Docket: T-928-15
Citation:
2016 FC 1062
Ottawa, Ontario, September 20, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
BETWEEN:
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MURRAY WILKINSON,
JERRY JESSO, CHRISTOPHER ARGUE,
JAMES BASTARACHE, CATHERINE BLACK,
CYNTHIA BURNS, LAURA CLARKE, RICHARD
CUZZETTO, ANGELO DE RIGGI, JEFF DUNK,
GEORGE DURSTON, JACQUES FRECHETTE,
LILY-CLAUDE FORTIN, FRANK GONCALVES,
NELSON GUAY, CLAUDE HARVEY, MARK HASTIE,
MARK HAYES, FANNY HO, ALANA HUNTLEY,
MARK KAPICZOWSKI, KEVIN KELLY, ROSE-ANN JANG,
ALAN JOHNS, ANGELIA JOHNSON, CAMERON JUNG,
BOB LEDOUX, ROBERT LOHNES, INA MACRAE,
DEBBIE MAIN, GREGORY MCKENNA,
SHANE MCKINNON, KAREN MCMAHON,
MAUREEN MILLER, MANJIT SINGH MOORE,
RON NAULT, FIONA NORTHCOTE, HENRY PETERS,
LINDA ROBERTSON, RALPH SCHOENIG,
PATRICK SCOTT, DARLENE STAMP,
RICHARD STEFANIUK, DOUG TISDALE,
KEITH WATKINS, HARALD WUIGK
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Applicants
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicants seek judicial review of a
decision of the Deputy Head of the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA], dated
May 19, 2015, refusing to adopt the recommendation of the Classification
Grievance Committee [Committee] to reclassify their occupational position from
FB-06 to FB-07.
[2]
The Applicants submit that the Deputy Head
relied on irrelevant considerations and that the decision was unreasonable. They
seek an order quashing the decision and sending it back for re-determination.
[3]
For the reasons that follow, I will allow this
application.
[4]
The Applicants each hold the position of Manager,
Regional Programs [MRP] at the CBSA. This position is currently classified at
the FB-06 group and level. In 2007, they filed a grievance under the Public
Service Labour Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22 seeking a reclassification of their
position to the FB-07 group and level. The grievance was considered by the
Committee which agreed that the position should be classified as FB-07. The
Committee made a recommendation to the Deputy Head to that effect. In February
2013, the Deputy Head refused the recommendation.
[5]
The fundamental point of difference between the
Committee and the Deputy Head rested on their respective rating of one factor -
Decision Making. The Committee was of the view that the evidence justified
that this factor’s rating be increased to degree 6; whereas the Deputy Head was
of the view that it should remain at degree 5. A degree 6 in Decision Making
would allow the MRP position to be reclassified as FB-07.
[6]
The Applicants filed an application for judicial
review of the Deputy Head’s decision. Justice Roy of this Court allowed the
application and found that the Deputy Head’s decision was unintelligible: Wilkinson
v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 741 at para 44, 243 ACWS (3d) 367:
In a case like this one, the reasons given
to depart from a well-articulated recommendation must be intelligible, in the
sense that they “are able to be understood” (The Canadian Oxford Dictionary,
2001, sub verbo, “intelligible”). With great respect, the decision does
not have that measure of intelligibility. It seems to contemplate statements
made with respect to degrees 7 and 6 as if they related to degrees 6 and 5. If
that is not what the decision actually meant, the respondent has been incapable
of enlightening the Court either by providing an alternate meaning. The
respondent also seems to rely on “the intention behind … the position” in order
to take the analysis outside of the job description that is at the heart of the
grievance adjudication. Finally it faults the Committee for not having
considered the organizational context, where it would appear that the Committee
considered that context. If the Deputy Head disagreed with the findings on
that account, he did not express where his disagreement lies. At the end of
the day, this reviewing court is left without understanding “why the tribunal
made its decision” (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, supra,
para 16).
[7]
In May 2015, the Deputy Head issued the
re-determination decision and once again refused the Committee’s recommendation,
apparently on the basis that the positions at issue are provided guidance and
additional scrutiny by regional managers:
The ratings of the
new decision differ from that of the Committee on one element, Decision
Making. Where the Committee argues that the work of the MRP position is
greater than degree 5 and warrants a degree 6, the President is of the view
that the MRP position’s decision making responsibilities are less than degree 6
and similar to degree 5. The disagreement with the Committee’s rating is the
importance given by the Committee members to the guidance and substantive
nature of the MRP’s decisions and recommendations.
