SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Andre
Omar Steele
Appellant
and
Her
Majesty The Queen
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney
General of Ontario
Intervener
Coram:
McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron
and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 59)
|
Fish J. (McLachlin C.J. and
Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
concurring)
|
______________________________
R. v.
Steele, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 36
Andre Omar
Steele Appellant
v.
Her Majesty
The Queen Respondent
and
Attorney
General of Ontario Intervener
Indexed
as: R. v. Steele
Neutral
citation: 2007 SCC 36.
File
No.: 31447.
2007: April 27;
2007: July 20.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie,
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Criminal law — Weapons — Using firearm in commission
of offence — Type of conduct that constitutes “using a firearm” — Whether
revealing presence or immediate availability of firearm by words or conduct is
using firearm — Whether weapon must be in physical possession of offender or
readily at hand — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, s. 85(1) .
Criminal law — Parties to offence — Common intention
— Using firearm in commission of offence — Gun brought into house by one of
intruders during break and enter — Whether rules of complicity apply such that
all intruders involved in break and enter party to offence of using firearm in
commission of offence — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46,
ss. 21 , 85 .
The accused and three accomplices forcibly entered a
home at night looking for a marijuana grow operation. The intruders hoped no
one was there; in fact, its three occupants were home. The residents heard the
intruders say, “We have a gun”, “Get the gun, get the gun”, and “Get the gun
out.” One intruder was holding something in his hand about the size of a gun
and one of the residents saw an intruder pull a dark metal object from his
inside jacket. All four intruders fled approximately five minutes after their
arrival. The residents made two 911 calls describing the intruders and
their getaway car and, within minutes, the police intercepted a vehicle
occupied by the accused and his accomplices. They searched the car and
found several weapons, including a loaded handgun. The accused was charged
with several offences, including using a firearm while committing or attempting
to commit the indictable offence of break and enter contrary to s. 85(1)
of the Criminal Code . The trial judge held that the four intruders had
formed a common intention to carry out a break and enter and a gun was used to
the knowledge of all four. The accused was found guilty of the s. 85(1)
offence and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.
Held: The appeal should
be dismissed. The conviction under s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code
should be affirmed.
An offender “uses” a firearm within the meaning of
s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code where, to facilitate the commission
of an offence or for purposes of escape, the offender reveals by words or
conduct the actual presence or immediate availability of a firearm. The weapon
must be in the physical possession of the offender or readily at hand. Where
two or more offenders act in concert, the usual rules of complicity apply.
This understanding of “use” reflects the two underlying purposes of
s. 85 : to prevent the danger of serious injury or death associated with
the use of firearms, and to prevent victim intimidation and alarm. Use
includes discharging or pointing a firearm or displaying a firearm for the
purpose of intimidation while committing an offence but the test is not met by
mere possession of a firearm, idle threats that refer to a firearm, or evidence
that a weapon was proximate for future use. Section 85(1) is concerned
with situations where the firearm is at the ready for present rather than
future use. [19-20] [27] [32‑35] [37]
Here, the accused and his accomplices “used” a firearm
within the meaning of s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code . They repeatedly
referred to a firearm in their physical possession or readily at hand in order
to facilitate the commission of the indictable offence of break and enter. The
trial judge’s reasons make plain that she was satisfied that the firearm was
brought into the home by one of the intruders, and remained in the physical
possession of that intruder, or another, during the break and enter. The
inference drawn by the trial judge that the intruders used the firearm was
reasonably supported by the evidence and the conviction under s. 85(1)
does not amount to an unreasonable verdict. Furthermore, given the trial
judge’s finding that the intruders formed a common intention to carry out a
break and enter and all four knew that a gun was involved, the accused is clearly
a party to a s. 85(1) offence committed in concert by all four
intruders. [38] [40] [43] [49‑50] [53]
Cases Cited
Discussed: R. v.
Covin, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 725; R. v. Chang (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 413; Bailey
v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995); referred to: McGuigan
v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 284; Krug v. The Queen, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 255; R. v. Langevin (1979), 47 C.C.C. (2d) 138; R. v. Belair
(1981), 24 C.R. (3d) 133; R. v. Scott (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 52, aff’d
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 425, 2001 SCC 73; R. v. Quon, [1948] S.C.R. 508; R.
v. Gagnon (1995), 86 O.A.C. 381; R. v. Switzer (1987), 32 C.C.C.
