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SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
James
Peter Emms
Appellant
and
Her
Majesty the Queen
Respondent
-
and -
Canadian
Civil Liberties Association, British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association,
Ontario Crown Attorneys’ Association, Information and
Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario, David Asper Centre for Constitutional
Rights
and Criminal Lawyers’ Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 51)
|
Moldaver J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel,
Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
|
R. v. Emms, 2012 SCC 74, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 810
James Peter Emms Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
and
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, British
Columbia
Civil Liberties Association, Ontario
Crown Attorneys’
Association, Information and Privacy
Commissioner
of Ontario, David Asper Centre for
Constitutional
Rights and Criminal
Lawyers’ Association Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Emms
2012 SCC 74
File No.: 34087.
2012: March 14 and 15; 2012: December 21.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Criminal
law — Jurors — Selection — Appellant convicted of fraud — Prior to jury
selection, Crown requesting that police conduct criminal record checks of
prospective jurors and also provide comments on whether any prospective jurors
were “disreputable persons” — None of the information received in response by
Crown disclosed to defence — Whether it was appropriate to seek such
information — Whether there should have been disclosure of same — Whether there
is a reasonable possibility that such conduct affected trial fairness or gave
rise to an appearance of unfairness, such that a miscarriage of justice
occurred.
In
2008, following a trial in Barrie, Ontario, E was convicted of three counts of
fraud. His appeal from conviction alleged as one of the grounds of appeal that
there had been improper jury vetting by the Crown Attorney’s office in
conjunction with the police. Prior to the jury selection in E’s trial, the
Crown Attorney’s office had requested that the police conduct inquiries as to
whether potential jurors had a criminal record or whether they were otherwise
“disreputable persons” who would be undesirable as jurors. Information obtained
from these checks was provided to Crown counsel, who used it when exercising
peremptory challenges. The information was not disclosed to the defence,
despite a practice memorandum distributed to Crown offices in Ontario in 2006
directing that any jury vetting carried out by the police was to be restricted
to criminal record checks and that any information obtained was to be disclosed
to the defence. In dismissing E’s appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the
Crown had failed to meet its disclosure obligations, but concluded that there
was no reasonable possibility that the non‑disclosure had any impact on
the partiality of the jury or on the verdict. The court was satisfied that the
selection process had not compromised the overall fairness of the trial. It
also held that the conduct of the Crown and the police did not impact on the
appearance of fairness of the trial and therefore had not occasioned a
miscarriage of justice.
Held:
The appeal should be dismissed.
The
principles governing the propriety of jury vetting and the use of police
databases to check the criminal antecedents of prospective jurors have been
canvassed in R. v. Yumnu, 2012 SCC 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828. They apply
equally to the present appeal. The Crown was entitled to have the police check
the antecedents of prospective jurors for ineligibility and challenge for cause
purposes. It was not entitled to have the police go further and use their
databases to determine if a prospective juror was, or might be, a person of
disreputable character, but, if information of that nature came to light during
a valid criminal record search, it was to be brought to the Crown’s attention. If
the Crown considered it to be relevant to the jury selection process, it was obliged
to disclose the information to the defence.
With
respect to trial fairness, as stated in Yumnu, persons seeking a new
trial must establish, at a minimum, that: (1) the Crown failed to
disclose information relevant to the selection process that it was obliged to
disclose; and (2) had the requisite disclosure been made, there is a
reasonable possibility that the jury would have been differently constituted. In
the case at bar, although the Crown failed to disclose information that was
relevant to the defence in the selection process, E has failed to show that
there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have been differently
composed had the Crown met its disclosure obligations.
With
respect to appearance of unfairness, this case is more troublesome than Yumnu
because at the time of E’s trial, all Crown offices across the Province of
Ontario had received the practice memorandum on criminal record checks and
disclosure. However, while the conduct of the police and the Crown was in some
respects improper and should not be repeated, there is no basis for concluding
that they conspired to obtain a favourable jury. What occurred did not
constitute a serious interference with the administration of justice, nor was
it so offensive to the community’s sense of fair play and decency that the
proceedings should be set aside as a miscarriage of justice.
Cases Cited
Applied:
R. v. Yumnu, 2012 SCC 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777; distinguished: R.
v. Latimer, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46,
s. 638(1) (c).
Authors Cited
Canadian Bar Association. Code of Professional Conduct.
