SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Ewaryst Prokofiew
Appellant
and
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario and Canadian Civil Liberties
Association
Interveners
Coram:
McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 36)
Dissenting
Reasons:
(paras. 37 to 114):
|
Moldaver J. (Deschamps, Abella,
Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
Fish J. (McLachlin C.J. and
LeBel and Cromwell JJ. concurring)
|
R. v. Prokofiew, 2012 SCC 49, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639
Ewaryst
Prokofiew Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The
Queen Respondent
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney
General
of Quebec, Criminal Lawyers’ Association
of
Ontario and
Canadian Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Prokofiew
2012 SCC 49
File No.: 33754.
2011: November 8; 2012: October 12.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Criminal
law — Evidence — Failure to testify — Charge to jury — Accused did not testify
but incriminated by co‑accused’s testimony — Co‑accused’s counsel
inviting jury to infer accused’s guilt from failure to testify — Trial judge
refrained from giving remedial instruction to jury about accused’s right to
silence — Whether trial judge prohibited by Canada Evidence Act from affirming
right to silence — Whether failure to give explicit remedial instruction
constituted error — If so, whether curative proviso applicable — Canada
Evidence Act, s. 4(6) — Criminal Code, s. 686(1) (b)(iii).
Criminal law — Evidence — Hearsay — Whether
trial judge’s erroneous admission of hearsay evidence sufficiently serious to
preclude application of curative proviso — Criminal Code, s. 686(1) (b)(iii).
The
Crown alleged that P and his co‑accused, S, participated in a fraudulent
scheme involving the fictitious sale of heavy equipment to generate harmonized
sales tax that was then not remitted to the federal government as required. The
fraudulent nature of the scheme was never challenged. The involvement of P and
S in the scheme was also conceded. The question for the jury was whether
either or both accused were aware of the fraudulent nature of the scheme. P did
not testify, but was incriminated by S’s testimony. In his closing address, S’s
counsel invited the jury to infer P’s guilt from P’s failure to testify. The
trial judge refrained from giving a remedial instruction to the jury about P’s
right to silence. P was convicted and sentenced and his appeal was dismissed.
Held
(McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ. dissenting):
The appeal should be dismissed.
Per Deschamps,
Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.: Section 4(6)
of the Canada Evidence Act does not prohibit a trial judge from
affirming an accused’s right to silence. Conversely, the trial judge need not
affirm the accused’s right in every case, only where there is a realistic concern
that the jury may place evidential value on an accused’s decision not to
testify. In such a case, the trial judge should make it clear to the jury that
an accused’s silence is not evidence and that it cannot be used as a makeweight
for the Crown in deciding whether the Crown has proved its case.
In
assessing the credibility and reliability of evidence upon which the Crown can
and does rely, a jury is entitled to take into account, among other things, the
fact that the evidence stands uncontradicted, if that is the case, and the jury
may be so instructed. The fact that evidence is uncontradicted does not mean that
the jury must accept it and an instruction to that effect should also be given.
In
this case, S’s counsel could have relied on the fact that his client had
testified to argue that S was innocent and had “nothing to hide”. Moreover, he
could have emphasized that S’s testimony stood uncontradicted and that the jury
could consider this in assessing whether they believed his evidence or whether
it left them in a state of reasonable doubt. What S’s counsel could not do is
mislead the jury on a matter of law. He could not invite the jury to use P’s
silence at trial as evidence, much less evidence of guilt.
While
counsel’s comment should not have been made, the judge would not have allowed
the trial to proceed if he truly believed that the comment had irretrievably
compromised P’s fair trial rights. He only allowed it to proceed — with the
acquiescence of P’s counsel who did not move for severance — on the belief that
he could disabuse the jury of the notion that P’s silence at trial could be
used as evidence of his guilt. Although an explicit remedial instruction from
the trial judge would have been preferable, his jury charge, when considered as
a whole, was adequate. The jury would have understood that the Crown could
prove P’s guilt only on the evidence and, as P’s silence at trial did not
constitute evidence, it could not be used to prove his guilt.
As
for the hearsay evidence, the trial judge’s error in admitting it was harmless
and there is no realistic possibility that the verdict would have been
different had the error not been made. The trial judge had warned the jury
that this evidence should be approached with caution and other items of
confirmatory evidence were available to the jury. Accordingly, this is a case
where the curative proviso of s. 686(1) (b)(iii) of the Criminal
Code can safely be applied to uphold P’s conviction.
Per McLachlin C.J.
and LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ. (dissenting): The trial judge erred in
failing to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from P’s
silence. Whenever there is a significant risk ― as the trial judge found
in this case ― that the jury will otherwise treat the accused’s silence
as evidence of guilt, an appropriate remedial direction ought to be given to
the jury. That was not done here.
Standard
instructions on the definition of evidence, the presumption of innocence, the
Crown’s burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard will not suffice. That
is particularly true where, as here, counsel for one accused has suggested
unmistakably to the jury that the guilt of a co‑accused may be inferred
from that person’s failure to testify.
As
a matter of principle, there is no reason why counsel whose client has
testified cannot refer to that fact and suggest this indicates the client is
innocent and has “nothing to hide”. Counsel may certainly emphasize as well
that the client’s testimony stands uncontradicted, even when the client asserts
his or her own innocence and imputes guilt to the co-accused. The right to
make full answer and defence is not constrained by the unfavourable impact its
effective exercise may have on others in jeopardy of conviction. However, it
is not absolute and cannot be exercised with total disregard for the
constitutional rights of a co‑accused, including that person’s right not
to have his or her silence treated as evidence of guilt.
In
this case, the absence of a remedial direction is sufficient to require a new
trial. Moreover, that error was exacerbated by the erroneous admission of
hearsay evidence. On any view of the matter, neither of the errors committed
by the trial judge can be characterized as trivial. In these
circumstances, the Crown has not satisfied its onerous burden in invoking the curative
proviso.
Cases Cited
By Fish J. (dissenting)
R.
v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874; R. v. Crawford, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858; McConnell
v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 802; Avon v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R.
650; R. v. Biladeau (2008), 93 O.R. (3d) 365; R. v. Assoun,
2006 NSCA 47, 244 N.S.R. (2d) 96; R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 525; R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 523; R. v. Naglik (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 385, rev’d [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122; R.
v. Pollock (2004), 188 O.A.C. 37; R. v. Oliver (2005), 194 O.A.C.
284; R. v. Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 751; R. v. Sarrazin,
2011 SCC 54, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 505; Vetrovec v. The Queen, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 811; R. v. Bevan, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599; R. v. Kehler, 2004
SCC 11, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 328; R. v. Brooks (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 661.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-5, s. 4(6) .
