SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Rogers Wireless
Inc.
Appellant
and
Frederick
I. Muroff
Respondent
Official English
Translation: Reasons of LeBel J.
Coram:
McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 21)
Concurring
Reasons:
(paras. 22 to 26)
|
McLachlin C.J. (Binnie, Fish, Abella, Charron and
Rothstein JJ. concurring)
LeBel J.
|
______________________________
Rogers Wireless Inc. v. Muroff, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 921, 2007 SCC
35
Rogers Wireless Inc. Appellant
v.
Frederick I. Muroff Respondent
Indexed as: Rogers Wireless Inc. v. Muroff
Neutral citation: 2007 SCC 35.
File No.: 31383.
2006: December 14; 2007: July 13.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish,
Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Civil procedure — Arbitration — Effect of arbitration
clause on court’s jurisdiction — Whether court must dispose of any arguments on
validity of arbitration clause before referral to arbitration — Code of Civil
Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C‑25, s. 940.1.
Rogers is a mobile telephone service provider. Its
Canadian subscribers can use their phones in the United States, subject to
“roaming” charges. In most parts of the United States, these charges were 95¢
per minute; however, in certain “excluded areas”, they were $4 per minute. The
service agreement between Rogers and M, a Quebec resident, contained an
arbitration clause. This clause not only referred all disputes to arbitration,
but also expressly prohibited a customer from commencing or participating in a
class action. M applied for authorization to institute a class action against
Rogers on behalf of himself and all other subscribers who had been charged $4
per minute for roaming charge, challenging both the $4 per minute charge and
the arbitration clause on the basis that they were abusive. Without addressing
the issue, the trial judge held that the clause deprived her of jurisdiction
and referred the matter to an arbitrator. The Court of Appeal set aside that
decision and returned the matter to the Superior Court to decide the issue of
the validity of the arbitration clause.
Held: The appeal should
be allowed.
Per McLachlin C.J.
and Binnie, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.: Applying the
principles set out by the majority in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34, the trial judge was correct to renounce
jurisdiction in favour of arbitration. To determine whether the arbitration
clause was abusive would have required a detailed factual inquiry on a mixed
question of law and fact. An arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to
undertake such an inquiry and for a court to do so would run counter to
art. 940.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and deprive the
arbitrator of jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction. [13] [15‑16]
As was also held in Dell, s. 11.1 of the Consumer
Protection Act, which prohibits any stipulation requiring a consumer to
refer a dispute to arbitration, does not apply to legal situations that had
fully occurred at the time it came into force, such as this one. [18‑19]
Per LeBel J.: A
review of the trial proceedings confirms that M plans to adduce evidence, which
could require a long and complex inquiry, to establish that the arbitration
clause is abusive. On either the test set out by the majority in Dell
Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC
34, or the one proposed by the dissent in that same case, the Superior Court
should decline to consider this issue. M’s claim must be referred to
arbitration. [25]
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J.
Followed: Dell
Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC
34, rev’g [2005] Q.J. No. 7011 (QL), 2005 QCCA 570.
By LeBel J.
Referred to: Dell
Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC
34.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act to amend the Consumer Protection Act and the
Act respecting the collection of certain debts,
Bill 48, 2nd Sess., 37th Leg., Quebec (now S.Q. 2006, c. 56), s. 2.
Civil Code of Québec,
S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1437, 3149.
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C‑25, art. 940.1.
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P‑40.1, ss. 8, 11.1.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal
(Morin, Rochon and Doyon JJ.A.), [2006] Q.J. No. 1000 (QL), 2006 QCCA
196, setting aside a decision of Borenstein J., [2005] Q.J. No. 17037
(QL). Appeal allowed.
Pierre Y. Lefebvre, Éric
Simard and Isabelle Deschamps, for the appellant.
Albert A. Greenspoon,
Johanne Gagnon and Steve Whitter, for the respondent.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish, Abella,
Charron and Rothstein JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice —
1. Introduction
1
This case concerns the effect of an arbitration clause on a court’s
jurisdiction under Quebec civil law — in particular, how a court should deal
with an arbitration clause that is alleged to be null. In this case, the
arbitration clause was allegedly null because it appeared in a consumer
contract and because it barred access to class action procedures. The appeal
therefore deals with issues similar to those in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union
des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34. However, no issues of
private international law are raised in this case.
