SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Suresh
Sriskandarajah
Appellant
and
United
States of America, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Respondents
-
and -
Attorney
General of Ontario, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia
Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
And
Between:
Piratheepan
Nadarajah
Appellant
and
United
States of America, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Respondents
-
and -
Attorney
General of Ontario, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia
Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell
and Karakatsanis JJ.
|
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 37)
|
McLachlin C.J. (LeBel, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
|
Sriskandarajah v. United States of America, 2012 SCC 70,
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 609
Suresh Sriskandarajah Appellant
v.
United States of America, Minister of
Justice
and Attorney General of Canada Respondents
and
Attorney
General of Ontario, Canadian Civil Liberties
Association
and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
- and -
Piratheepan Nadarajah Appellant
v.
United
States of America, Minister of Justice
and Attorney
General of Canada Respondents
and
Attorney
General of Ontario, Canadian Civil Liberties
Association
and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: Sriskandarajah v. United States of
America
2012 SCC 70
File Nos.: 34009, 34013.
2012: June 11; 2012: December 14.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Constitutional law —
Charter of Rights — Mobility rights — Extradition — Minister ordering surrender
of Canadian citizens to U.S. authorities to be tried there on terrorism charges
— Whether extradition violates right to remain in Canada even when foreign
state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or when prosecution in Canada is feasible
— Whether surrender decisions unreasonable on the evidence — Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, s. 6(1) — Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 .
Administrative law —
Natural justice — Procedural fairness — Minister providing all materials
considered in making decisions to surrender, except legal advice — Whether
procedural fairness required minister to obtain and disclose Canadian
prosecutorial authority’s assessment of whether to prosecute in Canada.
After the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice found that there was sufficient evidence to commit S and N, who are
Canadian citizens, for extradition to the United States to be tried there on charges related to their alleged
support of a terrorist organization, the Minister of Justice ordered
their surrender. Those decisions were subsequently upheld on appeal.
Held:
The appeals should be dismissed.
Extradition does not violate the
right of citizens to remain in Canada under s. 6(1) of the Charter ,
even when the foreign state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or when prosecution
in Canada is feasible. To hold otherwise would amount to overruling United
States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, United States of
America v. Kwok, 2001 SCC 18, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532, and Lake v. Canada
(Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761. No compelling
reasons have been shown to depart from the principles set out in those cases.
Extradition does not violate the core values of s. 6(1) . Rather, it
fulfills the needs of an effective criminal justice system. The decision to
extradite is a complex matter, involving numerous factual, geopolitical,
diplomatic and financial considerations. The Minister of Justice has superior
expertise in this regard, and his discretion is not conclusively bound by any
of the Cotroni factors. The ability of Canada to prosecute the offences
remains but one factor in the inquiry; nor is the strength of the foreign
jurisdiction’s claim to prosecute always determinative.
Here, the record shows that the
Minister properly considered and weighed the factors relevant to the situations
of S and N. The Minister did not ascribe
determinative weight to the fact that charges were not laid against them in
Canada, and he conducted an independent Cotroni assessment. His
conclusion that there were sufficient links to the U.S. to justify extradition
flowed from this independent assessment and has not been shown to be
unreasonable on the evidence.
The claim of procedural unfairness
has not been established. S and N’s request for disclosure of the assessment
of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada on whether to prosecute them in
Canada is a thinly disguised attempt to impugn the state’s legitimate exercise
of prosecutorial authority. Procedural fairness does not require the Minister
to obtain and disclose every document that may be indirectly connected to the
process that ultimately led him to decide to extradite.
S and N’s challenge to the
constitutionality of the Canadian terrorism provisions corresponding to the
alleged conduct for which they are sought in the U.S. is considered (and
dismissed) in the companion case, R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3
S.C.R. 555.
Cases Cited
Discussed: United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469; United States of America v.
Kwok, 2001 SCC 18, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532; Lake v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), 2008 SCC 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761; referred to: R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555; R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v.
Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
Statutes and Regulations
Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
ss. 1 , 2 , 6(1) , 7 .
Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, ss. 3 ,
7 .
International Transfer of Offenders Act,
S.C. 2004, c. 21 .
Authors Cited
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England,
4th ed., Book I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1770.
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal (Doherty, Moldaver and Cronk JJ.A.), 2010 ONCA 859, 109 O.R. (3d) 662, 278 O.A.C.
1, 266 C.C.C. (3d) 447, 81 C.R. (6th) 285, [2010] O.J. No. 5473 (QL), 2010
CarswellOnt 9667, affirming a committal order of Pattillo J., 95 O.R. (3d) 514, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 281, 2009
CanLII 9482, [2009] O.J. No. 946 (QL), 2009 CarswellOnt 1524, and a
decision of the Minister of Justice dated November 17, 2009, ordering the
surrender of the appellant to the United States of America. Appeal dismissed.
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal (Doherty, Moldaver and Cronk JJ.A.), 2010 ONCA 857, 109 O.R. (3d) 680, 275 O.A.C.
121, 266 C.C.C. (3d) 435, 223 C.R.R. (2d) 339, [2010] O.J. No. 5474 (QL), 2010
CarswellOnt 9674, affirming a committal order of Pattillo J., 95 O.R. (3d) 514, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 281, 2009
CanLII 9482, [2009] O.J. No. 946 (QL), 2009 CarswellOnt 1524, and a
decision of the Minister of Justice dated November 17, 2009, ordering the
surrender of the appellant to the United States of America. Appeal dismissed.
John Norris, Breese Davies, Brydie Bethell and
Erin Dann, for the appellants.
Croft Michaelson, Nancy Dennison and Sean Gaudet,
for the respondents.
Michael Bernstein, for the intervener the Attorney General
of Ontario.
Anil K. Kapoor and Lindsay L. Daviau, for the
intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Kent Roach and Michael Fenrick, for the
intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
[1]
The Chief Justice — The Minister of Justice has ordered the surrender of the
appellants, who are Canadian citizens, to the United States to be tried there
on terrorism charges, related to their alleged support of the Liberation Tigers
of the Tamil Eelam (“Tamil Tigers or LTTE”), a terrorist organization involved
in insurgency in Sri Lanka.
1. Overview
[2]
Suresh Sriskandarajah is alleged to have
assisted the Tamil Tigers in researching and acquiring submarine and warship
design software, communications equipment and other technology. He is said to
have helped smuggle items into territory controlled by the Tamil Tigers. He is
also alleged to have laundered money for the Tamil Tigers and to have
counselled individuals on how to smuggle goods to them in Sri Lanka.
[3]
Piratheepan Nadarajah is alleged to have been
part of a group of four individuals who attempted to purchase on behalf of the
Tamil Tigers both surface to air missiles and AK-47s from an undercover police
officer posing as a black market arms dealer in Long Island, New York. The
undercover officer had arranged the meeting with one Mr. Sarachandran, who had
allegedly named Nadarajah as his armaments expert in telephone conversations.
[4]
In 2006, the United States of America requested
the Canadian Minister of Justice for the extradition of both appellants to
stand trial in the U.S., on various terrorism-related charges. Pattillo J. of
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that there was sufficient evidence
to commit the appellants for extradition on terrorism charges ((2009), 95 O.R.
(3d) 514). In decisions dated November 17, 2009, the Minister of Justice
ordered the surrender of the appellants to the United States. These decisions
were subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal (2010 ONCA 857, 109 O.R. (3d)
680, and 2010 ONCA 859, 109 O.R. (3d) 662).
2. Issues
[5]
The appellants oppose their extradition on four grounds: (1) that the
conduct alleged against them apart from association with the LTTE is not
criminal conduct because the Canadian terrorism provisions corresponding to the
alleged conduct for which the appellants are sought in the United States are
unconstitutional; (2) that extradition violates s. 6(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms , which guarantees the right of citizens to
remain in Canada, when the foreign state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or
when prosecution in Canada is feasible; (3) that the Minister’s review of
the extradition order did not comply with the requirements of procedural
fairness; and (4) that the surrender decisions were unreasonable in all the
circumstances.