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46,
ss. 16 , 591(3) (b), 686(1) (b)(iii).
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Doherty,
Feldman, MacPherson, Blair and Juriansz JJ.A.), 2010 ONCA 423, 100 O.R.
(3d) 401, 256 C.C.C. (3d) 355, 264 O.A.C. 174, 77 C.R. (6th) 52, [2010]
G.S.T.C. 87, 2010 G.T.C. 1044, [2010] O.J. No. 2498 (QL), 2010 CarswellOnt
3899, upholding the convictions for fraud entered by Corbett J., [2005]
G.S.T.C. 135, [2005] O.J. No. 1824 (QL), 2005 CarswellOnt 3201. Appeal dismissed,
McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ. dissenting.
Russell Silverstein
and Ingrid Grant, for the appellant.
Jennifer M. Woollcombe and Ivan S. Bloom, Q.C., for the respondent.
James C. Martin
and Richard Kramer, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Sylvain Leboeuf and Gilles
Laporte, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
P. Andras Schreck and Lucy Saunders, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’
Association of Ontario.
Frank Addario, Gerald
Chan and Nader R. Hasan, for the intervener the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association.
The judgment of
Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. was delivered by
[1]
Moldaver J. — The issue in this case is whether a trial judge is prohibited by s.
4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 (“CEA ”),
from affirming an accused’s right to silence. At trial, the Crown alleged that
Mr. Prokofiew and his co-accused, Mr. Solty, participated in a fraudulent
scheme involving the fictitious sale of heavy equipment to generate harmonized
sales tax that was then not remitted to the federal government as required. The
fraudulent nature of the scheme was never challenged. The involvement of Messrs.
Prokofiew and Solty in the scheme was also conceded. The question for the jury
was whether either or both accused were aware of the fraudulent nature of the
scheme. Mr. Prokofiew did not testify, but was incriminated by Mr. Solty’s
testimony. In his closing address, Mr. Solty’s counsel invited the jury to
infer Mr. Prokofiew’s guilt from the latter’s failure to testify. The trial
judge refrained from giving a remedial instruction to the jury about Mr. Prokofiew’s
right to silence. Mr. Prokofiew was convicted and sentenced ([2005] G.S.T.C.
135) and his appeal was dismissed by Doherty J.A. on behalf of a unanimous
five-person panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal (2010 ONCA 423, 100 O.R. (3d)
401). Largely for the reasons given by Doherty J.A., I would dismiss Mr.
Prokofiew’s further appeal to this Court.
[2]
I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of
my colleague Justice Fish and I agree with much of his analysis. Where I disagree
with him is in the result. I will explain our disagreement and why the appeal
should be dismissed, but before doing so, I will address the matters on which
my colleague and I agree —
albeit with some additional observations.
I. Matters of Agreement
[3]
My colleague and I agree that s. 4(6) of the CEA
does not prohibit a trial judge from affirming an accused’s right to silence.
In so concluding, I should not be taken — nor do I understand my colleague to suggest — that such an instruction must be given in
every case where an accused exercises his or her right to remain silent at
trial. Rather, it will be for the trial judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion,
to provide such an instruction where there is a realistic concern that the jury
may place evidential value on an accused’s decision not to testify.
[4]
In cases where the jury is given an instruction
on the accused’s right to remain silent at trial, the trial judge should, in
explaining the right, make it clear to the jury that an accused’s silence is
not evidence and that it cannot be used as a makeweight for the Crown in
deciding whether the Crown has proved its case. In other words, if, after
considering the whole of the evidence, the jury is not satisfied that the
charge against the accused has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
cannot look to the accused’s silence to remove that doubt and give the Crown’s
case the boost it needs to push it over the line.
[5]
The case at hand provides an example of a
situation where such an instruction would be warranted — cut-throat defences where one accused testifies and points the
finger at the other, while the other exercises his right not to testify. My colleague
and I agree that, in summing up to the jury, Mr. Solty’s counsel could have
relied on the fact that his client had testified to argue that Mr. Solty was
innocent and had “nothing to hide”. Moreover, he could have emphasized that Mr.
Solty’s testimony stood uncontradicted and that the jury could consider this in
assessing whether they believed his evidence or whether it left them in a state
of reasonable doubt.
[6]
What Mr. Solty’s counsel could not do is mislead
the jury on a matter of law. He could not invite the jury to use Mr.
Prokofiew’s silence at trial as evidence, much less evidence of guilt.
[7]
In cases where there is a risk of counsel
misleading the jury on a co-accused’s right to remain silent at trial, trial
judges would do well to spell out the governing principles and ensure that
counsel’s remarks conform to those principles. That way, the potential harm can
be prevented from occurring, thereby sparing the need for a remedial
instruction.
[8]
In the context of the charge as a whole, I think
it might be helpful to explain how a jury may use a lack of contradictory
evidence in deciding whether the Crown has proved its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[9]
Apart from a few notable exceptions — such as when an accused raises the defence
of not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder under s. 16 of
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 — in every criminal trial, juries are instructed that an accused has
no obligation to prove anything. The onus of proof rests upon the Crown from
beginning to end and it never shifts.
[10]
Juries are also told that in deciding whether
the Crown has proved its case to the criminal standard, they are to look to the
whole of the evidence — and,
having done so, they may only convict if they are satisfied, on the basis of
evidence they find to be both credible and reliable, that the Crown has
established the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In coming to that
conclusion, a jury may not use an accused’s silence at trial as evidence, much
less evidence of guilt, and, where appropriate, the jury should be so
instructed.
[11]
That said, in assessing the credibility and
reliability of evidence upon which the Crown can and does rely, a jury is
entitled to take into account, among other things, the fact that the evidence
stands uncontradicted, if that is the case — and the
jury may be so instructed. Of course, the fact that
evidence is uncontradicted does not mean that the jury must accept it, and an
instruction to that effect should be given.
II. Is a New Trial Required?
A. Failure to Instruct the Jury on the Appellant’s Right to
Silence
[12]
In the course of his closing address to the
jury, which covered 23 pages of transcript, counsel for Mr. Solty incorporated the
following rhetorical question into his remarks: “Did [Mr. Prokofiew] have
something to hide or did he simply have no response that could help him since there
is no point in trying to contradict the truth?” (A.R., vol. V, at p. 17). That
comment was improper in that it implicitly invited the jury to treat Mr.
Prokofiew’s silence at trial as evidence of guilt. It should not have been
made.
