applied for, for
the use and benefit of a band: the Ross River Band. It was applied for, for a
permanent use: a village site. That constitutes “use and benefit of a band” as
in the Indian Act definition of “reserve”. The active words of the
document reserving the land are as close to the wording of the statute as all
but one of the four admitted Yukon Reserves for which the Court has been
provided the wording. The public servants who put the setting-aside in process
were Her Majesty’s agents.
B. Yukon
Territory Court of Appeal (1999), 182 D.L.R. (4th) 116
22
The respondents then appealed to the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal. A
majority of the court allowed the appeal, with Finch J.A. in dissent.
(1) Richard J.A.
23
Richard J.A., for the majority, held that the decision of the Yukon
Territory Supreme Court should be overturned. He found that the lands occupied
by the Band and its members were “lands set aside” but not a “reserve” under
the Indian Act . He noted that the distinction between “lands set aside”
and “reserves” was well established in the history of the Yukon, although the
terminology may have varied over time.
24
Richard J.A. found that it was the prerogative of the Crown to establish
a reserve which was usually formally evidenced by an Order-in-Council. He
found that there was no evidence that in 1965 the Crown ever intended to create
a reserve for the Band, either directly or by express or implied delegation.
He held that there was in fact a deliberate decision not to create a reserve.
He added that there was also no evidence that the Head of the Resources
Division had authority to create a reserve and the letter did not purport to be
an act of the Governor in Council or an exercise of the royal prerogative. A
generous or liberal reading of the definition of “reserve” in the Indian Act
would not have provided any assistance, because the land was not set apart for
the use and benefit of a “band”. Richard J.A. commented that the question at
issue was whether a reserve had in fact been created and not whether a reserve
should have been created.
(2) Hudson J.A. (concurring)
25
Hudson J.A. held that the chambers judge’s suggestion that some Crown
officers had conspired to impose the policy of integrating Aboriginal peoples
into the dominant society was not supported by the evidence. He stated that
the evidence indicated that the public servants complained about the policy
adopted by the government and, in fact, expressly favoured the goal of cultural
preservation through the reservation of land for the benefit of Aboriginal
peoples.
(3) Finch J.A. (dissenting)
26
Finch J.A. noted that neither the Indian Act nor the Territorial
Lands Act provided any formal mechanism for the creation of an “Indian
reserve” as defined in the Indian Act . He determined that the
definition of a reserve must be read against the background of the Crown’s
relationship with Aboriginal peoples to whom the Crown owed a fiduciary duty.
27
Finch J.A. found that the correspondence and conduct of officials from
the federal government responsible for Indian Affairs created a reserve in
1965, despite the absence of any Order-in-Council or other official instrument
reflecting an exercise of the Crown’s prerogative. In his opinion, the
statutory powers conferred in the Territorial Lands Act displaced the
Crown’s prerogative and allowed the Department of Northern Affairs and National
Resources to create reserves in the course of exercising statutory powers
delegated to them by the Governor in Council. Finch J.A. further found that
the Cabinet directive contained in Circular No. 27 was a delegation of statutory
authority sufficient to authorize public officials to create a “reserve” as
defined in the Indian Act .
28
Finch J.A. found that the definition of “reserve” in the Indian Act
required only an intention to allocate an area of Crown land for the use and
benefit of a band, and an act by a public official with the authority to give
effect to that intent. Finch J.A. decided that the appropriate government
official had set apart certain land intending it to be reserved for the use and
benefit of the Band. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the Crown’s
fiduciary obligations.
IV. Relevant
Statutory Provisions
29
Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18
3. The following terms contained in this
Act shall be held to have the meaning hereinafter assigned to them, unless such
meaning be repugnant to the subject or inconsistent with the context: —
.
. .
6. The term “reserve” means any tract or tracts of
land set apart by treaty or otherwise for the use or benefit of or granted to a
particular band of Indians, of which the legal title is in the Crown, but which
is unsurrendered, and includes all the trees, wood, timber, soil, stone,
minerals, metals, or other valuables thereon or therein.
Indian Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5
2. (1) In this Act,
“band” means a body of Indians
(a) for whose use and benefit in common, lands, the legal title
to which is vested in Her Majesty, have been set apart before, on or after
September 4, 1951,
(b) for whose use and benefit in common, moneys are held by Her
Majesty, or
(c) declared by the Governor in Council to be a band for the
purpose of this Act;
.
. .
“reserve”
(a) means a tract of land, the legal title to which is vested
in Her Majesty, that has been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit
of a band, and
(b) except in subsection 18(2), sections 20 to 25, 28, 36 to
38, 42, 44, 46, 48 to 51, 58 and 60 and the regulations made under any of those
provisions, includes designated lands;
.
. .
(2) The expression “band”, with reference to a
reserve or surrendered lands, means the band for whose use and benefit the
reserve or the surrendered lands were set apart.
.
. .
