SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Shawna
Prebushewski
Appellant
v.
Dodge
City Auto (1984) Ltd. and Chrysler Canada Ltd.
Respondents
Coram:
Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 45)
|
Abella J. (Major, Bastarache,
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Charron JJ. concurring)
|
Appeal heard and
judgment rendered: March 9, 2005
Reasons delivered:
May 19, 2005
______________________________
Prebushewski v. Dodge City Auto (1984) Ltd., [2005] 1 S.C.R.
649, 2005 SCC 28
Shawna Prebushewski Appellant
v.
Dodge City Auto (1984) Ltd. and Chrysler Canada Ltd. Respondents
Indexed as: Prebushewski v.
Dodge City Auto (1984) Ltd.
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 28.
File No.: 30189.
2005: March 9; 2005: May 19.
Present: Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish,
Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for saskatchewan
Sale of goods — Statutory warranties — Breach of
warranties — Truck bursting into flames and destroyed due to manufacturing
defect — Consumer successfully suing car manufacturer and dealer for breach of
statutory warranties pursuant to consumer protection legislation — Whether
violation of consumer protection legislation justified award of exemplary
damages — Whether violation was “wilful” — Consumer Protection Act,
S.S. 1996, c. C‑30.1, s. 65.
Damages — Exemplary damages — Consumer protection —
Truck bursting into flames and destroyed due to manufacturing defect — Consumer
successfully suing car manufacturer and dealer for breach of statutory
warranties pursuant to consumer protection legislation — Trial judge awarding
exemplary damages against car manufacturer and dealer — Whether violation of
consumer protection legislation justified award of exemplary damages — Whether
exemplary damages provision merely codified common law test for awarding such
damages — Consumer Protection Act, S.S. 1996, c. C‑30.1,
s. 65.
Costs — Party‑and‑party costs —
Consumer protection — Consumer successfully suing car manufacturer and dealer
for breach of statutory warranties pursuant to consumer protection legislation
— Court of Appeal affirming award of costs to consumer at trial but awarding
costs against her on appeal because manufacturer and dealer achieved
substantial success — Consumer protection legislation provides that costs may
not be awarded against consumer bringing suit against a manufacturer or retail
seller for breach of warranty unless suit is frivolous or vexatious — Whether
Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to award costs against consumer — Whether
protective scope of costs provision limited to proceedings at trials — Consumer
Protection Act, S.S. 1996, c. C‑30.1, s. 66.
Because of a manufacturing defect in the daytime
running light module, P’s truck burst into flames and was destroyed. Both the
manufacturer and the dealer which sold the truck to P denied liability. They
refused to provide any assistance and referred P to her insurer. At trial, the
manufacturer’s representative testified that the manufacturer had known for
several years that there were problems with the module and had not informed its
customers or ordered a recall. The trial judge found the manufacturer and the
dealer responsible for breaching statutory warranties under the Saskatchewan Consumer
Protection Act. P was awarded general and exemplary damages. The Court of
Appeal overturned the exemplary damages award and awarded costs against P.
Held: The
appeal should be allowed.
The trial judge’s award of exemplary damages should be
restored. The test for exemplary damages set out in s. 65 of the Consumer
Protection Act is not a codification of the common law test. Rather,
s. 65 creates a distinct regime designed to enhance consumer protection.
By providing that “wilful” violations of the Act are sufficient to trigger a
judge’s discretion to award exemplary damages, the legislature has signalled in
s. 65 an intention to lower the threshold and grant easier access to that
remedy. A “wilful” act is voluntary, intentional, or deliberate. In this
case, there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion that
the violation of the Act by the manufacturer and the dealer was wilful and that
exemplary damages were warranted. [23-28] [37-39]
The award of costs against P must be set aside.
Section 66 provides that costs shall not be awarded against a consumer who
brings an action against a manufacturer or retail seller for breach of warranty
unless the action is frivolous or vexatious. The prohibition against ordering
costs against the consumer applies whether or not the consumer is successful.
The protective scope of s. 66 is not limited to proceedings at trials.
Since both the trial court and the appeal court held that P was entitled to
damages in the amount of the purchase price of the truck, and since there was
no suggestion by either the manufacturer or the dealer that this action was
frivolous or vexatious, there was no basis for an award of costs against P by
the Court of Appeal. [41-44]
Cases Cited
Referred to: Performance
Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 678, 2002 SCC 19; Whiten v.
Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 2002 SCC 18; Hill
v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130; Norberg
v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Bills of
Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 15,
Part V [ad. S.C. 1969‑70, c. 48, s. 2].
Consumer Packaging and
Labelling Act , S.C. 1970‑71‑72,
c. 41.
Consumer Products Warranties
Act, 1977, S.S. 1976‑77, c. 15.
Consumer Protection Act, S.S. 1996, c. C‑30.1, ss. 3(c), 16, 40(1), 57(1), 65, 66.
Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs Act, S.C. 1967‑68,
c. 16.
Food and Drugs Act, S.C. 1952‑53, c. 38.
Hazardous Products Act, S.C. 1968‑69, c. 42.
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, S.C. 1969‑70, c. 30.
Textile Labelling Act, S.C. 1969‑70, c. 34.
Weights and Measures Act , S.C. 1970‑71‑72, c. 36.
Authors Cited
Black’s
Law Dictionary, 7th ed. St. Paul,
Minn.: West Group, 1999, “willful”.
Ontario. Law Reform Commission. Report
on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods. Toronto:
Department of Justice, 1972.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal (Tallis, Sherstobitoff and Lane JJ.A.), [2004]
4 W.W.R. 42, 241 Sask. R. 22, 313 W.A.C. 22,
40 B.L.R. (3d) 90, [2003] S.J. No. 856 (QL),
2003 SKCA 133, affirming in part a decision of Rothery J.,
[2002] 4 W.W.R. 321, 214 Sask. R. 135, 19 B.L.R.
(3d) 304, [2001] S.J. No. 739 (QL), 2001 SKQB 537. Appeal
allowed.
Ronald J. Balacko and Darren Grindle, for the appellant.
Kenneth A. Ready, Q.C., and Tamara R. Prince, for the
respondents.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
1
Abella J. — Shawna
Prebushewski bought a truck manufactured by Chrysler Canada Ltd. (“Chrysler”)
from Dodge City Auto (1984) Ltd. (“Dodge City”). Because of a manufacturing
defect, the truck burst into flames and was destroyed. At trial, Chrysler and
Dodge City were held responsible for breaching statutory warranties under The
Consumer Protection Act, S.S. 1996, c. C-30.1. Ms. Prebushewski was
awarded both general and exemplary, or punitive, damages. The Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal overturned the exemplary damages award and awarded costs
against her. Ms. Prebushewski’s appeal to this Court centres primarily on
the interpretation of exemplary damages under the Act.
I. Background
2
On December 17, 1996, Ms. Prebushewski and her husband bought a new, top
of the line Dodge Ram 4x4 one-half ton truck from Dodge City. Chrysler
manufactured the truck and Dodge City was one of its Saskatchewan dealers. The
Prebushewskis paid an additional $1,145 for an extended warranty from
Chrysler. The entire purchase price, including taxes and extended warranty,
was financed. The Prebushewskis borrowed $43,198.80 and, starting in January
1997, were required to make monthly payments of $721.23. For over a year and approximately
31,000 kilometres, Ms. Prebushewski and her husband drove the truck
without incident.
3
At the end of April 1998, Mr. Prebushewski drove to work and parked the
truck on the street outside his workplace. At about 9:00 p.m., he noticed that
a vehicle on the street had its headlights on. Shortly afterwards, his
employer noticed a fire. When Mr. Prebushewski and his employer went outside
to see what was burning, they discovered that the front end of the Prebushewski
truck was engulfed in flames. The truck was damaged beyond repair despite the
rapid response of the fire department.
4
Ms. Prebushewski and her husband reported the loss to their insurer,
Saskatchewan Government Insurance (“SGI”). After investigating the fire, SGI
determined that there was a defect in the daytime running light module which
had caused it to short-circuit.
5
On August 11, 1998, the insurance claim was settled. SGI valued the
truck at $27,340 at the time of loss, subtracted the $700 deductible, and gave
Ms. Prebushewski $26,640. She in turn gave the full amount to the bank
under the terms of a security agreement. Despite this payment, Ms.