(3d) 303; R. v. Griffin (1996), 111 C.C.C. (3d) 567; Rowe v. The King,
[1951] S.C.R. 713; R. v. Neufeld, [1984] O.J. No. 1747 (QL); Veilleux
v. Quebec (Commission de protection du territoire agricole), [1989] 1
S.C.R. 839.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1970, c. C‑34, s. 83(1) [rep. & sub. 1976-77, c. 53,
s. 3].
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 21 , 85 , 267 , 272 .
Authors Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary,
6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990, “use”.
Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2004, “use”.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal (Southin, Donald and Huddart JJ.A.) (2006), 223 B.C.A.C.
154, 369 W.A.C. 154, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 327, [2006] B.C.J. No. 492 (QL), 2006
BCCA 114, upholding the accused’s conviction under s. 85(1) of the Criminal
Code entered by Fisher J., 2005 CarswellBC 3330. Appeal dismissed.
Phillip C. Rankin
and Brent B. Olthuis, for the appellant.
Mary T. Ainslie and Mike J.
Brundrett, for the respondent.
Jennifer Woollcombe, for
the intervener.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Fish J. —
I
1
The appellant and three accomplices broke into and entered the wrong
place at the wrong time. They expected to find a marijuana grow operation and
they hoped no one was there. Instead, they broke into a residence adjacent
to what had once been a marijuana grow operation — and its three occupants
were home.
2
The only issue on this appeal is whether the appellant and his
accomplices used a firearm while committing that break and enter. The trial judge
found that they had. She therefore convicted the appellant, Andre Omar Steele,
under s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 . In virtue of
that provision, it is a distinct and separate offence to use a firearm while
committing certain indictable offences, including break and enter.
3
For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the trial judge was
entitled to conclude as she did. I would therefore affirm Mr. Steele’s
conviction at trial, and dismiss his present appeal to this Court.
II
4
On October 21, 2003, in Pitt Meadows, British Columbia, a neighbour
surprised three young men hovering suspiciously, in mid-afternoon, near a house
across the street. She challenged them and they fled. The appellant’s thumb
prints were lifted by the police from the frame of the rear window through
which he had attempted to gain entry.
5
Nine days later, on October 30, the appellant and three accomplices
forcibly entered the same home shortly after midnight. They awakened three
residents. One intruder warned a female resident, Christina Reid, not to move
and, evidently to ensure compliance, he immediately added: “We have a gun.”
Ms. Reid testified that the intruder had “something in his hand . . . about the
size of a gun” (trial judge’s reasons, 2005 CarswellBC 3330, at para. 23).
6
Another resident, Rosemary Reid, heard a second intruder twice tell an
accomplice to “Get the gun.” She testified that the intruder “pulled a dark
metal object from his inside jacket with his left hand” (ibid., at para.
24).
7
Two of the intruders asked the residents: “Where are the drugs?” and one
of them was heard by Larry Reid, the third resident, to tell an accomplice to “Get
the gun out” (ibid., at para. 25 (emphasis added)).
8
All four intruders fled the home approximately five minutes after their
arrival.
9
The Reids made two 911 calls, one while the intruders were still in the
house and a second, two minutes later, after the intruders had left. They gave
general descriptions of the intruders and provided a good description of the
getaway car. Approximately four minutes after the second 911 call, the police
intercepted a vehicle matching the description of the getaway car. Four
individuals, including the appellant and his girlfriend, were inside. They
were all arrested.
10
The police then searched the car and found several weapons, including
hammers, a crowbar, a kitchen knife, a machete, a silver knife with brass
knuckles and — “most importantly”, said the trial judge — a loaded handgun
under the driver’s seat.
11
The appellant was charged with attempted break and enter on October 21
and with breaking and entering on October 30. In respect of the latter
incident, he was charged as well with a number of firearms offences. We are
concerned here with only one: using a firearm while committing or attempting to
commit the indictable offence of break and enter, contrary to s. 85(1) of the Criminal
Code .
12
The trial judge found the appellant guilty on all counts.
13
Mr. Steele appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal against each
of the convictions. He contended that the trial judge should have severed the
count for attempted break and enter on October 21 from the counts concerning
the break and enter on October 30. He submitted as well, in essence, that the
convictions on each of the other charges rested on insufficient evidence and
were therefore unreasonable verdicts.