[13]
I note that the trial judge took umbrage at the
remarks made by Mr. Solty’s counsel. Initially, he stated that he would
provide the jury with a strong remedial instruction. The following day, in an
oral ruling delivered moments before he commenced his charge, the trial judge
ruled that he was constrained by s. 4(6) of the CEA from giving the jury
an explicit remedial instruction. In the same ruling, he remarked that there
was a “significant risk” the jury would infer guilt from Mr. Prokofiew’s
silence, if he did not “give a proper charge to the jury” (A.R., vol. I,
at p. 7).
[14]
Despite his strong language, I consider it
significant that neither the trial judge, on his own motion, nor counsel who
was acting for Mr. Prokofiew at the time, raised the prospect of severance. The
option of severing Mr. Prokofiew’s trial from Mr. Solty’s was clearly open if
the trial judge believed that severance was warranted in the interests of
justice: Criminal Code, s. 591(3) (b) — and it would have solved the problem if, as Mr. Prokofiew now argues
and my colleague accepts, the risk identified by the trial judge was so great
that it could not be overcome by instructions tailored to address, albeit
indirectly, the erroneous message conveyed by Mr. Solty’s counsel. Presumably,
Mr. Prokofiew’s trial counsel ascribed to the view that the judge’s
instructions to the jury would suffice, and thus refrained from moving for
severance. I prefer to view the matter that way, rather than to treat his
failure to move for severance as a tactical decision designed to preserve a
ground of appeal should things go badly at trial.
[15]
As for the trial judge, I cannot accept that he
would have allowed the trial against Mr. Prokofiew to proceed if he truly
believed that the impugned remarks had irretrievably compromised Mr.
Prokofiew’s fair trial rights. On the contrary, I am satisfied that he
proceeded — with the
acquiescence of Mr. Prokofiew’s trial counsel — on the belief that he could disabuse the jury of the notion that
Mr. Prokofiew’s silence at trial could be used as evidence of his guilt. And
that, in my view, is precisely what the trial judge proceeded to do.
[16]
My colleague states that the trial judge’s
instructions “left [the jury] to determine for themselves, with no assistance
from the judge, the evidentiary and legal effect of Mr. Prokofiew’s failure to
testify at trial” (para. 87). He further contends that, absent an explicit
instruction from the trial judge, “[w]e have no basis for supposing that the
jury understood . . . which [of the two] counsel had stated the law correctly”
(para. 89). With respect, I do not share his view that the jury was left on
its own without guidance, relegated in the end to choose, presumably as a
matter of guesswork, which of the two counsel had accurately stated the law.
[17]
First, the jury was told by the trial judge that
he (the trial judge) was supreme in the law and that they must take the law
from him. The jury was also told that if they had questions, they were to put
the questions in writing and the trial judge would answer them in open court.
[18]
In view of those instructions, I believe that if
the jury had been faced with the quandary my colleague poses — as to which of the two counsel, who had
made “diametrically opposite submissions on a fundamental principle of law”
(para. 88), they should believe — they would have asked the trial judge for clarification. I do not
accept that they would have left the matter to guesswork or any other form of
conduct that would indicate that the jury was being untrue to its oath.
[19]
As it is, the jury did not ask a question about
the two “diametrically opposite submissions”. That leads to a second area of
disagreement with my colleague. It relates to the instructions the jury
received and whether those instructions, though not explicit, were sufficient
to overcome the risk that the trial judge had flagged — that the jury would use Mr. Prokofiew’s silence at trial as
evidence of guilt.
[20]
As indicated, my colleague maintains that the
jury received no assistance from the trial judge in this regard. They were
“left free”, he maintains, “to treat Mr. Prokofiew’s failure to testify as
evidence of his guilt and to convict him, at least in part, for that reason”
(para. 92). With respect, I disagree. I prefer instead Doherty J.A.’s
analysis of the instructions, and his conclusion that, considered in their
entirety, the jury would have understood that the Crown could prove Mr.
Prokofiew’s guilt only on the evidence, that his silence at trial did not
constitute evidence, and that it could therefore not be used to infer guilt.
[21]
As Doherty J.A. points out, the trial judge made
it clear to the jury that the Crown carried the burden of proof throughout the
proceedings and that there was no obligation on the part of Mr. Prokofiew to
present evidence or prove anything. The trial judge also emphasized that the
jury was to base its verdict on the evidence given during the trial and nothing
else. Importantly, he defined “evidence” as being “[o]nly things that are
admitted, the exhibits and the things witnesses say in testimony before you”
(A.R., vol. V, at p. 143). Like Doherty J.A., I believe the jury would have
understood from this that Mr. Prokofiew’s silence did not constitute evidence,
and, as such, it could not be used in determining his guilt.
[22]
My colleague points out that the trial judge did
not give an explicit instruction to the jury about the impropriety of using Mr.
Prokofiew’s silence at trial as evidence of guilt. I agree. However, I do not
agree that the jury received no assistance from the trial judge on the matter.
On the contrary, I am satisfied that the trial judge implicitly endorsed the
remarks Mr. Prokofiew’s counsel made in direct response to the improper remarks
made by Mr. Solty’s counsel. At the very least, the trial judge went a long
way in that direction.
[23]
In response to the impugned remarks, counsel for
Mr. Prokofiew juxtaposed other jurisdictions in the world where accused persons
were required to disprove their guilt with the situation in Canada:
That is not, thankfully, the way things are done
here in Canada. We have the luxury and we have the thankfulness that we have a
system that requires the State to prove our guilt before a conviction or a
finding of guilt can be entered.
In
this situation, this is the situation why Mr. Prokofiew does not have to call
evidence, and this is why Mr. Prokofiew did not call evidence. [A.R., vol. V,
at p. 27]
[24]
In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge
picked up on this theme and endorsed it as follows:
Mr.
Solty and Mr. Prokofiew do not have to present evidence or prove anything in
this case. In particular, they do not have to prove that they are innocent of
the crimes charged [sic]. From start to finish, it is the Crown that
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is Crown counsel who must prove
Mr. Solty’s guilt and/or Mr. Prokofiew’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not
Mr. Prokofiew or Mr. Solty who must prove their innocence. [A.R., vol. V, at p.
133]
Doherty J.A. observed that
this jury instruction “tied the presumption of innocence into the burden of
proof in a manner that spoke almost directly to the irrelevance of the
appellant’s failure to testify” (para. 49). I agree.
[25]
In the face of an instruction that effectively
endorsed the remarks of Mr. Prokofiew’s counsel on the very issue of concern, I
fail to see how it can be said that the trial judge left the jury to cast about
on its own, with free rein to treat Mr. Prokofiew’s failure to testify as
evidence of his guilt and to convict him, at least in part, for that reason.
