SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Jean‑Paul
Labaye
Appellant
and
Her Majesty The
Queen
Respondent
Official English
Translation: Reasons of Bastarache and LeBel JJ.
Coram:
McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella
and Charron JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 72)
Dissenting
Reasons:
(paras. 73 to 154)
|
McLachlin C.J. (Major, Binnie, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and
Charron JJ. concurring)
Bastarache and LeBel JJ.
|
______________________________
R. v.
Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, 2005 SCC 80
Jean‑Paul Labaye Appellant
v.
Her Majesty
The Queen Respondent
Indexed
as: R. v. Labaye
Neutral
citation: 2005 SCC 80.
File
No.: 30460.
2005:
April 18; 2005: December 21.
Present: McLachlin
C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron
JJ.
on appeal from
the court of appeal for quebec
Criminal law — Keeping common bawdy‑house — Indecency — Harm‑based
test — Group sex in club — Whether conduct constitutes criminal indecency —
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 197(1) “common
bawdy‑house”, 210(1).
The accused was charged with keeping a common bawdy‑house for the
practice of acts of indecency under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code .
The accused operated a club in Montréal the purpose of which was to permit
couples and single people to meet each other for group sex. Only members and
their guests were admitted to the club. Prospective members were interviewed
to ensure that they were aware of the nature of the activities of the club.
Members paid an annual membership fee. A doorman manned the main door of the
club, to ensure that only members and their guests entered. The club had three
floors. The first floor was occupied by a bar, the second a salon, and the
third the “apartment” of the accused. Two doors separated the third floor
apartment from the rest of the club. One was marked “Privé” and the
other was locked with a numeric key pad. Members of the club were supplied
with the appropriate code and permitted to gain access to the third floor
apartment. This was the only place where group sex took place. Entry to the
club and participation in the activities were voluntary. At trial, the accused
was convicted. The trial judge found that the accused’s apartment fell within
the meaning of “public place”, as defined in s. 197(1) of the Criminal
Code . She also found social harm in the fact that sexual exchanges took
place in the presence of other members of the club. She concluded that this
conduct was indecent under the Criminal Code because it was degrading
and dehumanizing, was calculated to induce anti‑social behaviour in its
disregard for moral values, and raised the risk of sexually transmitted
diseases. A majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s
conviction.
Held (Bastarache and LeBel JJ. dissenting): The
appeal should be allowed and the accused’s conviction set aside.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Major, Binnie, Deschamps, Fish,
Abella and Charron JJ.: In order to establish indecent criminal conduct,
the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two requirements have been
met. The first is that by its nature the conduct at issue causes harm or
presents a significant risk of harm to individuals or society in a way that undermines
or threatens to undermine a value reflected in and thus formally endorsed
through the Constitution or similar fundamental laws by (a) confronting
members of the public with conduct that significantly interferes with their
autonomy and liberty, (b) predisposing others to anti‑social
behaviour, or (c) physically or psychologically harming persons involved
in the conduct. The categories of harm capable of satisfying the first branch
of the inquiry are not closed. The second requirement is that the harm or risk
of harm is of a degree that is incompatible with the proper functioning of
society. This two‑branch test must be applied objectively and on the
basis of evidence. [62]
In this case, the accused must be acquitted. The autonomy and liberty
of members of the public was not affected by unwanted confrontation with the
sexual conduct in question. On the evidence, only those already disposed to
this sort of sexual activity were allowed to participate and watch. There is
also no evidence of anti‑social acts or attitudes toward women, or for
that matter men. No one was pressured to have sex, paid for sex, or treated as
a mere sexual object for the gratification of others. The fact that the club
is a commercial establishment does not in itself render the sexual activities
taking place there commercial in nature. The membership fee buys access to a
club where members can meet and engage in consensual activities with other
individuals who have similar sexual interests. Finally, with respect to the
third type of harm, the only possible danger to participants on the evidence
was the risk of catching a sexually transmitted disease. However, this must be
discounted as a factor because it is conceptually and causally unrelated to
indecency. Since the Crown failed to establish the first requirement to prove
indecent criminal conduct, it is unnecessary to proceed to the second branch of
the test. If one did, there seems to be no evidence that the degree of alleged
harm rose to the level of incompatibility with the proper functioning of
society. [66‑71]
Per Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (dissenting): The
application of the appropriate test leads to the conclusion that the impugned
acts were indecent and that the accused’s establishment was a common bawdy‑house
within the meaning of s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code . [76]
The new approach to indecency proposed by the majority is neither
desirable nor workable. Not only does it constitute an unwarranted break with
the most important principles of our past decisions regarding indecency, but it
also replaces the community standard of tolerance with a harm‑based
test. Whether or not serious social harm is sustained has never been the
determinative test for indecency. Moreover, when the standard of tolerance is
established on the basis of the three categories of harm, it becomes impossible
to take into account the multitude of situations that could exceed the
threshold for indecency. This new harm‑based approach also strips of all
relevance the social values that the Canadian community as a whole believes
should be protected. The existence of harm is not a prerequisite for
exercising the state’s power to criminalize certain conduct: the existence of
fundamental social and ethical considerations is sufficient. Lastly, in the
context of an offence under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code , it is
not absolutely necessary to consider the harm done to society. [75] [98‑104]
[115]
To determine whether acts are indecent, it is preferable to continue
applying the original test for indecency, which focusses on a contextual
analysis of the impugned acts and incorporates the concept of harm as a
significant, but not determinative, factor to consider in establishing the
applicable level of tolerance. Whether or not harm is sustained is merely one
of several indicators or contextual factors that make it possible to gauge the
degree of tolerance of the Canadian community. Although a certain degree of
subjectivity is inherent in the establishment of the standard of tolerance
because of the judge’s role as interpreter of the community’s minimum standards
regarding sex, the analysis remains objective as long as the judge ignores his
or her personal convictions and instead tries to determine the nature of the social
consensus. [76] [134]
The question that must therefore be asked in the case at bar is as
follows: “Do the impugned acts offend the standard of tolerance of
the contemporary Canadian community, having regard to the place and context in
which they occurred?” The following contextual factors may be considered in
determining the standard of tolerance: (1) the private or
public nature of the place; (2) the type of participants and the
composition of the audience; (3) the nature of the warning given regarding
the acts; (4) the measures taken to limit access to the place;
(5) the commercial nature of the place and the acts; (6) the purpose
of the acts; (7) the conduct of the participants; and (8) harm
suffered by the participants. Regarding this last factor, attention must be
paid to the risk of physical or psychological harm. This approach permits the
risk of spreading sexually transmitted diseases to be taken into account.
Finally, the consent of the participants or the fact that those present are
informed adults is not in itself a determinative factor. A consensual sexual
act that is totally acceptable in one situation may be indecent if it is performed
in another context. It is the tolerance of the general public that counts, not
the tolerance of the participants or spectators. [81] [122] [131‑132]
In the case at bar, the impugned sexual acts were very explicit acts,
and the place where the acts were performed was a public establishment.
Although advertised as a private club, the accused’s club was a place to which
the public had ready access “by invitation, express or implied”, within the
meaning of s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code . All that was necessary
was to pay the requested fee after a cursory interview that was quite
superficial, or to be the guest of a club member. What is more, the measures
taken by the club to control access did not adequately limit the public’s
access to a place where very explicit sexual acts were performed. The
establishment’s operations are also indicative of the commercial nature of the
activities that took place there. Sexual acts could be performed on the third
level of the establishment only after a mandatory commercial transaction
between the participants and the owner of the establishment, since everyone had
to pay a fee to become a member. The participants essentially purchased sexual
services provided by other participants. In the instant case, it is even
possible to conclude that a form of social harm has been sustained that results
from the failure to meet the minimum standards of public morality. Finally,
even though the participants were informed adults whose actions were consensual
and voluntary and who presumably shared the philosophy of partner swapping,
this characteristic of the participants is not relevant under s. 210(1) of
the Criminal Code other than to demonstrate the existence of demeaning
or dehumanizing acts. Considered in context, the explicit sexual acts
performed in the accused’s establishment clearly offended the Canadian
community standard of tolerance. The community does not tolerate the
performance of acts of this nature in a place of business to which the public has
easy access. The acts were therefore indecent. The public and commercial
dimensions of the sexual practices in issue would lead to the conclusion that
those practices were indecent even if there were no harm. [137‑141] [145‑148]
[151‑153]
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J.
Applied: R. v. Butler,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; referred to: Reference re
ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1123; R. v. Mara, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630; R.
v. Hicklin (1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; Brodie v. The Queen,
[1962] S.C.R. 681; R. v. Dominion News & Gifts (1962) Ltd.,
[1963] 2 C.C.C. 103, rev’d [1964] S.C.R. 251; Towne Cinema
Theatres Ltd. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494; Little
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000]
2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69; R. v. Tremblay,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 932.
By Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (dissenting)
Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. The Queen, [1985]
1 S.C.R. 494; R. v. Mara, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630; R.
v. Tremblay, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 932; R. v. Butler,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; Brodie v. The Queen, [1962]
S.C.R. 681; R. v. Hicklin (1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; Dominion
News & Gifts (1962) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 251; Provincial
News Co. v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 89; Dechow v. The Queen,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 951; Germain v. The Queen, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 241; Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; Little Sisters
Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000]
2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69; R. v. Malmo‑Levine,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74; Roux v. La Reine,
[2001] R.J.Q. 567; R. v. Pelletier (1985), 27 C.C.C.
(3d) 77; R. v. Angerillo, [2003] R.J.Q. 1977; R. v. Jacob
(1996), 31 O.R. (3d) 350.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46,
ss. 163(8) , 167(1) , 197(1) “common bawdy-house”, “public place”, 210(1),
211, 212, 213.
Criminal Code, S.C. 1953‑54,
c. 51, s. 150(8) [ad. 1959, c. 41, s. 11].
Authors Cited
LeBel, Louis. “Un essai de conciliation de
valeurs: la régulation judiciaire du discours obscène ou haineux” (2001), 3(2) Éthique
publique 51.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and
Considerations on Representative Government. Edited by
R. B. McCallum. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Proulx, Rochon
and Rayle JJ.A.), [2004] R.J.Q. 2076, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 66,
[2004] Q.J. No. 7723 (QL), upholding the accused’s conviction on a charge
of keeping a common bawdy-house, [1999] R.J.Q. 2801, [1999] Q.J.
No. 2524 (QL). Appeal allowed, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. dissenting.
Robert La Haye and Josée Ferrari, for the
appellant.
Normand Labelle, for the respondent.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Major, Binnie, Deschamps, Fish,
Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice —
1. Introduction
1
The appellant appeals from a conviction of keeping a “common bawdy-
house” for the “practice of acts of indecency” under s. 210(1) of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 . The issue is whether the acts committed in his
establishment were acts of indecency within the meaning of our criminal law.
2
Defining indecency under the Criminal Code is a notoriously
difficult enterprise. The Criminal Code offers no assistance, leaving
the task to judges. The test developed by the cases has evolved from one based
largely on subjective considerations, to one emphasizing the need for objective
criteria, based on harm. This heightened emphasis on objective criteria rests
on the principle that crimes should be defined in a way that affords citizens,
police and the courts a clear idea of what acts are prohibited. (See Reference
re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1123, per Lamer J.) We generally convict and imprison people only where
it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that they have violated objectively
defined norms. Crimes relating to public indecency are no exception.
3
This appeal requires us to apply the norms developed in recent cases to
the operation of clubs established to facilitate group sex, a practice
colloquially referred to as “swinging”. This in turn invites further
refinement of the objective criteria for indecency under the Criminal Code .
4
I conclude that the appellant’s conviction should be quashed.