14
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed Mr. Steele’s appeal to that
court: (2006), 223 B.C.A.C. 154, 2006 BCCA 114. Huddart J.A., writing for the
court, found no proper basis for setting aside any of the convictions entered
at trial. The only real issue, in her view, related to Mr. Steele’s conviction
under s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code . And that issue was “whether the
trial judge erred in relying on the ‘most logical inference’ from the facts she
found, that the appellant and three other intruders ‘used’ the gun in
committing the indictable offence of breaking and entering a dwelling-house”
(para. 18).
15
In that regard, Huddart J.A. held that “possession of a firearm becomes
use under s. 85 of the Criminal Code when its use is threatened” (para.
25). In the absence of binding authority, she was attracted to the expression
“proximate for future use” as “an expression that connotes a sufficiently
nearby presence to be available to carry out the threat implicit in the
reference to the gun by the intruders” (para. 34). She found that the loaded
handgun later seized in the getaway car was either in the physical possession
of one of the intruders while they were still in the house or in the car immediately
outside the house. In either case, said Huddart J.A., “there was sufficient
evidence of proximity or nearby presence” to support the trial judge’s guilty
verdict under s. 85(1) (para. 36).
16
In this Court, Mr. Steele appeals his conviction on that count only.
III
17
Section 85(1) of the Criminal Code provides:
85. (1) Every person commits an offence who uses a firearm
(a)
while committing an indictable offence, other than an offence under section 220
(criminal negligence causing death), 236 (manslaughter), 239 (attempted
murder), 244 (causing bodily harm with intent — firearm), 272 (sexual assault
with a weapon) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault), subsection 279(1) (kidnapping)
or section 279.1 (hostage‑taking), 344 (robbery) or 346 (extortion),
(b)
while attempting to commit an indictable offence, or
(c)
during flight after committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence,
whether or not the person causes or means to cause bodily harm to any
person as a result of using the firearm.
18
Section 85(1) was enacted in 1977 as part of a comprehensive “gun
control” legislative scheme that was aimed at curtailing the proliferation of
firearm-related crime: R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 83(1) (rep. & sub. S.C.
1976-77, c. 53, s. 3); McGuigan v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 284, at
pp. 316-17; Krug v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 255, at p. 267. For
first-time offenders, it carries a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment
for one year, to be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed for the
predicate offence.
19
It is well established that Parliament’s objective in enacting this
provision was to prevent the danger of serious injury or death associated with
the use of firearms: R. v. Covin, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 725, at p. 729; Krug,
at p. 267; R. v. Langevin (1979), 47 C.C.C. (2d) 138 (Ont. C.A.), at p.
146; McGuigan, at p. 313.
20
The Crown submits that s. 85 serves a second purpose as well: the
prevention of victim intimidation and alarm. This view finds support in McGuigan,
at p. 319; Langevin, at p. 146; R. v. Belair (1981), 24 C.R. (3d)
133 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 136; R. v. Scott (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 52
(B.C.C.A.), per Braidwood J.A., at para. 43, aff’d on other grounds,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 425, 2001 SCC 73.
21
It is true that the Court, in Covin, expressly rejected the prevention
of alarm objective. Imitation firearms, said the Court, were no less
alarming or intimidating than real ones. Since Parliament had chosen not to
target the use of imitation firearms, the prevention of alarm and intimidation
could not have been contemplated by Parliament as an objective of s. 85 (Covin,
at p. 729).
22
But Covin predated Scott, and Parliament in the interim
amended s. 85 to include the use of imitation firearms. The Crown contends
that this amendment was a legislative response to Covin, expressing
Parliament’s intention to include the prevention of victim alarm and
psychological trauma as underlying objectives of s. 85 , which must be read
globally.
23
I find this submission persuasive. The use of a firearm in the
commission of a crime exacerbates its terrorizing effects, whether the firearm
is real or a mere imitation. Indeed, they share that very purpose.
24
With respect to both imitation and operational weapons, the meaning of
“uses a firearm” in s. 85 is informed by case law under its predecessors.
25
In McGuigan, for example, the central issue was whether R. v.