18. (1) Subject to this Act, reserves are
held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of the respective bands for which
they were set apart, and subject to this Act and to the terms of any treaty or
surrender, the Governor in Council may determine whether any purpose for which
lands in a reserve are used or are to be used is for the use and benefit of the
band.
21. There shall be kept in the Department a
register, to be known as the Reserve Land Register, in which shall be entered
particulars relating to Certificates of Possession and Certificates of
Occupation and other transactions respecting lands in a reserve.
87. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act of
Parliament or any Act of the legislature of a province, but subject to section
83, the following property is exempt from taxation, namely,
(a) the interest of an Indian or a band in reserve lands or
surrendered lands; and
(b) the personal property of an Indian or a band situated on a
reserve.
Territorial
Lands Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 263
18. The Governor in Council may
.
. .
(d) set apart and appropriate such areas or lands as may be
necessary to enable the Government of Canada to fulfil its obligations under
treaties with the Indians and to make free grants or leases for such purposes,
and for any other purpose that he may consider to be conducive to the welfare
of the Indians;
Territorial
Lands Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-7
23. The Governor in Council may
.
. .
(d) set apart and appropriate such areas or lands as may be
necessary
(i) to enable the Government of Canada to fulfil its obligations under
treaties with the Indians and to make free grants or leases for that purpose,
or
(ii) for any other purpose that the Governor in Council may consider
to be conducive to the welfare of the Indians;
V. Analysis
A. The
Issues
30
This appeal raises two well-defined issues about the creation of
reserves. The first one is the nature of the legal requirements which must be
met for the establishment of a reserve as defined in the Indian Act .
The second issue concerns whether, given these requirements, the lands set
aside for the Ross River Band have the status of a reserve.
B. The
Position of the Parties
(1) Appellants
31
The appellants submit that reserves have been created in a number of
ways. In their view, while the power to create reserves may originally have
been exercised under the royal prerogative, this was displaced beginning in
1868 with the passage of An Act providing for the organisation of the
Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of
Indian and Ordnance Lands, S.C. 1868, c. 42. The royal prerogative has
been further displaced by the combination of the definition of “reserve” in s.
2(1) of the Indian Act and s. 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial
Lands Act (now s. 23 (d)). The exercise of this statutory authority
thus requires no formal instrument signifying the exercise of the royal
prerogative such as an Order-in-Council or letters patent.
32
The appellants submit that reserves can be created by treaty or otherwise,
including by being set aside by survey. The lack of an Order-in-Council
setting lands aside has not been determinative of the creation of a reserve.
Indeed, the courts should continue to take a flexible approach to the Crown’s
actions in its relations with First Nations. The appellants adopt the view of
Finch J.A. that two conditions are required to create a reserve: (1) an
intention to create a de facto reserve, and (2) an act by a public
official with authority to give effect to the intention. The appellants have
also stated the criteria for creating a reserve as follows: (1) the Crown, as a
matter of fact, has set apart a specific tract of land; (2) the specific tract
has been set apart for the permanent use and benefit of a band of Indians; and
(3) the underlying title to these lands remains in the Crown.
33
The appellants submit that the village site inhabited by the Band meets
the test for the creation of a reserve. They claim that a specific tract of
land was set apart for their use in 1965. The lands have been used by the Band
ever since. Government officials as early as 1953 expressed an intention to
create a reserve for the Band, and continued to take this view in spite of
Ottawa’s intransigence. However, since the lands were set aside under the
Territorial Lands Act according to the appellants, a reserve was created.
The Crown had a clear purpose in setting aside the lands: to establish a
settled community where the Band would be able to live in permanent dwellings.
Further, DIAND adopted a policy in 1971 which recognized the Band’s beneficial
interest in the land and required the Department to consult and compensate the
Band if a right-of-way should be needed over its lands.
(2) Respondents
(i) Government of Canada
34
The Government of Canada submits that the power to create reserves in
the Yukon Territory continues to be an exercise of the royal prerogative. The
Crown in this case never intended to create a reserve, and never by a duly
authorized official or body exercised the royal prerogative to do so.
Intention to create a reserve is key, and the evidence accepted in the courts
below was that no such intention ever existed. The Government of Canada
submits that, as the Band is not the signatory of any treaty, reserve-creation
principles based on treaty-created reserves are inapplicable. Further, the Territorial
Lands Act does not grant authority to create reserves; even if it did, the
authority to do so would reside in the Governor in Council who has not
exercised that power to create a reserve for the Band.