3. Are the Canadian Terrorism
Offences Unconstitutional?
[6]
The Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 ,
requires that the conduct for which extradition is sought be an offence in
Canada: s. 3 . The appellants challenge the constitutionality of the Canadian
terrorism offences relied on in the Authority to Proceed. Pattillo J. and the
Court of Appeal rejected these arguments.
[7]
I consider the constitutionality of the impugned Canadian terrorism
provisions in the companion case, R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3
S.C.R. 555, concluding that they do not infringe the rights protected under ss.
2 and 7 of the Charter . For the reasons there stated, this ground of
appeal is dismissed.
4. What
Is the Scope of the Right to Remain in Canada Under Section 6(1) of the Charter ?
[8]
Section 6(1) of the Charter provides that “[e]very citizen of
Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada”. This Court
first analyzed the rapport between extradition and the right to remain in
Canada in United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
The scheme proposed in Cotroni was subsequently confirmed and refined in
United States of America v. Kwok, 2001 SCC 18, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532, and
in Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
761. From this jurisprudence, six principles provide guidance to respond to
the interpretation of s. 6(1) proposed by the appellants.
(a) The Jurisprudence
[9]
First, Cotroni, Kwok and Lake hold that extradition
constitutes a marginal limitation of the s. 6(1) right to remain in Canada. Although
the surrender of a Canadian citizen to a foreign country impairs the
individual’s right to remain on Canadian soil, s. 6(1) is primarily aimed
against exile and banishment, i.e. exclusion from membership in the national
community. As a consequence, this limitation “lies at the outer edges of the
core values” of s. 6(1) : Cotroni, at p. 1481.
[10]
Second, and flowing from the previous point, extradition will be
generally warranted under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limitation
of the right to remain in Canada: Cotroni, at p. 1483; Lake, at
para. 37. This is supported by the pressing and substantial objectives of
extradition: (1) protecting the public against crime through its
investigation; (2) bringing fugitives to justice for the proper determination
of their criminal liability; (3) ensuring, through international
cooperation, that national boundaries do not serve as a means of escape from
the rule of law.
[11]
Third, the Minister’s discretion to extradite or to prosecute in Canada
is a necessary condition for the effective enforcement of the criminal law, and
it attracts a high degree of deference: Cotroni, at p. 1497; Kwok,
at paras. 93-96; Lake, at para. 34. The Minister’s assessment of whether
the infringement of a fugitive’s s. 6(1) right is justified under s. 1 involves
a determination of whether, based on his superior expertise of Canada’s
international obligations and interests, Canada should defer to the interests
of the requesting state. This is mostly a political decision. Courts should
interfere with the Minister’s discretion only in the “clearest of cases” (Lake,
at para. 30).
[12]
Fourth, ministerial discretion to extradite is not unfettered. Public
authorities must give due regard and weight to the citizen’s Charter
right to remain in Canada in considering whether to prosecute domestically or
order surrender. The Minister must order surrender only if satisfied that
extradition is more appropriate than domestic prosecution, having balanced all
factors which he finds relevant under the circumstances, such as:
• Where was the impact of the offence felt or likely to have been
felt?
• Which
jurisdiction has the greater interest in prosecuting the offence?
• Which
police force played the major role in the development of the case?
• Which
jurisdiction has laid charges?
• Which
jurisdiction has the most comprehensive case?
• Which
jurisdiction is ready to proceed to trial?
• Where
is the evidence located?
• Is
the evidence mobile?
• How
many accused are involved and can they be gathered together in one place for
trial?
• In
what jurisdiction were most of the acts in furtherance of the crime committed?
• What
is the nationality and residence of the accused?
• What
is the severity of the sentence that the accused is likely to receive in each
jurisdiction?