Prebushewski still owed the bank $11,383.65. Because the security for the loan
was destroyed, the bank increased the annual interest rate on the remainder of
the loan from 8 percent to 11 percent. Ms. Prebushewski was still making
payments to the bank at the time of the trial.
6
In addition to reporting the loss to their insurance company, the
Prebushewskis also repeatedly tried to get assistance from Chrysler and Dodge
City over a period of several months, primarily by phone. They were
unsuccessful. Dodge City directed the Prebushewskis to Chrysler, and Chrysler directed
them to their insurance company.
7
In May or June 1998, they also sent a letter to both Chrysler and Dodge
City. In it they explained that the insurance company investigator had
concluded that the loss was caused by an electrical fire but was not yet able
to pinpoint the fire’s exact origin. They also said that, based on
conversations with work colleagues, family members and Transport Canada, they
believed the fire was caused by a defect in the daytime running light module.
The letter also noted that, during a phone conversation with a Chrysler
customer service representative, Mr. Prebushewski was told “that’s the way
the cookie crumbles”.
8
Chrysler replied to the Prebushewskis by letter on June 13, 1998
expressing regrets, but stating that “we must refer you to your insurance
company for review”. The daytime running light module was not mentioned in
Chrysler’s letter.
9
Dodge City did not respond to the Prebushewski letter.
10
On March 31, 1999, Ms. Prebushewski filed a statement of claim against
both Chrysler and Dodge City alleging, among other things, breach of statutory
warranties under the Act. In addition to general damages, she claimed exemplary
damages pursuant to s. 65 of the Act.
11
Chrysler and Dodge City denied liability.
12
At trial, Ms. Prebushewski called uncontradicted expert evidence to
establish that a manufacturing defect in the daytime running light module
caused the fire.
13
Chrysler and Dodge City called no evidence at trial. Eric Durance, an
electrical engineer at Chrysler, was, however, examined for discovery. He was
Chrysler’s “proper officer”, or authorized representative, and it was agreed
that his answers were to be binding on it. His evidence revealed that Chrysler
had known for several years that there were problems with the daytime running
light module:
Q: So this is what is known as the daytime
running light module?
A: The module is the device that performs
that function.
Q: They have been shorting out?
A: Well, we have had various problems with
them.
.
. .
Q: Mr. Durance, just so I can get this
clear, Chrysler knew it was having problems with the daytime running light
module prior to the Prebushewski fire on April 29, 1998?
A: Yes.
Q: Did it take any steps whatsoever to
advise Shawna Prebushewski or her husband that there was a problem with the
daytime running light modules?
A: No.
Q: How many daytime running light modules
are there?
A: Every car has one since 1988.
Q: Roughly?
A: Well, more than a million I would say.
Q: So I take it, to advise every owner of a
vehicle with a daytime running light module and bring it in for inspection and
perhaps replace it would be quite a costly process?
A: Yes.
Q: How much would it cost to call in a
customer and inspect and replace the daytime running light module?
A: I don’t know.
.
. .
Q: Give us a rough idea?
A: Probably a couple of hundred dollars,
$250.
Q: So for a million — a million of them it
would be $250,000,000; is that correct?
A: Yes.
14
The proper officer for Dodge City, comptroller Jim Wilkins, was also
examined for discovery. He admitted that Dodge City had done nothing to
investigate the fire or to compensate Ms. Prebushewski.
15
The trial judge, Rothery J., found Chrysler and Dodge City jointly
liable for breaching the statutory warranties provided for in the Act: (2001),
214 Sask. R. 135, 2001 SKQB 537. Section 57(1) provides that a consumer is
entitled to recover damages from both the manufacturer and the “retail seller”
for breaches of statutory warranties.
16
The trial judge observed that s. 65(1) allows for the recovery of
exemplary damages if there has been a “wilful violation” of the Act. Relying
on Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999), at p. 1593, she defined
“wilful” as “[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.”
Based on this interpretation, she concluded that if Chrysler and Dodge City’s
violation of the Act was intentional, exemplary damages were potentially
appropriate.