Ottawa: The Association, 2009 (online:
http://www.cba.org).
Law Society of Upper Canada. Rules of Professional Conduct,
updated April 26, 2012 (online: http://www.lsuc.on.ca).
Ontario. Information and Privacy Commissioner. Excessive
Background Checks Conducted on Prospective Jurors: A Special Investigation
Report. Toronto: The Commissioner, 2009.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Rosenberg, Blair and Juriansz JJ.A.),
2010 ONCA 817, 104 O.R. (3d) 201, 264 C.C.C. (3d) 402, 81 C.R. (6th) 267, 272
O.A.C. 248, [2010] O.J. No. 5195 (QL), 2010 CarswellOnt 9069, upholding
the accused’s conviction on three counts of fraud. Appeal dismissed.
Mark C. Halfyard and Daniel Brown, for the appellant.
Michal Fairburn, Deborah
Krick, John S. McInnes and Susan Magotiaux, for the
respondent.
Frank Addario, for
the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Nader R. Hasan
and Gerald Chan, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association.
Paul J. J. Cavalluzzo and Shaun O’Brien, for the intervener the Ontario Crown
Attorneys’ Association.
William S. Challis and Stephen McCammon, for the intervener the Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.
Cheryl Milne and Lisa
Austin, for the intervener the David Asper Centre for Constitutional
Rights.
Anthony Moustacalis
and Peter Thorning, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’
Association.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Moldaver J. —
I. Introduction
[1]
On October 8, 2008, following a 10-day trial in
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice before Salmers J. and a jury, the
appellant, James Emms, was convicted of one count of fraud over $5,000 and two
counts of fraud under $5,000. His appeal from conviction was argued before the
Ontario Court of Appeal (Rosenberg, Blair and Juriansz JJ.A.) on June 28 and
29, 2010. The appellant raised one ground of appeal relating to an evidentiary
ruling and a second ground alleging improper jury vetting by the Crown
Attorney’s office in Barrie, Ontario in conjunction with various police forces
in the Judicial District of Simcoe County.
[2]
On December 3, 2010, Rosenberg J.A., writing for
the court, released detailed reasons for judgment dismissing the appeal (2010
ONCA 817, 104 O.R. (3d) 201).
[3]
The appellant now appeals to this Court, solely
in respect of the jury vetting issue. In brief, he complains that the vetting
of potential jurors by the Crown and the police subverted the jury selection
process and resulted in a jury that, if not favourable to the Crown, might well
have been differently composed had he known of the practice and been advised of
the information obtained from it. Second, he submits that even if his fair
trial rights were not compromised, the conduct of the Crown and the police
amounted to a gross interference with the administration of justice and
resulted in a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial.
[4]
The appellant’s appeal was heard together with
the appeals of Mr. Yumnu, Mr. Cardoso and Mr. Duong (R. v. Yumnu, 2012
SCC 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777 (the “Yumnu appeals”)). All four appeals
emanate from the same jurisdiction and they raise common issues.
[5]
The principles governing the propriety of jury
vetting and the use of police databases to check the criminal antecedents of
prospective jurors have been canvassed in the Yumnu appeals. They apply equally to the present
appeal. What separates this appeal from the Yumnu appeals is the
facts. Specifically, the facts in this appeal are more favourable to the
defence — and that makes this appeal more challenging for the Crown and more
difficult to defend. In the end, while I believe that this case is closer to
the line than the Yumnu appeals, I am not persuaded that the appellant
was deprived of his right to a fair trial. Nor am I satisfied that the conduct
of the Crown and the police, though improper in some respects, can be said to
have crossed the line and occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, I
would dismiss the appeal.
II. Background
[6]
The facts surrounding the jury vetting issue
were presented to the Court of Appeal by way of an Agreed Statement of Facts.
Various documents were appended to the Agreed Statement of Facts, including
memoranda from the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario on background
juror checks, questionnaires completed by several Crown Attorneys in the Barrie
Crown’s office, information about prospective jurors on a marked-up jury panel
list used by the trial Crown during the selection process and evidence
concerning the various databases available to the police.