Quon, [1948] S.C.R. 508, continued to apply despite the material
differences between what was then s. 122(1) of the Criminal Code and its
successor, s. 83(1) (now, in substance, s. 85 ). Section 122(1) provided that
“[e]very one who has upon his person a rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver or any
firearm capable of being concealed upon the person while committing any
criminal offence is guilty of an offence” and subject to a minimum of two
years’ imprisonment in addition to any penalty imposed for the underlying
offence. Writing for the majority, Dickson J. (as he then was) explained that
s. 83(1) was more narrowly phrased than s. 122(1) to underscore its concern
with the actual use of a firearm, as opposed to its mere physical
possession, which sufficed to support a conviction under s. 122(1) (pp.
317-18).
26
Three years later, in Krug, at p. 263, the Court held that
possession alone could not support a conviction under s. 85 . And it has at
least since then been settled law that carrying a concealed weapon while
committing an offence is not “using” a firearm within the meaning of s. 85(1) : R.
v. Chang (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 413 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Gagnon (1995),
86 O.A.C. 381.
27
“Use” has been held to include discharging a firearm (R. v.
Switzer (1987), 32 C.C.C. (3d) 303 (Alta. C.A.)), pointing a firearm
(R. v. Griffin (1996), 111 C.C.C. (3d) 567 (B.C.C.A.)), “pulling out a
firearm which the offender has upon his person and holding it in his hand to
intimidate another” (Langevin, at p. 145, citing Rowe v. The King,
[1951] S.C.R. 713, at p. 717; see also Krug, at p. 265), and displaying
a firearm for the purpose of intimidation (R. v. Neufeld, [1984] O.J.
No. 1747 (QL) (C.A.)). In Gagnon, the court indicated in passing that
“use of firearm” may include revealing its presence by word or deed.
28
It is thus settled law that use and mere possession (or “being armed”)
are not synonymous. But courts have almost invariably determined on a case-by-case
basis whether the conduct alleged in each instance amounted to use of the
firearm in question. They cannot be said to have articulated a principled test
that fully captures the type of conduct that rises to the level of “use” within
the meaning of s. 85(1) .
29
The judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Chang,
however, does shed some light on the nature of the distinction between use and
mere possession in this context. In concurring reasons, Carrothers J.A. held
in Chang that “uses” within the meaning of s. 85(1) “bears the clear
connotation of the actual carrying into action, operation or effect”, which is
to be distinguished from being armed or possessing a firearm which “connote
merely a latent capability of ‘use’, rather than actual ‘use’” (p. 422).
30
The U.S. Supreme Court reached a like conclusion in Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which concerned the meaning of “use” in §
924(c)(1) of 18 U.S.C. — a provision similar to s. 85(1) of the Criminal
Code . Speaking for the court in Bailey, Justice O’Connor found that
“use” requires more than mere possession and that evidence of proximity and
accessibility of a firearm was insufficient to support a conviction for its use
under the statute. To establish use, she stated, “the Government must show active
employment of the firearm” (p. 144 (emphasis added)). She later stated:
The active-employment understanding of “use”
certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most
obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. We note that this reading
compels the conclusion that even an offender’s reference to a firearm in his
possession could satisfy §924(c)(1). Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated
to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a
“use,” just as the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table
can be a “use.” [p. 148]
31
These observations are entirely consistent with the ordinary and
accepted meaning of “use”. And the Court has recognized that the ordinary
meaning of “use” (or “utilise”, in the corresponding French version of a
statute) can be discerned from its dictionary definitions in both languages.
In determining the meaning of utiliser, albeit in a different context, the
Court adopted its definition in the Petit Robert, which includes [translation] “render useful [or] employ
for a specific purpose” (Veilleux v. Quebec (Commission de protection
du territoire agricole), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 839, at p. 854). This
definition, the Court found, “implies both the idea of activity and the idea of
an ultimate purpose”. Similarly, the Canadian Oxford Dictionary (2nd
ed. 2004) defines “use” as “employ (something) for a particular purpose . . .
[or] exploit (a person or thing) for one’s own ends”. Likewise, according to Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990), “use” means “make use of; to convert to
one’s service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a
purpose or action by means of; to put into action or service, especially to
attain an end” (emphasis added).
32
In the absence of a statutory definition, I would therefore hold that an
offender “uses” a firearm, within the meaning of s. 85(1) , where, to facilitate
the commission of an offence or for purposes of escape, the offender reveals by
words or conduct the actual presence or immediate availability of
a firearm. The weapon must then be in the physical possession of the offender
or readily at hand.
33
Where two or more offenders are acting in concert, the usual rules of
complicity apply: McGuigan, at pp. 307-8. It will therefore be
sufficient, where one of the offenders is in physical possession of a firearm
or has immediate access to it, for another to utter the firearm-related threat.