2. Facts
5
The appellant operated a club in Montréal, called L’Orage. The purpose
of the club was to permit couples and single people to meet each other for
group sex. Only members and their guests were admitted to the club.
Prospective members were interviewed to ensure that they were aware of the
nature of the activities of the club and to exclude applicants who did not
share the same views on group sex. Members paid an annual membership fee.
6
At the time of the events giving rise to the charge against the
appellant, the club L’Orage had three floors. The first floor was occupied by
a bar, the second a salon, and the third the “apartment” of the appellant. A
doorman manned the main door of the club, to ensure that only members and their
guests entered. Two doors separated access to the third floor apartment from
the rest of the club. One was marked “Privé” (Private) and the other
locked with a numeric key pad.
7
Members of the club were supplied with the appropriate code and
permitted to access the third floor apartment. This was the only place where
group sex took place. A number of mattresses were scattered about the floor of
the apartment. There people engaged in acts of cunnilingus, masturbation,
fellatio and penetration. On several occasions observed by the police, a
single woman engaged in sex with several men, while other men watched and
masturbated.
8
Entry to the club and participation in the activities were voluntary.
No one was forced to do anything or watch anything. No one was paid for sex.
While men considerably outnumbered women on the occasions when the police
visited, there is no suggestion that any of the women were there involuntarily
or that they did not willingly engage in the acts of group sex.
3. Judicial History
9
According to Baribeau J., the test of indecency required assessing the
public or private context of the activities at issue ([1999] R.J.Q. 2801). She
found that the appellant’s apartment fell within the meaning of “public place”,
defined in s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code as including “any place to
which the public have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied”.
The trial judge attached no significance to the fact that the public here was
composed of members of the club and their guests. Based on the public nature
of the locale, the trial judge concluded that the sexual practices on these
facts fell below the Canadian community standard of tolerance.
10
The trial judge, relying on R. v. Mara, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630,
found social harm in the fact that sexual exchanges took place in the presence
of other members of the club. In her view, this conduct was indecent under the
Criminal Code because it was degrading and dehumanizing, was calculated
to induce anti-social behaviour in its disregard for moral values, and raised
the risk of sexually transmitted diseases.
11
A majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the appellant’s
conviction ((2004), 191 C.C.C. (3d) 66). Rochon J.A. held that the activities
at issue were prejudicial to society because of the health risks involved and
the propagation of a degrading and dehumanizing view of sexuality. Rayle J.A.
agreed, inferring a more substantial risk of harm than in Mara from the
higher number of sexual partners involved. In the view of the majority, the
voluntary character of their participation did not diminish the resulting
degradation, loss of integrity and self-respect.
12
Proulx J.A., dissenting, found that the trial judge’s conviction was
based on several errors. Even if the establishment was a public place, as
defined in the Criminal Code , members of the club did not perform the
sexual acts in open public view, but in a context of relative privacy.
Entrants were screened and informed. All the participants retained their full
autonomy. The sexual exchanges they participated in reflected their personal
choice and view of sexuality. Since there was no meaningful distinction
between participants and observers, the presence of observers was not relevant
for assessing the publicly indecent character of the activities. Moreover,
there was no social harm comparable to that identified in Mara, where
the payment of women for sexual services led to an inference of exploitation.
4. Analysis
4.1 The Legal Test for Criminal Indecency
4.1.1 The History of Criminal Indecency
13
Section 210(1) of the Criminal Code makes it an offence,
punishable by two years in prison, to keep a common bawdy-house. A bawdy-house
is defined in s. 197(1) of the Code as a place kept, occupied, or
resorted to “by one or more persons for the purpose of prostitution or the
practice of acts of indecency”. The only question in this case is whether what
went on at L’Orage constituted “acts of indecency”.
14
Indecency has two meanings, one moral and one legal. Our concern is not
with the moral aspect of indecency, but with the legal. The moral and legal
aspects of the concept are, of course, related. Historically, the legal
concepts of indecency and obscenity, as applied to conduct and publications,
respectively, have been inspired and informed by the moral views of the
community. But over time, courts increasingly came to recognize that morals
and taste were subjective, arbitrary and unworkable in the criminal context,
and that a diverse society could function only with a generous measure of tolerance
for minority mores and practices. This led to a legal norm of objectively
ascertainable harm instead of subjective disapproval.
15
Canadian law on indecent acts, from its origins in the English common
law, has been firmly anchored in societal rather than purely private moral
concerns. For example, in the early case of R. v. Hicklin (1868), L.R.
3 Q.B. 360, Cockburn C.J. stated that the test for obscenity was whether the
material would tend to deprave and corrupt other members of society.
16
However, depravity and corruption vary with the eye of the beholder, and
the Hicklin test proved difficult to apply in an objective fashion.
Convictions often depended more on the idiosyncracies and the subjective moral
views of the judge or jurors than objective criteria of what might deprave or
corrupt. Nevertheless, the Hicklin test remained in place for almost a
century.
17
In 1959, the Canadian Parliament introduced a new “undue exploitation of
sex” test for obscene materials: s. 150(8) of the Criminal Code, S.C.
1953-54, c. 51 (added by S.C. 1959, c. 41, s. 11) (now s. 163(8) ). In
considering this test, the Supreme Court emphasized the failings of the
previous test and the need for new criteria “which have some certainty of
meaning and are capable of objective application and which do not so much
depend as before upon the idiosyncrasies and sensitivities of the tribunal of
fact, whether judge or jury”: Brodie v. The Queen, [1962] S.C.R. 681,
at p. 702, per Judson J.
18
Borrowing on decisions from Australia and New Zealand emphasizing the
foundation of criminal legislation on obscenity and indecency in societal
norms, the Court adopted a test based on the community standard of tolerance.
On its face, the test was objective, requiring the trier of fact to determine
what the community would tolerate. Yet once again, in practice it proved
difficult to apply in an objective fashion. How does one determine what the
“community” would tolerate were it aware of the conduct or material? In a
diverse, pluralistic society whose members hold divergent views, who is the
“community”? And how can one objectively determine what the community, if one
could define it, would tolerate, in the absence of evidence that community knew
of and considered the conduct at issue? In practice, once again, the test
tended to function as a proxy for the personal views of expert witnesses,
judges and jurors. In the end, the question often came down to what they, as
individual members of the community, would tolerate. Judges and jurors were
unlikely, human nature being what it is, to see themselves and their beliefs as
intolerant. It was far more likely that they would see themselves as
reasonable, representative members of the community. The chances of a judge or
juror saying, “I view this conduct as indecent but I set that view aside
because it is intolerant”, were remote indeed. The result was that despite its
superficial objectivity, the community standard of tolerance test remained
highly subjective in application.
19
Freedman J.A., dissenting in the Manitoba Court of Appeal, while noting
the difficult challenge of applying the new community standard of tolerance
test in an objective fashion, concluded that it was the only alternative to
pure subjectivity (R. v. Dominion News & Gifts (1962) Ltd.,
[1963] 2 C.C.C. 103). In a passage adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada
([1964] S.C.R. 251), Freedman J.A. wrote:
Those standards are not set by those of lowest taste or interest. Nor
are they set exclusively by those of rigid, austere, conservative, or puritan
taste and habit of mind. Something approaching a general average of community
thinking and feeling has to be discovered. Obviously this is no easy task, for
we are seeking a quantity that is elusive. Yet the effort must be made if we
are to have a fair objective standard in relation to which a publication can be
tested as to whether it is obscene or not. The alternative would mean a
subjective approach, with the result dependent upon and varying with the
personal tastes and predilections of the particular Judge who happens to be
trying the case. [p. 116]
20
In 1985, the Supreme Court pursued the search for objectivity by
introducing a two-part definition of community standards of tolerance in Towne
Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494. The first
way to establish obscenity (undue exploitation of sex) was to show that the
material violated the norm of tolerance of what Canadians would permit others,
whose views they did not share, to do or see (p. 508). The second was to show
that the material would have a harmful effect on others in society (p. 505).
Although this notion of harm had been implicit in Cockburn C.J.’s definition
of obscenity in Hicklin, Towne Cinema marked the first clear
articulation of the relationship between obscenity and harm in Canadian
jurisprudence, and represented the beginning of a shift from a community
standards test to a harm-based test.
21
The shift to a harm-based rationale was completed by this Court’s
decisions in R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, and Little Sisters
Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120, 2000 SCC 69. In Butler, the two-part test for obscenity of Towne
Cinema was resolved into a single test, in which the community standard of
tolerance was determined by reference to the risk of harm entailed by the
conduct:
The courts must determine as best they can what the
community would tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the degree
of harm that may flow from such exposure. Harm in this context means that
it predisposes persons to act in an anti-social manner as, for example,
the physical or mental mistreatment of women by men, or, what is perhaps
debatable, the reverse. Anti-social conduct for this purpose is conduct
which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning.
The stronger the inference of a risk of harm the lesser the likelihood of
tolerance. [Emphasis added; p. 485, per Sopinka J.]
22
The Court in Little Sisters confirmed that harm is an essential
ingredient of obscenity. As Binnie J. pointed out, “the phrase ‘degrading or
dehumanizing’ in Butler is qualified immediately by the words ‘if
the risk of harm is substantial’ . . . . This makes it clear that not all
sexually explicit erotica depicting adults engaged in conduct which is
considered to be degrading or dehumanizing is obscene. The material must
also create a substantial risk of harm which exceeds the community’s tolerance”
(para. 60 (emphasis added)).
23
In Mara, the Court affirmed that in cases of indecency, like
obscenity, the community standard of tolerance test amounts to a test of harm
incompatible with society’s proper functioning.
24
Grounding criminal indecency in harm represents an important advance in
this difficult area of the law. Harm or significant risk of harm is easier to
prove than a community standard. Moreover, the requirement of a risk of harm
incompatible with the proper functioning of society brings this area of the law
into step with the vast majority of criminal offences, which are based on the
need to protect society from harm.
25
However, it is not always clear precisely how the harm test for
indecency applies in particular circumstances. New cases have raised questions
as to the nature and degree of harm sufficient to establish indecency. Further
definition is required in order to resolve cases like this, and to permit
individuals to conduct themselves within the law and the police and courts to
enforce the criminal sanction in an objective, fair way.
4.1.2 Toward a Theory of Harm
26
Developing a workable theory of harm is not a task for a single case.
In the tradition of the common law, its full articulation will come only as
judges consider diverse situations and render decisions on them. Moreover, the
difficulty of the task should not be underestimated. We must proceed
incrementally, step by cautious step.
27
The facts of this case require the further exploration of what types of
harm, viewed objectively, suffice to found a conviction for keeping a
bawdy-house for the purposes of acts of indecency. This exploration must be
based on the purposes that the offence serves. More precisely, what harms are
sought to be curtailed by targeting indecent conduct?
28
The first step is to generically describe the type of harm targeted by
the concept of indecent conduct under the Criminal Code . In Butler
at p. 485 and Little Sisters at para. 59, this was described as “conduct
which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning”.
29
Two general requirements emerge from this description of the harm
required for criminal indecency. First, the words “formally recognize” suggest
that the harm must be grounded in norms which our society has recognized in its
Constitution or similar fundamental laws. This means that the inquiry is not
based on individual notions of harm, nor on the teachings of a particular
ideology, but on what society, through its laws and institutions, has
recognized as essential to its proper functioning. Second, the harm must be
serious in degree. It must not only detract from proper societal functioning,
but must be incompatible with it.
30
It follows that the analysis to be performed in a particular case
involves two steps. The first step is concerned with the nature of the
harm. It asks whether the Crown has established a harm or significant risk of
harm to others that is grounded in norms which our society has formally
recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental laws. The second step is
concerned with the degree of the harm. It asks whether the harm in its
degree is incompatible with the proper functioning of society. Both elements
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before acts can be considered indecent
under the Criminal Code .