[26]
In sum, while I agree that an explicit remedial
instruction from the trial judge would have been preferable — and would have been warranted in these
circumstances — I am satisfied
that the instructions that were given in the instant case, when considered as a
whole, were adequate. Like Doherty J.A., I am confident that the jury would
have understood, in the context of the entirety of the instructions, that the
Crown could prove Mr. Prokofiew’s guilt only on the evidence and, as Mr.
Prokofiew’s silence at trial did not constitute evidence, it could not be used
to prove his guilt. However, I do not fault the trial judge for concluding — wrongly but understandably — that he was
prohibited by s. 4(6) of the CEA from making any reference at all to Mr.
Prokofiew’s failure to testify. My colleague has addressed that matter and it should
not pose a problem in future cases.
B. Failure to Exclude Inadmissible Hearsay Evidence
[27]
The trial judge improperly admitted various
cheque stubs and a deposit book into evidence. Crown counsel at trial alleged
that the stubs and deposit book recorded cash payments to Mr. Prokofiew from
Discount Sales, one of the commercial vehicles of the fraud. Defence counsel
at trial disputed that the “E” to which the documents referred was his client,
Ewaryst “Eddie” Prokofiew. In my opinion, the trial judge’s error was minor
and the verdict would inevitably have been the same had he not made it.
[28]
My colleague, however, maintains that the
admission of the impugned documents was sufficiently serious to preclude the
application of the curative proviso in s. 686(1) (b)(iii) of the Criminal
Code . He points out that the Crown’s case against Mr. Prokofiew rested
almost entirely on the evidence of two disreputable witnesses, Messrs. Solty
and Tulloch (the latter being a co-accused who had pled guilty before the trial
of Messrs. Solty and Prokofiew and had since become a Crown witness). The jury
was told to proceed with caution and to look for confirmatory evidence before
acting on their testimony to convict Mr. Prokofiew. Depending on their
assessment of the cheque stubs and deposit book, the jury was instructed that
those items could constitute confirmatory evidence of Mr. Tulloch’s testimony,
which in turn would bear on the jury’s evaluation of Mr. Solty’s credibility.
Hence, according to my colleague, the error was not harmless, because the jury
“may [have relied] on the impugned evidence to take a small but critical first
step in a chain of deductions leading to a finding of guilt” (para. 111).
[29]
As indicated, I take a different view of the
error. In my view, it was minor and the verdict would inevitably have been the
same had it not been made.
[30]
Importantly, the impugned documents did not
stand alone. Other documentary items existed that lent support to the
testimony of Messrs. Solty and Tulloch. These items included:
• sixteen invoices written
by Mr. Prokofiew that set out the structure of the various fraudulent
transactions;
• financial records
confirming Mr. Tulloch’s evidence that Mr. Prokofiew used Discount Sales to
funnel portions of Mr. Tulloch’s share of the illicit proceeds into purchases
of a motorcycle and a boat for Mr. Tulloch;
• the Articles of Incorporation
for Discount Sales showed Mr. Prokofiew’s home address as the address for the
first director; and
• a document listed John O’Meara,
Mr. Prokofiew’s father-in-law, as the first director of Discount Sales.
[31]
In respect of John O’Meara’s directorship, his
widow testified that he had nothing to do with the operation of the business.
She further testified that her husband had no significant assets when he passed
away.
[32]
The various documentary items that I have listed,
in conjunction with the testimony of Mrs. O’Meara, provided the jury with ample
confirmatory evidence. The jury was entitled to rely on that evidence to
restore its faith in Messrs. Solty and Tulloch and to act on their evidence to
convict Mr. Prokofiew.
[33]
Apart from the significant body of confirmatory
evidence that existed over and above the impugned cheque stubs and deposit
book, it is worth noting, for the purposes of assessing the seriousness of the
error, that the trial judge cautioned the jury in strong terms that the cheque
stubs were hearsay evidence and that it was not possible to cross-examine the
person who had written the entries on them. He further told the jury that the
stubs were “of dubious reliability” and that the jury “should approach them
with great caution” (A.R., vol. V, at p. 162). After reviewing the factors
that the jury might wish to consider in deciding what use to make of the cheque
stubs, if any, the trial judge completed his remarks with a second strong
warning. He reminded the jury that “[n]o witness [had] testified as to these
cheque stubs” after reiterating the need to “approach [them] with caution”
(A.R., vol. V, at p. 165).
[34]
In the face of those instructions and the other
items of confirmatory evidence available to the jury, I cannot accept that the
admission of the cheque stubs and deposit book amounted to a significant
error. The error, in my view, was harmless in its overall effect —
and I have no doubt that the verdict would have been
the same had it not been made. Accordingly, this is a case where the curative
proviso can safely be applied to uphold the conviction.
III. Conclusion
[35]
Taking into account the entirety of the trial
judge’s instructions, I am satisfied that the jury would have understood that
Mr. Prokofiew’s silence at trial could not be used as evidence of his guilt.
As for the trial judge’s error in admitting the hearsay evidence, in my view,
the error was harmless and there is no realistic possibility that the verdict would have been
different had it not been made.
[36]
Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
The reasons of
McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ. were delivered by
Fish J. (dissenting) —
I
[37]
At the conclusion of their joint trial before
judge and jury, Ewaryst Prokofiew and Peter Solty were both convicted of fraud
and conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada of $3.25 million ([2005]
G.S.T.C. 135).
[38]
Mr. Prokofiew did not testify. Mr. Solty did,
proclaiming his innocence and incriminating Mr. Prokofiew.
[39]
In his closing address to the jury, Mr. Solty’s
counsel implied that Mr. Prokofiew’s silence indicated that he had something to
hide. There is no dispute as to the significance of counsel’s words: The Crown
concedes in its factum that “counsel for Mr. Solty suggested [to the jury] that
[Mr. Prokofiew] had not testified because he was guilty of the alleged
offences” (R.F., at para. 2 (emphasis added)).
[40]
The trial judge recognized that no such
inference was permitted and he wanted to make this clear to the jury. He
concluded there was a “significant risk” that the jury might otherwise, as
suggested by Mr. Solty’s counsel, infer from Mr. Prokofiew’s silence that he
was guilty as charged (A.R., vol. I, at p. 7).
[41]
In response to defence counsel’s request for a
“strong [remedial] direction”, the trial judge replied: “You can count on it”
(A.R., vol. V, at p. 92).
[42]
“[T]here are few rights more fundamental than
the right to remain silent”, the judge added, “and it must be made clear to the
jury . . . that they may not consider Mr. Prokofiew’s silence . . . as
indicative of guilt when they come to considering his guilt or innocence”
(A.R., vol. V, at p. 92).