17
Rothery J. then made a number of factual findings to support the
exercise of her discretion to award exemplary damages: Chrysler knew about the
defect in the daytime running light module before the fire, but did not advise
Ms. Prebushewski or any other consumer about the defect; Chrysler made a
business decision not to advise its customers of the defect or to recall the
vehicles; and neither Chrysler nor Dodge City made any effort to investigate
the fire or to compensate Ms. Prebushewski.
18
She awarded Ms. Prebushewski $25,000 in exemplary damages in addition to
$41,969.83 in general damages.
19
On appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Tallis J.A., writing for
a unanimous court (Sherstobitoff and Lane JJ.A.), upheld the general damages
award but set aside the exemplary damages award: (2003), 241 Sask. R. 22, 2003
SKCA 133. In his view, the trial judge had unduly focused on Chrysler and
Dodge City’s failure to compensate Ms. Prebushewski. Tallis J.A. held that
this was insufficient to support an award of exemplary damages because the
defendants had not acted in bad faith when they took the position that the loss
was essentially an insurance claim.
20
Tallis J.A. also disagreed with Rothery J.’s condemnation of Chrysler’s
corporate policy and, despite her express finding to the contrary, was of the
view that, before the Prebushewskis’ truck burned, there was no indication that
the daytime running light module defect caused fires. In his words:
There was no evidence that Chrysler knew of, or should have expected a
fire loss of this magnitude before the occurrence of this loss. Furthermore,
there was no evidence adduced of any corporate policy of placing profits before
the potential danger to its customer’s safety. . . .
In light of the evidence, we find no rational purpose
in the award of exemplary damages in this case . . . . [paras. 50-51]
21
There was no explicit analysis of what the applicable test for an award
of exemplary damages was under the Act, but the Court of Appeal appears to have
accepted Chrysler and Dodge City’s argument that the common law test prevailed.
22
In addition to setting aside the award of exemplary damages, the Court
of Appeal awarded Chrysler and Dodge City their costs of the appeal.
Ms. Prebushewski appealed both conclusions.
II. Analysis
A. Exemplary
Damages
23
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the violation of the Act in
this case gave rise to exemplary damages under s. 65 of the Act. This requires
a determination of whether s. 65 articulates a discrete test for exemplary
damages, or should be interpreted as merely codifying the common law. Section
65 is found in Part III of The Consumer Protection Act dealing with
consumer product warranties:
65(1) In addition to any other remedy provided by this Part or
any other law in force in the province, a consumer or a person mentioned in
subsection 41(1) or in section 64 may recover exemplary damages from any
manufacturer, retail seller or warrantor who has committed a wilful violation
of this Part.
(2) In an action in which exemplary damages are claimed, evidence
respecting the existence of similar conduct in transactions between the
manufacturer, retail seller or warrantor and other consumers is admissible for
the purposes of proving that violation of this Part was wilful or of proving
the degree of wilfulness of the violation.
24
At common law, exemplary or punitive damages are awarded only in
exceptional cases to meet the goals of retribution, deterrence and denunciation
in cases of “malicious, oppressive and high-handed” conduct that “offends the
court’s sense of decency”. The test limits the award to “misconduct that
represents a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour”; Performance
Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R.
678, 2002 SCC 19, at para. 79; Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002]
1 S.C.R. 595, 2002 SCC 18, at para. 36; Hill v. Church of
Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 199; and Norberg
v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, at p. 267.
25
In my view a different test for exemplary damages is anticipated by
s. 65(1). The language of s. 65(1) is clear and unambiguous: once a
wilful — or deliberate — violation has been found, the trial judge has a
discretion to award exemplary damages. Had the legislature intended that the
common law — and more exacting — test apply, it could easily have used words
affiliated with the traditional approach to exemplary damages, such as
“malicious” or “oppressive”. By designating instead that “wilful” violations of
the Act are sufficient to trigger a judge’s discretion, the legislature has
signalled an intention to lower the threshold and grant easier access to the
remedy of exemplary damages.
26
This intention to override existing law, such as the common law test, is
reinforced by the introductory words to s. 65, which state:
In addition to any other remedy provided by this Part or any other
law in force in the province, a consumer . . . may recover exemplary
damages . . . .
27
Similarly, an intention that it be interpreted as charting a different
remedial course from the common law can be found in s. 40(1), which, like s.