After review of the degree 6 definition, in
conjunction with the general guidelines of the Application Guidelines and
corresponding examples of work activities; I am of the opinion that the
guidance provided to the MRP positions and the additional scrutiny by regional
managers are such that the MRP positions do not warrant a degree 6 allocation.
[emphasis added]
[8]
The Respondent in submitting that it is open to
the Deputy Head to disagree with the recommendation of the Committee noted that
both “operate under a particular and specialized regime
which reflects a high level of expertise.” Indeed the Committee is
comprised of three individuals knowledgeable in classification issues and
experienced in the use of the relevant classification standard. In the present
case, they submitted a unanimous recommendation to the Deputy Head which
Justice Roy found to be a careful examination comprising some 22 pages.
[9]
The Respondent submits that the Deputy Head “is best placed to know and understand the decision-making
process of his Agency, including the process from ‘top to bottom’ and the role
of the various levels of management in that decision-making process.”
Undoubtedly this is true. While I accept the submission of the Respondent that
this Court has stated in Bourdeau v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC
1089, 258 ACWS (3d) 736 that the process is not a simple matching of words in
the position description and the classification standard, this does not suggest
that the words in the position description are to be ignored or are not to be considered
when examining the position’s content and duties.
[10]
Indeed, in this case the classification request
could not be considered until there was agreement between the parties on the
job description. This illustrates just how relevant the work description is
when the Deputy Head examines “the process from ‘top to
bottom’ and the role of the various levels of management in that
decision-making process.”
[11]
One of the documents before the Deputy Head when
the decision was made was a chart prepared by his human resources officials
relating to the decision-making element of the position in question. That
chart excerpts portions of the work description statements for the MRP position
and juxtapositions them to the Classification Standard, Application Guidelines,
and Examples of Work Activities [EWAs] of levels 5 and 6.
[12]
I accept the Applicants’ submission that the
chart was significantly deficient in that it ignored or omitted relevant
aspects of the MRP work description that arguably correspond to the degree 6 EWAs
and which could reasonably have led to a finding by the Deputy Head to accept
the Committee’s recommendation. I am persuaded that it is more likely than not
that the Deputy Head gave considerable weight to this chart because the areas
in which it is deficient are the areas the Deputy Head appears to have focused
on in reaching the decision that the MRP position was not at degree 6 of
decision-making but at degree 5.
[13]
In a classification exercise, the work
description must be evaluated against the appropriate classification standard,
and it is an error to modify the work description or refuse to consider the
duties and activities in the work description: Wilkinson v Canada (Attorney
General), 2014 FC 741 at para 9, 243 ACWS (3d) 367; Allard v Canadian
Food Inspection Agency, 2012 FC 979 at paras 26 and 39, 417 FTR 1.
[14]
The significant omissions in the chart
demonstrate that the MRP work description was modified and not considered in
full by the Deputy Head. The chart omits portions of the MRP work description
that largely match the EWAs for degree 6 decision-making. Had these portions
of the work description been before the Deputy Head, his decision might well
have been different. Even with what was before him, counsel for the Respondent
conceded that he could have rated it as a 6 rather than a 5 because
classification is an art, not a science.
[15]
I agree with the Respondent that the materials
before the Deputy Head may be considered as part of the reasons: See Wanis v
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2013 FC 963 at para 21.
[16]
The Respondent submits that the Deputy Head is
assumed to have weighed and considered all the evidence presented and that he
is not required to address every excerpt in the work description that is
inconsistent with the language that he accepts. As a general proposition, this
is sound; however, where the aspects of the work description that are not addressed
strongly support a contrary result, the decision-maker must expressly indicate
that they have been considered and explain the reasoning for reaching a
decision that appears contrary to that evidence. Here there is no such
indication. Moreover, the fact that these relevant portions of the work
description were omitted from the chart prepared for the Deputy Head makes it a
reasonable inference that they were not in fact considered by the Deputy Head
in reaching his decision.
[17]
For these reasons, the decision must be set
aside again and referred back to the Deputy Head for a redetermination in which
the entire work description of the MRP position is considered.
[18]
The Applicants are entitled to their costs.
They seek costs at an elevated level given that this is the second time they
have had to have the decision reviewed and for the inordinate delays from the
time of the Committee’s decision to the time of the Deputy Head’s decision. It
was suggested that something in the order of $12,000 to $15,000 would be
appropriate. The Respondent proposed something in the range of $5,000 to
$6,000.
[19]
In my assessment, given the volume of materials
produced, the late filing of the chart upon which the decision largely turns,
and the fact that this is the second time the decision has had to be reviewed an
award of $8,000 is appropriate.