[13]
Fifth, no single factor is dispositive. Nor need all relevant factors
be given equal weight. The Minister may decide to grant an extradition request
because of one factor which he finds determinative in a given case. The
pertinence and significance of the “Cotroni factors” vary from case to
case: Lake, at para. 30. Nothing precludes the Minister from
paying more heed to one factor than another in a given case. The inquiry is
essentially a fact-based, balancing assessment within the expertise of the
Minister.
[14]
Sixth, the question of whether a Canadian prosecution is a realistic
option is simply one factor that must be considered. It is not the
determinative factor in the Minister’s assessment: Cotroni, at p. 1494; Kwok,
at para. 92; Lake, at para. 37. In Kwok, Arbour J. noted that
“[t]he efficacy of a prosecution goes beyond simply determining whether it has
any chance of resulting in a conviction. It requires an assessment, in the
public interest, of all the costs and risks involved, including delay,
inconvenience to witnesses and applicable rules” (para. 90). In addition, the
interest of the foreign nation in prosecuting the fugitive on its territory
must not be neglected. Indeed, it would not be wrong for a Minister, after
having pondered all the relevant factors, to “yield to the superior interest of
the Requesting State, even in a case where some form of prosecution in Canada
[was] not materially impossible or totally unlikely to succeed” (Kwok,
at para. 91).
(b) Should the Jurisprudence be Reconsidered?
[15]
The appellants ask the Court to reconsider Cotroni.
First, they submit that extradition should no longer automatically be seen as a
marginal limitation of the right to remain in Canada, “l[ying] at the outer
edges of the core values” protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter
(Sriskandarajah factum, at para. 37). They submit that where a citizen is
sought by a foreign country which has a weak claim of jurisdiction “by Canadian
lights”, extradition should be seen as a more serious infringement of s. 6(1)
than contemplated in Cotroni (at para. 52). They say this evolution is
needed because of recent trends in extradition and criminal justice, in
particular the emergence of sweeping claims of jurisdiction by foreign states
over the conduct of Canadian citizens within Canadian territory.
[16]
On the basis of this revised interpretation of
s. 6(1) , the appellants argue that two factors should have near-dispositive
weight in the s. 1 analysis: (1) a weak claim of jurisdiction by the foreign
state; and (2) a realistic possibility of prosecuting in Canada. They argue
that if the requesting state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or there is a
realistic possibility of prosecuting a citizen in Canada for the crimes, the
Minister will not be justified in ordering the surrender of the citizen in
question.
[17]
To accept the appellant’s propositions would
amount to overruling Cotroni, Kwok and Lake. The
appellants’ interpretation of s. 6(1) of the Charter departs from the Cotroni
jurisprudence in two important ways. First, it rejects the proposition
that extradition is a marginal limitation of the right to remain in Canada.
Second, it abandons the view that ministerial discretion is not conclusively
bound by any of the Cotroni factors.
[18]
The Court does not lightly depart from the law
set out in the precedents. Adherence to precedent has long animated the common
law: “. . . it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation” (W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England (4th ed. 1770), Book I, at p. 69). The rule of precedent, or stare
decisis, promotes predictability, reduces arbitrariness, and enhances
fairness, by treating like cases alike.
[19]
Exceptionally, this Court has recognized that it
may depart from its prior decisions if there are compelling reasons to do so: R.
v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 44. The benefits must
outweigh the costs. For instance, compelling reasons will be found when a
precedent has become unworkable, when its validity has been undermined by
subsequent jurisprudence or when it has been decided on the basis of
considerations that are no longer relevant.
[20]
No compelling reasons have been shown to depart
from the principles set out in Cotroni, Kwok and Lake. These
principles have been consistently and repeatedly upheld by this Court. The
common theme is that extradition, unlike exile and banishment, does not lie at
the core of the right to remain in Canada under s. 6(1) of the Charter .