[7]
Jury selection in the appellant’s trial was
scheduled to begin on September 22, 2008. On September 4, 2008, someone in the
Court Services Division of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General
provided the Barrie Crown’s office with a copy of the jury panel list for the
week of September 22. On September 10, an administrative assistant in the
Crown Attorney’s office sent copies of the jury list to five local Ontario Provincial
Police detachments and the Midland Police Service. Accompanying each list was
a memorandum dated September 10, requesting the police to provide the Crown
with the same information the Crown’s office had sought in the Yumnu appeals
some four years earlier. Among other things, the memorandum included the
following request:
Please check the attached jury panel list, for
the persons listed in your locality, and advise if any of them have criminal
records. We are not able to provide dates of birth.
It
would also be helpful if comments could be made concerning any disreputable
persons we would not want as a juror. All we can ask is that you do your best
considering the lack of information available to us.
[8]
Upon receiving the memorandum and the jury panel
list, checks were carried out by the various police detachments using databases
available only to the police. These databases — mainly the Canadian Police
Information Centre (“CPIC”) and Niche RMS — revealed the criminal records of
prospective jurors, as well as other matters such as outstanding warrants,
court orders, charges, police contacts, and investigations relating to
individuals and locations.
[9]
Information obtained from these checks was sent
to the Crown Attorney’s office in Barrie and turned over to the Crown with
carriage of the trial. As Rosenberg J.A. noted, at para. 39, the
information in question was of limited value. For the most part, it consisted
of notations such as “OK”, “negative”, or “possible”. Crown counsel took the
words “OK” and “negative” to mean that the prospective juror had no prior
criminal record. She took the word “possible” to mean that the prospective juror
might have a criminal record.
[10]
In several instances, the notations suggested
that the individual might have had some involvement with the criminal law, even
though no convictions had been recorded. For example, beside one prospective
juror, the words “CNI [Criminal Name Index] 1995 Drugs no convictions”
appeared.
[11]
None of the information obtained by the police
and forwarded to the Crown was disclosed to the defence, either directly, or
indirectly as had occurred in the Yumnu appeals. By the time the jury
vetting was carried out in this case, all Crown offices across the province of
Ontario had received a Practice Memorandum dated March 31, 2006 (PM [2005] No.
17), directing that criminal record checks, if done, and any concrete
information provided by police to the Crown suggesting that an individual may
not be impartial should be disclosed to the defence. The same memorandum made
it clear that apart from criminal record checks, Crown counsel were not to ask
the police “to undertake an investigation into the list of jurors”, nor were
they to “request police to conduct out-of-court investigations into private
aspects of potential jurors’ lives”.
[12]
As is apparent, the March 31, 2006 Practice
Memorandum was not followed in this case. Disclosure of relevant information
was not made to the defence and the September 10, 2008 memorandum from the
Crown’s office invited the police to go beyond criminal record checks and use
their databases to provide “comments . . . concerning any disreputable persons we would not want as a juror”.
I will have more to say about this in due course.
[13]
During the jury selection process, Crown counsel
used the information she had received from the police when exercising the 12
peremptory challenges she had available to her. Of the prospective jurors on
the Crown’s master list who were shown as possibly having criminal antecedents,
only four were called forward during the peremptory challenge phase of the
selection process. Of those four, the Crown challenged two peremptorily and the
defence challenged the other two (juror roll nos. 5679 and 2818).
[14]
Given her pattern of challenging prospective jurors
with possible criminal records, it is likely that Crown counsel would have
challenged all four of the prospective jurors had defence counsel not
challenged two of them. In other words, the Crown probably gained two
challenges by reason of its failure to make disclosure to the defence.
Conversely, the defence likely lost two challenges.
[15]
As the record shows, at the completion of the
selection process, the Crown had one challenge remaining. But if the Crown had
been required to use two challenges to remove the two prospective jurors the
defence had challenged, it would have been one challenge over its allotted
limit, and would not have been able to challenge prospective juror roll no. 2586
— the last prospective juror challenged by the Crown before the jury was
completed.
III. Findings of the Court of Appeal: The Effect of
Non-Disclosure on Trial Fairness
[16]
The Court of Appeal accepted that the Crown had
failed to meet its disclosure obligations. Information showing that a
potential juror may have had some prior criminal history should have been
turned over to the defence.
