Docket: T-1499-15
Citation: 2016 FC 918
Ottawa,
Ontario, July 12, 2016
PRESENT:
Madam Prothonotary Mandy Aylen
BETWEEN:
|
CHARLES NORMAN
HOLMES
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Plaintiff
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN AND
THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR CANADA
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Defendants
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ORDER
AND REASONS
[1]
On February 12, 2016, the Attorney General of
Canada moved on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada [the Federal
Crown], pursuant to Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules, for an order
pursuant to subsection 40(1) of the Federal Courts Act that the
Plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant and be prohibited from bringing
further proceedings in this Court without the prior approval of this Court, and
for lump sum costs in the amount of $3,000.00.
[2]
This motion arises in the context of an action instituted
by the Plaintiff on September 4, 2015 seeking, amongst other relief, an order
requiring payment from the Federal Crown to the Plaintiff of approximately
$25,000,000.00 representing the “principal amount of
the Canada Pension Plan” accounts for the Plaintiff and his spouse, Gail
Arlene Walrath, an order requiring payment from the Federal Crown to the
Plaintiff of approximately $240,000.00 paid yearly in advance representing “patrimony for living expenses in the amount of and equal to
the cost of housing an inmate at a Federal Penitentiary”, an order that
the Federal Crown return the “care, control and
unhindered direct access by promissory note(s) of the CHARLES NORMAN HOLMES
security” to the Plaintiff, and a declaration that the Federal Crown has
failed to meet its obligations under various international covenants and is in
violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
[3]
By Order of Prothonotary Roger Lafrenière dated
October 22, 2015, the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim was struck, without leave
to amend, on the basis that the Statement of Claim failed to disclose a
reasonable cause of action, was frivolous and vexatious and was an abuse of the
Court’s process. Costs in the amount of $4,000.00 were awarded to the Federal
Crown and the Federal Crown was granted leave to bring an application in these
proceedings, at a later date, for a declaration pursuant to section 40(1) of
the Federal Courts Act that the Plaintiff no longer be entitled to initiate
proceedings against the Federal Crown in this Court without leave of the Court.
[4]
The Plaintiff appealed the Order of Prothonotary
Lafrenière and by Order of Mr. Justice Henry Brown dated December 1, 2015, the
appeal was dismissed. On December 7, 2015, the Plaintiff appealed the Order of
Justice Brown to the Federal Court of Appeal (A-524-15).
[5]
This motion, originally brought by the Federal
Crown on February 12, 2016, was held in abeyance in order to permit the
Plaintiff to pursue his appeal before the Federal Court of Appeal. On July 19,
2016, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal on status
review as the Plaintiff was in default of filing the Appeal Book, made no
satisfactory representations as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for
delay and failed to propose a timetable for the completion of the steps
necessary to advance the appeal.
[6]
The sole issue on this motion is whether the
Plaintiff, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the Plaintiff’s
conduct in other court proceedings, should be designated a vexatious litigant
pursuant to subsection 40(1) of the Federal Courts Act.
[7]
The following provisions of the Federal
Courts Act are applicable on this motion:
Vexatious
proceedings
40 (1) If the
Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application,
that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has
conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further
proceedings be instituted by the person in that court or that a proceeding
previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by
leave of that court.
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Poursuites
vexatoires
40 (1) La
Cour d’appel fédérale ou la Cour fédérale, selon le cas, peut, si elle est
convaincue par suite d’une requête qu’une personne a de façon persistante
introduit des instances vexatoires devant elle ou y a agi de façon vexatoire
au cours d’une instance, lui interdire d’engager d’autres instances devant
elle ou de continuer devant elle une instance déjà engagée, sauf avec son
autorisation.
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Attorney
General of Canada
(2) An
application under subsection (1) may be made only with the consent of the
Attorney General of Canada, who is entitled to be heard on the application
and on any application made under subsection (3).
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Procureur
général du Canada
(2) La
présentation de la requête visée au paragraphe (1) nécessite le consentement
du procureur général du Canada, lequel a le droit d’être entendu à cette
occasion de même que lors de toute contestation portant sur l’objet de la
requête.
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Application
for rescission or leave to proceed
(3) A person
against whom a court has made an order under subsection (1) may apply to the
court for rescission of the order or for leave to institute or continue a
proceeding.