A Canadian citizen who is extradited to stand trial in a foreign state does not
necessarily become persona non grata: the accused may return to Canada
if he is acquitted or, if he is convicted, at the end of his sentence or even
to serve his sentence in accordance with the International Transfer of
Offenders Act, S.C. 2004, c. 21 . Extradition does not violate the
core values of s. 6(1) , but rather, it fulfills the needs of an effective
criminal justice system.
[21]
The appellants have not shown that the
considerations on which Cotroni (1989), Kwok (2001) and Lake (2008)
were based are no longer valid. If anything, the march of globalization calls
for increased international cooperation in law enforcement.
[22]
The decision to extradite is a complex matter,
involving numerous factual, geopolitical, diplomatic and financial
considerations. A strong factor in one case may be a weak factor in another.
This supports maintaining a non-formalistic test that grants flexibility to the
Minister’s decision when faced with a foreign state’s request. The Minister of
Justice has superior expertise in this regard, and his discretion is necessary
for the proper enforcement of the criminal law.
[23]
More particularly, the case for elevating either
of the factors on which the appellants rely to near-dispositive factors has not
been made. It is for the Minister to decide whether granting the foreign
state’s request of extradition is appropriate in the circumstances. The
ability of Canada to prosecute the offences remains but one factor in this
inquiry, and may be offset by other factors, such as where the prosecution may
most efficaciously be carried out. Extradition is not to be avoided at all
costs. In an age when crimes span borders, states should not be reduced to
piecemeal prosecutions of one perpetrator in one jurisdiction and another in
another jurisdiction. Nor is the strength of the foreign jurisdiction’s claim
to prosecute always determinative. It is one factor among others. A highly
tenuous claim of jurisdiction might be a reason to refuse extradition, to be
sure. However, a weak claim does not conclusively entail an unjustified breach
of s. 6(1) . Rather, the weakness of a claim of jurisdiction informs the
reasonableness of the Minister’s decision, which I discuss later.
5. The Argument on Procedural Fairness
[24]
The appellants argue that the Minister’s duty of
procedural fairness goes beyond providing reasons to explain which Cotroni factors
prompted his decision. Procedural fairness, they say, also requires the
Minister of Justice to obtain and disclose the assessment of the Public
Prosecution Service of Canada (“PPSC”) on whether to prosecute them in Canada.
The appellants argue that they should be given time to respond to the
prosecution assessment by the PPSC, following which the Minister should address
their concerns in his final decision to extradite. They submit that disclosure
is important because the decision not to lay charges in Canada was a key factor
in the final decision to extradite. They add that this would ensure that the prosecutorial
authorities’ assessment was not based on erroneous or outdated information.
[25]
The Minister refused the appellants’ requests
for this information, stating that he had provided the appellants with all of
the materials which he had considered in making the decisions on surrender,
with the exception of legal advice, and that he had not been provided with a
copy of any PPSC assessment. With respect to the PPSC’s assessment of
prosecution in Canada, the Minister took the position that the decision whether
to prosecute in Canada was only one of many relevant factors, and pointed out
that the appellant’s right of appeal was from the decision to extradite, not
the decision whether to prosecute, which involves prosecutorial discretion.
(See Minister’s Reasons on Surrender re Sriskandarajah, A.R., vol. I, at pp.
50-51; see also Minister’s reasons on Surrender re Nadarajah, at pp. 58-59.)
[26]
The appellants’ submission that they are
entitled to see the PPSC’s prosecution assessment cannot be sustained.
[27]
First and foremost, prosecutorial authorities
are not bound to provide reasons for their decisions, absent evidence of bad
faith or improper motives: Kwok, at paras. 104-108. Not only does
prosecutorial discretion accord with the principles of fundamental justice — it
constitutes an indispensable device for the effective enforcement of the
criminal law: Cotroni, at pp. 1497-98. The appellants do not allege bad
faith. Their request to see the prosecution assessment is a thinly disguised
attempt to impugn the state’s legitimate exercise of prosecutorial authority.