31
I now turn to a more detailed consideration of each of the two
requirements for establishing indecent acts for the purposes of s. 210 of the Criminal
Code .
4.1.3 The Nature of the Harm: Harm to
Individuals or Society Contrary to Society’s Norms
32
To ground criminal responsibility, the harm must be one which society formally
recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning: Butler, at
p. 485.
33
The requirement of formal societal recognition makes the test
objective. The inquiry is not based on individual notions of harm, nor on the
teachings of a particular ideology, but on what society, through its
fundamental laws, has recognized as essential. Views about the harm that the
sexual conduct at issue may produce, however widely held, do not suffice to
ground a conviction. This is not to say that social values no longer have a
role to play. On the contrary, to ground a finding that acts are indecent,
the harm must be shown to be related to a fundamental value reflected in our
society’s Constitution or similar fundamental laws, like bills of rights, which
constitutes society’s formal recognition that harm of the sort envisaged may be
incompatible with its proper functioning. Unlike the community standard of
tolerance test, the requirement of formal recognition inspires confidence that
the values upheld by judges and jurors are truly those of Canadian society.
Autonomy, liberty, equality and human dignity are among these values.
34
The complexity of the guarantee of freedom of religion in this context
requires further comment. The claim that particular sexual conduct violates
particular religious rules or values does not alone suffice to establish this
element of the test. The question is what values Canadian society has formally
recognized. Canadian society through its Constitution and similar fundamental
laws does not formally recognize particular religious views, but rather the
freedom to hold particular religious views. This freedom does not endorse
any particular religious view, but the right to hold a variety of diverse
views.
35
The requirement of formal endorsement ensures that people will not be
convicted and imprisoned for transgressing the rules and beliefs of particular
individuals or groups. To incur the ultimate criminal sanction, they must have
violated values which Canadian society as a whole has formally endorsed.
36
Three types of harm have thus far emerged from the jurisprudence as
being capable of supporting a finding of indecency: (1) harm to those whose
autonomy and liberty may be restricted by being confronted with inappropriate
conduct; (2) harm to society by predisposing others to anti-social conduct; and
(3) harm to individuals participating in the conduct. Each of these types of
harm is grounded in values recognized by our Constitution and similar
fundamental laws. The list is not closed; other types of harm may be shown in
the future to meet the standards for criminality established by Butler.
But thus far, these are the types of harm recognized by the cases.
37
Reference to the fundamental values of our Constitution and similar
fundamental laws also eliminates types of conduct that do not constitute
a harm in the required sense. Bad taste does not suffice: Towne Cinema,
at p. 507. Moral views, even if strongly held, do not suffice.
Similarly, the fact that most members of the community might disapprove of the
conduct does not suffice: Butler, at p. 492. In each case, more is
required to establish the necessary harm for criminal indecency.
38
A particular type of conduct may involve several types of harm; life
does not fall into neatly tagged juridical boxes. But since each type of harm
rests on its own set of values, it is useful to consider each independently.
Being clear about the type of harm raised by the facts of a particular case,
helps to determine what factors are relevant to assessing whether it rises to
the degree prescribed in Butler. It ensures that the analysis is truly
contextual, and is not skewed by factors that may not be relevant to the
particular harms alleged in the case.
39
Against this background, I turn to a closer look at the three types of
harm that may ground a finding of criminal indecency. If harm in any of these
senses is established beyond a reasonable doubt, the inquiry then proceeds to
the second step of the Butler test, to assess whether the nature and
quality of the harm rises to the required degree.
4.1.3.1 The Harm of Loss of Autonomy and
Liberty Through Public Confrontation
40
The first is the harm of public confrontation with unacceptable and
inappropriate conduct. One reason for criminalizing indecent acts and displays
is to protect the public from being confronted with acts and material that
reduce their quality of life. Indecent acts are banned because they subject
the public to unwanted confrontation with inappropriate conduct. This harm is
conceptually akin to nuisance. Nevertheless, to call this the “eyesore” basis
of criminalization of indecent acts is to trivialize the harm. The harm is not
the aesthetic harm of a less attractive community, but the loss of autonomy and
liberty that public indecency may impose on individuals in society, as they
seek to avoid confrontation with acts they find offensive and unacceptable.
The value or interest protected is the autonomy and liberty of members of the
public, to live within a zone that is free from conduct that deeply offends
them.
41
Much harm in this category does not rise to the levels of harm required
by Butler and Little Sisters. Tolerance requires that only
serious and deeply offensive moral assaults can be kept from public view on
pain of criminal sanction. We live in an age when sexual images, some subtle
and some not so subtle, are widely dispersed throughout our public space.
However, this does not negate the fact that even in our emancipated society,
there may be some kinds of sexual conduct the public display of which seriously
impairs the livability of the environment and significantly constrains
autonomy. Sexual relations are an intensely personal, religious and
age-sensitive matter. People’s autonomy and enjoyment of life can be deeply
affected by being unavoidably confronted with debased public sexual displays.
Even when avoidance is possible, the result may be diminished freedom to go
where they wish or take their children where they want. Sexual conduct and
material that presents a risk of seriously curtailing people’s autonomy and
liberty may justifiably be restricted. The loss of autonomy and liberty to
ordinary people by in-your-face indecency is a potential harm to which the law
is entitled to respond. If the risk of harm is significant enough, it may rise
to the degree of the test for criminal indecency in Butler — conduct
which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning.
42
Since the harm in this class of case is based on the public being
confronted with unpalatable acts or material, it is essential that there be a
risk that members of the public either will be unwillingly exposed to the
conduct or material, or that they will be forced to significantly change their
usual conduct to avoid being so exposed.
43
This makes relevant the manner, place and audience of the acts alleged
to be indecent. In this respect, indecency differs from obscenity, where an
element of public exposure is presumed: Butler, at p. 485. As stated
in R. v. Tremblay, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 932, at p. 960, “the place in which
the acts take place and the composition of the audience” may affect whether
acts are indecent.
44
While these factors inform the factual and contextual determination of
indecency, they are merely subsidiary and instrumental to the ultimate finding
of harm. Whether certain acts are indecent cannot simply depend on whether they
are performed in a “public place”, as defined in the Criminal Code .
Tremblay cautioned against an overly simplistic reliance on this factor, as
“common sense indicates that there are great differences between locations
which can come within the definition of public places” (p. 970). More
importantly, exclusive reliance on the public nature of the place is at odds
with the harm-based rationale for criminal indecency. Indecency targets harm
or significant risk of harm to members of the public, which has to be
established on the evidence and cannot be presumed or automatically inferred
from the nature of the location where the acts take place.
4.1.3.2 The
Harm of Predisposing Others to Anti-social Acts or Attitudes
45
The second source of harm is based on the danger that the conduct or
material may predispose others to commit anti-social acts. As far back as Hicklin,
Cockburn C.J. spoke of using the criminal law to prevent material from
depraving and corrupting susceptible people, into whose hands it may fall. The
threshold for criminal indecency is higher under Butler than that
envisioned by Cockburn C.J. almost a century and a half ago, but the logic is
the same: in some cases, the criminal law may limit conduct and expression in
order to prevent people who may see it from becoming predisposed to acting in
an anti-social manner: Butler, at p. 484. Indeed, a particular harm
envisaged in Butler was the “predispos[ition of] persons to act in an
anti-social manner as, for example, the physical or mental mistreatment of
women by men, or, what is perhaps debatable, the reverse” (p. 485).
46
This source of harm is not confined to explicit invitations or exhortations
to commit anti-social acts. As discussed in Butler, the inquiry
embraces attitudinal harm. Conduct or material that perpetuates negative and
demeaning images of humanity is likely to undermine respect for members of the
targeted groups and hence to predispose others to act in an anti-social manner
towards them. Such conduct may violate formally recognized societal norms,
like the equality and dignity of all human beings, which is protected by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and similar fundamental laws such as the
provincial human rights codes.
47
Because this source of harm involves members of the public being exposed
to the conduct or material, here too it is relevant to inquire whether the
conduct is private or public. This type of harm can arise only if members of
the public may be exposed to the conduct or material in question.
4.1.3.3 Harm
to Participating Individuals
48
A third source of harm is the risk of physical or psychological harm
to individuals involved in the conduct at issue. Sexual activity is a positive
source of human expression, fulfilment and pleasure. But some kinds of sexual
activity may harm those involved. Women may be forced into prostitution or
other aspects of the sex trade. They may be the objects of physical and
psychological assault. Sometimes they may be seriously hurt or even killed.
Similar harms may be perpetrated on children and men. Sexual conduct that
risks this sort of harm may violate society’s declared norms in a way that is
incompatible with the proper functioning of society, and hence meet the Butler
test for indecent conduct under the Criminal Code .
49
The consent of the participant will generally be significant in
considering whether this type of harm is established. However, consent may be
more apparent than real. Courts must always be on the lookout for the reality
of victimization. Where other aspects of debased treatment are clear, harm to
participating individuals may be established despite apparent consent.
50
Unlike the previous types of harm by confrontation and by inculcation,
the third type of harm is only minimally dependent on whether the conduct is
private or public, since its focus is not on harm to society or members of
society, but on individuals involved in the acts. Harm of this type is not
dependent on public viewing, and may occur in a private room of an
establishment, so long as the minimal element of publicity is satisfied to
bring it within the scope of the indecency provisions, by showing it to be a
place kept for the purpose of practising such acts, for instance. In the final
analysis, the critical issue is not how members of the public might be
affected, but how the participant is affected.
51
A form of harm to participants which invokes special considerations is
the danger of sexually transmitted disease. Clearly this is an important harm
that may flow from sexual conduct. It has been considered as a factor in
determining whether conduct is criminally indecent (Tremblay), and as a
factor exacerbating an already existing harm (Mara). However, it
is difficult to assign the risk of sexually transmitted disease an independent
role in the test for indecency. The risk of disease, while it may be
connected to other legal consequences, is not logically related to the question
of whether conduct is indecent, either conceptually or causally. Indecency
connotes sexual mores rather than health concerns, and sex that is not indecent
can transmit disease while indecent sex might not.
4.1.4 The Degree of the Harm: Harm
Incompatible With the Proper Functioning of Canadian Society
52
At this stage, the task is to examine the degree of the harm to
determine whether it is incompatible with the proper functioning of society.
The threshold is high. It proclaims that as members of a diverse society, we
must be prepared to tolerate conduct of which we disapprove, short of conduct
that can be objectively shown beyond a reasonable doubt to interfere with the
proper functioning of society.
53
The objective test for criminal indecency that this Court has long
insisted must be our goal, requires careful and express analysis of whether the
alleged harm is on the evidence in the particular case truly incompatible with
the proper functioning of Canadian society. This involves value judgements.
What is the “proper” functioning of society? At what point do we say an
activity is “incompatible” with it?
54
Value judgements in this domain of the law, like many others, cannot be
avoided. But this does not mean that the decision-making process is subjective
and arbitrary. First, judges should approach the task of making value
judgments with an awareness of the danger of deciding the case on the basis of
unarticulated and unacknowledged values or prejudices. Second, they should
make value judgments on the basis of evidence and a full appreciation of the
relevant factual and legal context, to ensure that it is informed not by the
judge’s subjective views, but by relevant, objectively tested criteria. Third,
they should carefully weigh and articulate the factors that produce the value
judgements. By practices such as these, objectivity can be attained.
