Docket: T-489-16
Citation:
2016 FC 535
Ottawa, Ontario, May 12, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Manson
BETWEEN:
|
ANITA
PARENTEAU, DANNY MOOSEHUNTER, MICAH DANIELS, AND WESLEY BALLANTYNE, EACH IN
THEIR CAPACITY AND IN THEIR CAPACITY AS COUNCILLORS
|
Applicants
|
and
|
LESLIE BADGER
AND CLAUDIA MCCALLUM, AND ROMONA COOK IN THEIR CAPACITY AS THE STURGEON LAKE
FIRST NATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL
|
Respondents
|
and
|
HENRY FELIX, LAURIE PETERS-WHITEMAN, DAVID BADGER,
ORVILLE LONGJOHN SR., FRED FELIX, ISADORE WICHIHIN, AND WAYNE MCCALLUM
|
Respondents
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review
pursuant to sections 18, 18.1, and 44 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC
1985, c F-7, challenging the decision [the Decision] of the Sturgeon Lake First
Nation Appeal Tribunal [the Appeal Tribunal], that upheld a decision of the CEO
and DEO of Sturgeon Lake First Nation [Sturgeon Lake] dismissing each of the
Applicants from their offices as members of Council and banning each from
running for nomination in the 2016 Sturgeon Lake election for Chief and Council
[the March 2016 Election].
I.
Background
[2]
The Applicants, Anita Parenteau, Danny
Moosehunter, Micah Daniels, and Wesley Ballantyne, are four of the six
incumbent members of the Sturgeon Lake Council [the Council]. Each was sworn in
as Councillor on March 30, 2013, for a three year term that ended on March 29,
2016.
[3]
The Respondents, also members of Sturgeon Lake,
include:
- Leslie Badger and Claudia McCallum, who held the positions of
Chief Electoral Officer [CEO] and Deputy Electoral Officer [DEO],
respectively, during the time period in question (from January 15, 2016,
onwards);
- Laurie
Peters-Whiteman, David Badger, Orville Longjohn Sr., Fred Felix, Isadore
Wichihin and Wayne McCallum, were voted as Councillors of Sturgeon Lake
following a vote convened by the CEO and DEO on March 16, 17, and 18,
2016, the legitimacy of which is challenged in this application;
- Henry Felix Sr.
is the current Chief of Sturgeon Lake as a result of his acclamation in
the March 2016 Election, the legitimacy of which is also challenged in
this application; and
- Howard Badger,
Brian Wichihin and Romona Cook, formed the Appeal Tribunal and rendered
the Decision under review by this Court.
[4]
Sturgeon Lake is a custom election band. The
customary election law of Sturgeon Lake is codified by the Sturgeon Lake
First Nation Election Act, 2009 [the Election Act], and the Sturgeon
Lake First Nation Executive Act, 2009 [the Executive Act].
[5]
The Election Act governs the procedure
for administering elections and any disputes arising therefrom. The CEO, the
DEO, and a three-person Appeal Tribunal are tasked with ensuring that elections
are conducted in accordance with the legislation. These individuals are
selected at a special meeting held prior to the election for Chief and Council
members and are appointed by the passing of a band council resolution [BCR].
They serve the same term as the Chief and Council members (sections 3.1,
3.2(a), 3.3(a), 3.4, 4 and 11.1 of the Election Act). The role of the
CEO and DEO is to ensure that elections conform to the Election Act, and
the Appeal Tribunal deals with any challenges by interested parties to election
results or procedure.
[6]
Section 8.3 of the Executive Act also
includes provisions for an Elders Executive Advisory Council [Elders EAC],
which acts as “the conscience of the band,” and
which may carry out duties assigned to it by the Chief and Council.
[7]
Implementation of the Election Act and
the Executive Act, despite having resulted from extensive consultations
and codified custom, has to say the least, a troubled history. This Court has
been involved in three previous occasions determining matters in relation to
the Election Act and the Appeal Tribunal, each involving the Respondent,
Henry Felix Sr. (see Felix v Sturgeon Lake First Nation, 2011 FC 1139 [Felix
1]; Felix v Sturgeon lake First Nation, 2013 FC 310; Felix v
Sturgeon lake First Nation, 2014 FC 911 [Felix 3]).