35
The Government of Canada submits that the power to create reserves is
part of the royal prerogative because of the special nature of the relationship
of First Nations to the Crown. By convention and long-standing practice, only
the Governor in Council is able to exercise this power; its exercise cannot be
delegated to ministers of the Crown or other delegates. The exercise of the
royal prerogative requires an outward public manifestation through an
Order-in-Council; warrants, commissions or orders under the sign manual; or
proclamations, writs, letters patent, letters close, charters, grants and other
documents under the Great Seal. In most cases, reserves have been created by
means of Orders-in-Council, although there have been exceptions. In the view
of the Government of Canada, these exceptions do not prove that the creation of
reserves is no longer a prerogative power. In this case, there is no treaty
manifesting an intention to create a reserve, nor any other concrete evidence
of it. While some Crown servants may have favoured the creation of a reserve,
their views were never adopted by the Crown which had a stated policy against
the creation of reserves in the Yukon Territory.
36
The royal prerogative can only be limited by means of express language
in statute. Neither the Indian Act nor the Territorial Lands Act
supplants the prerogative by means of explicit language with respect to reserve
creation. The Government of Canada rejects the trial judge’s application of
the definition of the word “reserve” in the Indian Act as inconsistent
with the purposive, contextual approach to interpretation advocated by this
Court. The Government of Canada adds that the context of the Indian Act
makes it clear that not all lands occupied by Indians under the Act are reserve
lands; First Nations may also reside on Crown lands that have not been set
apart as reserves. Moreover, in many cases, powers in relation to reserves
under the Act must be exercised by the Governor in Council. Finally, because
the creation of a reserve has effects upon the general population as well as
the specific band, it is critical that the process of establishing a reserve be
appropriately public to ensure clarity, certainty and public notice.
(ii) Government of Yukon
37
The Government of Yukon has taken no position on the questions in this
appeal. However, the Government of Yukon stated its concern about the impact
of any decision in this case on the Umbrella Final Agreement, which sets the
pattern for land settlement agreements between it and the First Nations of the
Yukon Territory. The Umbrella Final Agreement treats reserves and lands set
aside, or settlement land, differently. Lands set aside must become settlement
land, outside of the Indian Act , under the Umbrella Final Agreement; on
the other hand, reserves are to be retained or converted to settlement land.
Different tax regimes affect each type of land, with reserves entitled to the
exemption under s. 87 of the Indian Act , whereas lands set aside have
been granted a moratorium on the collection of certain types of tax. Further,
federal grants in lieu of taxes are paid to the Government of Yukon on lands
set aside, but not on reserve lands. A judgment of this Court finding that the
Ross River lands are a reserve would impact on other First Nations in the Yukon
Territory and could disrupt the current land agreement.
(3) Interveners
38
Two interveners, the Attorney General of British Columbia and the
Coalition of B.C. First Nations (the “Coalition”) made sharply conflicting
submissions on the key issues raised in this appeal. In support of the
Government of Canada, the Attorney General of British Columbia submitted that
the creation of reserves remains essentially a matter of royal prerogative.
The Indian Act is concerned with the management of reserves but does not
provide for their creation. Moreover, a finding that an Indian Act
reserve has been established requires evidence of an outward manifestation of
intent to bring a tract of land under the management and protection scheme of
the Act.
39
The Coalition submitted broad arguments on the nature of the
relationship between the Crown and First Nations. It views reserve creation as
an exercise of the royal prerogative, constrained by the Crown’s legal and
equitable obligations to First Nations, as well as by statute. In this
context, it submits that reserves may come into existence by various means like
the treaty process, unilateral government action, or even de facto
through the historical development of a particular native community which gives
the reserve definite boundaries over time.
40
Given the position of the parties and the issues they raise, I will
review the legal process of reserve creation in the Yukon Territory, after a
few comments about the history of the process in Canada. I will then turn to
the evidence in order to determine whether it establishes that a reserve was
created at Ross River.
C. The
Creation of Reserves
41
A word of caution is appropriate at the start of this review of the
process of reserve creation. Some of the parties or interveners have attempted
to broaden the scope of this case. They submit that it offers the opportunity
for a definitive and exhaustive pronouncement by this Court on the legal
requirements for creating a reserve under the Indian Act . Such an
attempt, however interesting and challenging it may appear, would be both
premature and detrimental to the proper development of the law in this area. Despite
its significance, this appeal involves a discussion of the legal position and
historical experience of the Yukon, not of historical and legal developments
spanning almost four centuries and concerning every region of Canada.
42
The key issue in this case remains whether the lands set aside nearly
half a century ago for the Ross River Band have the status of a reserve as
defined in the Indian Act . Was the process purely an exercise of
the prerogative power? Did statute law displace this power completely or in
part? These questions must be answered in order to determine whether a reserve
now exists at the junction of the Ross and Pelly Rivers.
43
Canadian history confirms that the process of reserve creation went
through many stages and reflects the outcome of a number of administrative and
political experiments. Procedures and legal techniques changed. Different
approaches were used, so much so that it would be difficult to draw
generalizations in the context of a specific case, grounded in the particular
historical experience of one region of this country.
