SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Her Majesty The
Queen
Appellant
and
Gordon Dwight
Hurley
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish, Abella, Charron,
Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 22)
|
Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie,
Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
|
______________________________
R. v.
Hurley, 2010 SCC 18, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 637
Her Majesty
The Queen Appellant
v.
Gordon Dwight
Hurley Respondent
Indexed
as: R. v. Hurley
2010 SCC 18
File
No.: 33301.
2010: March 23;
2010: May 14.
Present: McLachlin
C.J. and Binnie, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for
saskatchewan
Criminal law — Charge to jury — Sufficiency of Vetrovec warning —
Jailhouse informant testifying for Crown on critical aspect of its murder case
against accused — Trial judge warning jury to be extremely cautious in
accepting witness’s evidence because of his previous convictions and drug
dependency and advising them that it was “unsafe” and “dangerous” to rely on
his testimony absent other supporting evidence — Warning not informing jury
that witness was jailhouse informant facing charges and aware of reward offered
for information about killing — Accused convicted of second degree murder —
Whether trial judge’s Vetrovec warning adequate.
Criminal law — Evidence — Fresh evidence — Accused seeking to adduce
new evidence before Supreme Court of Canada — New evidence coming from
additional police forensic testing and DNA analysis after Court of Appeal set
aside accused’s conviction and ordered new trial — Whether new evidence should
be admitted — Whether new evidence, when taken with other evidence adduced at
trial, could reasonably be expected to have affected the result.
The accused was charged with second degree murder and tried before a
jury. The Crown’s evidence indicated that at least two individuals had been in
the hotel room with the victim and there was no dispute that the accused was
one of them. Critical to the Crown’s case was the testimony of a jailhouse
informant, N, who testified that the accused had told him that he had cleaned
the hotel room in order to remove DNA evidence of his presence. The accused
acknowledged talking with N but denied speaking with him about DNA,
fingerprints, or wiping down surfaces. The trial judge advised the jury to be
“extremely cautious” in accepting N’s evidence because he admitted to previous
convictions and to having a drug dependence, and advised them that it was
“unsafe” and “dangerous” for them to rely on N’s testimony unless they found
some support for it in the rest of the evidence. However, he did not tell the
jury that caution was required because N was a jailhouse informant, that he was
facing charges himself, or that he was aware a reward was offered for
information about the killing. The accused was convicted, but the Court of
Appeal, in a majority decision, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial
on the basis that the trial judge’s Vetrovec warning was inadequate.
The Crown then conducted additional forensic testing and DNA analysis which
resulted in reports that more of the accused’s DNA was found in the hotel
room. The Crown appealed to this Court as of right, and the accused sought to
adduce this new evidence.
Held: The fresh evidence should be
admitted and the appeal should be dismissed.
A jury, in order to assess the risk of accepting testimony from an
unsavoury witness, must understand the reasons for special scrutiny. The
characteristics of the witness which bring his or her credibility into serious
question must therefore be identified for the jury. Here, the trial judge’s
warning did not point out to the jury that they should be cautious with N’s
evidence because of his possible motive to lie in order to get some advantage
for himself in his own legal troubles or to collect the reward. While it was
debatable whether this omission in the judge’s direction was sufficiently
serious in the context of this trial so as to require appellate intervention,
the new evidence clearly made a new trial necessary. The new evidence met all
the relevant criteria for its admission; in particular, it may reasonably, when
taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected
the result. The Crown effectively conceded in its closing argument to the jury
that the accused could not be convicted unless the jury accepted N’s evidence.
The new evidence showing the accused’s DNA on three items in the hotel room
could have an impact not only on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of N,
whose evidence was bolstered by the evidence of cleaning, but also on the
portion of the trial judge’s Vetrovec warning where he specifically
instructed the jury that the absence of DNA evidence in the room could be
considered as supporting N’s evidence about his jail cell conversation with the
accused.
Cases Cited
Referred to: R. v. Khela,
2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104; R. v. Smith, 2009 SCC 5, [2009] 1
S.C.R. 146; Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759; R. v. Taillefer,
2003 SCC 70, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307.
Statutes and
Regulations Cited
Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002‑156, r. 52.
Supreme Court Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑26, s. 62(3) .
APPEAL from a judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
(Richards, Smith and Hunter JJ.A.), 2009 SKCA 86, 331 Sask. R. 105, 460 W.A.C.
105, 246 C.C.C. (3d) 469, [2009] 10 W.W.R. 217, [2009] S.J. No. 462 (QL),
2009 CarswellSask 500, setting aside the accused’s conviction for second degree
murder and ordering a new trial. Appeal dismissed.
