Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan, 2009 SCC 7, [2009] 1 SCR 181

                                                 SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

Between:

Laura Ravndahl

Appellant

and

Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the

Province of Saskatchewan as represented

by the Government of Saskatchewan and

Workers’ Compensation Board

Respondents

‑ and ‑

Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,

Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of New Brunswick,

Attorney General of Manitoba, Attorney General of British Columbia

Attorney General of Alberta, and

Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador

Interveners

Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.

______________________________

Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan, 2009 SCC 7, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 181

Laura Ravndahl                                                                                                                  Appellant

v.

Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the

Province of Saskatchewan as represented

by the Government of Saskatchewan and

Workers’ Compensation Board                                                                                    Respondents

and

Attorney General of Canada,

Attorney General of Ontario,

Attorney General of Quebec,

Attorney General of New Brunswick,

Attorney General of Manitoba,

Attorney General of British Columbia,

Attorney General of Alberta, and

Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador                                                        Interveners

Indexed as:  Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan

Neutral citation:  2009 SCC 7.

File No.:  32225.

2008:  December 17; 2009:  January 29.

Present:  McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for saskatchewan

Limitation of actions — Applicability of limitation periods — Constitutional challenge — Pre‑Charter denial of benefits —  Equality rights — Claims seeking personal relief and declarations of unconstitutionality — Whether statutory limitation periods applicable to claims for personal relief — Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L‑15, s. 3(1)(j).

The appellant lost her widow’s pension benefit upon remarriage on October 20, 1984 pursuant to s. 68 of the Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Act of 1978.  After her remarriage, legislative amendments ultimately provided for compensation to continue to be payable to a surviving dependent spouse in case of remarriage occurring on or after April 17, 1985 — the date the equality rights guaranteed by s. 15  of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  came into effect.  These amendments did not affect the appellant because of the date of her remarriage.  In 1999, a special Act provided for a lump sum payment to persons whose spousal pensions had been terminated by virtue of remarriage prior to April 17, 1985, but the appellant did not apply for payment.  Rather, she brought an action in 2000 based on s. 15  of the Charter , seeking an order (1) reinstating her spousal pension and awarding damages and interest and (2) declaring that the legislative amendments and the 1999 Act were of no force or effect.  Following an application to determine a point of law, the Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed the action as statute‑barred under s. 3(1)(j) of The Limitation of Actions Act.  The Court of Appeal ordered the reinstatement of the prayers for relief relating to the declaratory action under s. 52  of the Constitution Act, 1982 , while confirming that the claims for personal relief were barred.

Held:  The appeal should be dismissed.

Personal claims for constitutional relief are claims brought as an individual qua individual for a personal remedy and must be distinguished from claims enuring to affected members generally under an action for a declaration that a law is unconstitutional.  [16]

The Limitation of Actions Act applies to personal claims.  Here, the cause of action arose on April 17, 1985 when s. 15  of the Charter  came into effect.  Before that date, the appellant had no cognizable legal right upon which to base her claim.  Subsequent attempts to lessen the discriminatory effects of the 1978 Act did not create a new cause of action in her favour.  There is also no renewing cause of action arising with each pension payment not received in this case because it cannot be assumed that the benefits which had been terminated would have otherwise been paid.  Since the appellant’s cause of action arose on April 17, 1985 and the six‑year limitation period is applicable, the personal claims were statute‑barred.  [17‑18] [20-22] [24]

The claim for a declaration of constitutional invalidity and, if granted, what remedies are to issue, is for the trial judge to determine.  Any remedies flowing from s. 52  of the Constitution Act, 1982 , would not be personal remedies but rather remedies from which the appellant, as an affected person, might benefit.  [26]

Cases Cited

Applied:  Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3; referred to:  Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429. 

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 15 , 24 .

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52 .

Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L‑15, s. 3.

Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), Rule 188.

Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act, S.S. 1999, c. S‑56.01.

Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. W‑17, s. 68.

Workers’ Compensation Act, 1974, S.S. 1973‑74, c. 127.

Workers’ Compensation Act, 1979, S.S. 1979, c. W‑17.1, s. 98.1 [ad. 1984‑85‑86, c. 89, s. 25].

Workers’ Compensation General Regulations, 1985, R.R.S., c. W‑17.1, Reg. 1 [am. S. Reg. 15/1999, s. 2].