2. Facts
2
Rogers is a mobile telephone service provider. Its Canadian subscribers
can use their telephones in the United States, subject to “roaming” charges. In
most parts of the United States, these charges are 95¢ per minute; however, in
certain “excluded areas”, they are $4 per minute. Dr. Muroff, a Quebec
resident, used his Rogers mobile phone to make calls from Rhode Island and
Maine; Rogers billed him $4 per minute for these calls.
3
The service agreement between Rogers and Dr. Muroff contained an
arbitration clause. Not only did this clause refer all disputes to arbitration,
it also expressly prohibited the customer from commencing or participating in a
class action. The service agreement appeared on the bills that Rogers sent to
Dr. Muroff, and on Rogers’ Web site.
3. Legal
History
4
Dr. Muroff applied for authorization to institute a class action against
Rogers on behalf of himself and all other Rogers subscribers who had been
charged $4 per minute for roaming service. This contradicted the arbitration
clause in the service agreement, so Dr. Muroff challenged both the $4 per
minute charge and the arbitration clause, arguing that they were abusive,
contrary to art. 1437 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64
(“C.C.Q.”), and s. 8 of the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1.
5
Rogers argued that the court had no jurisdiction, due to the arbitration
clause (art. 940.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25
(“C.C.P.”)). Dr. Muroff brought a motion for permission to conduct an
examination on discovery of Rogers’ representatives. Rogers asked the court to
dismiss this application.
6
The Superior Court judge, Borenstein J., noted that Rogers’ bills and
its Web site contained an arbitration clause. She held that Dr. Muroff had
accepted the terms and conditions of the contract by paying these bills.
Borenstein J. was satisfied that the arbitration clause was mandatory and
exclusive (“parfaite”). She did not address the question of whether the
clause was abusive; she simply held that the clause deprived her of
jurisdiction to rule on either the examination on discovery or the institution
of a class action ([2005] Q.J. No. 17037 (QL)).
7
The Court of Appeal overturned this decision, holding that Borenstein J.
had erred by sending the dispute to arbitration without deciding whether or not
the clause was abusive. Citing its decision in Dell ([2005] R.J.Q. No.
1448, 2005 QCCA 570), the Court of Appeal declared that the Superior Court
should first assess the validity of an arbitration clause before renouncing
jurisdiction in favour of arbitration. The Court of Appeal therefore returned
the matter to the Superior Court to decide this issue ([2006] Q.J. No. 1000
(QL), 2006 QCCA 196).
8
Rogers appeals to this Court. It argues that the Court of Appeal erred
in ordering the Superior Court to assess the validity of the arbitration
clause. In its view, Borenstein J. was correct to hold that an arbitrator had
exclusive jurisdiction.
4. Analysis
9
Two principal questions arise. The first is the degree of scrutiny a
trial court should apply to an arbitration clause whose validity is contested
under art. 940.1 C.C.P. The second is the allegedly abusive nature of the
clause under art. 1437 C.C.Q., and whether the trial judge should have
addressed this question, applying the correct level of scrutiny.
10
Irrespective of these questions, this Court must also ask whether
the arbitration clause in this case was rendered null by the enactment of Bill
48, An Act to amend the Consumer Protection Act and the Act respecting the
collection of certain debts, 2nd
Sess., 37th Leg., Québec, 2006 (now S.Q. 2006, c. 56).
4.1 The
Effect of the Arbitration Clause on the Court’s Jurisdiction
11
In Dell, the Court was unanimous in finding that
under art. 940.1 C.C.P., arbitrators have jurisdiction to rule on their own
jurisdiction (the “compétence-compétence principle”). The majority of
the Court held that, when an arbitration clause exists, any challenges to the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator must first be referred to the arbitrator. Courts
should derogate from this general rule and decide the question first only where
the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction concerns a question of law
alone. Where a question concerning jurisdiction of an arbitrator requires the
admission and examination of factual proof, normally courts must refer such
questions to arbitration. For questions of mixed law and fact, courts must
also favour referral to arbitration, and the only exception occurs where
answering questions of fact entails a superficial examination of the
documentary proof in the record and where the court is convinced that the
challenge is not a delaying tactic or will not prejudice the recourse to arbitration.