Lane Wiegers, for the appellant.
Morris P. Bodnar, Q.C., for
the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
[1]
Rothstein and Cromwell
JJ. — The Crown appeals as of right on the question of whether the Vetrovec
warning given by the trial judge was adequate. The respondent seeks leave to
adduce new evidence, pursuant to s. 62(3) of the Supreme Court Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 , and Rule 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Canada, SOR/2002-156. The motion was heard with the appeal and judgment
was reserved. For the reasons that follow, we would admit the fresh evidence
and dismiss the appeal.
[2]
Following a jury trial, Gordon Dwight Hurley was convicted of the second
degree murder of a young woman, Jarita Naistus. Ms. Naistus’ body was found in
a hotel room in Lloydminster, Saskatchewan, on October 2, 2005. The cause of
her death was asphyxiation due to strangulation and swelling of the brain
caused by blunt force trauma. The Crown’s evidence indicated at least two
individuals had been in the hotel room with Ms. Naistus the previous day. One
of these individuals was Mr. Hurley; a torn receipt belonging to him was found
in the toilet, his DNA matched a sample found under one of Ms. Naistus’
fingernails, and he was a match for biological matter on a facecloth found near
Ms. Naistus’ body.
[3]
Mr. Hurley testified that he met Ms. Naistus at the hotel bar,
struck up a conversation and bought her a drink. He wanted to buy some
cocaine, and according to his testimony, Ms. Naistus indicated they should go
back to her room and she would call a friend who would deliver it. Mr. Hurley
testified that after they got to the room Ms. Naistus made a phone call to
locate the cocaine. At this point, he was not feeling well and vomited in the
toilet in the hotel room. He testified that he used towels to wipe his hands
and the top of the toilet. Afterward, when Ms. Naistus advised him her friend
would not sell the cocaine, he left the hotel room. According
to Mr. Hurley, Ms. Naistus was drunk but alive when he left.
[4]
There was no dispute that Mr. Hurley had been in the hotel room. The
only question was whether he was Ms. Naistus’ killer. Critical to that aspect
of the Crown’s case was the testimony of Darrel Niemi, a jailhouse informant.
The Crown did not attempt to minimize the importance of his evidence to its
circumstantial case against Mr. Hurley. Crown counsel’s position before the
jury was that they needed to combine both the evidence of opportunity (either
from the DNA evidence or Mr. Hurley’s testimony) and Mr. Niemi’s evidence, in
order to secure a conviction. According to the Crown, the evidence of
opportunity alone only supported a mere suspicion (A.R., vol. 3, at pp.
418-20).
[5]
Mr. Niemi’s testimony concerned conversations he claimed to have had
with Mr. Hurley about what Mr. Niemi came to believe was the Naistus murder
and, in particular, Mr. Hurley’s alleged comments that he cleaned the hotel
room in order to remove DNA evidence of his presence. Mr. Hurley testified at
trial and, while he acknowledged that he had spoken with Mr. Niemi in the cells
and that some elements of his account of the conversation were correct, he
denied having any conversation with Mr. Niemi about DNA, fingerprints, or
wiping down surfaces.
[6]
While Mr. Niemi’s evidence was self-evidently important to the Crown’s
case, it was also dangerous. There were important reasons to be concerned about
Mr. Niemi’s credibility: he was facing charges himself, he was approached by
the police, he was aware there was a reward offered for information about the
killing and he made no mention of what he had allegedly heard when first
approached by the police.
[7]
The evidence about the attempts to clean the room was unquestionably
significant to the Crown’s case. In his closing address, Crown counsel
submitted to the jury that, on the evidence before the court, it was “clear
that there was an attempt to clean the room” (A.R., vol. 3, at p. 417). The
evidence of attempts to clean the room could be taken as independent evidence
tending to support Mr. Niemi’s evidence about his conversation with Mr.
Hurley. In turn, Mr. Niemi’s evidence supported the Crown’s case that Mr.
Hurley had not only been there, but also that he was the killer. Thus anything
that tended to rebut the room cleaning theory tended to weaken the independent
evidence that could be seen as supporting Mr. Niemi’s version of the conversation
with Mr. Hurley and, consequently, weakened the Crown’s circumstantial case.