34
In my view, this understanding of “use” reflects the two underlying
purposes of s. 85 . As we have seen, moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bailey
adopted a similar “active employment” test in a similar statutory context.
35
I take care to add that this test does not bring within s. 85(1) of the Criminal
Code any threat — including an idle threat — that refers to a
firearm. Use, at least in this regard, is a matter of fact, not fiction.
Section 85(1) does not capture the threatened use of a non-existent firearm.
However effective and objectionable, it is the threat in that case that
is “used”, and not a firearm. Moreover, had Parliament intended to
capture idle threats under s. 85(1), it would have said so expressly, as it
did in ss. 267 and 272 of the Criminal Code .
36
And finally, on this branch of the matter, a brief word on the approach
adopted by the Court of Appeal. In affirming the appellant’s conviction, the
court found in this case that the requirement of “use” under s. 85(1) is
satisfied by evidence that the weapon was “proximate for future use”.
37
With respect, I would not adopt that test for two reasons. First,
because it provides no real measure — or even indication — of the degree of
proximity required to found guilt: Trial courts are left to determine on
their own, without a meaningful test, how near to the commission of the
predicate offence, in space and time, the weapon must be in order for the
requirement of use to be satisfied. Second, because I believe that “proximate
for future use” casts the net too wide. Section 85(1) is concerned with
situations where the firearm is at the ready for present rather than future
use.
IV
38
In this case, while committing the break and enter, the intruders
referred repeatedly to a firearm in their physical possession or readily at
hand. And they did so to facilitate the commission of that offence. They
therefore employed the weapon actively, or “used” it, within the meaning of s.
85(1) of the Criminal Code .
39
The appellant concedes that active employment of a firearm includes an
oral reference to it, but submits that one must also be armed with that weapon
to be convicted under s. 85(1) . He argues, however, that no firearm was found
to have been brought into the home, and he urges us for that reason to quash
his conviction under s. 85(1) and to enter an acquittal instead.
40
On the record before us, this assertion fails. The trial judge did not
expressly explain in her reasons, which were delivered orally, her
understanding of the word “use” in s. 85(1) . But the basis of her conclusion
is nonetheless clear from her reasons, read as a whole and in the light of the
submissions of counsel. The trial judge was evidently satisfied that the
firearm later seized in the getaway car was brought into the Reid home by one
of the intruders, and remained in the physical possession of that intruder, or
another, during the break and enter.
41
I turn first to the submissions of counsel. The appellant’s guilt on
the count under s. 85(1) was made by both sides to depend entirely on whether
the prosecution had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was
brought into the dwelling-house. Defence counsel acknowledged that there was
evidence that gun use was threatened, but submitted that there was no evidence
establishing that a gun had been brought into the home by any of the intruders;
Crown counsel, on the other hand, argued that a conviction should be entered
because the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was indeed
brought into the home to the knowledge of the appellant.
42
Faced with these conflicting positions on the only live issue, the trial
judge expressly agreed “with the Crown that the four individuals formed a
common intention to carry out a break and enter and that there was a gun
involved to the knowledge of all four” (para. 56 (emphasis added)). She
rested this conclusion largely on the number and nature of the intruders’
references to their gun and on its discovery in their getaway car within
minutes after they had fled.
43
Read in this context, the reasons of the trial judge make plain that she
contemplated and rejected the possibility that the gun had been left in the
getaway car by the appellant and his accomplices. Had the trial judge instead
thought that the requisite element of “use” had been made out by the mere
presence of the weapon in the nearby car, she would hardly have found it
necessary to explain or infer such use in view of the direct and
incontrovertible evidence to that effect. Yet, that is what she felt bound to
do — not necessarily because she thought the presence of the gun in the car
failed to establish its use during the break and enter, but because its
presence in the house necessarily did. And in that regard, the trial judge
committed no reviewable error of fact and she was certainly correct in law.
44
Subsidiarily, we are urged by the appellant to conclude, if we are
satisfied that the trial judge did find that the gun was brought into the
house, that she misapprehended the Crown’s burden of proof in deciding as she
did. Instead of applying the correct standard — proof beyond a reasonable
doubt — the trial judge rested her conclusion, according to the appellant, on
the less demanding standards of “most reasonable inference” and “most logical
explanation”.