44
In the Maritime provinces, or in Quebec, during the French regime or
after the British conquest, as well as in Ontario or later in the Prairies and
in British Columbia, reserves were created by various methods. The legal and
political methods used to give form and existence to a reserve evolved over
time. It is beyond the scope of these reasons to attempt to summarize the
history of the process of reserve creation throughout Canada. Nevertheless,
its diversity and complexity become evident in some of the general overviews of
the process which have become available from contemporary historical research.
For example, in the course of the execution of its broad mandate on the
problems of the First Nations in Canada, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples reviewed the process in its report (“RCAP Report”) (see Looking
Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1, at pp. 142-45; Restructuring the
Relationship, vol. 2, at pp. 464-85). The report gives a good overview of
the creation of reserves, emphasizing its very diversity. A more detailed
study of the topic may also be found in R. H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves and
Aboriginal Lands in Canada: A Homeland — A Study in Law and History (1990);
see also J. Woodward, Native Law (loose-leaf), at pp. 247-48.
Northern Canada
45
In this appeal, more detailed attention must be given to a review of the
process of reserve creation in Northern Canada. Treaties 8, 10 and 11 provided
for the creation of reserves in Northern Canada (consisting in part of the
northern Prairie provinces and the western portions of the Northwest
Territories, southeastern Yukon Territory, and northeastern British Columbia).
These have been characterized as “resource development” agreements in the sense
that there was no desire to turn the Aboriginal peoples of these areas into
farmers as had been the case in the South. Moreover, First Nations were told
generally that they would not be forced to live on the reserve allotments nor
would their traditional economic life be disrupted. However, as in the more southerly
numbered treaties, the federal government was often slow to meet its obligation
to create reserves, leaving many First Nations to continue the struggle to
settle land claims into very recent times (see RCAP Report, vol. 2, supra,
at pp. 479-84). In a number of cases, some First Nations never acceded to
treaties purporting to cover their lands. In other cases, no treaties were
ever signed, as is the case in most of the Yukon Territory. However, in the
last two decades there has been some movement to formulate land settlement
claims with the Inuit (which led to the creation of Nunavut), the Dene and
Yukon First Nations. These agreements generally provide for some form of
Aboriginal self-government, but do not necessarily provide for the creation of
reserves (as in the Umbrella Final Agreement in the present case).
46
The legal methods used to give a form of legal existence to these
reserves have varied. Each of them must be reviewed in its own context. I
will hence focus now more narrowly on the legal nature of the process which
prevailed in the Yukon and on its application to the facts in this case.
D. Reserve
Creation in the Yukon
47
Three different sources for the authority to create reserves have been
identified by the parties. The appellants essentially submit that the
authority to create a reserve is statute based. In their view, statute law has
displaced the royal prerogative as the primary source of authority. As
mentioned above, the federal government answers that the reserve-creation power
in the Yukon Territory continues to flow from the royal prerogative. One of
the interveners, the Coalition, advances the submission that the authority to
create reserves derives from the combined application of prerogative powers and
statute.
(1) Statute
48
In order to determine whether statutory authority exists, it is
necessary to turn first to the provisions of the Indian Act . Under s.
2(1) of the Indian Act , the term “reserve” in the context of the
Act is defined as follows: “[A] tract of land, the legal title to which is
vested in Her Majesty, that has been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and
benefit of a band”. In certain sections of the Indian Act (namely, ss.
18(2) , 20 to 25 , 28 , 36 to 38 , 42 , 44 , 46 , 48 to 51 , 58 and 60 , and the
regulations made under those sections), the definition of “reserve” is extended
to include “designated lands”, which s. 2(1) defines to mean “a tract of land
or any interest therein the legal title to which remains vested in Her Majesty
and in which the band for whose use and benefit it was set apart as a reserve
has, otherwise than absolutely, released or surrendered its rights or
interests, whether before or after the coming into force of this definition”.
This latter expansion of the definition is not of relevance in the instant
case, so my analysis will focus on the definition proper.
49
The definition in s. 2(1) of “reserve” exists primarily to identify what
lands are subject to the terms of the Act. The Act outlines property rights of
Indians on reserves, establishes band governments and outlines their powers,
identifies how Indians are or are not subject to taxation, and provides for a
variety of other matters.
50
Under the Indian Act , the setting apart of a tract of land as a
reserve implies both an action and an intention. In other words, the Crown
must do certain things to set apart the land, but it must also have an
intention in doing those acts to accomplish the end of creating a reserve. It
may be that, in some cases, certain political or legal acts performed by the
Crown are so definitive or conclusive that it is unnecessary to prove a
subjective intent on the part of the Crown to effect a setting apart to create
a reserve. For example, the signing of a treaty or the issuing of an
Order-in-Council are of such an authoritative nature that the mental
requirement or intention would be implicit or presumptive.