[8]
The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning; he advised the jury to
be “extremely cautious” in accepting Mr. Niemi’s evidence because he admitted
to two criminal convictions for assault and to having a drug addiction or
dependence. The trial judge further advised the jury that it was “unsafe” and
“dangerous” for them to rely on Mr. Niemi’s testimony unless they found some
support for it in the rest of the evidence. These instructions clearly
communicated to the jury that it was dangerous to rely on Mr. Niemi’s evidence
absent other evidence supporting it. However, the trial judge’s explanation of
the reasons for the caution was incomplete. He did not tell the jury that
caution was required because Mr. Niemi was a jailhouse informant, that he was
facing charges himself, or that he was aware a reward was offered for
information about the killing. Although these facts were included in the trial
judge’s summary of Mr. Niemi’s evidence, at no point in the jury charge were
they linked to the need for extreme caution in relying on his evidence.
[9]
With respect to the independent evidence, the trial judge referred to
two matters. First, he highlighted the evidence tending to place Mr. Hurley in
the room, although as the trial judge noted, Mr. Hurley admitted this. Second,
the lack of fingerprint or DNA evidence was referred to by the trial judge as
evidence that “may bolster the evidence of Mr. Niemi when he says the accused
told him he wiped down the room”. Thus, the evidence about cleaning the room
was critical to the circumstantial evidence against Mr. Hurley, as the Crown
accepted that Mr. Niemi’s evidence was critical to its case.
[10]
Mr. Hurley appealed his conviction and argued, among other things, that
the Vetrovec warning provided by the trial judge was inadequate. The
Court of Appeal (Hunter J.A. dissenting) allowed the appeal, quashed the
conviction, and ordered a new trial: 2009 SKCA 86, 246 C.C.C. (3d) 469. In
short, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge’s explanation of why
Mr. Niemi’s evidence had to be regarded with care was insufficient, as it
failed to flag some important reasons for doing so, namely his knowledge of a
reward and the fact he was in custody and facing charges at the time.
[11]
The law about Vetrovec warnings was most recently set out by this
Court in R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, and R. v.
Smith, 2009 SCC 5, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 146. As Fish J. put it in Khela,
at para. 47:
A truly
functional approach [to appellate review of the adequacy of a Vetrovec
warning] must take into account the dual purpose of the Vetrovec
warning: first, to alert the jury to the danger of relying on the unsupported
evidence of unsavoury witnesses and to explain the reasons for special scrutiny
of their testimony; and second, in appropriate cases, to give the jury the
tools necessary to identify evidence capable of enhancing the trustworthiness
of those witnesses.
[12]
As noted, the trial judge’s warning did caution the jury to be very
careful in assessing Mr. Niemi’s evidence and did refer to some reasons for
that caution. However, the judge’s warning did not point out to the jury that
they should be cautious with Mr. Niemi’s evidence because of his possible
motive to lie in order to get some advantage for himself in his own legal
troubles or to collect the reward. As Fish J. observed in Smith, at
para. 14:
In order to assess the risk of accepting testimony from an unsavoury
witness, a jury must understand the reasons for special scrutiny (R. v.
Sauvé (2004), 182 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 85). This requires
identifying for the jury the characteristics of the witness that bring his or
her credibility into serious question.
[13]
As the disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the Court of
Appeal demonstrates, it is debatable whether this omission in the judge’s
direction was sufficiently serious in the context of this trial so as to
require appellate intervention. However, the new evidence, in our view, makes
it clear that a new trial is necessary.
[14]
Mr. Hurley seeks to adduce new evidence that comes from additional RCMP
forensic testing and DNA analysis, submitted for testing by the Crown after the
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The well‑known criteria applicable
to this issue were stated in Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
759, at p. 775, and reaffirmed in R. v. Taillefer, 2003 SCC 70, [2003] 3
S.C.R. 307, at para. 74:
(1) The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due
diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general
principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases .
. . .
(2) The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a
decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial.
(3) The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is
reasonably capable of belief, and
(4) It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when
taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected
the result.
[15]
There is no contest that the first three requirements are met. The
parties disagree about the application of the fourth Palmer factor. The
issue is whether the new evidence could reasonably, when taken with the other
evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result. For the
reasons that follow, we would answer this question in the affirmative.
[16]
The reports put before this Court on the respondent’s motion include new
evidence that Mr. Hurley’s DNA was found in the hotel room on an ashtray, a
cigarette filter found in the toilet, and a Bacardi Breezer bottle cap. The
respondent submitted in argument that the new evidence, coupled with the
evidence of someone else’s DNA on a cigarette butt inside the Bacardi Breezer
bottle, may have had an impact on the outcome of the trial in the following
three ways: it could have led to the conclusion that Mr. Hurley was not the
last person in the room with Ms. Naistus; it could have cast doubt on the
Crown’s theory that the room was cleaned or an attempt was made to clean DNA
and fingerprints out of the room, which in turn could have cast doubt on the
credibility of Mr. Niemi; and it could have bolstered the credibility of one of
the civilian witnesses who testified she saw Ms. Naistus with persons other
than Mr. Hurley on the evening Ms. Naistus was killed.