55
It is important to evaluate the nature of the conduct in light of
contemporary Canadian standards. As Freedman J.A. wrote 42 years ago in Dominion
News & Gifts, at pp. 116-17:
Times change, and ideas change with them. Compared to the Victorian era
this is a liberal age in which we live. One manifestation of it is the
relative freedom with which the whole question of sex is discussed. In books,
magazines, movies, television, and sometimes even in parlour conversation,
various aspects of sex are made the subject of comment, with a candour that in
an earlier day would have been regarded as indecent and intolerable. We cannot
and should not ignore these present-day attitudes when we face the question
whether Dude and Escapade are obscene according to our criminal law.
Only if the
impact of the acts in degree of harm poses a real risk of damaging the autonomy
and liberty of members of the public, judged by contemporary standards, can
indecency be established.
56
Incompatibility with the proper functioning of society is more than a
test of tolerance. The question is not what individuals or the community think
about the conduct, but whether permitting it engages a harm that threatens the
basic functioning of our society. This ensures in part that the harm be
related to a formally recognized value, at step one. But beyond this it must
be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct, not only by its nature but
also in degree, rises to the level of threatening the proper functioning of our
society.
57
Whether it does so must be determined by reference to the values engaged
by the particular kind of harm at stake. If the harm is based on the threat to
autonomy and liberty arising from unwanted confrontation by a particular kind
of sexual conduct, for example, the Crown must establish a real risk that the
way people live will be significantly and adversely affected by the conduct.
The number of people unwillingly exposed to the conduct and the circumstances
in which they are exposed to it are critical under this head of harm. If the
only people involved in or observing the conduct were willing participants,
indecency on the basis of this harm will not be made out.
58
If the harm is based on predisposing others to anti-social behaviour,
a real risk that the conduct will have this effect must be proved. Vague
generalizations that the sexual conduct at issue will lead to attitudinal
changes and hence anti-social behaviour will not suffice. The causal link
between images of sexuality and anti-social behaviour cannot be assumed.
Attitudes in themselves are not crimes, however deviant they may be or
disgusting they may appear. What is required is proof of links, first between
the sexual conduct at issue and the formation of negative attitudes, and second
between those attitudes and real risk of anti-social behaviour.
59
Similarly, if the harm is based on physical or psychological injury to
participants, it must again be shown that the harm has occurred or that there
is a real risk that this will occur. Witnesses may testify as to actual harm.
Expert witnesses may give evidence on the risks of potential harm. In
considering psychological harm, care must be taken to avoid substituting
disgust for the conduct involved, for proof of harm to the participants. In
the case of vulnerable participants, it may be easier to infer psychological
harm than in cases where participants operate on an equal and autonomous basis.
60
These are matters that can and should be established by evidence, as a
general rule. When the test was the community standard of tolerance, it could
be argued that judges or jurors were in a position to gauge what the community
would tolerate from their own experience in the community. But a test of harm
or significant risk of harm incompatible with the proper functioning of society
demands more. The judge and jurors are generally unlikely to be able to gauge
the risk and impact of the harm, without assistance from expert witnesses. To
be sure, there may be obvious cases where no one could argue that the conduct
proved in evidence is compatible with the proper functioning of society,
obviating the need for an expert witness. To kill in the course of sexual
conduct, to take an obvious example, would on its face be repugnant to our law
and the proper functioning of our society. But in most cases, expert evidence
will be required to establish that the nature and degree of the harm makes it
incompatible with the proper functioning of society. In every case, a
conviction must be based on evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt
actual harm or a significant risk of actual harm. The focus on evidence helps
to render the inquiry more objective. It does not, however, transform the
entire inquiry into a pure question of fact. A finding of indecency requires
the application of a legal standard to the facts and context surrounding the
impugned conduct. It is this legal standard that the harm-based test seeks to
articulate.
61
Where actual harm is not established and the Crown is relying on risk,
the test of incompatibility with the proper functioning of society requires the
Crown to establish a significant risk. Risk is a relative concept. The more
extreme the nature of the harm, the lower the degree of risk that may be
required to permit use of the ultimate sanction of criminal law. Sometimes, a
small risk can be said to be incompatible with the proper functioning of
society. For example, the risk of a terrorist attack, although small, might be
so devastating in potential impact that using the criminal law to counter the
risk might be appropriate. However, in most cases, the nature of the harm
engendered by sexual conduct will require at least a probability that the risk
will develop to justify convicting and imprisoning those engaged in or
facilitating the conduct.
4.1.5 Summary of the Test
62
Indecent criminal conduct will be established where the Crown proves
beyond a reasonable doubt the following two requirements:
1. That, by its nature, the
conduct at issue causes harm or presents a significant risk of harm to
individuals or society in a way that undermines or threatens to undermine a
value reflected in and thus formally endorsed through the Constitution or
similar fundamental laws by, for example:
(a) confronting members of the public with
conduct that significantly interferes with their autonomy and liberty; or
(b) predisposing others to anti-social
behaviour; or
(c) physically or psychologically harming
persons involved in the conduct, and
2. That the harm or risk of harm is
of a degree that is incompatible with the proper functioning of society.
As the above
makes clear, the categories of harm capable of satisfying the first branch of
the inquiry are not closed, nor is any one of the listed categories in itself
an integral part of the definition of harm. For example, predisposition to
anti-social behaviour, while central to this Court’s analysis in Butler,
is but one illustration of the type of harm that undermines or threatens to
undermine one of society’s formally recognized values.
63
This test, applied objectively and on the basis of evidence in
successive cases as they arise, is directed to articulating legal standards
that enhance the ability of persons engaged in or facilitating sexual
activities to ascertain the boundary between non-criminal conduct and criminal
conduct. In this way, the basic requirements of the criminal law of fair
notice to potential offenders and clear enforcement standards to police will,
it is hoped, be satisfied.
4.2 Application
of the Test
64
The first question is whether the conduct at issue harmed, or presented
a significant risk of harm to individuals or society.
65
The sexual acts at issue were conducted on the third floor of a private
club, behind doors marked “Privé” and accessed only by persons in
possession of the proper numerical code. The evidence establishes that a
number of steps were taken to ensure that members of the public who might find
the conduct inappropriate did not see the activities. Pre-membership
interviews were conducted to advise of the nature of the activities and screen
out persons not sharing the same interests. Only members and guests were
admitted to the premises. A doorman controlled access to the principal door.
66
On these facts, none of the kinds of harm discussed above was
established. The autonomy and liberty of members of the public was not
affected by unwanted confrontation with the sexual conduct in question. On the
evidence, only those already disposed to this sort of sexual activity were
allowed to participate and watch.
67
Nor was there evidence of the second type of harm, the harm of
predisposing people to anti-social acts or attitudes. Unlike the material at
issue in Butler, which perpetuated abusive and humiliating stereotypes
of women as objects of sexual gratification, there is no evidence of
anti-social attitudes toward women, or for that matter men. No one was
pressured to have sex, paid for sex, or treated as a mere sexual object for the
gratification of others. The fact that L’Orage is a commercial establishment
does not in itself render the sexual activities taking place there commercial
in nature. Members do not pay a fee and check consent at the door; the
membership fee buys access to a club where members can meet and engage in
consensual activities with other individuals who have similar sexual interests.
The case proceeded on the uncontested premise that all participation was on a
voluntary and equal basis.
68
Finally, there is no evidence of the third type of harm — physical or
psychological harm to persons participating. The only possible danger to
participants on the evidence was the risk of catching a sexually transmitted
disease. However, this must be discounted as a factor because, as discussed
above, it is conceptually and causally unrelated to indecency.
69
As stated above, the categories of harm are not closed; in a future case
other different harms may be alleged as a basis for criminal indecency.
However, no other harms are raised by the evidence in this case. All that is
raised, in the final analysis, is the assessment that the conduct amounted to
“an orgy” and that Canadian society does not tolerate orgies (Rochon J.A., at
para. 133). This reasoning erroneously harks back to the community standard of
tolerance test, which has been replaced, as discussed, by the harm-based test
developed in Butler.
70
I conclude that the evidence provides no basis for concluding that
the sexual conduct at issue harmed individuals or society. Butler is
clear that criminal indecency or obscenity must rest on actual harm or a
significant risk of harm to individuals or society. The Crown failed to
establish this essential element of the offence. The Crown’s case must
therefore fail. The majority of the Court of Appeal erred, with respect, in
applying an essentially subjective community standard of tolerance test and
failing to apply the harm-based test of Butler.
71
It is unnecessary to proceed to the second branch of the test. However,
if one did, there appears to be no evidence that the degree of alleged harm
rose to the level of incompatibility with the proper functioning of society.
Consensual conduct behind code-locked doors can hardly be supposed to
jeopardize a society as vigorous and tolerant as Canadian society.
72
I would allow the appeal and set aside the conviction.
English version of the reasons of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. delivered by
Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (dissenting)
—
1. Introduction
73
The fundamental issue in this case is what constitutes indecency and in
what circumstances the conditions required to establish indecency will lead to
the conclusion that a common bawdy‑house is being kept within the meaning
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 (“Cr. C.”).
In our dissenting reasons, we will therefore examine the criteria to be applied
in defining indecency, specifically in the context of an offence under
s. 210(1) Cr. C., which prohibits the keeping of a common
bawdy‑house. The next step will be to determine whether the sexual acts
at issue in this case are indecent and whether the appellant is consequently
guilty of keeping a common bawdy‑house in the circumstances of the case.
74
Our colleagues have opted to modify the concept of indecency found in
the case law to make it more objective by basing it solely on harm and
disregarding the other criteria that have been recognized by the courts.
According to the majority, the fundamental test for determining what the
contemporary Canadian community will tolerate can be reduced to whether or not
the conduct causes social harm that is serious enough to be incompatible with
the proper functioning of society by, for example, predisposing individuals to
act in an anti‑social manner. Only by demonstrating such harm can it be
established that the acts in question are not tolerated by the community. The
acts must constitute wrongs that are formally recognized as such by the
community and must be sufficiently serious in degree. This ensures that the
test is objective. In the case at bar, our colleagues are of the view that no
serious social harm was demonstrated, given the absence of degradation,
commercial transactions or sexual exploitation. They instead stress the
consensual nature of the acts and state that there was no evidence that the
participants were used as objects of gratification. As there were, according
to this harm‑based test, no acts that could be defined as indecent, the
appellant’s establishment was not, in their view, a common bawdy‑house.
75
The majority is in this way departing from the case law of this Court
and proposing a new approach to indecency that is, in our view, neither
desirable nor workable. It constitutes an unwarranted break with the most
important principles of our past decisions regarding indecency. Our
colleagues’ approach replaces the community standard of tolerance with a test
that treats harm as the basis of indecency rather than as a criterion for
determining the community’s level of tolerance. Whether or not serious social
harm is sustained has never been the determinative test for indecency, and it
cannot take the place of a contextual analysis of the Canadian community
standard of tolerance without completely transforming the concept of indecency
and rendering it meaningless.
76
In contrast to our colleagues, we propose to continue applying the
original test for indecency, which focusses on a contextual analysis of the
impugned acts and incorporates the concept of harm as a significant, but not
determinative, factor to consider in establishing the applicable level of
tolerance. Whether or not harm is sustained is merely one of several
indicators or contextual factors that make it possible to gauge the degree of
tolerance of the Canadian community. In our view, all the contextual factors
must be considered in every case. The application of this test to the facts of
the case at bar leads to the conclusion that the impugned acts were indecent
and that the appellant’s establishment was a common bawdy‑house within
the meaning of s. 210(1) Cr. C.
2. Facts
77
In our opinion, the description of the facts set out in the majority
opinion is incomplete. We believe it is important to clarify the following
facts.