[43]
After considering two decisions of this Court,
however, the trial judge held — wrongly but understandably, as we shall see —
that he was prohibited by s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 , from making any reference at all to Mr. Prokofiew’s
failure to testify. He therefore refrained from giving the remedial
instruction that he had earlier thought necessary to prevent the jury from
drawing the impermissible inference they had been invited to draw by Mr.
Solty’s counsel.
[44]
The Court of Appeal for Ontario, correctly in my
view, held that s. 4(6) prohibits comments prejudicial to the accused — but
not the remedial instruction requested by defence counsel and contemplated by
the judge (2010 ONCA 423, 100 O.R. (3d) 401). The Court of Appeal held as
well, again correctly, that the trial judge had erred in admitting hearsay
evidence. It is undisputed in this Court that the hearsay evidence was
inadmissible and ought to have been excluded.
[45]
The Court of Appeal nonetheless dismissed Mr.
Prokofiew’s appeal on the ground that both errors were harmless. With respect,
I am of a different view. For the reasons that follow, I would quash Mr.
Prokofiew’s conviction, allow the appeal and order a new trial.
II
[46]
Having concluded that a new trial should be had,
I shall refer to the facts only to the extent necessary to explain my
conclusion.
[47]
Mr. Prokofiew and Mr. Solty were alleged by the
Crown to have participated knowingly in a fraudulent scheme involving the sale
of non-existent “heavy equipment” between the Maritimes and Ontario.
Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) was collected on these fictitious sales but never
remitted to the government. In all, the perpetrators of the scheme defrauded
the Government of Canada of more than three million dollars.
[48]
It was uncontested at trial that the scheme was
fraudulent and that Mr. Prokofiew and Mr. Solty had both participated in it.
The only live issue was whether they were aware of its fraudulent nature.
[49]
Mr. Solty testified that he was an innocent
participant. He was induced, he said, to participate in the fraud by Mr.
Prokofiew, who orchestrated the scheme.
[50]
Mr. Prokofiew did not testify.
[51]
In his address to the jury, counsel for Mr.
Solty contrasted in the following terms Mr. Prokofiew’s silence with Mr.
Solty’s decision to testify:
It’s clear that Mr. Solty never ran and [n]ever
tried to hide from his involvement in this case. . . . And when it came to his
turn to tell his side of the story, he did not, like Ewaryst Prokofiew, shirk
from that challenge. And why did he do all this? Especially when there was
absent no obligation for him to do anything? Because, I suggest, he had nothing
to hide. Because he’s innocent. Innocent people don’t make themselves scarce
when the troubles begin. They stand up with their friends and colleagues and
try and deal with the problem. I suggest to you that at every turn, Peter Solty
acted in a manner that is consistent with an innocent person.
. . .
Lastly, Peter Solty took the stand and
told his story, warts and all. Ewaryst Prokofiew did not. Mr. Solty accused him
of massive monetary fraud, and backed up that accusation with the hand-written
invoices and other documentation that he provided to the police. What was Mr.
Prokofiew’s response? Ask yourself why Ewaryst Prokofiew did not testify. Did he
have something to hide or did he simply have no response that could help him
since there is no point in trying to contradict the truth? [A.R., vol. V, at
pp. 10-11 and 16-17]
[52]
The trial judge was concerned that these
comments could undermine Mr. Prokofiew’s right to a fair trial. As earlier
mentioned, he felt there was a “significant risk” that the jury would infer
that Mr. Prokofiew’s silence could be taken as evidence of guilt, in
contravention of R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (A.R.,
vol. I, at p. 7). It was therefore necessary, said the judge, to make
clear to the jury that no such inference was permitted — “that they may not consider
Mr. Prokofiew’s silence . . . as indicative of [his] guilt” (A.R., vol. V, at
p. 92).
[53]
However, after hearing submissions and reviewing
Noble and R. v. Crawford, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858, the trial judge
concluded that s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act precluded him from
commenting in any way on an accused’s silence at trial. He therefore
made no reference in his jury instructions to Mr. Prokofiew’s failure to
testify.
[54]
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge
that Sopinka J. did state in Noble and Crawford that s. 4(6)
prohibits any mention of the accused’s failure to testify. However, Doherty
J.A., speaking for a unanimous Court, found that Justice Sopinka’s statements
to this effect in both Noble and Crawford were obiter dicta.
[55]
Justice Doherty recognized that lower courts
should presume that obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are binding upon
them (para. 21). And he then proceeded to explain, persuasively and with care,
why that presumption was inapplicable in this instance.
[56]
Justice Doherty first noted that the impugned obiter
dicta were plainly inconsistent with the ratio decidendi of
decisions predating Crawford and Noble — in particular, McConnell
v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 802, and Avon v. The Queen, [1971]
S.C.R. 650.
[57]
One reason for treating obiter as binding is to
preserve and promote certainty in the law. Yet to do so here would have the
opposite effect. It would disregard precedent that was not questioned in Crawford,
Noble or subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court — and, indeed, applied
recently and consistently at the appellate level in Ontario, and elsewhere in
Canada (para. 29, citing, inter alia, R. v. Biladeau (2008), 93
O.R. (3d) 365 (C.A.), at para. 20, and R. v. Assoun, 2006 NSCA 47,
244 N.S.R. (2d) 96, at paras. 285-88).
[58]
Justice Doherty noted as well that the comments
in Crawford and Noble relied on by the judge in this case were
not only tangential (para. 36), but entirely inconsistent with the
“constitutional vision” articulated in Noble itself (para. 39).
[59]
The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the
trial judge had misconstrued s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act and
could properly have instructed the jury not to draw an adverse inference from
Mr. Prokofiew’s silence. The court recognized that “no one knows for sure what
the jury used or did not use”, but found that the absence of a remedial
instruction would only be fatal where the “appellant shows a real risk that his
silence was misused” (para. 42).
[60]
The Court of Appeal concluded that Mr. Prokofiew
had not discharged this burden. Relying on the judge’s charge as a whole, and
more particularly on passages to which I shall later refer, the court was
satisfied that the absence of a specific remedial instruction did not amount to
reviewable error in this case.
[61]
A second ground of appeal raised by Mr.
Prokofiew in the Court of Appeal was likewise dismissed. It concerned the
admission by the trial judge of hearsay documents that, according to the Crown,
implicated Mr. Prokofiew in the fraud. The Crown conceded before the Court of
Appeal that this evidence was inadmissible and should therefore have been
excluded.