51
While s. 2(1) of the Indian Act defines “reserve” for the
purposes of the Act as land set apart by the Crown for the use and benefit of
Indians, nothing in the Act bestows upon the Governor in Council, the Minister
of DIAND, or any other statutory delegate, the authority to perform the actions
necessary to create a reserve. Nor does the Act explain what must be done to
set apart lands for the purpose of creating a reserve: the Act neither sets out
the material element nor the intentional element required for the setting apart
of land to take place. One must look elsewhere for sources of any such
statutory authority.
52
The appellants concede that the royal prerogative was the original
source of the Crown’s authority to create a reserve. In such instruments as the
Mi’kmaq treaties in the early 1760s discussed in R. v. Marshall, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 456, the Crown interacted directly with the First Nations without the
interposition of any statutory authority. Such a situation is a pure act of
prerogative authority. Only since the latter part of the eighteenth century
has legislation been enacted which could eliminate or reduce the scope of the
royal prerogative with respect to reserve creation.
53
The appellants submit that, while the royal prerogative may have once
been the source of authority for creating reserves, it has been superseded by
statute. The question, then, which must first be answered is whether and to
what degree the royal prerogative has been limited in the scope of its
application to reserve creation. This analysis necessarily implies determining
how the royal prerogative is limited.
(2) Royal Prerogative
54
Generally speaking, in my view, the royal prerogative means “the powers
and privileges accorded by the common law to the Crown” (see P. W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed.), vol. 1, at p. 1:14). The
royal prerogative is confined to executive governmental powers, whether federal
or provincial. The extent of its authority can be abolished or limited by
statute: “once a statute has occupied the ground formerly occupied by the
prerogative, the Crown [has to] comply with the terms of the statute”. (See P.
W. Hogg and P. J. Monahan, Liability of the Crown (3rd ed. 2000), at p.
17; see also, Hogg, supra, at pp. 1:15-1:16; P. Lordon, Q.C., Crown
Law (1991), at pp. 66-67.) In Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal
Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.), Lord Dunedin described the interplay
of royal prerogative and statute, at p. 526:
Inasmuch as the Crown is a party to every Act of Parliament it is
logical enough to consider that when the Act deals with something which before
the Act could be effected by the prerogative, and specially empowers the Crown
to do the same thing, but subject to conditions, the Crown assents to that, and
by that Act, to the prerogative being curtailed.
Lord Parmoor
added, at p. 568: “The Royal Prerogative has of necessity been gradually
curtailed, as a settled rule of law has taken the place of an uncertain and
arbitrary administrative discretion”. In summary, then, as statute law expands
and encroaches upon the purview of the royal prerogative, to that extent the
royal prerogative contracts. However, this displacement occurs only to the
extent that the statute does so explicitly or by necessary implication: see Interpretation
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 17 ; Hogg and Monahan, supra, at
p. 17; Lordon, supra, at p. 66.
55
The appellants submit that statute has long since displaced the royal
prerogative in the area of reserve creation. The first post-Confederation
statute which dealt with Indians, An Act providing for the organisation of
the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of
Indian and Ordnance Lands, gave the Secretary of State authority to control
and manage the lands and property of Indians and, in s. 3(6) of the Indian
Act, 1876, defined a reserve to include any land “set apart by treaty or
otherwise”, implying that there were several ways by which a reserve could be
created. The essential element then, and which continues today, is that the
lands be set apart.
56
Further, s. 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial Lands Act , the
successor to the Dominion Lands Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 113, repealed S.C.
1950, c. 22, s. 26, states that the Governor in Council may “set apart and
appropriate such areas or lands as may be necessary to enable the Government of
Canada to fulfil its obligations under treaties with the Indians and to make
free grants or leases for such purposes, and for any other purpose that he may
consider to be conducive to the welfare of the Indians”. The appellants submit
that this provision, in combination with the provisions discussed above in the Indian
Act , has supplanted the royal prerogative.
57
The respondents counter that s. 18(d) provides for the creation
of a land bank from which the Crown may create reserves, but that it does not
provide for the actual creation of reserves themselves. The respondents rely
upon Town of Hay River v. The Queen, [1980] 1 F.C. 262 (T.D.), in which
Mahoney J. stated in obiter, at p. 265, that “the authority to set apart
Crown lands for an Indian reserve in the Northwest Territories appears to
remain based entirely on the Royal Prerogative, not subject to any statutory
limitation”.
58
In my view, the statutory framework described by the appellants has
limited to some degree but not entirely ousted, the royal prerogative in respect
of the creation of reserves within the meaning of the Indian Act in the
Yukon. Whenever the Crown decides to set up a reserve under the Indian Act ,
at a minimum, s. 2(1) puts limits on the effects of the decision of the Crown
in the sense that the definition of a “reserve” in the Act means (1)
that the title to reserve lands remains with the Crown, and (2) that the
reserve must consist of lands “set apart” for the use and benefit of a band of
Indians. If the royal prerogative were completely unlimited by statute, the
Crown would essentially be able to create reserves, in any manner it wished,
including the transfer of title by sale, grant or gift to a First Nation or
some of its members. However, in the Yukon, so long as the Crown intends to
create a reserve as defined by the Indian Act , Parliament has put limits
on the scope and effects of the power to create reserves at whim, through the
application of the statutory definition of a reserve in s. 2(1) . If the Crown
intended to transfer land to a First Nation outside the scope of the Indian
Act , the role and effects of the prerogative would not be constrained by
this Act and would have to be examined in a different legal environment.