45
This submission, like the first, fails on a fair reading of the trial
judge’s reasons as a whole. It is true that she referred to the “most logical
explanation” and “most reasonable inference”. But she did so in evaluating the
competing submissions of counsel which I have already mentioned.
46
Essentially, the trial judge was invited by counsel to rest her decision
on whether she was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the intruders had
brought their gun into the house. The language she used in making this
determination does invite scrutiny, but I am satisfied after considering it
carefully that it was merely intended to signify that the trial judge agreed
with the Crown and not with the defence.
47
As noted earlier, she said so expressly, and I cannot reconcile this
explicit statement with the appellant’s submission that the trial judge
mistakenly thought that the Crown needed only to establish that guilt was the
most reasonable inference. The Crown never said that, and the trial judge, in
agreeing with the Crown, cannot be understood to have thought that. On the
contrary, the Crown set out its burden of proof impeccably and the trial judge,
in concluding that the Crown had in fact discharged its burden, cannot have had
a different and lesser burden in mind.
48
Any residual concern in this regard is in my view dissipated by the fact
that the trial judge, dealing with the attempted break and enter, earlier set
out correctly the applicable burden in these terms: “the circumstantial
evidence is consistent with guilt and there is no other reasonable inference
that could be drawn” (para. 16). She again set out the applicable standard
later in her reasons, when she stated specifically that she was satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt with respect to all
other charges (para. 59).
49
Finally, the appellant submits, in effect, that the trial judge made an
overriding and palpable error in concluding on the strength of insufficient
evidence that the firearm was used in committing the break and enter — and that
the appellant’s conviction under s. 85(1) therefore amounts to an unreasonable
verdict.
50
In determining whether a trial judge’s verdict is reasonable, an
appellate court cannot substitute its own view of the facts for that of the
judge. Accordingly, the question is not whether we would have drawn the
inference that the gun was brought into the house, but rather whether that
inference drawn by the trial judge, was reasonably supported by the evidence
before her. In my view, it was.
51
While in the Reid home, the intruders referred repeatedly to the fact
that they had a gun — “We have a gun” said one intruder, “Get the gun out” said
another — and a gun was indeed found minutes later underneath the
driver’s seat in the getaway car. They thought they were breaking into a
marijuana grow operation, with all of its attendant risks. They hoped to find
it unguarded but, before entering, armed themselves nonetheless with a hammer.
It “defies logic”, as the Crown says, to conclude that the intruders left
behind in the car the loaded gun they had brought with them in setting out on
their risky criminal adventure.
52
I do not think it unreasonable to infer from these facts and from the
attendant circumstances that the intruders brought the gun with them into
the home and that it was in the physical possession of one of them, to the
knowledge of all, during the commission of the break and enter. I thus see no
proper basis for interfering with the trial judge’s finding that the firearm
was “used”, within the meaning of s. 85(1) , during the commission of the break
and enter.
53
I attach no importance to the absence of a
finding that the appellant personally brought the gun into the house, or
physically possessed it, or personally uttered the threats. In McGuigan,
the Court held that s. 21 of the Criminal Code applies to s. 85(1) (pp.
307-8). Given the trial judge’s finding that “the four individuals formed a
common intention to carry out a break and enter and that there was a gun
involved to the knowledge of all four” (para. 56 (emphasis added)), the
appellant is clearly a party to the s. 85(1) offence committed in concert by
the four intruders.
V
54
I conclude with this observation.
55
We are dealing in this case with a break and enter committed by several
intruders acting in concert. Even if they had left their charged firearm in
the getaway car when they entered the Reid home, any one of them could easily
have slipped away momentarily to retrieve it from the car, parked just outside,
without interrupting the commission of the offence.
56
In these circumstances, applying the test I have set out, the trial
judge could have properly concluded that the intruders used the firearm, within
the meaning of s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code , even if they did not
have it in their physical possession while in the Reid home.
57
As I have mentioned, however, the trial judge was not asked by the Crown
to convict the appellant on that basis. Understandably, and quite properly,
she convicted him instead on the case as pleaded before her and for the reasons
set out in her judgment.
58
It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether the appellant could have
been found guilty on a different basis as well.
VI
59
For all of these reasons, I would affirm the appellant’s conviction
under s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code and dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Solicitors for the appellant: Rankin & Bond, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of
British Columbia, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the intervener: Attorney General of Ontario,
Toronto.