APPEAL from a judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (Gerwing, Lane and Smith JJ.A.), 2007 SKCA 66, 299 Sask. R. 162, [2007] 10 W.W.R. 606, 43 C.P.C. (6th) 201, [2007] S.J. No. 282 (QL), 2007 CarswellSask 297, allowing in part an appeal from a judgment of Pritchard J., 2004 SKQB 260, 251 Sask. R. 156, 50 C.P.C. (5th) 161, 119 C.R.R. (2d) 372, [2004] S.J. No. 374 (QL), 2004 CarswellSask 398.  Appeal dismissed.

Robert E. Houston, Q.C., for the appellant.

Alan F. Jacobson, for the respondent the Province of Saskatchewan.

Leonard D. Andrychuk, Q.C., and Christy J. Stockdale, for the respondent the Workers’ Compensation Board.

Michael H. Morris and Sean Gaudet, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.

Robert E. Charney and Rochelle S. Fox, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.

Isabelle Harnois, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.

Gaétan Migneault, for the intervener the Attorney General of New Brunswick.

Michael Conner, for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba.

Jonathan G. Penner, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.

Roderick S. Wiltshire, for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta.

Written submission only by Barbara Barrowman, for the intervener the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador.

[1]     The Chief Justice — This case raises the question of whether a statutory limitation period applies to personal claims for constitutional relief, and if so, how the limitation period affects such claims. 

[2]     The following constitutional question was stated by this Court:

Is s. 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-15, constitutionally inapplicable to the appellant’s claims for personal relief, including damages, reinstatement and other monetary remedies, in an action alleging that s. 98.1(5) of The Workers’ Compensation Act, 1979, S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1, and related legislation is of no force or effect to the extent that it breaches her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ?

[3]     The appellant falls into a group sometimes known as the “pre-Charter  widows”.  Before the equality provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  came into force on April 17, 1985, workers’ compensation legislation provided that pensions to survivor spouses would cease upon remarriage.  The appellant, who held a widow’s pension, lost her benefit upon remarriage on October 20, 1984, and hence brings this action.

[4]     The action has not yet proceeded to trial.  The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan held that the appellant’s cause of action was subject to s. 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-15, and was statute-barred. The majority of the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan allowed the appeal and ordered the reinstatement of the prayers for relief relating to the declaratory action under s. 52  of the Constitution Act, 1982 , while confirming that the claims for personal relief were barred.  Smith J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal in its entirety.

I.      Facts and Legislative Framework

[5]     On November 17, 1975, the appellant’s former husband died of injuries arising out of his employment. Subsequently, the appellant began receiving a monthly pension as a surviving dependent spouse pursuant to The Workers’ Compensation Act, 1974, S.S. 1973-74, c. 127.  Beginning on February 26, 1979, the appellant’s compensation benefits were paid pursuant to The Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. W-17 (“1978 Act”).

[6]     On October 20, 1984, the appellant remarried.  Until the time of her remarriage her compensation benefits as a surviving dependent spouse were being paid pursuant to the 1978 Act, notwithstanding the enactment of The Workers’ Compensation Act, 1979, S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1, on January 1, 1980 (“1979 Act”).  On her remarriage, the appellant’s benefits were terminated pursuant to s. 68 of the 1978 Act which provided as follows:

68. — (1) If a surviving dependant spouse marries, the monthly payments to the spouse shall cease but the spouse shall be entitled in lieu of them to a lump sum equal to the monthly payments for two years.

[7]     The Workers’ Compensation Amendment Act, 1985, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 89,  amended the 1979 Act by the addition of s. 98.1, which provided that from the date it came into force (September 1, 1985), remarriage would not result in a termination of benefits.  Section 98.1 did not apply to the appellant as it only applied to surviving dependent spouses who remarried on or after September 1, 1985.

[8]     On March 11, 1999, an amendment to The Workers’ Compensation General Regulations, 1985, R.R.S., c. W-17.1, Reg. 1, reinstated spousal pensions for persons who had remarried between April 17, 1985 (the day the equality rights provision of the Charter  came into force) and August 31, 1985 (S. Reg. 15/1999, s. 2).  The reinstatement was effective only from the day the section came into force.  Again, this amendment did not apply to the appellant as she had remarried prior to April 17, 1985.

[9]     On May 6, 1999, The Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act, S.S. 1999, c. S-56.01, was enacted.  It provided for an $80,000 payment to persons whose spousal pensions were terminated by virtue of remarriage prior to April 17, 1985 (and required the surviving spouse to execute a release).   The appellant did not apply for the payment.