[62]
Justice Doherty described the inadmissible
hearsay as nothing more than “a small brick in a very large wall built by the
evidence offered by the Crown against the appellant” (para. 57). And he
concluded that the second error, like the first, was not fatal, since “the rest
of the evidence presented an overwhelming case” (para. 57).
[63]
In the result, the Court of Appeal found that
the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence “caused no substantial wrong or
miscarriage of justice” (para. 54), applied the curative proviso of s.
686(1) (b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , and
dismissed Mr. Prokofiew’s appeal.
III
[64]
Noble establishes
that a trier of fact may not draw an adverse inference from the accused’s
failure to testify and that the accused’s silence at trial may not be treated
as evidence of guilt. To do so would violate the presumption of innocence and
the right to silence. It would to that extent and for that reason shift the
burden of proof to the accused, turning the accused’s constitutional right to
silence into a “snare and a delusion” (Noble, at para. 72).
[65]
We are now urged by the Crown to overrule Noble.
Upon careful consideration of Crown counsel’s full and able argument, and the
helpful submissions of all counsel on this issue, I would decline to do so.
[66]
I see no persuasive reason to overturn Noble.
Noble is a recent and important precedent regarding a fundamental
constitutional principle. The Court’s decision in that case is constitutionally
mandated and has not proven unworkable in practice. Nothing of significance
has occurred since 1997 to cause the Court to reconsider its decision. And it
is well established that the Court must exercise particular caution in
contemplating the reversal of a precedent where the effect, as here, would be
to diminish the protection of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms :
R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 44.
[67]
These questions remain: Does s. 4(6) of the Canada
Evidence Act prohibit any comment at all by the trial judge on the
failure of the accused to testify ― as the trial judge found in this case? If not, what can trial
judges tell juries about the failure of an accused to testify? Was a remedial
instruction required in this case? If so, is the absence of a remedial
instruction fatal to the verdict?
[68]
Section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act
provides:
The
failure of the person charged, or of the wife or husband of that person, to
testify shall not be made the subject of comment by the judge or by counsel for
the prosecution.
[69]
In Crawford, Justice Sopinka stated that
s. 4(6) “encompasses both comment prejudicial to the accused, as well as a
direction that the jury must not draw an unfavourable conclusion from the
accused’s failure to testify” (para. 22).
[70]
And he reiterated this observation in Noble:
Section
4(6) , whose validity is not at issue in the present case, prevents a trial
judge from commenting on the silence of the accused. The trial judge is
therefore prevented from instructing the jury on the impermissibility of using
silence to take the case against the accused to one that proves guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. [para. 95]
[71]
I agree with Justice Doherty that both comments
were obiter dicta. Section 4(6) was not at issue in either Crawford
or Noble. Crawford dealt with what an accused or defence counsel
may say in relation to a co-accused’s pre-trial silence, while Noble
held that an accused’s silence at trial cannot be used as evidence of guilt.
[72]
In both cases, Justice Sopinka’s references to
s. 4(6) merely formed part of his description of the legislative background in
describing ancillary issues relating to an accused’s silence. His
comments were brief and unnecessary to the result. Dicta of this sort
may be set aside where, as in this instance, there are good reasons to do so: Henry,
at para. 57.
[73]
First, the impugned observations in Noble
and Crawford ignored — indeed, contradicted ― judgments of the Court that explicitly defined and applied
s. 4(6) (McConnell, at p. 809; Avon, at p. 655; R. v.
Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at pp. 557-58). These well-established
precedents cannot be taken to have been overruled without mention ― en passant, as it were — by obiter
comments in Crawford and Noble.
[74]
Second, as McConnell, Avon and Potvin
demonstrate, a purposive interpretation of s. 4(6) compels the conclusion
that trial judges may inform the jury of the accused’s right to silence and the
protection it affords. More specifically, applying Noble, trial judges
may instruct the jury that, as a matter of law, no adverse inference may be
drawn from the failure of the accused to testify.
[75]
In McConnell, the trial judge instructed
the jury that there was no onus on an accused to testify and that they should
not be influenced in their decision by the accused’s silence at trial (p.
815). In rejecting the contention that the trial judge’s instructions
contravened s. 4(5) of the Canada Evidence Act (now s. 4(6) ), Ritchie J.
explained:
Here the language used by the trial judge to which
objection is taken was not so much a “comment” on the failure of the persons
charged to testify as a statement of their right to refrain from doing so, and
it does not appear to me that it should be taken to have been the intention of
Parliament in enacting s. 4(5) of the Canada Evidence Act to preclude
judges from explaining to juries the law with respect to the rights of accused
persons in this regard. . . .
I
think it is to be assumed that the section in question was enacted for the
protection of accused persons against the danger of having their right not to
testify presented to the jury in such fashion as to suggest that their silence
is being used as a cloak for their guilt. [Emphasis added; p. 809.]
[76]
Avon dealt with a
similar instruction. And the Court again rejected a submission that s. 4(5)
(now s. 4(6) ) prohibits any mention by the trial judge of the accused’s silence
at trial:
.
. . I would say that the language used by [the trial judge] is a “statement” of
an accused’s right not to testify, rather than a “comment” on his failure to do
so. In my opinion, the instructions complained of cannot be construed as
prejudicial to the accused or such as to suggest to the jurors that his silence
was used to cloak his guilt. [p. 655]
[77]
Similarly, in Potvin, Wilson J. held that
s. 4(5) (now s. 4(6) ) must be interpreted in a purposive and not literal
manner. Properly understood, it prohibits only statements prejudicial to the
accused (pp. 557-58).
[78]
Quite properly, the Crown has conceded before us
that s. 4(6) should be interpreted in accordance with McConnell, Avon
and Potvin.
[79]
In short, s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act
does not prohibit an affirmation by the trial judge of the accused’s right to
silence. And, in appropriate circumstances, an instruction that no adverse
inference may be drawn from the silence of the accused at trial is not a
prohibited “comment” on the accused’s failure to testify within the meaning of
that provision.
IV
[80]
I turn now to consider whether the trial judge
in this case erred in failing to instruct the jury that no adverse inference
could be drawn from the appellant’s failure to testify. Unlike the Court of
Appeal, and with the greatest of respect, I believe that he did. And I believe
as well that this error, though understandable in light of Crawford and Noble,
is fatal to the jury’s verdict.
[81]
The Court of Appeal recognized that “no one
knows for sure what the jury used or did not use”, but found that the absence
of a remedial instruction would only be fatal where the “appellant shows a real
risk that his silence was misused” (para. 42).