[17]
That said, the court concluded that there was
“no reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure had any impact on the
partiality of the jury” (para. 49). The court further found that there was “n[o]
reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure had any impact on the verdict
since, one way or another, jurors 5679 and 2818 [the two prospective jurors
with possible criminal antecedents whom the defence had challenged] were not
going to be on that jury” (para. 50).
[18]
In my view, both findings were available to the
court and I see no basis for interfering with them. In arriving at the second
finding, the court noted that at the end of the jury selection process, because
defence counsel still had two peremptory challenges remaining, the fact that
defence counsel “may have ‘wasted’ two challenges did not impact on the kind of
jury he wanted to try the case” (para. 50). I cannot say that the court was
wrong in coming to that conclusion.
[19]
The more problematic issue is the one I
mentioned earlier. It hinges on the appellant’s submission that if the Crown
had been required to use up two challenges on the two prospective jurors the
defence challenged, it would have had no challenges left for juror roll no.
2586, the last prospective juror actually challenged by the Crown. This was
important, according to the appellant, because juror roll no. 2586
was a senior bankruptcy analyst and official receiver who, because of his
background and training, would have appreciated the appellant’s defence that
while he may have committed a civil wrong, he was not guilty of criminal fraud.
[20]
The Court of Appeal considered the appellant’s
argument in relation to juror roll no. 2586 and rejected it for two reasons.
[21]
First, the court questioned the logic of the
appellant’s reason for wanting juror roll no. 2586 on the jury and found it
“hardly . . . likely” (para. 52) that a bankruptcy analyst and official
receiver would have been helpful to his cause. Second, the court concluded
that “in any event, to suggest that the overall fairness of the trial process
was impacted in those circumstances descends from the reasonably possible to
mere speculation” (para. 52). Ultimately, considering how the jury selection
process had unfolded, the court was satisfied that there was no “actual impact
on the jury selection” (para. 53). Accordingly, it rejected the appellant’s
submission that the selection process had compromised the overall fairness of
the trial.
IV. Analysis: The Effect of Non-Disclosure on Trial
Fairness
[22]
Applying the test set out in the Yumnu appeals,
it is apparent that the first step is satisfied: the Crown failed to disclose
information that was relevant to the defence in the selection process.
However, the appellant has failed to show that there is a reasonable
possibility that the jury would have been differently composed had the Crown
met its disclosure obligations.
[23]
In so concluding, I recognize that whenever one
attempts to put the pieces together after the event, there is bound to be a
certain amount of speculation as to what might (or might not) have occurred had
the aggrieved party been given the information to which it was entitled.
[24]
That said, in the instant case, I cannot accept
the appellant’s premise that if the Crown had been required to challenge the
two prospective jurors (roll nos. 5679 and 2818) whom the defence
challenged, it would have had no challenges left for juror roll no. 2586 — the
bankruptcy analyst and official receiver. On the contrary, I am satisfied on
balance that the Crown would not have been left in that position.
[25]
In exercising its peremptory challenges, the
Crown challenged seven prospective jurors who had the notation “OK” beside
their names. I consider that important. It provides context against which to
measure the appellant’s submission that the Crown would have had no challenges
left for juror roll no. 2586.
[26]
Had the Crown been forced to use two of its
challenges on juror roll nos. 5679 and 2818, I believe it would have been more
cautious in challenging the seven prospective jurors who were shown as being
“OK” and thus record-free. Refraining from challenging even one of those prospective
jurors would have left the Crown with the remaining challenge it needed to
remove juror roll no. 2586 — and I am satisfied that the Crown would have
followed that course. I base that finding on the record and legitimate
inferences that can be drawn from it.
[27]
On the appellant’s scenario, the Crown would
have used up all of its challenges before the twelfth juror had been selected,
thereby leaving the defence with four free challenges and the opportunity to
effectively hand-pick the twelfth juror.
[28]
That is unrealistic. The Crown was obviously
keeping track of the peremptory challenges it was using. It had one challenge
remaining at the conclusion of the jury selection process. I do not put that
down to coincidence but to planning — the same planning that would have
occurred had the Crown been required to use up two of its challenges on juror
roll nos. 5679 and 2818. The Crown was not about to leave itself in the
position of giving free reign to the defence to select the twelfth juror — nor
did it have to. It could and, in my view, would have refrained from
challenging at least one of the prospective jurors noted as “OK” to avoid that
situation.
[29]
Accordingly, the appellant has failed to show
that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have been
differently composed had the Crown complied with its disclosure obligations.