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Requête en
levée de l’interdiction ou en autorisation
(3) Toute
personne visée par une ordonnance rendue aux termes du paragraphe (1) peut,
par requête au tribunal saisi de l’affaire, demander soit la levée de
l’interdiction qui la frappe, soit l’autorisation d’engager ou de continuer
une instance devant le tribunal.
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Court may
grant leave
(4) If an
application is made to a court under subsection (3) for leave to institute or
continue a proceeding, the court may grant leave if it is satisfied that the
proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds
for the proceeding.
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Pouvoirs
du tribunal
(4) Sur
présentation de la requête prévue au paragraphe (3), le tribunal saisi de
l’affaire peut, s’il est convaincu que l’instance que l’on cherche à engager
ou à continuer ne constitue pas un abus de procédure et est fondée sur des
motifs valables, autoriser son introduction ou sa continuation.
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No appeal
(5) A
decision of the court under subsection (4) is final and is not subject to
appeal.
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Décision
définitive et sans appel
(5) La
décision du tribunal rendue aux termes du paragraphe (4) est définitive et
sans appel.
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[8]
The pre-condition in subsection 40(2) of the Federal
Courts Act has been met in this case, as this motion is brought by the
Attorney General of Canada and the Federal Crown has included in its motion
record a consent executed by the Assistant Deputy Attorney General dated
December 24, 2015.
[9]
Despite having been properly served with the
Federal Crown’s motion record and book of authorities, the Plaintiff has not
responded to this motion. However, the Plaintiff’s failure to object to the
relief sought by the Federal Crown is of no moment, as the burden remains on
the Federal Crown to satisfy the Court, on an objective standard, that the
Plaintiff has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a
proceeding in a vexatious manner. Given the extraordinary nature of the power
conferred by section 40, the Court will not grant such relief lightly.
[10]
There are numerous factors to be considered when
determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. In Tonner v Lowry,
2016 FC 230, Mr. Justice Michael Phelan summarized key indicators of vexatious
behaviour at para. 20 as follows:
[20] …
• a propensity to re-litigate matters that
have already been determined;
• the initiation of frivolous actions or
motions;
• the making of unsubstantiated allegations
of impropriety against
• the opposite party, legal counsel and/or
the Court;
• the refusal to abide by rules and orders
of the Court;
• the use of scandalous language in
pleadings or before the Court; and
• the failure or refusal to pay costs in
earlier proceedings and the failure to pursue litigation on a timely basis.
[11]
In Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Co. v.
Coote, 2013 FC 643 at para. 25 (CanLII), aff’d 2014 FCA 98 (CanLII), Mr.
Justice Roger Hughes cited with approval the following principles regarding
vexatious proceedings, as detailed by Madam Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson in
R. v. Mennes, 2004 FC 1731 at para. 77:
[77] …
(a) the bringing of one or more actions to
determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;
(b) where it is obvious that an action
cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no
reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is
vexatious;
(c) vexatious actions include those brought
for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other
parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the
assertion of legitimate rights;
(d) it is a general characteristic of
vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward
into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions
brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in
earlier proceedings;
(e) in determining whether proceedings are
vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just
whether there was originally a good cause of action;
(f) the failure of the person instituting
the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to
be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;
(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently
taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious
conduct of legal proceedings.
[12]
It is not necessary that all of these factors or
indicia noted above be present in order for an individual to be declared a
vexatious litigant. In order to declare the Plaintiff to be a vexatious
litigant, the Court must be satisfied on an objective standard that the Plaintiff
has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted himself in a
vexatious manner during the proceedings.
[13]
On the basis of the clear and uncontroverted
evidence before me, I conclude that the Federal Crown has met its heavy burden.
The evidence demonstrates without doubt that the plaintiff has persistently
instituted vexatious proceedings and has conducted proceedings in a vexatious
manner. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the Plaintiff’s
litigation history and conduct before this Court, the Federal Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court of British Columbia (Mazhero v. Fox, 2011 FC 392).
[14]
In this regard, since January 2013, the
Plaintiff has instituted seven actions before this Court on his own behalf or
on behalf of his spouse or his corporations, Conscious Planet Enterprise
Solutions Ltd. [Conscious Planet] and Dharma Distributors Ltd. d.b.a Hempco
Canada [Dharma Distributors], all of which have been struck as disclosing no
reasonable cause of action and/or as being frivolous, vexatious and abusive.