78
First, it must be acknowledged that the L’Orage club is located in a
commercial building. Other facts also serve to establish the commercial nature
of the place. As the trial judge noted: (i) advertisements
encouraging the public to become members appeared regularly in the Journal
de Montréal, Voir magazine, the newsletter of a Toronto swingers’
club, and an erotic publication; (ii) interviews were granted to magazines
and television hosts to attract new members; and (iii) an information
booth was rented at the Salon de l’amour et de la séduction trade fair
in Montréal in February 1998, where between 2,000 and 3,000 brochures
were distributed to the general public. The commercial nature of the place and
the activities that took place there is beyond doubt. This factor is of major
significance in the contextual analysis respecting the standard of tolerance.
79
Second, we would note that, as the trial judge concluded, the
appellant’s apartment on the third floor of the building in which he operated
his business was not genuinely intended to be lived in. It was essentially a
large loft‑style room with few intimate or private spaces. It should
also be noted that the layout of the premises created at best an illusion of
privacy or intimacy. On this point, the trial judge pointed out that there was
no kitchen equipped with basic plumbing, cupboards or electrical outlets.
There was no space that could serve as a bedroom, apart from eight mattresses
strewn about on the floor. According to a city of Montréal building inspector,
the premises could not be characterized as a residential apartment based on the
standards of the National Building Code. Moreover, there was a constant
movement of people from one level of the establishment to another. The only
step taken to limit access to any part of the establishment was the
installation of two doors leading to the third level. One of the doors was
marked “Privé” (private). The other was equipped with a numeric lock
whose access code was known to all club members. All these facts confirm that the
place where the impugned acts took place was indeed public.
80
Finally, it should be noted that any adult person interested in group
sexual activities could become a member of the swingers’ club unless, according
to the evidence, he or she seemed to be “disrespectful” or did not share the
philosophy of the club and its members. Few applicants were refused
membership. At the time of the search, over 800 people had access to L’Orage,
including its third level, where the sexual acts in issue took place. Interviews
with prospective members consisted primarily in answering the questions of
those wishing to enter the club. It was a mere formality that could not
reasonably be intended to limit the public’s access to the club. Moreover,
every member had the right to bring guests, who did not have to be interviewed.
3. Analysis
3.1 General
Description of the Test
81
In our opinion, there is a single question that must be asked to find
that acts are indecent and to determine whether a place constitutes a common
bawdy‑house: “Do the impugned acts offend the standard of
tolerance of the contemporary Canadian community, having regard to the place
and context in which they occurred?”
82
Dickson C.J. stated the guiding principles for establishing the
standard of tolerance in Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. The Queen, [1985]
1 S.C.R. 494, at p. 508:
. . . (i) in determining what is undue exploitation
within s. 159(8), one of the tests to be applied is whether the accepted
standards of tolerance in the contemporary Canadian community have been
exceeded; (ii) the standards must be contemporary as times change and ideas
change with them, one manifestation being the relative freedom with which the
whole question of sex is discussed; (iii) it is the standards of the
community as a whole which must be considered and not the standards of a small
segment of that community such as the university community where a film was
shown; (iv) the decision whether the publication is tolerable according to
Canadian community standards rests with the court; (v) the task is to
determine in an objective way what is tolerable in accordance with the contemporary
standards of the Canadian community, and not merely to project one’s own
personal ideas of what is tolerable.
The cases all emphasize that it is a standard of tolerance,
not taste, that is relevant. What matters is not what Canadians think is right
for themselves to see. What matters is what Canadians would not abide other
Canadians seeing because it would be beyond the contemporary Canadian standard
of tolerance to allow them to see it. [Emphasis in original.]
83
It is now well established in the case law that the standard of
tolerance is established by means of a contextual analysis that requires an
assessment of the specific circumstances of each case: Towne Cinema,
at p. 508; R. v. Mara, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 630, at
para. 32. In R. v. Tremblay, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 932,
Cory J., writing for the majority, summed up the approach to be adopted as
follows, at p. 960:
In any consideration of the indecency of an act,
the circumstances which surround the performance of the act must be taken into
account. Acts do not take place in a vacuum. The community standard of
tolerance is that of the whole community. However just what the community will
tolerate will vary with the place in which the acts take place and the
composition of the audience.
84
The purpose of assessing indecency in relation to tolerance and not on
the basis of personal taste is to prevent it from becoming a tool for
establishing or bolstering the morality of a particular group or minority of
people in relation to sexual mores. Also, the analysis must not be based
solely on the personal and subjective opinions of judges: see Towne
Cinema, at pp. 508 and 516; Tremblay, at p. 958.
85
Nonetheless, where indecency is concerned, place and context are
relevant to the establishment of the applicable limits when assessing certain
sexual acts and their conformity to the standards of tolerance of the Canadian
community. By reason of the nature of the standard of tolerance, applying it
necessarily entails a choice of values that relate to social or public morality
and are recognized by the entire Canadian community as minimum, but mandatory,
standards. The standard of tolerance does not impose a morality based on
particular religious beliefs or particular ideologies. It implements a social
morality that is the product of values characteristic of the entire community.
These values generally reflect a social consensus that manifests itself
through, for example, a concern for [translation]
“the dignity of individuals and their autonomy, potential for
development and fundamental equality”: see L. LeBel, “Un essai de
conciliation de valeurs: la régulation judiciaire du discours obscène ou
haineux” (2001), 3(2) Éthique publique 51, at p. 57.
What must be done is not, therefore, to choose the preferences of a particular
social group and impose them on others. Rather, it is necessary to establish
the degree of tolerance of the majority of the Canadian community as a whole
toward sexual acts, taking their context, including the place where they occur,
into account. The test for indecency thus remains sufficiently objective,
because it is based on a social consensus among Canadians as to what is
acceptable in terms of sexual practices.
86
The community standard of tolerance can be established in two ways.
First, use can be made of factual evidence, such as surveys, reports or
research regarding Canadians’ sexual practices and preferences, and their
attitudes toward and levels of tolerance of sexual acts in various contexts.
Expert witnesses can help judges decide a case by providing this sort of
information. The relevance of the information and the expert opinions is
weighed on the basis of the extent of their connection to the impugned acts and
the context of the case. However, judges are not bound by expert opinions and
may make their own assessments without such assistance: Towne
Cinema, at p. 517.
87
Second, judges may draw on the fundamental values and principles
underlying legislation respecting sexual mores. The courts’ determination of
the standard is not strictly dependent on the existence of factual
evidence: Mara, at para. 25. Establishing the standard is a
question of law rather than a purely factual analysis. In Mara, at
para. 25, Sopinka J. explained the nature of the analysis to be
carried out:
This determination [of the standard of tolerance], then, can be made in
the absence of evidence and is not susceptible of proof in the traditional way.
It must perforce be a question of law, otherwise proof would be required based
on evidence and according to the criminal standard.
88
Judges called upon to determine the standard of tolerance may therefore
rely on principles of social morality drawn from legislation. Parliament has
given effect to these principles by enacting statutory provisions banning such
acts as child pornography or incest. It has also prohibited acts that constitute
transgressions of social morality in the context and in the places in which
they are performed. Thus, acts that encourage the exploitation of women, the
exchange of sexual favours for money, and sexual violence offend against social
morality: see, for example, R. v. Butler, [1992]
1 S.C.R. 452, at pp. 478‑79. These factors are indicia
upon which judges may rely to reach a finding of indecency, since they are
indicators of the level of tolerance of the community as a whole.
89
It is also important to explain the role played by the concept of harm
in the analysis.
3.2 The Concept of
Harm and Its Role in the Analysis
90
The recognition of the Canadian community standard of tolerance as the
test for indecency originated in the definition of community standards given by
this Court in the context of obscenity in Brodie v. The Queen,
[1962] S.C.R. 681. It had become necessary to adopt a new test
following the enactment of the former s. 150(8) of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1953‑54,
c. 51, as a result of which the test that had been applied up to that time
— the test established by Cockburn C.J. in R. v. Hicklin
(1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 — had become obsolete: see Towne
Cinema, at p. 503. Under the old test, images and texts tending to
deprave or corrupt were declared obscene. The test was criticized for
depending on the subjective moral views of the court. It is interesting to note
that the majority in the case at bar has now adopted what might lead to anti‑social
behaviour as a type of social harm that would serve to establish indecency.
91
The general Canadian community standard of tolerance has become the
fundamental test for establishing obscenity. The standard has been applied or
cited consistently and uniformly in cases subsequent to Brodie: Dominion
News & Gifts (1962) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 251; Provincial
News Co. v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 89, at pp. 98‑99;
Dechow v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 951, at pp. 962‑63;
Germain v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 241, at pp. 253‑54.
It was in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code
(Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at p. 1159, that this Court
confirmed that the standard of tolerance test applies to indecency.
92
The case law was to start evolving, however, with Towne Cinema,
in which this Court stressed the concept of social harm. As the majority
points out, this concept was presented in that decision as an alternative way
to establish indecency or obscenity. It should be noted, however, that the
standard of tolerance test, as formulated in Towne Cinema, did not
incorporate social harm as a criterion. The standard of tolerance and the
concept of harm were two ways to establish that certain publications were
“undue” under s. 159(8) Cr. C. (R.S.C. 1970, c. C‑34).
As Dickson C.J. wrote at p. 505:
There are other ways in which exploitation of sex
might be “undue”. Ours is not a perfect society and it is unfortunate but true
that the community may tolerate publications that cause harm to members of
society and therefore to society as a whole. Even if, at certain times, there
is a coincidence between what is not tolerated and what is harmful to society, there
is no necessary connection between these two concepts. Thus, a legal
definition of "undue" must also encompass publications harmful to
members of society and, therefore, to society as a whole. [Emphasis added.]
93
It was in Butler that the concept of harm came to play a major
role in establishing indecency and obscenity. However, it is essential to note
that the test based on social harm, which is defined in that case as the
predisposition of persons to act in an anti‑social manner, was adopted to
fill a vacuum. Its purpose was to establish the relationship between the
community standards test and the degrading or dehumanizing treatment test. As
Sopinka J. wrote in Butler, at p. 483:
This review of jurisprudence shows that it fails
to specify the relationship of the tests one to another. Failure to do so
with respect to the community standards test and the degrading or dehumanizing
test, for example, raises a serious question as to the basis on which the
community acts in determining whether the impugned material will be tolerated.
With both these tests being applied to the same material and apparently
independently, we do not know whether the community found the material to be
intolerable because it was degrading or dehumanizing, because it offended
against morals or on some other basis. [Emphasis added.]
94
The harm‑based test thus gained new importance in the
establishment of the community standard of tolerance. The fact that there were
harmful acts, that is, acts that predisposed individuals to anti‑social
conduct, was now sufficient to sustain a finding of indecency, provided that
the degree of harm related to those acts was sufficient. Sopinka J.
summed up this approach as follows in Butler, at p. 485:
The courts must determine as best they can what the
community would tolerate others being exposed to on the basis of the degree of
harm that may flow from such exposure. Harm in this context means that it
predisposes persons to act in an anti‑social manner as, for example, the
physical or mental mistreatment of women by men, or, what is perhaps debatable,
the reverse. Anti‑social conduct for this purpose is conduct which
society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning. The
stronger the inference of a risk of harm the lesser the likelihood of
tolerance. The inference may be drawn from the material itself or from the
material and other evidence. Similarly evidence as to the community standards
is desirable but not essential.
95
There can be no doubt that, since Butler, social harm has been a
very important test for establishing indecency. For example, in Mara,
at para. 33, this Court stated that the standard of tolerance test for a
performance was “if the social harm engendered by the performance, having
reference to the circumstances in which it took place, is such that the
community would not tolerate it taking place”. See also Little Sisters Book
and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000]
2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69, at para. 52.