65, is found in Part III of the Act:
40(1) The rights and remedies provided in this Part are in
addition to any other rights or remedies under any other law in force in Saskatchewan
unless a right or remedy under that law is expressly or impliedly
contradicted by this Part.
28
This provision, which explicitly acknowledges that the Act takes
precedence over existing law, would be inoperable if s. 65(1) were
interpreted in accordance with common law precepts rather than as reflecting an
intention to replace them by creating a distinct regime designed to enhance
consumer protection.
29
Each of these two sections signals the distinctiveness of the approach
to exemplary or punitive damages in the legislative scheme; together, they
trumpet it.
30
One can find additional support for the view that s. 65(1) represents a
departure from the common law test for exemplary damages from the way such
damages are referred to in s. 16, contained in Part II of the Act. Part II
addresses unfair marketplace practices. Section 16(1)(b) provides that when a
court finds that a supplier has committed an unfair practice, it may
award the consumer damages in the amount of any loss suffered because
of the unfair practice, including punitive or exemplary damages;
31
Section 16(1)(b), by referring to “punitive or exemplary” damages
without any limiting modifiers, can be seen as alluding to a different test for
exemplary damages than the one set out in s. 65(1). The use of different
language in s. 16 and s. 65 must be presumed to be meaningful.
32
The conclusion that the s. 65(1) test for exemplary damages replaces the
common law approach also emerges from an analysis of the historical context and
legislative history of Saskatchewan’s consumer protection legislation.
33
Part III of the Act, in which s. 65 is found, was originally enacted in
1977 as The Consumer Products Warranties Act, 1977, S.S. 1976-77,
c. 15. It was part of an emerging legislative pattern in North America designed
to equitably reconfigure the imbalance in bargaining power between consumers
and those who manufacture and sell products. In order to inform consumers and
protect them from unsafe products and fraudulent or deceptive practices,
legislation was introduced to rectify consumer vulnerability resulting from
such common law principles as caveat emptor.
34
In Canada, the federal government enacted the Department of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Act, S.C. 1967-68, c. 16. A new Department of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs was given responsibility for coordinating the
enforcement of a number of federal consumer protection statutes. Other
significant federal enactments included the Food and Drugs Act, S.C.
1952-53, c. 38, the Hazardous Products Act, S.C. 1968-69, c. 42,
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, S.C. 1969-70, c. 30, the Textile
Labelling Act, S.C. 1969-70, c. 34, the consumer notes provisions of the Bills
of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 15, Part V (added by S.C. 1969-70, c. 48,
s. 2), the Weights and Measures Act , S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 36, and the Consumer
Packaging and Labelling Act , S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 41.
35
Provincial governments, through their jurisdiction over property and
civil rights, also began to enact legislation designed to improve protection
for consumers and enhance their remedial options. One such statute was
Saskatchewan’s Consumer Products Warranties Act, 1977.
36
When this statute was introduced in the Saskatchewan legislature, the
then Minister of Consumer Affairs referred to a 1972 Ontario Law Reform
Commission Report on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods
(1972), to explain why similar Saskatchewan warranty law was inadequate to meet
the needs of consumers. The Minister quoted the following passage from p. 23
of the report:
[Ontario’s Sale of Goods Act] proceeds from the fictitious
premise that the parties are bargaining from positions of equal strength and
sophistication . . . . Especially serious is the Act’s preoccupation with the
bilateral relationship between the seller and the buyer, which totally ignores
the powerful position of the manufacturer in today’s marketing structure. . . .
[O]ur sales law is private law and it has failed to provide any meaningful
machinery for the redress of consumer grievances. This last weakness is perhaps
the most serious of all weaknesses, for as has been frequently observed, a
right is only as strong as the remedy available to enforce it. [Emphasis
added.]
37
In my view, the combined effect of the statute’s language, history and
purpose leads inexorably to the trial judge’s conclusion that the s. 65 test
for exemplary damages is different from the common law approach. A “wilful”
act is voluntary, intentional or deliberate. The words embraced by the concept
of wilfulness under the Act represent a less onerous entry point than the words
acting as gatekeepers to an award of exemplary damages at common law, and
fulfil the legislature’s intention to enhance the accessibility of the remedy.
There is no basis for imputing the common law test into a provision so clearly
designed to replace it.