[15]
On January 4, 2013, the Plaintiff commenced four
actions action against the Federal Crown – (a) T-33-13 in his own right; (b) T-31-13
on behalf of his spouse; (c) T-32-13 on behalf of Dharma Distributors; and (d)
T-34-13 on behalf of Conscious Planet.
[16]
With the exception of the relief sought, the allegations
in all four actions were essentially the same and related to the claimant’s tax
indebtedness to the Federal Crown. All four actions were struck out, without
leave to amend, by Orders of Prothonotary Lafrenière dated February 21, 2013 on
the basis that the Statements of Claim did not disclose any reasonable cause of
action and constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the correctness of
tax assessments. Costs in the amount of $500.00 per action were ordered payable
to the Federal Crown. These cost orders have not been satisfied by the Plaintiff,
his spouse or his companies and no appeals therefrom have been brought.
[17]
On January 25, 2013, the Plaintiff commenced an
action (T-178-13) against the Federal Crown and the Honourable Jim Rondeau, the
Minister of Healthy Living, Seniors and Consumer Affairs for Manitoba seeking
damages in the amount of $89,000,000.00 on the apparent basis that his birth
certificate constitutes a “security” for which
he has not received payment from the Federal Crown. By Order dated April 5,
2013, Madam Justice Judith Snider struck the Statement of Claim, without leave
to amend, on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and, to
the extent that its meaning could be deciphered at all, appeared to constitute
an impermissible collateral attack on the correctness of tax assessments. Costs
in the amount of $500.00 in favour of the Federal Crown and $500.00 in favour
of Minister Rondeau were ordered payable by the Plaintiff. This cost order has not
been satisfied by the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff did not appeal the Order of
Justice Snider.
[18]
On April 8, 2013, the Plaintiff commenced an
action (T-584-13) against the Federal Crown in which he sought an order requiring
the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA] to issue a letter of apology acknowledging that
certain Requirements to Pay “were improperly marked”
and therefore void, and that his tax accounts, as well as those of his spouse
and two companies, be cancelled. The Plaintiff also sought repayment of all
funds collected by the CRA and damages in the amount of $50,000,000.00.
[19]
By Order dated May 30, 2013, Prothonotary
Lafrenière struck the Statement of Claim, without leave to amend. In his Order,
Prothonotary Lafrenière stated:
The Statement of
Claim should be read generously with allowance for inadequacies due to drafting
deficiencies. However, the Court need not accept at face value bare
allegations, factual allegations which may be regarded as scandalous, frivolous
or vexatious, or legal submissions dressed up as factual allegations. On its
face, it is plain and obvious that the Statement of Claim does not set out any
material facts that disclose a reasonable, or any cause of action. In fact, the
allegations are unintelligible, rendering it impossible for the Defendant to
defend and for the Court to manage the proceeding. The Statement of Claim
should be struck out on this ground alone.
For the sake of
completeness, I also find that the action constitutes an abuse of process. This
is the sixth action brought by the Plaintiff in his personal capacity, or on
behalf of his wife and corporations, relating to collection activity by the CRA
(Other Proceedings). The five earlier proceedings were struck out on the
grounds that they constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the
correctness of tax assessments, matters that fall squarely within the jurisdiction
of the Tax Court of Canada. The present action is clearly duplicitous and
abusive.
Being substantially
in agreement with paragraphs 16 to 61 and 77 of the written representations
filed on behalf of the Defendant, which I adopt and make mine, I conclude that
the Statement of Claim should be struck out, without leave to amend.
As for the
Defendant’s request that the Plaintiff be prohibited from initiating
proceedings against the Federal Crown in this Court without leave of the Court
until he has paid the costs awarded in the Other Proceedings, I conclude that
Rule 416 is not applicable. First, no order for security for costs has been
granted in this or the Other Proceedings. Second, Rule 416(3) would only
prevent a party from taking steps “in the action” until security required by an
order has been given. Given the extraordinary nature of the relief requested,
the Defendant should be required to apply for an order pursuant to section 40
of the Federal Courts Act. I should add that a declaration that the Plaintiff
is a vexatious litigant appears to be warranted based on the material before
me.
[20]
Prothonotary Lafrenière ordered the Plaintiff to
pay the costs of the Federal Crown in the fixed amount of $3,000.00, which cost
order has not been satisfied. The Plaintiff did not appeal the Order of
Prothonotary Lafrenière.