[82]
In concluding that Mr. Prokofiew had not
discharged that burden, the Court of Appeal pointed to various passages of the
judge’s charge. Essentially, in the passages considered by the Court of Appeal
(paras. 46-48), the trial judge instructed the jury that their verdict must be
based on “the evidence put before you, and only on that evidence” (A.R., vol.
V, at p. 125); that both Mr. Prokofiew and Mr. Solty were presumed innocent
throughout the trial; that they did not have to prove their innocence; and that
the presumption of their innocence “is only defeated if and when Crown counsel
has satisfied all of you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either or both Mr.
Prokofiew and Mr. Solty are guilty of either or both of the crimes with which
they are each charged” (p. 132).
[83]
Relying on the entirety of the judge’s
instructions, and notably on the instructions mentioned, the court was satisfied
“that the jury would understand that the Crown could prove the appellant’s
guilt based only on the evidence, and that the appellant’s silence at trial ― or indeed, any other non-evidentiary
matter ― could not be
used to infer the appellant’s guilt” (para. 51).
[84]
The Court of Appeal also characterized as a
“direct response” (para. 44) to the prejudicial comments by counsel for Mr.
Solty, the following passages from the closing address of counsel for Mr.
Prokofiew:
Mr. Prokofiew, as [counsel for Mr. Solty]
pointed out, chose not to testify in this case. There are many jurisdictions in
the world that are, frankly, not as kind as ours; that when a person has an
allegation against them, that they have to stand up; you’re alleged to do this;
or you prove to us, you tell us why you are not guilty. That is not,
thankfully, the way things are done here in Canada. We have the luxury and we
have the thankfulness that we have a system that requires the State to prove
our guilt before a conviction or a finding of guilt can be entered.
In
this situation, this is the situation why Mr. Prokofiew does not have to call
evidence, and this is why Mr. Prokofiew did not call evidence. In the context
of [counsel for Mr. Solty’s] statement, well, yes, Mr. Solty testified, but
with respect, Mr. Solty had no choice but to testify. He was implicated at
every turn of these transactions. He was in transactions up to his neck. And as
a result, with respect to him, he had no choice but to take the stand. In
response to Mr. Prokofiew, as I will mention in my submission, the evidence
comes down to the evidence of Mr. Tulloch, and juxtaposed by the evidence of
Peter Solty. With the greatest respect to them, their evidence does not come
close to establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. And in the
context of what Mr. Solty testified to will simply adjust the position of the
evidence of Mr. Tulloch. Nothing more, nothing less. [A.R., vol. V, at pp.
27-28]
[85]
With respect, unlike the Court of Appeal, I
believe these comments by counsel for Mr. Prokofiew lend little curative weight
to the absence of a remedial instruction by the trial judge.
[86]
It is true that “[a]ppellate review of the trial
judge’s charge will encompass the addresses of counsel as they may fill gaps
left in the charge” (R. v. Daley, 2007 SCC 53, [2007] 3 S.C.R.
523, at para. 58). However, we are not dealing in this case with a failure by
the trial judge to mention evidence that is brought to the jury’s attention by
counsel in their closing submissions. Nor are we concerned with uncontested or
uncontroversial matters inadvertently omitted from the judge’s charge. Or with
any other gap of the kind contemplated by Daley.
[87]
That is not our case. Here, the jurors were
faced with conflicting comments by counsel that complicated — rather
than complemented — the “gap” in the judge’s charge. They were left to
determine for themselves, with no assistance from the judge, the evidentiary
and legal effect of Mr. Prokofiew’s failure to testify at trial.
[88]
It is true that the addresses of counsel may in
some circumstances adequately complement the judge’s charge. But that cannot
be so where counsel for two antagonistic accused make diametrically opposite
submissions on a fundamental principle of law, as in this case.
[89]
We have no basis for supposing that the jury
understood, in the absence of an explicit instruction by the judge, which
counsel had stated the law correctly. The jury had no informed reason to
believe one lawyer rather than the other. The guiding hand of the trial judge
was essential — and absent.
[90]
Most importantly, neither the judge’s
instructions cited by the Court of Appeal nor the comments by counsel
for Mr. Prokofiew address the impermissibility of drawing an adverse inference
from Mr. Prokofiew’s silence.
[91]
The essence of the matter is that Mr. Solty’s
counsel had invited the jurors to draw the impermissible inference that Mr.
Prokofiew was using his silence to “cloak his guilt” (Avon, at p. 655).
In the Crown’s words, “[he] suggested [to the jury] that [Mr. Prokofiew] had
not testified because he was guilty of the alleged offences” (R.F., at
para. 2).
[92]
The impugned comments by Mr. Solty’s counsel, as
the trial judge recognized, cried out for an explicit, remedial instruction.
They received no remedial instruction at all. I agree with the Court of Appeal
that “no one knows for sure what the jury used or did not use” (para. 42).
What we do know for sure is that they were left free to treat Mr. Prokofiew’s
failure to testify as evidence of his guilt and to convict him, at least in
part, for that reason.
[93]
In my respectful view, this alone is fatal to
their verdict.
[94]
Trial judges must take care to ensure that the
right to silence becomes neither a snare nor a delusion (Noble, at para.
72). To this end, whenever there is a “significant risk” ― as the trial judge found in this
case ― that the jury will
otherwise treat the silence of the accused as evidence of guilt, an appropriate
remedial direction ought to be given to the jury. That was not done here.
[95]
Standard instructions on the definition of
evidence, the presumption of innocence, the Crown’s burden of proof, and the
reasonable doubt standard will not suffice. That is particularly true where,
as here, counsel for one accused has suggested unmistakably to the jury that
the guilt of a co-accused may be inferred from that person’s failure to
testify.
V
[96]
The judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R.
v. Naglik (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 385, rev’d on other grounds, [1993] 3 S.C.R.
122, has been cited as authority for the proposition that counsel may comment
on the failure of a co-accused to testify (for example, by the Court of Appeal
in this case, at para. 12; see also Crawford, at para. 24; R. v.
Pollock (2004), 188 O.A.C. 37, at para. 149; R. v. Oliver (2005),
194 O.A.C. 284, at para. 65).
[97]
This aspect of the matter has not been fully
canvassed in the courts below. And the outcome of this appeal does not turn on
whether the Court of Appeal in Naglik was correct. I therefore think it
sufficient for present purposes to make clear that Naglik does not
support the proposition that counsel may invite the jury to use a co-accused’s
silence at trial as evidence of guilt, as Mr. Solty’s counsel did in this case.