96
However, despite the importance of the social harm test, it cannot be
said to be the only standard by which the tolerance of the Canadian community
for sexual practices is to be measured. The very definition of social harm
warrants closer examination before this test can be applied to determine the
level of tolerance of the Canadian community. Apart from the conceptual and
practical difficulties that arise out of adopting such an approach, which will
be discussed below, it can be seen from the analysis of the emergence of the
concept of harm in this Court’s decisions relating to obscenity and indecency
that Towne Cinema has never been overruled or contradicted. Bearing in
mind the reasons that led to the adoption of the social harm test, it does not
follow from Butler, Tremblay and Mara that the courts must
determine what the community tolerates by reference to the degree of harm
alone, and in particular of harm as it is defined by our colleagues in the
majority in the instant case. The standard of tolerance is established by
means of a contextual analysis. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in
Tremblay, which dealt with indecency, the majority’s analysis did not
rely on harm as its sole test. The analysis was based more on an overall
assessment of the contextual elements specific to that case.
97
Thus, serious harm is not the sole criterion for determining what the
Canadian community will tolerate. Harm is but one indicator of the community
standard of tolerance. The cases cited by the majority must be placed in the
context of a line of authority that focusses on determining whether the
standard of tolerance has been violated, based on the nature of the acts, the
places where the acts occurred and the context. In our opinion, therefore, the
majority’s analysis departs in practice from the case law by adopting an
approach based solely on harm, whereas Mara and Butler did not
break with the contextual approach.
98
In principle, we consider the change to the legal order proposed by the
majority to be inappropriate, particularly because no valid justification is
given for departing from the existing test. We are convinced that this new
approach strips of all relevance the social values that the Canadian community
as a whole believes should be protected.
99
First, our colleagues’ approach changes the role of the judge in
establishing the standard of tolerance. It is clear from the case law that the
judge’s role is, through contextual analysis, to interpret the community’s view
of sexual practices as expressed in various places at various times. Whether
the impugned acts met the Canadian community standard of tolerance is thus a
question of law: see Mara, at para. 26; Tremblay,
at p. 946 (per Gonthier J., dissenting, but not on this
issue). However, by adopting certain categories of harm that emphasize the
mere exposure of the general public to sexual acts or the risk of serious
psychological or physical harm, the majority’s approach tends to reduce the
judge’s analysis to a purely fact‑based one. The inquiry into the
standard of tolerance thus becomes more a question of fact, which is contrary
to this Court’s case law.
100
Second, when the standard of tolerance is established on the basis of
the three categories of harm adopted by the majority, it becomes impossible to
take into account the multitude of situations that could exceed the threshold
for indecency. Granted, the harm‑based test for indecency will in most
cases yield the same result as a contextual approach. However, it is easy to
conceive of situations in which the categories will not reflect the Canadian
community standard of tolerance. For example, it is possible that, even in the
absence of degrading acts or of harm to the participants, the Canadian
community will not tolerate certain acts committed in a given context and
place, regardless of whether spectators are present or whether they consent.
In other words, sexual acts of any nature performed without an audience would de
facto fall outside the ambit of the provisions aimed at prohibiting
indecency. In our view, indecency cannot be based solely on the exposure of
the general public to sexual acts. This outcome is unacceptable.
101
The Canadian community’s tolerance for sexual practices must be assessed
independently of the presence of spectators. The nature of the principle that
is to be applied must not be forgotten. It consists in establishing not what
Canadians think is right for themselves, or what the spectators or participants
in question think is right for themselves, but what Canadians would not abide
other Canadians seeing: Towne Cinema, at pp. 508‑9.
In a situation in which the Canadian community’s tolerance for sexual acts must
be established, as opposed to the situation in Mara, which concerned
indecent performances, the principle will necessarily concern what Canadians
would not abide other Canadians doing, taking into account the place and
general context, of course. Another thing to bear in mind is that it is the
standards of the community as a whole that must be considered and not the
standards of a small segment of the community: Towne Cinema,
at p. 508. Consequently, indecency cannot be based solely on the presence
of participants or on their views. The contextual approach allows us to take
into account the private nature of the place where the acts are carried out.
But for sexual practices in places to which the public has access not to be
subject to the standard of tolerance because of their allegedly private nature
— we are referring here to the ambiguous concept of relatively private places —
would be incompatible with a proper interpretation of the standard of tolerance.
An approach that in many situations, like the situation in the instant case,
systematically prevents the standard of tolerance from being established and
applied must be rejected.
102
Furthermore, the majority’s approach poses serious problems in light of
the practical consequences that would result from adopting it. To successfully
defend against a charge under s. 210(1) Cr. C. in a context in
which there are no degrading acts or in which the participants do not suffer
serious harm, it would be enough to ensure that the general public is not a
spectator, regardless of the number of participants. It would then be
difficult to characterize the acts as indecent, as there would be no evidence
of harm.
103
In our opinion, the test adopted by the majority introduces a concept of
tolerance that does not seem to be justifiable according to any principle
whatsoever. This concept cannot be accepted on the pretext that harm is easier
to prove or that it is desirable for this type of offence to have the same
rationale as the vast majority of other criminal offences, namely the need to
protect the community from harm. Social morality, which is inherent in
indecency offences and is expressed through the application of the standard of
tolerance, must still be allowed to play a role in all situations where it is
relevant. Otherwise, the social values that the Canadian community as a whole
considers worth protecting would be stripped of any relevance.
104
Furthermore, the existence of harm is not a prerequisite for exercising
the state’s power to criminalize certain conduct. The existence of fundamental
social and ethical considerations is sufficient: see R. v. Malmo‑Levine,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74, at p. 635. There is
no principle that supports the harmonization of offences.
105
The philosophical underpinnings of the majority’s harm‑based
approach are found in the liberal theories of J. S. Mill. This
philosopher argued that the only purpose for which state power can be
rightfully exercised over a member of the community is to prevent harm to
others: see J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Considerations
on Representative Government (1946), at p. 8. This court had occasion
to address the principle of harm in Malmo‑Levine. Although that
case concerned the constitutional limits on the state’s power to legislate in
criminal matters, the majority’s reasons stressed that the justification for
state intervention cannot be reduced to a single factor. There are multiple
criteria for justifying state intervention in criminal matters, even if it
restricts human liberty: see Malmo‑Levine, at
para. 109. Offences under the Criminal Code are thus based on principles
and values other than harm. In the case at bar, the offence relates to social
morality. To place excessive emphasis on the criterion of harm will therefore
make it impossible to give effect to the moral principles in respect of which
there is a consensus in the community.
106
Our colleagues’ position also raises problems relating to the
determination of the level of harm required for a finding of indecency. The
proposed threshold is, in our view, too demanding and too abstract. There is
no justification for adopting a threshold that would require neither more nor
less than proof that the sexual practices in issue will lead to social
disorder. The Court has not gone that far in its past decisions; rather, it
has merely concluded that encouraging anti‑social conduct would be
incompatible with the proper functioning of society. Why should such a notion
be adopted when tolerance is clearly linked to public morality and community
values? What is meant by conduct that is incompatible with the proper
functioning of society? How can proof that an act will lead to anti‑social
conduct be required, assuming that it is defined objectively, and why should it
be required when the proceeding may concern acts that in fact fit that
definition?
107
The position taken in Mara, in which tolerance was defined
according to the harm suffered by those who view a performance, must be
disregarded in the context of an offence under s. 210(1) Cr. C.
Whereas the issue analysed in Mara concerned the indecency of a
performance, the issue in the case at bar concerns the indecency of an
act: see Mara, at para. 39. In the case of indecent
acts, there is no need to consider the potential harm to spectators.
108
To adopt that position would have the effect of disregarding the
community’s judgment in respect of sexual practices and any application of the
social morality associated with them. The standard of tolerance cannot exclude
only those acts that cross the hypothetical line beyond which the proper functioning
of society is compromised. It is also related to social order, insofar as what
is acceptable to the community is expressed in terms of a known social
morality. The concept of harm is thus linked to social morality, not just to
societal dysfunction or to the creation of a predisposition to anti‑social
conduct.
109
According to contemporary Canadian social morality, acts such as child
pornography, incest, polygamy and bestiality are unacceptable regardless of
whether or not they cause social harm. The community considers these acts to
be harmful in themselves. Parliament enforces this social morality by enacting
statutory norms in legislation such as the Criminal Code . The community
does not tolerate degrading acts or sexual exploitation either: Butler,
at p. 485. Nor is the purchase of sexual favours in public places
accepted, as evidenced by the various provisions of the Criminal Code that
prohibit common bawdy‑houses and prostitution. In this second type of
situation, morality is conveyed by means of provisions that demand that each
individual case be assessed in light of its specific context and circumstances
in order to gauge the Canadian community’s tolerance for the acts in question.
Certain acts are thus prohibited because of their harmful nature. Others are
prohibited because of the context and places in which they arise, as in the
case at bar. Harm is thus ultimately linked to a concept of social morality.
There is also harm where what is acceptable to the community in terms of public
morals is compromised.
110
Thus, the need to prove societal dysfunction to a degree approaching
social disorder would appear to unduly restrict the situations in which a court
could reach a finding of indecency. The importance of this requirement profoundly
alters the traditional concept of tolerance by suggesting that the public will
tolerate anything that is contrary to public morals unless it can be
established that an act will cause significant social disorder.
111
Furthermore, analytical problems would seem to arise when only the harm
test is taken into account in the context of s. 210(1) Cr. C.
In Mara, the appellants had been charged under s. 167(1) Cr. C.
with presenting “an immoral, indecent or obscene performance, entertainment or
representation”. However, this Court held as follows, at para. 37:
A finding of an indecent performance depends on a finding of harm to
the spectators of the performance as perceived by the community as a whole.
The potential harm to the performers themselves, while obviously regrettable,
is not a central consideration under s. 167.
112
The Court thus played down the importance of the factor of risk of harm
to participants. Nevertheless, it considered that this principle does not
apply to offences under s. 210(1) Cr. C. At para. 39,
Sopinka J. wrote the following:
I note, however, that this Court in Tremblay and the Court of
Appeal in the present case placed significance on the risk of sexual assault
and transmission of disease which I do not, but it is important to recall
that Tremblay involved an analysis of whether acts performed in a
private room were indecent, whereas the present case involves an analysis of
whether a performance was indecent. The charge in Tremblay was
under s. 193(1) of the Criminal Code (now s. 210(1) ). The
gravamen of that offence is the keeping of a place for the purpose of the
practice of acts of indecency. The presence of spectators and the effect on
spectators is relatively unimportant. On the other hand, the gravamen of
the offence under s. 167 is giving or allowing an indecent performance.
The presence of spectators and of “performance” under s. 167(1) , changes
the emphasis in the present case largely to an analysis of the effect on the
spectators, rather than the performers. While I do not share the view of the
Court of Appeal with respect to the importance of the risk of infectious
diseases to a finding of an indecent performance, I otherwise fully agree with
the manner in which Dubin C.J.O. admirably set out the differences between
the present case and Tremblay and Hawkins, and explained why the
activities in the present case were indecent. While it is unnecessary to
repeat verbatim what was said, the principal distinctions may be summarized as
follows. [Emphasis added.]
113
Thus, whereas the effect on spectators is a central factor in the
establishment of indecency for the purposes of s. 167(1) Cr. C.,
the impact on participants remains important in the context of s. 210(1) Cr. C.
In other words, in determining whether the offence of keeping a common bawdy‑house
has been committed, the relevant harm is not “the attitudinal harm on those
watching the performance as perceived by the community as a whole” (Mara,
at para. 34), but the harm sustained by those who participate in
the acts as perceived by the community as a whole. These remarks clearly
illustrate the inadequacy of an analysis based entirely on the concept of
serious harm.