[21]
In the underlying action (T-1499-15), which was
commenced by the Plaintiff on September 4, 2015 and subsequently struck by the
Order of Prothonotary Lafrenière dated October 22, 2015, the Plaintiff made various
unintelligible allegations against the Federal Crown which appeared to once
again have as their premise an assertion that the Plaintiff’s birth certificate
constitutes a form of security that he is entitled to “cash
in” to avoid his tax indebtedness to the Federal Crown.
[22]
In striking the Statement of Claim in the
underlying action and granting the Federal Crown leave to bring this motion,
Prothonotary Lafrenière stated as follows:
Suffice
it to say that the Plaintiff alleges that his human rights have somehow not
been respected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
various international conventions and treaties. The Plaintiff states that he is
not a “graven image”, nor a member, citizen or servant of the Federal Crown. At
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff claims that he is
not an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigant within the
meaning of Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (Meads), but rather a
“Titled Holder of the CHARLES NORMAN HOLMES CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH security”.
Notwithstanding
the Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, the Plaintiff is plainly and
obviously an OCPA litigant. The Statement of Claim contains unusual formalities
commonly used by OCPA litigants, such as a red thumb print. In addition, the
Plaintiff seeks to foist on the Federal Crown unilateral agreements, trust
obligations or judgments based on nonsensical arguments.
In
the past few months, this Court has been deluged with motions by the Crown to
strike statements of claim brought by plaintiffs who have made similar
allegations. Those plaintiffs were all found to fall within a class of
individuals described in Meads as “OPCA litigants”, who follow a
well-known path of illogic, presumption, and pseudo-legal rants.
In
Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1126, Prothonotary Kevin Aalto struck five
statements of claim brought by what he termed “quintessential OPCA litigants”.
Prothonotary Aalto found that the causes of action pleaded were based on
“snippets and fragments” of international treaties, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedom, various Supreme Court of Canada cases and miscellaneous
statutes, both federal and provincial, all bound together in “pseudo-legal
verbiage”. He stated as follows at para. 7:
[7] These Plaintiffs also allege
that they are owed duties by Her Majesty the Queen pursuant to various
international treaties and the Charter and these rights have been breached.
They do not have unlimited freedom (i.e. they are required to obtain jobs to
pay for licences/taxes/realty taxes etc.) or are required to contribute towards
the economic social and cultural development of the Defendant (i.e. pay
taxes). They argue they sent notices of demand and notices opting out of these
legislative requirements (in Meads this is referred to as the “magic
hat” argument). They “opt out” from legislation requirements yet use the Court
system to try and enforce these imaginary claims. These are examples of the
pseudo-legal drivel which informs much of the content of the statements of claim.
The
same reasoning applies in this case. The allegations in the Statement of Claim
are without any merit and pure drivel. The gist of the Plaintiff’s case is that
he is exempt from the application of the law, while at the same time entitled
to seek damages for infringement of his “rights”. Madam Justice Elizabeth
Heneghan recently struck a statement of claim in Court File No. T-388-15 that
contained similar allegations as those made by the Plaintiff in the present
proceeding. By Order dated September 4, 2015, Justice Heneghan concluded that
the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, that
the allegations were vexatious and that the remedies sought by the plaintiffs
were beyond this Court’s jurisdiction.
Similar
claims were also recently considered and rejected by Mr. Justice George Locke
in Michael Douglas Stegemann and Dianne Charlene Armitage v Her Majesty the
Queen (September 1, 2015, Court File No. T-877-15), and Mr. Justice Russel
Zinn in Caitlin Doell v Her Majesty the Queen et al (October 19, 2015,
Court File No. T-1338-15), to name of few.
Because
of the nonsense they argue, OPCA litigants are invariably unsuccessful and
their positions dismissed, typically without written reasons. Nevertheless,
their litigation abuse continues. I agree with Justice Rooke that the growing
volume of this kind of vexatious litigation requires a strong response to curb
this misconduct: see Meads, para 71.
Being
substantially in agreement with the written representations filed on behalf of
the Crown, I conclude that the Statement of Claim should be struck in its
entirety, without leave to amend. In light of the number of unsuccessful
actions brought by the Plaintiff before this Court, in his personal capacity or
as a representative, and what I consider to be a continuing abuse of this
Court’s process, I consider just and appropriate to sanction the Plaintiff’s
conduct by way of a substantial award of costs.