[28]
Second, as the Minister pointed out, the ability
to prosecute in Canada is but one of many factors to be considered in deciding
whether to extradite a person for prosecution in another country. Procedural
fairness does not require the Minister to obtain and disclose every document
that may be indirectly connected to the process that ultimately led him to
decide to extradite.
[29]
Finally, concerns that the decision may have
been based on outdated information are met by the appellants’ ability to bring
full and correct information to the attention of the Minister. In turn, the
Minister must, in good faith, transfer to the prosecution authorities the
information he finds relevant.
[30]
As a matter of procedural fairness, full Stinchcombe-type
disclosure is not required at the surrender stage: R. v. Stinchcombe,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. The Minister must present the fugitive with adequate
disclosure of the case against him or her, and with a reasonable opportunity to
state his or her case against surrender (Kwok, at paras. 99 and 104),
and he must provide sufficient reasons for his decision to surrender (Lake,
at para. 46; Kwok, at para. 83). In this case, the Minister complied
with these requirements.
[31]
I conclude that the claim of procedural
unfairness has not been established.
6. Were the Minister’s Decisions Unreasonable?
[32]
The appellants argue that the Minister’s decisions to
order their surrender to the United States was unreasonable because he failed
to consider all relevant factors bearing on the Cotroni assessment. In
particular, they submit, the Minister failed to address (1) the weak American
claim of jurisdiction over the appellants’ alleged conduct, and (2) the ability
to prosecute in Canada. Accordingly, extradition was an unjustifiable
limitation on the appellants’ s. 6(1) rights.
[33]
As explained above, the Minister’s order of surrender is a
political decision that attracts a high degree of judicial deference. The Extradition
Act confers broad discretion on the Minister’s decision to extradite: s.
7 .
[34]
In these cases, the record shows that the Minister
properly considered and weighed the factors relevant to the situation of the
appellants. With respect to the appellants’ first concern, the Minister found
that the “negative impact of [their] actions, when considered in concert with
the alleged actions of [their] many co-conspirators, would have been felt in
jurisdictions outside of Canada”, implicitly including the United States (A.R.,
vol. I, at pp. 54 and 60). Additionally, it seems clear on the facts alleged
here that the conduct described is connected in one way or another with the use
of e-mail accounts, companies and bank accounts based within the United
States. With respect to the appellants’ second concern, the Minister
considered whether prosecution should proceed in Canada and concluded that this
factor did not negate extradition.
[35]
In concluding that extradition was a justifiable
limitation of the appellants’ s. 6(1) right, the Minister provided five reasons
which were relevant: the investigation was initiated and developed by American
authorities; charges have been laid in the U.S.; the U.S. is ready to proceed
to trial; all of the co-accuseds have been charged in the U.S.; and most of the
witnesses are located in the U.S. Contrary to the suggestion of the appellants
(Sriskandarajah factum, at paras. 78-82), the Minister did not ascribe
determinative weight to the fact that the PPSC decided not to lay charges in
Canada against them. The Minister conducted an independent Cotroni
assessment and concluded that the surrender of the appellants would not
unjustifiably violate their s. 6(1) rights, principally on the basis of the
fact that the U.S. had taken the lead in investigating and prosecuting the
actions of the appellants. The Minister’s conclusion that there were sufficient
links to the U.S. to justify extradition flowed from this independent
assessment and has not been shown to be unreasonable on the evidence.
[36]
The claim that the Minister’s decision was
unreasonable must be rejected.
7. Conclusion
[37]
The appeals are dismissed and the orders of
surrender confirmed.
Appeals dismissed.
Solicitors for the
appellants: John Norris, Toronto; Di Luca Copeland Davies, Toronto.
Solicitor for the
respondents: Attorney General of Canada, Toronto; Attorney General
of Canada, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the intervener the
Attorney General of Ontario: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association: Kapoor Barristers, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener the
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Paliare, Roland,
Rosenberg, Rothstein, Toronto.
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