59
Section 18(d) of the 1952 Territorial Lands Act has
similarly placed limits on the royal prerogative with respect to the creation
of reserves by establishing a new and different source of authority whose
exercise may trigger the process of reserve creation. It indicates that at
least some of the lands used to fulfill treaty requirements, which include the
creation of reserves for signatory First Nations, are to be drawn from lands
set apart and appropriated for that purpose by the Governor in Council under
the terms of the 1952 Territorial Lands Act .
60
That said, it would not be accurate to state that the royal prerogative
has been completely ousted from the field by the 1952 Territorial Lands Act .
Section 18 (d) does, on its face, seem to bestow a power on the Governor
in Council to set apart lands for the creation of reserves. However, as the
respondent Government of Canada points out, this does not necessarily mean that
this section grants authority to actually create the reserve and that the
prerogative no longer plays any part in the process. The setting apart and
appropriating of land is not the entire matter; the Crown must also manifest an
intent to make the land so set apart a reserve. The use of the words “as may
be necessary” implies a separation in time between the appropriation of the lands
and the fulfilment of the treaty obligations. In other words, once the land is
appropriated, it does not yet have the legal status of a reserve; something
more is required to accomplish that end. This requirement reflects the nature
of a process which is political, at least in part. Given the consequences of
the creation of a reserve for government authorities, for the bands concerned
and for other non-native communities, the process will often call for some
political assessment of the effect, circumstances and opportunity of setting up
a reserve, as defined in the Indian Act , in a particular location
or territory.
61
The appellants have not pointed to any other statutory provision which
identifies the process by which the Crown takes lands set apart and
appropriated under s. 18(d) and turns them into a reserve. Indeed, the
Act remains entirely silent in this respect. Rather, the appellants seem to
rely on a logical leap from the fact of setting apart and appropriating the
land to the creation of a reserve. As I have said, the language of s. 18(d)
does not make that leap. If Parliament had meant in s. 18(d) to grant
the Governor in Council the power to both appropriate lands for the purpose of
meeting treaty obligations to create reserves and to create the reserves from
the lands appropriated, it would have used more specific language to effect
such a grant of authority.
62
Even if I were to find that s. 18(d) has occupied the field with
respect to the creation of Indian reserves, it is nevertheless clear from the
language of the section that the Governor in Council has been given the power
to create reserves from lands set apart. The Governor in Council is given
discretion (indicated by the use of the word “may”) to decide whether to set
apart lands and whether to designate said lands as the reserve of any
particular First Nation. Further, the Governor in Council is under no
obligation to set apart particular lands for the use and benefit of a band,
unless that has been provided for under treaty or some other land settlement
agreement. Otherwise, the Governor in Council is free to designate any Crown
land the Crown chooses as a reserve for a particular band. Although this is
not at stake in the present appeal, it should not be forgotten that the
exercise of this particular power remains subject to the fiduciary obligations
of the Crown as well as to the constitutional rights and obligations which
arise under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
63
It is worth noting that, in either situation, it is the Governor in
Council who exercises the authority granted. The royal prerogative in Canada
is exercised by the Governor General under the letters patent granted by His
Majesty King George VI in 1947 (see Letters Patent constituting the office
of Governor General of Canada (1947), in Canada Gazette, Part I,
vol. 81, p. 3014 (reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 31)). In the usual
course of things, the Governor General exercises these powers for the Queen in
right of Canada, acting on the advice of a Committee of the Privy Council
(which consists of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the government of the
day). Thus, if the power to create reserves is derived from the royal
prerogative, the Governor General, or Governor in Council, would normally
exercise that power. On the other hand, s. 18(d) of the 1952
Territorial Lands Act specifically designates the Governor in Council as
the holder of the power to set apart and appropriate lands for the fulfilment
of treaty obligations. In effect, the holder of the power is the same person
in both cases.
64
The question arises in both cases as to whether the powers of the
Governor in Council must be exercised personally or if those powers may be
delegated to a government official. As the intervener Coalition submits, one
must look both at the Crown and Aboriginal perspectives to determine on the
facts of a given case whether the party alleged to have exercised the power to
create a reserve could reasonably have been seen to have the authority to bind
the Crown to act to appropriate or set apart the lands and then to designate
them as a reserve. In my view, the correct test of this is to be found in this
Court’s judgment in R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at
p. 1040:
To arrive at the conclusion that a person had the capacity
to enter into a treaty with the Indians, he or she must thus have represented
the British Crown in very important, authoritative functions. It is then
necessary to take the Indians’ point of view and to ask whether it was
reasonable for them to believe, in light of the circumstances and the position
occupied by the party they were dealing with directly, that they had before
them a person capable of binding the British Crown by treaty.