[23]
I agree with Prothonotary Lafrenière’s finding
that the Plaintiff is plainly and obviously an OCPA litigant, as that term is
described above. The evidence filed by the Federal Crown in support of this
motion demonstrates that the Plaintiff has employed various incantations of
himself, altering his name with the use of hyphens and colons or purporting to
be constituted as a trust or as a secured party of himself. The Statements of
Claim filed by the Plaintiff, and the documents attached thereto, are executed
with red fingerprints, postage stamps and what appears to be his own blood. The
Plaintiff has included with his pleadings documents that he claims constitute
instruments payable to the Federal Crown in satisfaction of cost orders, when
in fact these documents are photocopies of orders of this Court with
handwritten notations made thereon by the Plaintiff. In other supporting
documents, the Plaintiff purports to be a secured party creditor and priority
interest holder of his birth certificate and social insurance number.
[24]
In addition to the aforementioned actions before
this Court and the Plaintiff’s appeal of the Order of Justice Brown to the
Federal Court of Appeal, the Plaintiff has also initiated legal proceedings in
British Columbia.
[25]
On May 17, 2013, the Plaintiff commenced an
action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia bearing court file no. 151549
against the Honourable Robert Douglas Nicholson, Minister of National Defence [the
BC Action]. Although not named as a Defendant in the action, the Plaintiff also
served the Notice of Civil Claim on the Honourable Shirley Bond, the Attorney
General for British Columbia, who thereafter participated in the action. In the
BC Action, the Plaintiff sought the following relief:
1. Removal of any and all inferences to me as the juridical/corporate
personality CHARLES NORMAN HOLMES et als and that I be recognized by all Canada
government agencies, unless otherwise stated, under common law as :charles-norman:
holmes, a human being with intrinsic rights and with lawful excuse as per my
Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights attached, that I am
exempt from levy, and that I use government ID for convenience sake only and
usage does not create enactment or citizenship joinder, and;
2. The CHARLES N HOLMES TRUST T-30-7543-18 is acknowledged as
secured party creditor to the CHARLES NORMAN HOLMES ESTATE et als and related
accounts and that Canada government agents agree the account is under new
management, to cease and desist allowing any access to the Credit/Patrimony
(UNDRR General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 “Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources”) of the account(s) without written and expressed
permission by the CHARLES N HOLMES TTEE, and to make appropriation from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund (Financial Administration Act 33(1)(2)), in the
amount of $10,000,000 CAD (the rights and defences of which are subrogated by
Private Bond #BNDS-28031963840CNH-7, reg # RW 652 445 205 CA), by check made
payable to the: CHARLES N HOLMES TRUST, and;
3. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA):
a. To
acknowledge CRA is the owner, trustee and liable party to the SIN account that
was created for our mutual benefit, and that I am NOT the trustee, nor am I a
public servant/government employee that received compensation from the
collection of taxes and therefore I am NOT subject to the enactments of law and
I am NOT obligated to file tax returns for/as that entity. CRA to acknowledge
that the account is under new management and the equity is revenued back to
source and not taxed as income. CRA agrees to honor my right to discharge debt
and is obliged to ledger the discharge payments that I have made/sent/received
by the Receiver General for Canada, and repay all erroneous and illegal
garnishments from the accounts, CHARLES NORMAN HOLMES, GAIL ARLENE WALRATH,
CONSCIOUS PLANET ENT. SOL. LTD. and DHARMA DIST. LTD., at treble the total
amount in damages of all said garnishments in the amount of $500,000 CAD, by
check made payable to the: 7778775 CANADA INC., and;
b. Process
the 7778775 CANADA INC. T2 and CHARLES N HOLMES TRUST T3 returns for years 2012
back to 2005 and pay the refund total: taxes paid, bank deposits and discharge
payments in the amount of $33,000,000 CAD, by check made payable to the:
7778775 CANADA INC.
[26]
On November 28, 2013, following a two-day
hearing, the BC Action was struck by Mr. Justice G.P. Weatherill and costs in
favour of the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Federal Crown were
awarded in the amount of $2,346.27 respectively, which cost orders have not
been satisfied by the Plaintiff.