38
As previously indicated, the trial judge made a number of factual
findings underpinning her conclusion that the violation was wilful and that
exemplary damages were warranted. She stated:
. . . the admissions of Eric Durance on behalf of Chrysler clearly show
that not only did Chrysler know about the problems of the defective daytime
running light modules, it did not advise the plaintiff of this. It simply chose
to ignore the plaintiff’s requests for compensation and told her to seek recovery
from her insurance company. Chrysler . . . made a business decision to neither
advise its customers of the problem nor to recall the vehicles to replace the
modules. . . . Chrysler was not prepared to spend $250 million even though it
knew what the defective module might do.
Mr. Durance admits that there is no other
explanation for the fire in the plaintiff’s truck. There is no indication that
the plaintiff did anything to the truck to cause the fire. Jim Wilkins, the
proper officer for Dodge, admitted that Dodge has done nothing to find out why
the truck burned. Mr. Wilkins admits that Dodge has done nothing to
compensate the plaintiff.
Counsel for the defendants argues that this matter
had to be resolved by litigation because the plaintiff and the defendants
simply had a difference of opinion on whether the plaintiff should be
compensated by the defendants. Had the defendants [had] some dispute as to the
cause of the fire, that may have been sufficient to prove that they had not
wilfully violated this Part of the Act. They did not. They knew about the
defective daytime running light module. They did nothing to replace the burned
truck for the plaintiff. They offered the plaintiff no compensation for her
loss. Counsels’ position that the definition of the return of the purchase
price is an arguable point is not sufficient to negate the defendants’
violation of this Part of the Act. I find the violation of the defendants to
be wilful. Thus, I find that exemplary damages are appropriate on the facts of
this case. [paras. 42-44]
39
Her factual findings were available on the record. I see no basis for
interfering either with them or her conclusion that they represent a “wilful”
violation of the Act attracting exemplary damages. Since the quantum of those
damages is not at issue, I would restore the trial judge’s award of exemplary
damages in the amount of $25,000.
B. Costs
40
In the Court of Appeal, costs were awarded against Ms. Prebushewski, an
award she submits the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to make.
41
Unless the action is frivolous or vexatious, s. 66 of the Act provides
that costs “shall” not be awarded against a consumer who brings an action
against a manufacturer or retail seller for breach of warranty, whether or not
the consumer is successful:
66(1) No costs shall be awarded against a consumer, a person
mentioned in subsection 41(1) who derives his or her property or interest in a
consumer product from or through a consumer, or a person mentioned in section
64, who:
(a) brings an action against a manufacturer, retail seller or
warrantor for breach of a warranty pursuant to this Part;
.
. .
(2) Subsection (1) applies regardless of whether the consumer or other
person is successful in his or her action, defence or counterclaim unless, in
the opinion of the court, the action, defence or counterclaim was frivolous or
vexatious.
42
Chrysler and Dodge City argue that this provision’s protective scope is
limited to proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench. They rely on s. 3(c) of
the Act which defines “court” as “Court of Queen’s Bench”. I see nothing in
the language of s. 66 that either expressly or implicitly limits its
application to the first stage in the natural progression of legal
proceedings. Section 66(1), which stipulates that no costs should be awarded
against a consumer, is clearly the defining provision in s. 66. It does not
mention the word “court”. The presence of that word in s. 66(2), a modifying
provision, should not be read in a way that detracts from the clear purpose
articulated in s. 66(1).
43
The spirit of s. 66 is to protect consumers who start legitimate
lawsuits from the disincentive of potentially onerous costs awards against
them. Its intent is to encourage the lawful pursuit of such claims. Limiting
the application of such costs protection to the trial level would have the
opposite effect, given the likelihood that unsuccessful defendants may, as they
have a right to do, seek to appeal.
44
Since both the trial and the appeal court held that Ms. Prebushewski was
entitled to damages in the amount of the purchase price of the truck, and since
there is no suggestion by either Chrysler or Dodge City that this action is
frivolous or vexatious, there was no basis for an award of costs against her in
the Court of Appeal.
45
I would allow the appeal with costs throughout and restore the decision
of the trial judge.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Rusnak Balacko Kachur
Rusnak, Yorkton, Saskatchewan.
Solicitors for the respondents: McDougall Gauley, Regina.