[17]
As in our view there must be a new trial, we will not comment on the
evidence more than necessary to explain our conclusions. We agree that the new
evidence, in the eyes of a properly instructed jury, could reasonably be
expected to have affected the result. The presence of Mr. Hurley’s DNA on
additional items in the room — the ashtray, the cigarette filter, and the
bottle cap — could have been interpreted by the jury as casting doubt on the
Crown’s theory that Mr. Hurley cleaned the room to avoid detection. Moreover,
the fourth Palmer factor requires an assessment of the new evidence in
the context of the other evidence adduced at trial. The Crown’s position at
trial was that the absence of DNA evidence tended to support the theory that
Mr. Hurley cleaned the room to avoid detection. However, it must be remembered
that it was clear at trial that some of Mr. Hurley’s DNA was found in the room,
for example, on a facecloth. It was open to the jury to think that the finding
of this DNA evidence was inconsistent with the Crown’s wiping down theory. It
follows that some of the proposed new evidence, which if accepted would reveal
that more of Mr. Hurley’s DNA was found in the room, could reasonably be seen
to further undermine the Crown’s theory. Of course, these are all factual
questions for a jury to determine and the only issue before this Court is
whether the new evidence, viewed in the context of the record, could reasonably
be expected to have affected the result.
[18]
The important point is that any impact on the Crown’s theory that there
had been an attempt to wipe down the room may in turn have had an impact on the
jury’s assessment of the credibility of both Mr. Niemi, whose evidence was
bolstered by the evidence of cleaning, and of Mr. Hurley, who denied both the
conversation with Mr. Niemi about DNA and doing any cleaning of the room apart
from cleaning up after himself after vomiting. As noted earlier, the Crown
effectively conceded in its closing argument to the jury that Mr. Hurley could
not be convicted unless the jury accepted Mr. Niemi’s evidence.
[19]
The new evidence relates directly to what the trial judge told the jury
they could consider as evidence tending to confirm Mr. Niemi’s testimony as
part of the Vetrovec warning. As set out in Khela, “the
jury, in determining the veracity of the suspect evidence, should look for
evidence from another source tending to show that the untrustworthy witness is
telling the truth as to the guilt of the accused” (para. 37). As noted earlier,
the trial judge drew the jury’s attention to both the presence and absence of
DNA evidence connecting Mr. Hurley to the room and specifically instructed the
jury that the absence of such evidence could be considered as supporting Mr.
Niemi’s evidence about his jail cell conversation with Mr. Hurley:
You might consider the DNA found at the scene on the towel [sic]
and under the victim’s fingernails tend to identify that the accused was in the
room, but he has admitted this. However, this evidence may help convince you
that what Mr. Niemi said that the accused told him was evidence of the actions
of the accused in room 114. Secondly; the lack of other fingerprints or
DNA evidence found at the scene may bolster the evidence of Mr. Niemi when he
says the accused told him he wiped down the room. However, you have also heard
other explanations as to why there might be no DNA on objects like bottles. And
the defence asserts that other human material, like hair, was found and should
have been tested and might have provided DNA profiles.
(A.R., vol. 3,
at pp. 445-46 (emphasis added))
[20]
Just as the evidence about the lack of DNA evidence found at the scene
may have bolstered the testimony of Mr. Niemi, the new evidence showing Mr.
Hurley’s DNA on three items in the room could reasonably be seen as undermining
Mr. Niemi’s testimony in the mind of the jury and as having an impact on this
portion of the Vetrovec warning. We conclude that the new evidence
(specifically, the presence of Mr. Hurley’s DNA on three items in the room) may
reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to
have affected the result.
[21]
Whether or not one concludes, on the record before the Court of Appeal,
that appellate intervention was required because the caution omitted mention of
some important reasons for being careful with Mr. Niemi’s testimony, the
judge’s charge also encouraged the jury to seek comfort from the cleaning
evidence. In light of the new evidence, it now seems that this cleaning
evidence may not have been as strong as it may have appeared to be at trial. This,
as noted, relates directly and significantly to the jury’s assessment of a
critical Crown witness.
[22]
We would admit the new evidence, dismiss the appeal, and affirm the
Court of Appeal’s order of a new trial.
Appeal
dismissed.
Solicitor
for the appellant: Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Regina.
Solicitors
for the respondent: Bodnar & Campbell, Saskatoon.