R. v. Cheddesingh, 2004 SCC 16, [2004] 1 SCR 433

R. v. Cheddesingh, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2004 SCC 16

David Masi Cheddesingh                                                                                Appellant

v.

Her Majesty The Queen                                                                               Respondent

Indexed as:  R. v. Cheddesingh

Neutral citation:  2004 SCC 16.

File No.:  29662.

2004:  March 19.

Present:  McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps and Fish JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario

Criminal law — Sentencing — Manslaughter — Life sentence — Accused convicted of manslaughter resulting from rape and subsequent death of 76-year-old victim — Sentencing judge characterizing offence as one of “stark horror” — Whether judge considered all relevant factors and exercised his discretion judicially in sentencing accused to life imprisonment.

Criminal law — Sentencing — Eligibility for parole — Appropriateness of parole ineligibility order.

Cases Cited

Applied:  R. v. Zinck, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 41, 2003 SCC 6.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 743.6(2) .

Authors Cited

Manson, Allan. The Law of Sentencing.  Toronto:  Irwin Law, 2001.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 721, 162 O.A.C. 151, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 310, [2002] O.J. No. 3176 (QL), dismissing the accused’s appeal from his sentence of life imprisonment for manslaughter and varying the parole ineligibility period.  Appeal dismissed.

C. Leslie Maunder, for the appellant.

Sandra Kingston and David Leposky, for the respondent.

The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by

1                                   The Chief Justice — We are all of the view that this appeal should be dismissed.  The first issue is whether the trial judge erred by using the concept of “stark horror” in imposing a life sentence.  We agree with the appellant’s counsel that terms such as “stark horror”, “worst offence” and “worst offender” add nothing to the analysis and should be avoided.  All relevant factors under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , must be considered.  A maximum penalty of any kind will by its very nature be imposed only rarely (see A. Manson, The Law of Sentencing (2001), at p. 106) and is only appropriate if the offence is of sufficient gravity and the offender displays sufficient blameworthiness.  As is always the case with sentencing, the inquiry must proceed on a case-by-case basis.  Here we are satisfied that the sentencing judge considered all the relevant factors and exercised his discretion judicially in sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment.

2                                   The second issue is the appropriateness of the parole ineligibility order under s. 743.6(2) of the Code, as amended by the Court of Appeal to 10 years in conformity with the wording of the section.  In our view this matter is governed by R. v. Zinck, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 41, 2003 SCC 6.  The sentencing judge in this case applied the principles set out in Zinck and cannot be said to have made a demonstrably unfit parole order.  Specific deterrence was a paramount concern and for justifiable reasons.  The expert evidence indicated that the offender’s personality disorders made him a danger to society.  His ability to address his personality disorders can come only with time and possibly not at all.  As such, the parole order must be upheld.  We would dismiss the appeal.

Judgment accordingly.

Solicitors for the appellant:  Pinkofskys, Toronto.

Solicitor for the respondent:  Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.