[8]
A BCR, in which the CEO, DEO and Appeal Tribunal
are appointed, commences an election and sets dates for nomination meetings and
the election (section 3.4 of the Election Act). To commence the March
2016 Election process, the Applicants enacted BCR 2015-2016-018 at a duly
convened meeting of Council on January 15, 2016, and appointed: (i) Leslie
Badger as CEO; (ii) Claudia McCallum as DEO; and (iii) Howard Badger, Brian
Wichihin, and Ramona Cook to the Appeal Tribunal. It also set February 29,
2016, as the date for the candidate nomination meeting and the dates for the
election (March 9, 2016 in Saskatoon, March 10, 2016 in Prince Albert, and
March 11, 2016 in Sturgeon Lake).
[9]
The CEO and DEO issued a report on January 28,
2016, stating that five of the current Council members were permitted to run
for nomination in the Election, but that the sixth Councillor – Donna
Kingfisher – could not run for nomination based on an impaired driving
conviction occurring while in office. The report also purported to reinstate
Henry Felix Sr. as Chief, notwithstanding that a March 18, 2015 decision of the
Appeal Tribunal, following a formal hearing, had removed him as Chief and
prohibited from being an eligible candidate in any Sturgeon Lake election for a
period of the lesser of three terms or nine years.
[10]
Soon thereafter, concern arose over the CEO and
DEO’s execution of their roles in accordance with the Election Act.
Allegedly, they refused to provide their signed Oaths of Office to Sturgeon
Lake, and to adhere to the budget approved by Council for the election.
[11]
On February 26, 2016, Counsel for Sturgeon Lake
wrote the CEO and DEO emphasizing that they were required to hold the election
in accordance with the Election Act, previous Appeal Tribunal rulings,
and their Oaths of Office.
[12]
The CEO and DEO dismissed the remaining five
Councillors of Sturgeon Lake on February 29, 2016, and disqualified them from
running in the March 2016 Election on the basis that their failure to terminate
Ms. Kingfisher from her position as Counsellor following her impaired driving
conviction constituted a “corrupt practice” under the Election Act.
[13]
In response, Counsel for Sturgeon Lake wrote a
letter dated March 2, 2016, advising that the CEO and DEO did not have
authority to dismiss Band Councillors; that their actions and failure to abide
by their Oaths of Office constituted grounds for their removal; and that the
duly elected Councillors could not be unilaterally removed from office without
being afforded basic procedural fairness.
A.
The Decision of the Appeal Tribunal
[14]
The Decision under review is that of the Appeal
Tribunal rendered on March 3, 2016, upholding the CEO’s February 29, 2016
decision to dismiss each of the Councillors and disqualify them from running in
the March 2016 Election.
[15]
While Rule 302 of the Federal Courts Rules,
SOR/98-106, states that unless this Court orders otherwise, an application for
judicial review shall be limited to a single order in which relief is sought,
this does not apply when there is a continuous course of conduct (Shotclose
v Shorey First Nation, 2011 FC 750 at para 64). In my view, the CEO and DEO
decision and the Appeal Tribunal Decision were so closely linked that they constitute
one continuing decision (Truehope Nutritional Support Ltd v Canada (Attorney
General), 2004 FC 658 at para 6). Indeed, it appears the Appeal Tribunal
simply affirmed the CEO and DEO’s unauthorized decision to remove and ban the
Applicants as Councillors: there was no evidence presented before the Appeal
Tribunal, and the decisions were made on the same facts.
[16]
The Decision outlines the applicable legislation,
including that under section 15.1 of the Election Act, the offices of
Chief and Councillor shall immediately become vacant when the person holding
that office:
(c) is found
guilty by the Appeal Tribunal, in connection with an Election, of Corrupt
Practice, giving or accepting a bribe, dishonesty or malfeasance; and
(g) fails to
uphold the Oath of Office, Band By-laws or other duly enacted band legislation
including this Act and the Executive Act.
[17]
Section 2.7 of the Election Act defines
“corrupt practice” as:
any act done by an Elected Official,
whether Chief or Councillor, who unlawfully and/ or wrongly uses his or her
name or position of authority or trust to procure some benefit or favour for
him or herself or for another person contrary to his or her official or
fiduciary duties and/or the rights of other persons and includes any act or
omission that is recognized by law or custom to be a Corrupt Practice. The
custom gifting of tobacco and/or cloth/or proper purposes is not a corrupt
practice.