12
In the same case, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. suggested an alternative,
discretionary approach favouring resort to the arbitrator in most instances: “a
court should rule on the validity of the arbitration only if it is possible to
do it on the basis of documents and pleadings filed by the parties without
having to hear evidence or make findings about its relevance and reliability”
(para. 176).
13
Applying the standard endorsed by the majority in Dell, the trial
judge was therefore correct to refer the matter to arbitration, unless the
nature of the challenge and its evidentiary implications justified a departure
from the general rule of deference to arbitral jurisdiction.
4.2 The
Allegedly Abusive Nature of the Arbitration Clause
14
Dr. Muroff alleges that the arbitration clause is abusive under art.
1437 C.C.Q. He claims the right to prove this in court using a variety of
evidence, including transcripts of oral examinations of Rogers’
representatives.
15
Whether the arbitration clause is abusive is a mixed question of law and
fact. Answering this question would apparently require a probing factual
inquiry, including cross-examination; it would go far beyond a superficial
examination of the documentary evidence. (As Bastarache and LeBel JJ. held in Dell
at para. 229, an arbitration clause is not necessarily abusive simply because
it appears in a consumer contract; see also the reasons of Deschamps J. at
para. 104.)
16
Under the approach to art. 940.1 C.C.P. adopted by the majority of this
Court in Dell, an arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to undertake
such an inquiry. For a court to conduct such an inquiry would run counter to
art. 940.1 and deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction to rule on its own
jurisdiction.
17
Borenstein J. was therefore correct to hold that she had no jurisdiction
and to refer the matter to an arbitrator. The Court of Appeal erred in
returning the matter to the Superior Court for a determination on this issue.
4.3 Transitional
Law
18
Bill 48 was assented to on December 14, 2006, the day of the
hearing of this case before our Court. Section
2 of Bill 48, which added s. 11.1 to the Consumer Protection Act, came
into force the same day. This provision prohibits any stipulation requiring a
consumer to refer a dispute to arbitration, particularly if it deprives a
consumer of access to class action procedures.
19
As this Court held in Dell, s.
11.1 of the Consumer Protection Act represents a change of substantive
law. It has no retroactive effect. It only applies to legal situations
that occurred after its coming into force or were ongoing at the time it came
into force. It does not apply to legal situations that had fully occurred at
the time it came into force, such as this one.
5. Conclusion
20
Faced with a challenge to the validity of an arbitration clause that
would have required a detailed factual inquiry on a mixed question of law and
fact, Borenstein J. was correct to renounce jurisdiction in favour of the
arbitrator, under art. 940.1 C.C.P. The Court of Appeal erred in returning the
matter to the Superior Court.
21
I would therefore allow the appeal, reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeal and reinstate the decision of the Superior Court, with costs in this
Court only.
English version of the reasons delivered by
22
LeBel J. —
I have read the Chief Justice’s reasons. I agree with her that the appeal
should be allowed and the respondent’s claim referred to arbitration. However,
I feel that certain aspects of this case require further comment.
23
First of all, the interpretation of art. 3149 of the Civil Code
of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, is not at issue in the case at bar, and
it would not be at issue even if the respondent had clearly raised it. This
question has been resolved by the decision of the majority of this Court in Dell
Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC
34, in which it is held that art. 3149 does not apply to an arbitration
clause like the one in the parties’ contract. I would nevertheless reaffirm
the comments I wrote jointly with my colleague Bastarache J. in our
dissenting reasons in Dell.
24
Thus, the remaining issue in the instant case concerns the validity of
the arbitration clause in the telephone service contract between Rogers and
Dr. Muroff. Dr. Muroff contests its validity, arguing that it is
abusive.
25
A review of the trial proceedings confirms that Dr. Muroff plans to
adduce evidence, which could require a long and complex inquiry, to establish
that the agreement is abusive. In my opinion, on either the test for
intervention by the Superior Court set out by Deschamps J. in her reasons in Dell
or the one proposed by the dissent in that same case, the Superior Court should
decline to consider this issue. As the trial judge held, Dr. Muroff’s
claim must be referred to arbitration.
26
Therefore, as the Chief Justice proposes, I would allow the appeal,
reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision and restore the Superior Court’s
judgment, with costs in this Court.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Fasken Martineau DuMoulin, Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent: Kaufman Laramée, Montréal.