65
While these words were said in the context of treaty creation, they seem
relevant in principle to the creation of a reserve. In both cases, an agent of
the Crown, duly authorized, acts in the exercise of a delegated authority to
establish or further elaborate upon the relationship that exists between a
First Nation and the Crown. The Crown agent makes representations to the First
Nation with respect to the Crown’s intentions. And, in both cases, the honour
of the Crown rests on the Governor in Council’s willingness to live up to those
representations made to the First Nation in an effort to induce it to enter
into some obligation or to accept settlement on a particular parcel of land.
66
However, from the passage from Sioui, it is also clear that not
just any Crown agent will do. Many minor officials who are Crown agents could
hardly be said to act to bind the Crown in this case or any other, in a process
which involves significant political considerations or concerns about the
Crown’s duties and obligations towards First Nations. The Crown agent must
“have represented [the Crown] in very important, authoritative functions” (Sioui,
supra, at p. 1040). Similarly, where reserves have been created by means
of an Order-in-Council, there is no question that it is the Governor in Council
who is making the representations and who is exercising the power to create the
reserve. On the other hand, in the circumstances of this case, the
registration in the Yukon Territory Land Registry of the setting aside of land
for the Indian Affairs Branch is not sufficient to show intent to create a
reserve given the widely varying types of interests in land recorded in that
Register.
E. Summary
of Principles Governing the Creation of Reserves Applicable to this Case
67
Thus, in the Yukon Territory as well as elsewhere in Canada, there
appears to be no single procedure for creating reserves, although an
Order-in-Council has been the most common and undoubtedly best and clearest
procedure used to create reserves. (See: Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 654, at pp. 674-75; Woodward, supra, at pp.
233-37.) Whatever method is employed, the Crown must have had an intention to
create a reserve. This intention must be possessed by Crown agents holding
sufficient authority to bind the Crown. For example, this intention may be
evidenced either by an exercise of executive authority such as an
Order-in-Council, or on the basis of specific statutory provisions creating a
particular reserve. Steps must be taken in order to set apart land. The
setting apart must occur for the benefit of Indians. And, finally, the band
concerned must have accepted the setting apart and must have started to make
use of the lands so set apart. Hence, the process remains fact-sensitive. The
evaluation of its legal effect turns on a very contextual and fact-driven
analysis. Thus, this analysis must be performed on the basis of the record.
68
It should be noted that the parties did not raise, in the course of this
appeal, the impact of the fiduciary obligations of the Crown. It must be kept
in mind that the process of reserve creation, like other aspects of its
relationship with First Nations, requires that the Crown remain mindful of its
fiduciary duties and of their impact on this procedure, and taking into
consideration the sui generis nature of native land rights: see the
comments of Lamer C.J. in St. Mary’s Indian Band v. Cranbrook (City),
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 657, at paras. 14-16.
F. The
Evidence Relating to the Creation of a Reserve at Ross River
69
To succeed, the appellants in this case have to show at least that land
had been set apart for them. No real dispute arises with respect to the
setting aside of land, nor with respect to the absence of an Order-in-Council,
which latter issue, in my view, is not determinative of the issue. The key
question remains whether there was an intention to create a reserve on the part
of persons having the authority to bind the Crown. In other words, what is
critical is whether the particular Crown official, on the facts of a given
case, had authority to bind the Crown or was reasonably so seen by the First
Nation, whether the official made representations to the First Nation that he
was binding the Crown to create a reserve, and whether the official had the
authority to set apart lands for the creation of the reserve or was reasonably
so seen.
70
The appellants pointed to parts of the evidence which, in their opinion,
indicated that such an intention had existed and had led to the setting apart
of the lands where the Band had been living for many years. The appellants
point to a number of individuals involved in the management of native affairs
in the Yukon who recommended to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
Indian Affairs Branch, and/or the Supervisor of Lands and Mining, Department of
Northern Affairs and National Resources, that a reserve be created for the
Band. They placed strong emphasis on their recommendations as well as on the
fact that a village was established at Ross River, as had also been recommended.