114
A problem thus arises, as the analysis becomes circular. If it is
accepted that the test for indecency in the context of s. 210(1) Cr. C.
consists in determining whether those participating in the acts are predisposed
to act in an anti‑social manner (one of the three types of harm proposed
by the majority), it seems illogical to ask whether the individual committing
an allegedly indecent act is predisposed to act in an anti‑social
manner. The person is already acting in an anti‑social manner. In the
context of indecent acts, as opposed to indecent performances, the issue of
predisposition to act in an anti‑social manner would seem to be
irrelevant. The harm would be more the result of a violation of social norms,
as we saw above.
115
Consequently, in the context of an offence under s. 210(1)
Cr. C., we are of the opinion that it is not absolutely necessary to
consider the harm done to society, such as the predisposition to act in an anti‑social
manner. This type of harm will be present where there is evidence of
dehumanizing, degrading or demeaning acts. In our view, Tremblay
appears, given that the analysis did not focus on the predisposition to act in
an anti‑social manner, to confirm this approach. To sum up, it is simply
not possible to carry out a rational analysis in this area by limiting the test
for tolerance to evidence of serious harm and, in particular, by equating
serious harm with a predisposition to act in an anti‑social manner.
116
These reasons are sufficient for rejecting a test for the standard of
tolerance that is based solely on harm. Our colleagues’ approach has too many
shortcomings, both practical and theoretical. It introduces a concept of
tolerance that appears to be supported by no principle whatsoever. It is also
hard to find support for this position in the case law. We will now set out
what we feel to be a more appropriate approach.
3.3 A Context‑Based Standard of
Tolerance
117
The analysis to establish the standard of tolerance should be based on
two main factors: the nature of the acts and their context.
3.3.1 Nature of the Acts
118
It seems hard to dispute that, in a given context, the Canadian
community’s tolerance for sexual acts varies depending on the nature of the
acts. In our opinion, this explains why, in cases involving indecency, the
courts have taken the nature of the sexual acts into consideration in
establishing the standard of tolerance: see Tremblay, at
pp. 957, 969 and 971; Mara, at para. 40; Roux v. La Reine,
[2001] R.J.Q. 567 (C.A.). The testimony of expert witness
Michel Campbell in the instant case also confirms the relevance of this
factor: A.R., vol. VIII, at pp. 1247, 1251 and 1297. The
nature of the sexual acts and the context in which they were performed are thus
two factors that interact dynamically to influence the Canadian community’s
threshold of tolerance.
119
Two points require clarification at this stage. First, judges should
not pass judgment on the morality of the acts themselves without regard to the
context. Taking the nature of the acts into account simply offers the
possibility of comparing them with other acts in a similar context. For
example, if the courts have found a sexual practice to be indecent in a similar
context, the nature of more degrading or dehumanizing acts will lead more
easily to a finding of indecency. The public will be less tolerant of these
acts because of their potential for causing social harm.
120
Second, the assessment of the acts’ nature should not be influenced by
the sexual orientation of the participants. The standard of tolerance cannot
incorporate a discriminatory attitude based on sexual orientation. As
Binnie J. explained in Little Sisters, at para. 119, “[i]t is
antithetical to the remedial reasons underlying adoption of the community
standard to single out a particular minority as being less worthy than others
of protection and respect.”
3.3.2 Context
121
In light of its relationship to indecency, s. 210(1) Cr. C.
necessarily imposes restrictions of time (such as the time of day) and place on
sexual practices. Indecency concerns sexual behaviour or the representation of
sexual behaviour that is neither obscene nor immoral, but inopportune or
inappropriate according to Canadian standards of tolerance because of the
context in which it takes place: Tremblay, at p. 962, quoting
Boilard J. in R. v. Pelletier (1985),
27 C.C.C. (3d) 77 (Que. Sup. Ct.), at p. 89. From the
perspectives of both statute and case law, indecency thus requires a contextual
analysis of the acts in issue.
122
It can be seen from this Court’s case law on indecency and obscenity
that the following contextual factors may be taken into consideration in
determining the standard of tolerance: (1) the private or
public nature of the place; (2) the type of participants and the
composition of the audience; (3) the nature of the warning given regarding
the acts; (4) the measures taken to limit access to the place;
(5) the commercial nature of the place and the acts; (6) the purpose
of the acts; (7) the conduct of the participants; and (8) harm
suffered by the participants (see Tremblay, at pp. 960‑61; Mara,
at para. 32). This list is not exhaustive, however. In our opinion, the
nature of the factors adopted by the courts reflects the community’s desire to
limit the performance of sexual acts in public, especially in a commercial
context.
123
It would be helpful to elaborate on some of these contextual factors.
First, a consideration of the public or private nature of the place where the
acts are performed should not be based on a simple public/private dichotomy.
In light of the large number of situations in which the courts may be called
upon to rule on the indecent nature of sexual practices, this simplistic
dichotomy must give way to an analysis based on a continuum of situations and
contexts. In our view, the expert testimony of Mr. Campbell cited in R.
v. Angerillo, [2003] R.J.Q. 1977 (Mun. Ct. Mtl.), at
paras. 129‑30, reflects the fact that tolerance varies in degree
according to the public nature of the place:
[translation] However,
the Court understands from Dr. Campbell’s testimony that for Canadians, in
all cases, swinging is understood to mean that the swapping of sexual partners
is done in private, that is, “among themselves”. The witness referred to a
kind of “social contract” that is entered into, tacitly or specifically,
between those who wish to participate in swapping. Thus, the more closed
and off‑limits the “social contract” is to third parties, the closer it
is to falling within the “classical” definition of swinging. According to the
witness, this is where the threshold of the contemporary Canadian community
lies, that is, on the condition that the sexual activities take place in
private.
Similarly, if the sexual activities take place
in public, what is happening is no longer “swinging”, but an “orgy”.
According to Dr. Campbell, Canadians clearly do not tolerate orgies and do
not accept that other Canadians, even informed and consenting adults,
participate in them. [Emphasis added.]
Mr. Campbell
confirmed this approach several times in his testimony at
trial: A.R., vol. VIII, at pp. 1292 and 1313.
124
For these reasons, a swingers’ club cannot automatically be
characterized as a “private” place on the basis that the general public is not
permitted to circulate freely within it. The place may retain a public
dimension that is sufficient to support a finding of indecency. If the
contrary position were adopted, it would be impossible, provided that the
participants consent and that the spectators are considered only to be
participants, to sanction any sexual act that is not degrading or harmful to
the participants. As we have seen, this unacceptable solution amounts to
denying that the standard of tolerance can be applied to sexual acts performed
in establishments that are accessible to the public. Such a solution does not
take into account the fact that indecency is based on what Canadians do not
abide other Canadians seeing or doing: Towne Cinema, at
p. 508. It would also amount to saying that only the morality of the
participants themselves is relevant.
125
Section 197(1) Cr. C. also limits the possibility of
characterizing every place where the general public does not circulate as a
private place. It defines a “public place” as “any place to which the public
have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied”.
126
For the same reasons that have compelled us to reject the public/private
dichotomy, we find it impossible to accept the validity of the concept of [translation] “relative privacy”
proposed in the Court of Appeal by Proulx J.A. ((2004), 191 C.C.C. (3d)
66). This vague concept can serve only to create a new category under which an
act is tolerable if a certain degree of privacy — based on the
unforeseeable definition that may be given to the concept — is
maintained while the act is being performed. In Tremblay, Cory J.
referred to this concept only to sum up the context in which the acts took
place, that is, in a closed room where only two adults were present
(p. 970). This differs from the facts in the instant case, as we will see
below.
127
The commercial nature of the place and acts plays an important role in
the establishment of the Canadian community’s threshold of tolerance. In Mara,
this Court took into consideration the fact that the commercial transaction
contributed to the degrading and humiliating nature of the impugned acts by
contributing to the use of women as sexual objects (para. 34).
Gonthier J. also referred, in dissent, to the commercialization of certain
sexual activities as establishing the existence of harm that can arise in the
public sphere:
While exposure of persons is one of those harms, there are many others
which are undoubtedly important, and they include exploitation, degradation,
the undue commercialization of certain activities, and the dangers these harms
entail.
(Tremblay, at p. 943)
128
Conversely, the absence of a commercial dimension to an impugned act can
also be a factor in favour of tolerance: R. v. Jacob (1996),
31 O.R. (3d) 350 (C.A.), at p. 365, per
Osborne J.A. Finally, the numerous offences in the Criminal Code respecting
common bawdy‑houses (ss. 210 and 211 Cr. C.), procuring
(s. 212 Cr. C.), and soliciting sexual services (s. 213 Cr. C.)
testify to our community’s low level of tolerance for the commercialization of
sexual acts.
129
Consequently, the commercial nature of sexual practices cannot be
disregarded in establishing indecency. This factor is relevant because the
association of sexual acts with a commercial transaction has an impact on
community tolerance, particularly because the persons involved in this type of
transaction are exploited and experience a loss of dignity or autonomy.
130
The purpose of the acts is a factor that takes the intention or
objective underlying the allegedly indecent practices into account. For
example, in respect of obscenity and indecent performances, indications of an
artistic purpose will generally result in greater tolerance (see Towne
Cinema, at p. 512; Butler, at pp. 482‑83; Little
Sisters, at paras. 65 and 195). Where indecent acts are concerned,
practices intended to inflict bodily harm or to commit degrading acts will be
perceived negatively by the community.
131
Harm to the participants is also relevant. Attention must therefore be
paid to the risk of physical or psychological harm. This approach permits the
risk of spreading sexually transmitted diseases (“STDs”) to be taken into
account: Tremblay, at pp. 970‑71. If the evidence
demonstrates a real risk of transmission linked to the systematic absence of
protective measures, this factor will be relevant. We do not agree with the
majority on this point, since Canadians’ tolerance of sexual practices is
influenced by the risks of spreading STDs.
132
Finally, the consent of the participants or the fact that those present
are informed adults is not in itself a determinative factor. A consensual
sexual act that is totally acceptable in another situation may be indecent if
it is performed in a context in which it offends the Canadian community
standard of tolerance. Once again, it is the tolerance of the general public
that counts, not the tolerance of the participants or spectators: Towne
Cinema, at p. 508. Moreover, Sopinka J. stated the following in Butler,
at p. 479:
In the appreciation of whether material is degrading or dehumanizing,
the appearance of consent is not necessarily
determinative. . . . Sometimes the very appearance of consent
makes the depicted acts even more degrading or dehumanizing.
See also Mara,
at para. 35. It is even necessary to avoid relying on the consent of the
participants as a determinative factor. The absence of consent may
nevertheless contribute to the characterization of acts as degrading or
dehumanizing. This is how we interpret Cory J.’s discussion of informed
consent in his reasons in Tremblay, at p. 971.
3.4 Role of the Judge
133
Before applying these principles to the facts, we will discuss the issue
of the role of judges in identifying and applying the standard of tolerance. A
precise understanding of the role of the judge will help to explain why a
contextual analysis of the standard of tolerance offers a sufficient degree of
objectivity. It will also reduce the need to change the state of the law on
indecency on the basis that the analysis must be made more objective.
134
In support of using harm as the basic test for establishing indecency,
the majority cites the need to make the analysis more objective. It must be
acknowledged, however, that a certain degree of subjectivity is inherent in the
establishment of the standard of tolerance because of the judge’s role as
interpreter of the community’s minimum standards regarding sex. Despite this
problem, the analysis remains objective on the whole as long as the judge ignores
his or her personal convictions and instead tries to determine the nature of
the social consensus. Judges must not only identify the harm addressed by the Criminal
Code ’s provisions on indecency, but also determine the nature and content
of the moral values of the community in which they perform their functions in
order to establish the standard of tolerance.