[30]
That brings me to the second issue in this
appeal, namely, whether the conduct of the Crown and the police, which was
improper in some respects, can be said to have crossed the line and occasioned
a miscarriage of justice.
V. Findings of the Court of Appeal: Appearance of Unfairness
[31]
In considering whether the conduct of the Crown
and the police occasioned a miscarriage of justice, the Court of Appeal
considered the following five allegations of wrongdoing raised by the
appellant: “. . . the non-disclosure, the violations of the Juries Act
and provincial privacy legislation, misuse of police databases and the wording
of the [September 10, 2008] memo from the Crown Attorney” (para. 54).
[32]
Before addressing these matters, the court
considered certain contextual elements, one being the process of having
prospective jurors self-report on their criminal record status.
[33]
In a report prepared by the Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario following an investigation into the jury
vetting practices of the Barrie Crown’s office and other Crown offices, the
Commissioner found that the process of self-reporting by prospective jurors was
“seriously flawed” (see Excessive Background Checks Conducted on Prospective
Jurors: A Special Investigation Report (2009), at p. 141).
[34]
In that report, at p. 127, the Commissioner
determined that while it was acceptable for the police to disclose to Crown
counsel criminal record information going to a prospective juror’s eligibility,
it was a breach of provincial privacy legislation to provide other personal
information relating to a prospective juror.
[35]
The Court of Appeal further noted that under the
rules of professional conduct prepared by the Law Society of Upper Canada and
the Canadian Bar Association, inquiries made by the parties for the purpose of
exercising a challenge for cause, including investigations about criminal
records under s. 638(1) (c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46 , were not prohibited (see Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of
Professional Conduct (online), Rule 4.05(1) to (3) and associated
commentary; Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (online),
Rule 21 , note 9). If pertinent information was obtained, it was to be
disclosed to the other side.
[36]
Finally, the court considered the two prospective
jurors whom the defence had “unnecessarily” challenged and pointed out that the
Crown could have brought their possible criminal antecedents to the attention
of the trial judge. The trial judge could then have made inquiries and excused
the prospective jurors on the basis of ineligibility or other reasonable cause,
if warranted.
[37]
Having identified these contextual matters, the
court turned its attention to the alleged wrongdoings.
[38]
Commencing with non-disclosure, the court
acknowledged that the Crown had failed to meet its disclosure obligations. But
in deciding whether a miscarriage of justice had occurred, the court reiterated
its finding that the breach did not have a discernible impact on the
composition of the jury.
[39]
As for the alleged breaches of provincial
privacy legislation, the court found that they “add[ed] nothing to the
miscarriage of justice claim” (para. 59). Any rights infringed were those of
the potential jurors, not the appellant. The rights of prospective jurors had
been investigated by the Information and Privacy Commissioner and
recommendations had been made to better protect the privacy interests of
prospective jurors. According to the court, that was “the appropriate remedy”
(para. 59). It would be “excessive” to grant the appellant a remedy for
breaches committed against potential jurors.
[40]
The court next considered the misuse of police
databases and the memorandum from the Crown Attorney asking for “comments . . .
concerning any disreputable persons we would not want as a juror”. Of the
various allegations of wrongdoing alleged by the appellant, the court found
these two aspects to be “most troubling”:
This
use of police resources and attempt to align the Crown with the police is
inconsistent with Crown counsel’s obligation to ensure that the accused
receives a fair trial. [para. 60]
[41]
Despite this concern, the court felt that “what
occurred must be put in context” (para. 60). Most of the information received
from the police related to criminal record information. In the two instances
where the information went beyond that, one of the prospective jurors was not
called forward in the jury selection process; the other was challenged by the
defence, so there was “no way of knowing how Crown counsel would have used the
information” — which, in any event, “did not impact on the appearance of
fairness of the trial” (para. 60).
[42]
In the end, the court refused to give effect to
the appellant’s submission that the conduct of the Crown and the police had
occasioned a miscarriage of justice. At para. 61, the court stated:
The
collection and disclosure of this information was a misuse of the police
databases and should not have occurred. It would appear to be a product of the
Crown Attorney’s letter, which was improperly worded. But, did this process so
taint the administration of justice that a verdict reached by a properly constituted
jury be set aside? In my view, that would be a disproportionate reaction. The
conduct of the police service and the Crown Attorney’s office is not the kind
of egregious misconduct that brings the administration of justice into
disrepute or would lead reasonable people to believe that the appearance of
justice had been undermined.