71
In my view, the critical flaw in the appellants’ reliance on the
authority of these Crown officials to bind the Crown appears when one asks
whether these agents either (1) made representations to the Ross River Band
that they had authority to create reserves; or (2) both made the
representations and set apart the lands by legal act. On this appeal, the
appellants have made no attempt to show that in fact these Crown agents ever
made representations to the members of the Ross River Band that the Crown had
decided to create a reserve for them. Nowhere in the appellants’ lengthy
review of the facts is there any reference to such evidence. Nor did Maddison
J., in his reasons for judgment at trial, make any such reference. The evidence
presented by the appellants all relates to recommendations made by Crown
officials to other Crown officials, which recommendations were generally
ignored or rejected. There appears to have been a long-lasting and deep-seated
tension, even disagreement, as to the opportunity of creating new reserves
between the civil servants working directly with native groups in the Yukon and
their superiors in Ottawa. The evidence shows that no person having the
authority to bind the Crown ever agreed to the setting up of a reserve at Ross
River. Every representation made by those Crown officials actually in a
position to set apart the lands was to the effect that no reserves existed in
the Yukon Territory and that it was contrary to government policy to create reserves
there. There is simply no evidence provided by the appellants which suggests
that any Crown agents with the authority to set apart lands went to the members
of the Band and in effect said: “The Crown is now creating a reserve for you, a
reserve of the type contemplated under the Indian Act and which will be
subject to all of the terms of that Act”. Conversely, those Crown officials
who did advocate the creation of a reserve, whether or not they made
representations to the Band, never had the authority to set apart the lands
and create a reserve.
72
Some specific facts are particularly telling in this respect. They
confirm that the appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of the
intentional component of the reserve-creation process. At most, as indicated
above, they proved that there had been a long-standing disagreement between the
local agents of DIAND and its predecessors and its central administration in
Ottawa. This conflict originated in the 1950s. For example, the Indian
Commissioner for British Columbia, who was also in charge of native affairs in
the Yukon, recommended that a number of new reserves, including one at Ross
River, be created in the territory. The Deputy Minister of the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, advised the Acting Minister
against such a move and no action was taken.
73
A few years later, in 1957, the Deputy Minister recommended against the
creation of new reserves. As a result, the Government of Canada decided not to
implement a recommendation to set up 10 new reserves including one at Ross
River. In 1958, the Deputy Minister received new recommendations against the
creation of reserves.
74
In 1962, the Yukon Agency of the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department
of Citizenship and Immigration applied to the Department of Northern Affairs
and National Resources and asked that land be set aside for the Ross River
Indian Village site, presumably pursuant to the Territorial Lands Act . After
a series of correspondence about the location and size of the site, the
Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources informed the Indian
Affairs Branch that land had been set aside “for [the] Indian Affairs Branch”,
but not specifically for the Ross River Band.
75
After the village was established and the land was set aside, the
Department constantly maintained the position that it had not intended to
create a reserve. In 1972, a published list of reserves restated the official
position that no reserve had been created in the Yukon, within the meaning of
the Indian Act . In 1973, the Department reversed in part its previous
stance. It acknowledged that six reserves had been created by
Orders-in-Council, between 1900 and 1941. The Ross River site was not among
them.
76
After 1965, the reality of these set-asides which do not constitute
reserves seems to have been well established. There was an early illustration
of this fact. In 1966, the Government of Yukon took back control of a lot on
the site of the Ross River Indian Village and leased it to a private citizen.
There was consultation with the Band, but no authorization or consent was
requested from it. No suggestion was made at the time that the Band’s consent
would be required. Finally, as we shall see, the existence of these lands set
aside, while not having the status of reserves, was recognized during the
negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Umbrella Final Agreement.
G. The
Effect of the Setting Aside
77
As argued by the respondent, the Government of Canada, what happened in
this case was the setting aside of lands for the use of the Band. No reserve
was legally created. This procedure may raise concerns because it may amount
to a bureaucratic attempt to sidestep the process of reserve creation and establish
communities which remain in legal limbo. The use of this procedure may leave
considerable uncertainty as to the rights of the Band and its members in
relation to the lands they are allowed to use in such a manner. Nevertheless,
it must not be forgotten that the actions of the Crown with respect to the
lands occupied by the Band will be governed by the fiduciary relationship which
exists between the Crown and the Band. It would certainly be in the interests
of fairness for the Crown to take into consideration in any future negotiations
the fact that the Ross River Band has occupied these lands for almost half a
century.
78
The Umbrella Final Agreement acknowledges that these set asides were
common practice in the Yukon. Indeed, as pointed out in the factum of the
Government of Yukon, the Umbrella Final Agreement provides for rules and
procedures designed to deal with the status of lands set aside, which set-aside
lands are clearly distinguished from Indian Act reserves. Under this
agreement, lands set aside must become settlement land under a Yukon First
Nation Final Agreement. Such settlement land is specifically identified as not
being reserve land. Thus, it may well be thought that the alleged claim of the
appellants should have been pursued through the negotiation process, given the
absence of intention to create a reserve on the part of the Crown.
VI. Conclusion
79
For these reasons, the appeal should be dismissed, with no order as to
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Solicitors for the appellants: Gowling Lafleur Henderson, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada: The Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the respondent the Government of Yukon: The Minister
of Justice of the Yukon Territory, Whitehorse.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of British
Columbia: The Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.
Solicitors for the intervener the Coalition of B.C. First Nations:
Mandell Pinder, Vancouver.