135
The judge’s role is not to review the evidence for the sole purpose of
determining whether or not a particular social harm has been sustained and
establishing the degree of that harm. His or her role is to resolve a question
of law by assessing the nature of the acts in their context and evaluating them
in relation to the practices and attitudes of Canadians. It is a difficult task,
but as [translation] “a product
of his or her times, shaped by his or her culture and concerns, the judge must
assume the risks of the problems involved in identifying and reconciling values
that are contradictory”: see LeBel, at p. 57. Despite the difficulties,
the original test for tolerance should not be set aside to make way for a new
one based solely on harm. The test was from the start designed to be a
sufficiently objective standard, both conceptually and when applied to the
facts: see Towne Cinema, at pp. 503, 508, 515 and 516. Judges
inquire into the behaviour and attitudes of Canadians relating to morals and
then consider the parties’ evidence on this issue. A choice of values is made,
but the judge must subordinate his or her personal views on morality to
community‑wide standards. This approach makes it possible to uphold the
values on which there is a social consensus and thereby ensure a sufficient
level of objectivity. Following it does not appear to pose insurmountable
problems for the courts: Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code (Man.), at p. 1159. Nor is this the only area in
which judges must engage in such an exercise.
136
Judges uphold a social morality that is not necessarily attached to
personal beliefs, but is grounded in the values of the general public,
particularly those values that are reflected in legislation dealing with
sexuality. In such a context, judges can, despite their role as interpreters
of social morality, maintain a sufficient degree of objectivity by relying on
values asserted in legislation. Expert witnesses, often specialists in social
sciences, can also assist judges in their work and help ensure a sufficient
degree of objectivity.
4. Applying the Principles to the Facts
137
In the case at bar, we find that the sexual acts in issue were indecent,
given their context. In our opinion, the community does not tolerate the
performance of acts of this nature in a place of business to which the public
has easy access. The appellant’s establishment was therefore a common bawdy‑house.
4.1 Nature of the Acts
138
The nature of the sexual acts in the instant case contributes to their
indecency. Objectively, irrespective of the context and of views regarding the
morality of the acts themselves, it must be recognized that group sexual
practices are not the norm. At page 34 of his expert report, and in his
testimony, Mr. Campbell indicated that [translation]
“most Quebeckers do not wish to take part in partner swapping or group
sex”: A.R., vol. VIII, at pp. 1244 and 1400. Only two to
five percent of the population engages in these practices: A.R.,
vol. VIII, at p. 1196. It should be recognized that although the
expert maintains that Canadians generally tolerate partner swapping, his
comments clearly indicate that it would not be tolerated in a public place.
The context will be discussed below. Moreover, the type of partner swapping
that occurred in the appellant’s establishment involved the widest range of
practices, including acts of penetration, fellatio and masturbation performed
simultaneously or in turn by several men with a single woman.
139
In our view, it would be possible to characterize some of these acts as
degrading, given that the types of sexual acts between several men and a single
women could lead to the exploitation or degradation of women or to the use of
women or their bodies as objects of sexual gratification. However, this issue
does not need to be resolved in the case at bar, since the nature of the acts must
always be considered in their context. A contextual analysis shows that
the impugned acts exceed the Canadian public’s threshold of tolerance.
4.2 Context
140
The majority discussed the fact that all the participants were informed
adults whose actions were consensual and voluntary. As we saw above, the
participants’ consent and their membership in a club or adoption of a
collective philosophy are not determinative factors for establishing the
general standard of tolerance or determining whether the acts were indecent.
The fundamental question is whether Canadians tolerate other Canadians
participating in or witnessing the sexual acts in issue, having regard to the
context in which they occurred. In the analysis in the instant case, five
contextual elements must be considered.
4.2.1 Private or Public Nature of the Place
141
An analysis of the place where the acts were performed shows that the
establishment is a public one. Although advertised as a private club, L’Orage
was a place to which the public had ready access “by invitation, express or
implied”, within the meaning of s. 197(1) Cr. C. Several
facts illustrate this public dimension and the ease with which the public could
enter the establishment. It should be noted that, despite the measures
allegedly taken to limit access, members of the general public were on many
occasions invited to join the club and to take part in sexual activities on the
third floor. The number of people who had access to the establishment and,
potentially, to the third floor was also very high, about 800. All that was
necessary to gain access to the establishment was to pay the requested fee
after a cursory interview that was quite superficial. It was even easier to
gain access to the establishment and to the third floor simply as the guest of
a club member. Neither the appellant nor his employees interviewed guests or
gave them an official warning. They merely relied on the members to tell their
guests about the exact nature of the sexual acts taking place on the third
floor and to ensure that those guests shared the philosophy of partner swapping
and would not be shocked by what they saw.
142
To sum up, this was a place with a decidedly public character. The
appellant’s establishment was not just a place to which the general public had
access by express or implied invitation. The public could enter it very
easily. The evidence demonstrates the ease with which members of the general
public could gain access to the club and to the third floor to witness or take
part in sexual acts. This was not a closed circle whose members shared the
same philosophy and swapped partners in private. The situation in the case at
bar has nothing in common with that of Tremblay, in which those involved
were able to isolate themselves in a place that, in the circumstances of that
case, offered relative privacy. We therefore agree with the conclusions drawn
by the trial judge:
[translation]
Having reviewed the evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Labaye
intentionally characterized the third floor as a private apartment even though
all the members and their guests had access to it. The distinction made by
Mr. Labaye between his “public” club and his allegedly “private” apartment
is but a smokescreen that fails to hide the incontrovertible reality that
sexual relations of all sorts were taking place in public inside a licensed
establishment that was accessible to a large number of clients who had paid to
enter it.
([1999] R.J.Q. 2801, at pp. 2807-8)
143
The majority’s reasons for judgment appear to indicate that since the
“public” in the case at bar consisted solely of club members and their guests,
the “general public” was at no risk of seeing the acts in question. We cannot
subscribe to this interpretation. The “public” in the instant case consisted
of people who were both participants and spectators. A place can be
sufficiently public even though the people gathered there are members of a
“private” club or the guests of members. It should be noted here that in the
context of an offence under s. 210(1) Cr. C., tolerance, and
thus indecency, concerns persons who take part in acts, their consent
notwithstanding and regardless of whether spectators are present. The
fundamental issue remains whether the community tolerates having these
individuals witness these activities or take part in them in this context.
144
In our view, the standard of tolerance is offended when acts of partner
swapping such as those performed in the case at bar occur in a place whose
public nature is undeniable. We rely in particular on the testimony of
Mr. Campbell cited above and on the analysis of his testimony by
Judge Boisvert in Angerillo, at para. 129. Although the
expert in the instant case relied on erroneous facts in concluding that the
apartment on the third floor of Labaye’s building was a private place, the
principles that can be drawn from his testimony are still applicable here. The
ease with which the public had access to the appellant’s establishment where
acts as explicit as these were taking place and the absence of privacy provide
strong support for the conclusion that the community’s tolerance does not go so
far as to include these practices.
4.2.2 Composition of
the Group of Participants and the Audience
145
As we have already mentioned, this is a case involving informed adults
who presumably shared the philosophy of partner swapping. However, this
characteristic of the participants is not relevant under s. 210 Cr. C.
other than to demonstrate the existence of degrading or dehumanizing acts.
4.2.3 Measures Taken to Limit Access to the
Place
146
In the case at bar, the appellant claims to have set up an adequate
system for limiting access to the establishment and to the third floor to
individuals who shared the philosophy of partner swapping and who knew what to
expect when they entered the establishment. Our colleagues agree with him that
the initial interview, the membership fees, the doorman on the first floor, the
word “Privé” on the door leading to the third floor and the numeric lock
on the door to the appellant’s apartment were effective and appropriate
measures for controlling access.
147
With respect, these conclusions contradict the trial judge’s findings,
and we see no fatal error in her analysis. The interview with prospective
members served merely to answer their questions, they were given no warning or
official explanation regarding the sexual acts taking place in the
establishment, and the veracity of their statements was not verified. The
membership fees only confirm the commercial nature of the place and of the
impugned acts, as we will see below. The purpose for which the money was
collected is irrelevant, as the only material question is whether it was
necessary to pay to take part in the acts. The notice on the door to the third
floor was just as ineffective, since there was, as the trial judge indicated, a
constant flow of people between the establishment’s three floors. The trial
judge pointed out that the third floor was a dependency of the two lower floors
(p. 2807). Finally, the evidence shows that all club members were given
the combination to the numeric lock on the apartment door upon joining the club
and that they were all free to take guests there. In short, these measures did
not adequately limit the public’s access to a place where very explicit sexual
acts were performed. In our view, the degree of privacy was therefore
insufficient.
4.2.4 Commercial Nature of the Place and the
Acts
148
An analysis of the establishment’s operations reveals the commercial
nature of the activities that took place there. Several of the facts mentioned
above testify to the commercial nature of the appellant’s business. Sexual
acts could be performed on the third level of the establishment only after a
mandatory commercial transaction between the participants and the owner of the
establishment, since everyone had to pay a fee to become a member. The participants
essentially purchased sexual services provided by other participants, although
the commercial operation was less direct or significant than in Mara, in
which the payment was made in exchange for the right to perform certain acts
with a dancer.
149
Canadians are not inclined to tolerate the commercial exploitation of
sexual activities, which is contrary to a number of values of the Canadian
community, such as equality, liberty and human dignity. The existence of facts
that appear to be indicative of the commercial exploitation of sexual acts,
while not in itself sufficient to support a finding of indecency, does clearly
support the conclusion that the community standard of tolerance has been
offended in the case at bar.
4.2.5 Resulting Social Harm
150
Under s. 210(1) Cr. C., whether or not social harm has
been sustained is not a determinative factor in establishing indecency. It
may, however, assist in gauging the degree of community tolerance when
humiliating, degrading or demeaning acts are performed.
151
In the instant case, it is still possible to conclude that a form of
social harm has been sustained that indicates that the level of tolerance of
Canadians has been exceeded. This harm results from the failure to meet the
minimum standards of public morality rather than from incompatibility with the
“proper functioning of society” or from predisposing others to anti‑social
behaviour. This conclusion is specific to s. 210(1) Cr. C.
and results from the establishment of the standard of tolerance on the basis of
an objective, contextual analysis of the sexual acts.
152
Thus, an analysis of the context in which the acts took place may make
up for the absence of harm as defined by the majority, as whether or not such
harm has been sustained is just one of the factors to be considered. In the
instant case, the public and commercial dimensions of the sexual practices in
issue would lead to the conclusion that those practices were indecent even if
there were no harm.
4.3 Conclusion Regarding Indecency
153
In the case at bar, the impugned sexual acts were very explicit acts,
and they took place in a commercial establishment that was easily accessible to
the general public. This situation caused a certain form of social harm
resulting from the failure to meet the minimum standards of public morality.
In light of these contextual factors, we are of the opinion that the sexual
acts performed in the appellant’s establishment clearly offended the Canadian
community standard of tolerance and were therefore indecent. Our analysis does
not permit us to conclude that the Canadian community would tolerate the
performance, in a commercial establishment to which the public has easy access,
of group sexual activities on the scale of those that took place in this case.
The appellant’s establishment is therefore a common bawdy‑house within
the meaning of s. 210(1) Cr. C.
5. Disposition
154
We would have dismissed the appeal and upheld the appellant’s
conviction.
Appeal allowed, Bastarache
and LeBel JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors for the appellant: Robert La Haye,
Montréal; Pariseau, Olivier, Montréal.
Solicitor for the respondent: City of Montréal.