[10] On March 31, 2000, the appellant commenced this action claiming the following relief, as set out in para. 30 of her Amended Statement of Claim:

a)    A declaration pursuant to Section 52  of the Constitution Act 1982  that Section 98.1(5) of The Workers’ Compensation Amendment Act 1985 is unconstitutional and of no force or effect;

b)    A declaration that Section 98.1(5) of The Workers’ Compensation Act, 1979 c. W-17.1 is unconstitutional and of no force and effect;

c)    A declaration that The Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act is unconstitutional and of no force and effect;

d)    An Order reinstating the Plaintiff’s spousal pension;

e)    Damages;

f)     Interest in accordance with The Pre-Judgment Interest Act;

g)    Costs;

h)    Such further and other relief as the Plaintiff may advise and this Honourable Court may allow.

[11] The applicable limitation provision in effect at the relevant time was s. 3(1)(j) of The Limitation of Actions Act.  It stated as follows:

3. — (1) The following actions shall be commenced within and not after the times respectively hereinafter mentioned:

. . .

(j)  any other action not in this Act or any other Act specifically provided for, within six years after the cause of action arose.

II.    Judicial History

A.    Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, 2004 SKQB 260, 251 Sask. R. 156

[12] The respondents applied to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench for determination of the following point of law pursuant to Rule 188 of The Queen’s Bench Rules:

Is the Plaintiff’s cause of action . . . subject to Section 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act and thereby barred by virtue of the operation of Section 3 . . .?

[13] Pritchard J. dismissed the action in its entirety.  She characterized the claim as a s. 24  Charter  claim, which she found to be subject to s. 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act, a limitation period of general application.  And since it was “common ground” that the action was commenced outside of the six-year time limit, Pritchard J. determined that the claims were statute-barred.

B.    Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 2007 SKCA 66, 299 Sask. R. 162

[14]   Gerwing J.A., writing for the majority, found that nothing in the material warranted immediately striking the claims seeking declarations of invalidity (set out in subparas. 30(a) to (c)), since applications for declarations of invalidity are not generally governed by limitations statutes.  However, she found that the remaining claims (subparas. 30(d) to (h)) were for relief of a personal nature and, whether claimed under s. 24  of the Charter  or flowing from a declaration of invalidity under s. 52  of the Constitution Act, 1982 , were subject to the limitations statute and had been correctly struck out as they were statute-barred.  Gerwing J.A. severed the portions of the appellant’s claim seeking declarations of unconstitutionality from the claims seeking personal relief.

[15] Smith J.A. agreed that s. 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act could operate to limit the extent of the appellant’s relief flowing from a s. 52  declaration.  However, she disagreed with Gerwing J.A.’s conclusion that the appellant’s claims were statute-barred. In her view, if the appellant could persuade the trial court that her case was one of ongoing discrimination, based on her continuing status and repeated each month she does not receive a monthly benefit, the claim was not out of time.  Smith J.A. would have reinstated all of the appellant’s claims.

III.   Analysis

A.    Does Section 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act Apply to the Appellant’s Claims for Personal Relief?

[16] It was argued below that statutory limitation periods do not apply to personal claims for constitutional relief.  Personal claims for constitutional relief are claims brought as an individual qua individual for a personal remedy.  As will be discussed below, personal claims in this sense must be distinguished from claims which may enure to affected persons generally under an action for a declaration that a law is unconstitutional.

[17]  The argument that The Limitation of Actions Act does not apply to personal claims was abandoned before us, counsel for the appellant conceding that The Limitations of Actions Act applies to such claims.  This is consistent with this Court’s decision in Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, which held that limitation periods apply to claims for personal remedies that flow from the striking down of an unconstitutional statute. 

B.    Are the Appellant’s Personal Claims Statute-Barred?

[18] In order to determine whether the appellant’s personal claims are statute-barred, it is necessary to pinpoint when her cause of action arose.  In my view, her cause of action arose on April 17, 1985 when s. 15  of the Charter  came into effect.  The appellant was denied benefits pursuant to the operation of s. 68(1) of the 1978 Act.  However, she had no cognizable legal right upon which to base her claim until s. 15  of the Charter  came into force.  On April 17, 1985 a claim that the non-receipt of benefits pursuant to s. 68(1) of the 1978 Act discriminated against her on the basis of marital status became actionable.  Although the appellant does not directly challenge the constitutionality of the 1978 Act, it is the operation of the 1978 Act that ultimately forms the basis of her discrimination claim.  (These reasons assume, without deciding, that a challenge to a pre-Charter denial of benefits would be a permissible application of the Charter .)