[98]
First, Naglik was decided several years before
Noble. The Court of Appeal found that the impugned comment by counsel
in that case was, at the time, correct in law (see p. 395). Second, in Naglik
the Court of Appeal went on to say that counsel may not “encourage the jury to
speculate or draw unwarranted inferences” (p. 397). What was an
unwarranted inference then is an impermissible inference now, in virtue of Noble.
Third, this Court expressly declined in Naglik to determine whether
counsel may refer to the failure of a co-accused to testify (p. 137).
[99]
As a matter of principle, I see no reason why
counsel whose client has testified cannot refer to that fact and suggest this
indicates the client is innocent and has “nothing to hide”. Counsel may
certainly emphasize as well that the client’s testimony stands uncontradicted,
even when the client asserts his or her own innocence and imputes guilt to the
co-accused.
[100]
The right to make full answer and defence is not
constrained by the unfavourable impact its effective exercise may have on
others in jeopardy of conviction. It is, however, not absolute and cannot be
exercised with total disregard for the constitutional rights of a co-accused,
including that person’s right not to have his or her silence treated as
evidence of guilt.
VI
[101]
It is uncontested that the trial judge erred in
law by admitting hearsay evidence that ought to have been excluded.
[102]
The impugned evidence consisted of cheque stubs
and a deposit book. The Crown alleged at trial that the stubs and deposit book
recorded cash payments made to Mr. Prokofiew from Discount Sales, one of the
commercial vehicles of the fraud. Counsel for Mr. Prokofiew disputed that the
“E” to which the documents referred was his client, Ewaryst “Eddie” Prokofiew.
[103]
While conceding that the hearsay evidence should
have been excluded, the Crown submits that its erroneous admission is of
negligible significance. As we shall see, I am of a different view.
VII
[104]
We are urged by the Crown to apply the curative proviso
of s. 686(1) (b)(iii) if we conclude, as I would, that the trial
judge erred in law in failing to give the jury the remedial instruction
requested by defence counsel and, again, in admitting the hearsay evidence that
ought to have been excluded.
[105]
It is now well established that the proviso
may only be applied where the Crown satisfies the court that the evidence of
the appellant’s guilt is overwhelming or that the trial judge’s errors of law
were harmless because there is “no realistic possibility that a new trial would
produce a different verdict” (R. v. Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29, [2000]
1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 46; R. v. Sarrazin, 2011 SCC 54, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
505, at paras. 23-24). I am not satisfied that the Crown has discharged its
burden in this case.
[106]
The Court of Appeal held that the case against
Mr. Prokofiew was “overwhelming” (para. 57). This conclusion overlooks the
fact that the strength of the Crown’s case depends on the credibility of the
two witnesses who incriminated Mr. Prokofiew, both disreputable. And it rests
on the assumption that neither of the judge’s errors of law has any bearing on
their credibility, tainted to begin with.
[107]
I refer, of course, to the co-accused, Mr.
Solty, and to Andrew Tulloch, a Crown witness. Mr. Tulloch had pleaded guilty
prior to the trial. They alone asserted that Mr. Prokofiew was the architect
of the fraudulent scheme. None of the Crown’s other witnesses had dealt with
Mr. Prokofiew directly or were able to attest to his knowing participation in
the fraud. Some documentary evidence demonstrated Mr. Prokofiew’s involvement
in the transactions. But nothing in the documents or elsewhere — independent
of Mr. Solty and Mr. Tulloch’s testimony — showed conclusively that he
conducted them with fraudulent intent.
[108]
It was, of course, open to the jury to consider
the testimony of Mr. Solty and Mr. Tulloch credible. Quite properly, however,
the trial judge warned the jury against resting its verdict on their
uncorroborated evidence. Mr. Tulloch was a Vetrovec witness (Vetrovec
v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811). The trial judge therefore
instructed the jury that it would be “dangerous” to rely on his testimony
absent confirmatory evidence (A.R., vol. V, at p. 160). The trial judge also
cautioned the jury against relying on Mr. Solty’s evidence when considering the
case against Mr. Prokofiew:
You
should consider that testimony of Mr. Solty with particular care, because he
may have been more concerned about protecting himself and damaging Mr.
Prokofiew than in telling the truth. [A.R., vol. V, at p. 156]
[109]
In addition, counsel for Mr. Prokofiew suggested
at trial that Mr. Solty was motivated by a powerful animus against Mr.
Prokofiew: Mr. Solty was aware that Mr. Prokofiew had had an affair with Mr.
Solty’s wife.
[110]
When confronted with tainted witnesses of this
sort, triers of fact must act on their evidence with caution (Vetrovec; R.
v. Bevan, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599; R. v. Kehler, 2004 SCC 11, [2004] 1
S.C.R. 328). Accordingly, they will not lightly accept the unsupported
assertions of potentially unreliable witnesses where
little but the word of those witnesses implicates the accused in the commission
of the crime charged (Kehler, at para. 17; Bevan, at pp. 614-15; R. v. Brooks (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 661 (C.A.),
at pp. 694-95).
[111]
And when such witnesses are central to the
Crown’s case, as they were here, corroboration becomes particularly
significant. In this regard, an evidential error that might otherwise appear
insignificant raises particular concern when it goes to the credibility of
potentially unreliable witnesses. Unaware of its erroneous admission, the
trier of fact may rely on the impugned evidence to take a small but critical
first step in a chain of deductions leading to a finding of guilt.
[112]
On any view of the matter, neither of the errors
committed by the trial judge can be characterized as trivial. As I have
already mentioned, the absence of a remedial direction is in my view sufficient
to require a new trial. That error was exacerbated by the erroneous admission
of hearsay evidence. In his charge to the jury, the trial judge referred to
that evidence as tending to corroborate the evidence of Mr. Tulloch (A.R., vol.
V, at p. 161). If they found that it did, this would likely bear as well on
the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of Mr. Solty, whose evidence, the
trial judge said, was in turn corroborated by Mr. Tulloch’s (A.R., vol. V, at
p. 161). And the acceptance of their evidence, I repeat, was essential to the
Crown’s case against Mr. Prokofiew.
[113]
In these circumstances, the Crown cannot be said
to have satisfied its onerous burden in invoking the curative proviso of
s. 686(1) (b)(iii) of the Criminal Code .
VIII
[114]
For all of these reasons, I would allow the
appeal and order a new trial.
Appeal dismissed, McLachlin C.J. and
LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors
for the appellant: Russell Silverstein & Associate, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the respondent: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada: Attorney General
of Canada, Halifax.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Attorney General
of Quebec, Québec.
Solicitors
for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario: Schreck
Presser, Toronto.
Solicitors for the
intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association: Sack Goldblatt
Mitchell, Toronto; Ruby Shiller Chan, Toronto.