[27]
In his Oral Reasons for Judgment (para. 30),
Justice Weatherill found that the action:
…is without
substance and discloses no reasonable claim. Moreover, it is groundless,
fanciful and trifles with the Court’s time; it is scandalous, frivolous and
vexatious and an abuse of the process of this court. It must be entirely
struck.
[28]
I note that in reviewing the Oral Reasons for
Judgment of Justice Weatherill, the Plaintiff engaged in disrespectful and
disruptive behaviour before the court and made unsubstantiated allegations of
impropriety against the court. Justice Weatherill had to admonish the Plaintiff
to “sit down and listen” or be removed from the
courtroom (para. 69). Moreover, the Plaintiff repeatedly demanded that Justice
Weatherill produce his oath of office and certificate of registration to the
Plaintiff, and then accused Justice Weatherill of being in “criminal breach” of section 337 of the Criminal
Code (paras. 60-68).
[29]
I find that the Plaintiff has also made
unsubstantiated claims of impropriety against counsel for the Federal Crown,
Ms. Nicole Johnston, including that she has not been compliant with the Federal
Courts Rules by allegedly changing the style of cause and changing the
jurisdiction and status of the Plaintiff from private person to public trustee.
[30]
In the circumstances, I find that numerous
indicia of vexatious behaviour are engaged, including:
a) The Plaintiff has instituted multiple proceedings before this Court
and one proceeding before the Supreme Court of British Columbia that did not
disclose any reasonable cause of action, amounted to an impermissible
collateral attack on the correctness of tax assessments, were an abuse of
process, and/or were scandalous, frivolous and vexatious.
b) The Plaintiff has repeatedly rolled forward into subsequent actions
grounds and issues that he raised in earlier proceedings that were dismissed as
disclosing no reasonable cause of action, as amounting to an improper
collateral attack or on the basis that they were abusive, scandalous, frivolous
and vexatious. In his most recent proceedings before this Court (T-1499-15), the
Plaintiff has attempted to supplement his claims with new unintelligible allegations,
but an objective reading of his Statement of Claim reveals that his most recent
claims are simply an improper repetition of the claims that were previously struck
by this Court and the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
c) The Plaintiff has refused to obey multiple orders of this Court and
one order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, all of which required the
payment of costs to the Federal Crown.
d) The Plaintiff has engaged in disrespectful and disruptive behaviour
before Justice Weatherill of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
e) The Plaintiff has made unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety against
the lawyer for the Federal Crown and against Justice Weatherill.
f)
The Plaintiff has failed to prosecute his appeal
before the Federal Court of Appeal in A-524-15 with diligence or at all.
[31]
For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that
the Plaintiff has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings and has conducted
the underlying proceeding in a vexatious manner within the meaning of
subsection 40(1) of the Federal Courts Act. As such, I am granting the
Federal Crown’s motion and ordering that no further proceedings be instituted
by the Plaintiff in this Court except by leave of this Court and that any
proceedings brought by the Plaintiff and presently underway in this Court are
hereby stayed, pending leave of this Court to proceed.
[32]
I note that the Federal Crown has not asked for
any relief that expressly prohibits the Plaintiff from bringing any future
proceedings in a representative capacity for his spouse or his corporations, as
he has done in the past. In my view, such relief is not required. As the
Plaintiff is not a lawyer, he has no ability to initiate proceedings on behalf
of his spouse and similarly, he is not entitled under the Federal Courts
Rules to initiate proceedings on behalf of his corporations unless he is
expressly granted leave to do so by the Court pursuant to Rule 120.
[33]
The Federal Crown has requested a lump sum cost
award in the amount of $3,000.00. In the circumstances, I find that such an
award of costs is warranted and accordingly, the Federal Crown shall have its
costs fixed in the amount of $3,000.00 and payable forthwith.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1.
The Plaintiff, Charles Norman Holmes, is a
vexatious litigant pursuant to section 40 of the Federal Courts Act.
2.
The Plaintiff is hereby barred from initiating
any further proceedings in the Federal Court, except with leave of the Court.
3.
Any proceedings brought by the Plaintiff in the
Federal Court and presently underway in this Court are hereby stayed, pending
leave of the Court to proceed.
4.
The Plaintiff shall pay to the Federal Crown its
costs of the motion fixed in the lump sum amount of $3,000.00 payable forthwith.
“Mandy Aylen”