VI. Analysis: Appearance of Unfairness
[43]
This case is more troublesome than the Yumnu
appeals because by the time of the appellant’s trial, all Crown offices across
the province of Ontario had received the March 31, 2006 Practice Memorandum to
which I have referred. That memorandum made it clear that any jury vetting
carried out by the police was to be restricted to “criminal record checks” and
that “any concrete information provided by police to the Crown suggesting that
an individual may not be impartial” was to be disclosed to the defence.
[44]
The record is silent as to why that memorandum
was not complied with. Whatever the reason, it is apparent that the Barrie
Crown Attorney’s Office simply continued to carry on the practice it had been
following for some years. That is unacceptable — but I do not put it down to
malevolence or intentional wrongdoing. While disconcerting, the evidence falls
well short of establishing that the police and the Crown conspired to obtain a
jury favourable to their cause.
[45]
At bottom, the Crown wanted to be aware of prospective
jurors who either had a criminal record or who, because of prior involvement
with the authorities, might have difficulty remaining neutral and approaching
the case with an open mind. While the Crown and the police may have gone about
it in the wrong way, the law as to what they could and could not do and how far
they could go in checking out the criminal antecedents of potential jurors was
anything but clear. Certainly, the rules of professional conduct prepared by
the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Canadian Bar Association contemplated
inquiries that went beyond mere criminal record checks and included information
that could form the basis of a challenge for cause.
[46]
The situation in R. v. Latimer, [1997] 1
S.C.R. 217, where the police actually sought out potential jurors and provided
them with a questionnaire designed to obtain their views on a number of issues,
is a stark example of the kind of conduct that the authorities knew, or should
have known, is off-limits and completely unacceptable.
[47]
But short of situations like that, there was a
good deal of grey, not just on the Crown side of the ledger but the defence
side as well, as to the nature and extent of background checking that could
lawfully be carried out and the type of information that must be disclosed,
short of cases involving obvious partiality.
[48]
In the present case, as explained in the Yumnu
appeals, the Crown was entitled to have the police check the antecedents of
prospective jurors for ineligibility purposes and challenge for cause purposes
under s. 638(1) (c) of the Criminal Code . It was not
entitled to have the police go further and use their databases to determine if
a prospective juror was, or might be, a person of disreputable character. By
the same token, if, by chance, information of that nature were to come to light
during a valid criminal record search, it would be proper to bring it to the
Crown’s attention. If the Crown considered it to be relevant to the jury
selection process, it would be obliged to disclose the information to the
defence.
[49]
In sum, there is no basis for concluding that
the Crown and the police conspired to obtain a jury favourable to their cause.
Nor can it be said that the errors they made in carrying out the process —
going beyond criminal record checks and failing to disclose information of
discreditable conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction — were so obvious
and so clearly wrong that they knew, or should have known, better. What
occurred here is a far cry from the conduct at issue in Latimer —
conduct which was manifestly inappropriate and which this Court condemned as “a
flagrant abuse of process and interference with the administration of justice”
(para. 43).
[50]
In the end, while the conduct of the police and
the Crown was in some respects improper and should not be repeated, I am not
persuaded that what occurred here constituted a serious interference with the
administration of justice, nor was it so offensive to the community’s sense of
fair play and decency that the proceedings should be set aside as a miscarriage
of justice.
VII. Conclusion
[51]
The appellant had a fair trial and I am not
persuaded that the conduct of the Crown and the police crossed the line and
occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.
Solicitors
for the appellant: Rusonik, O’Connor, Robbins, Ross, Gorham &
Angelini, Toronto; Daniel Brown Law Office, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the respondent: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors
for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association: Addario
Law Group, Toronto.
Solicitors
for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Ruby
Shiller Chan Hasan, Toronto.
Solicitors
for the intervener the Ontario Crown Attorneys’ Association: Cavalluzzo
Hayes Shilton McIntyre & Cornish, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario: Information
and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the intervener the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights: University
of Toronto, Toronto.
Solicitors for the
intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association: Anthony Moustacalis,
Toronto; Brauti Thorning Zibarras, Toronto.