[19] Before this Court, the appellant argued that a new cause of action arose when the government adopted remedial legislation reinstating the pensions of persons who had remarried on or after April 17, 1985, and passed The Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act.  This cause of action is said to rest on the under-inclusivity of this remedial legislation.  The appellant did not benefit from the remedial regulations since she had remarried prior to April 17, 1985.  She chose not to apply for the $80,000 lump-sum payment under The Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act, but instead brought this action on March 31, 2000.

[20] This argument cannot succeed.  The appellant’s cause of action must be based, as explained above, on the unconstitutionality of the 1978 Act.  Subsequent attempts by the Legislature to lessen the discriminatory effects of legislation do not create a new cause of action in her favour.  The remedial provisions did not affect her position in any way. 

[21] In her written materials, the appellant, relying on Kingstreet, asserted that her personal claims are not statute-barred because the limitation period is rolling in nature, applying anew to each pension payment that she did not receive.  However, it is clear that such a result is dependent on a new cause of action arising with each event.

[22] In Kingstreet, a new cause of action was said to arise each time a payment of tax was made under unconstitutional legislation.  This case is distinguishable from the present case.  As stated by this Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429:

Where the government has collected taxes in violation of the Constitution, there can be only one possible remedy: restitution to the taxpayer.  In contrast, where a scheme for benefits falls foul of the s. 15  guarantee of equal benefit under the law, we normally do not know what the legislature would have done . . . . [para. 108]

The renewing cause of action argument cannot succeed as it assumes that the benefits which were terminated would have otherwise been paid.

[23] In this case, there is but one cause of action which arose on April 17, 1985, when s. 15  of the Charter  came into force.

[24] Since the appellant’s cause of action arose on April 17, 1985 and the six-year limitation period set out s. 3 of The Limitation of Actions Act is applicable, the appellant’s personal claims, which were commenced almost a decade out of time, are statute-barred.

C.    The Claim for a Declaration of Constitutional Invalidity

[25] The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the appellant’s right to maintain her claims for a declaration under s. 52  of the Constitution Act, 1982  that the impugned legislative provisions were unconstitutional insofar as they operated on discriminatory grounds. 

[26] It will be for the trial judge to determine whether a declaration of invalidity should be granted, and if so, what remedies if any should be granted.  Because the appellant’s personal claims are statute-barred, any remedies flowing from s. 52  would not be personal remedies, but would be remedies from which the appellant, as an affected person, might benefit.

[27] It is important to distinguish the appellant’s personal, or in personam,  remedies, brought by her as an individual, from an in rem remedy flowing from s. 52  that may extend a benefit to the appellant and all similarly affected persons.  As stated in the factum of the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario:

Where legislation is found to be unconstitutionally underinclusive, the prospective remedial option chosen by the court might extend the benefit at issue through severance or reading in, or it might suspend the operation of the declaration of invalidity to allow the government to determine whether to cancel, modify, or extend the benefit at issue.  If the unconstitutional underinclusive benefit is extended to include the [appellant’s] Charter  claiman[t] group, whether through the court’s s. 52(1)  declaration or through government’s response to the court’s s. 52(1)  declaration, the [appellant], like any otherwise eligible person [in the claimant group], reaps the benefit of the s. 52(1)  declaration, even if the claimant does not obtain a personalized remedy from the court. [para. 45]

IV.   Conclusion

[28] The only issue on this appeal is whether the appellant’s claims for personal relief are statute-barred.  For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that they are.

[29] The appeal is dismissed and the order of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal affirmed.  I would answer the constitutional question in the negative. 

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the appellant:  Stamatinos Leland & Campbell, Kamsack, Saskatchewan.

Solicitor for the respondent the Province of Saskatchewan:  Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Regina.

Solicitors for the respondent the Workers’ Compensation Board:  MacPherson Leslie & Tyerman, Regina.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada:  Attorney General of Canada, Toronto.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario:  Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec:  Attorney General of Quebec, Ste‑Foy.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of New Brunswick:  Attorney General of New Brunswick, Fredericton.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba:  Attorney General of Manitoba, Winnipeg.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia:  Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta:  Attorney General of Alberta, Edmonton.

Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador:  Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador, St. John’s.