[Emphasis in original]
[18]
Based on contraventions of subsections 15.1(c)
and 15.1(g) of the Election Act, the Decision upholds the Councillor suspensions.
The Appeal Tribunal further rules that the Councillors are ineligible to be
candidates in the March 2016 Election, and are prevented from running for
office for the lesser of three terms or nine years (section 5.1(iii) of the Election
Act).
B.
Post-Decision Disputes and the March 2016
Election
[19]
At a meeting of Council on March 4, 2016, the
Applicants enacted BCR 2015-2016-021, removing the CEO and DEO from office,
effective immediately, for failing to provide a signed Oath of Office, failing
to submit deposit funds received from candidates, and for not accepting the
election budget approved by Council.
[20]
The next day, the Council signed an Interim Plan
setting out the election process to be followed thereafter. Elaine Vandall,
Sturgeon Lake’s External Manager, was appointed to run all program operations
from the nomination date of March 12, 2016, onwards.
[21]
On March 6, 2016, by letter and BCR, the “removed”
CEO wrote to the Council conveying his intention to proceed with the scheduled
nomination meeting and with the election process generally.
[22]
The Election process was thus splintered into
two separate and concurrent election processes.
[23]
On March 8, 2016, Counsel for Sturgeon Lake
wrote to the “removed” CEO and DEO, informing them that the “dismissed”
Councillors were eligible to run in the election, as neither the CEO, nor the
Appeal Tribunal in the absence of an appeal or proper hearing, had authority to
dismiss Council.
[24]
On March 10, 2016, the Elders EAC distributed a
Media Release conveying that the CEO and DEO had been removed from their
positions, cancelling the CEO and DEO’s March 11, 2016 nomination meeting, and
scheduling a Special Meeting of Council for the appointment of a new CEO and
DEO.
[25]
Contrary to this direction, the “removed” CEO
and DEO nevertheless held a nomination on March 11, 2016. At this meeting Henry
Felix Sr. was named as Chief as he “won by acclamation”;
ten candidates were nominated for Councillor positions; and election for
Council was to take place on March 16 through 28, 2016.
[26]
Evidently, there was confusion in the community
surrounding the legitimacy of this nomination meeting and election process. The
Applicants had been prohibited from running as nominees, despite having paid
the required fee. As well, at least four candidates had paid the fee to be
eligible to run for Chief, and numerous other candidates who had sought to run
for Council had not been notified that the nomination meeting had been changed
to March 11, 2016.
[27]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 2016, the Applicants
held a special meeting to explain the Election process going forward to
members: 495 members of Sturgeon Lake voted and elected a new CEO [the New CEO]
and a new DEO [the New DEO], as well as members of a new Appeal Tribunal. A BCR
formally enacted these changes.
[28]
The following day, the New CEO and DEO set out
an election schedule and published Notices of Election. The nomination meeting
would take place on March 29, 2016, and the general election would take place on
April 5, 6, and 7, 2016 [the April 2016 Election].
[29]
Notwithstanding this direction, on March 18,
2016, the “removed” CEO and DEO held a poll for the March 2016 Election at a
local church. Several of the Applicants attempted to interfere with the
process, first at the advance poll on March 17, and again at the main poll on
March 18, which had to be moved to another location. At this election:
- the names of the
Applicants who sought re-election as Councillors were not on the ballot;
- some band
members were denied the right to vote;
- 289 of 1728
(17%) eligible voters cast ballots (by contrast, in the 2013 Election 927
of 1605 eligible voters cast votes);
- the position of
Chief was purportedly uncontested, although in modern times, it has always
been a contested election.
[30]
The following day, the “removed” CEO and DEO
“swore in” Henry Felix Sr. as Chief, and six other individuals as Councillors: Laurie
Peters-Whitman, David Badger, Orville Longjohn Sr., Fred Felix, Isadore
Wichihin, and Wayne McCallum - Respondents in this proceeding.
[31]
The April 2016 Election, presided over by the
New CEO and DEO, was held on April 5, 6, and 7, 2016, as scheduled: 614 members
of Sturgeon Lake cast ballots. At this election Greg Ermine was elected Chief
(309 votes), and Anita Parenteau, Danny Moosehunter, Christina Longjohn, Dalton
Kingfisher, Elaine Naytowhow, and Craig Bighead were elected to the positions
of Councillor.
[32]
Accordingly, there are currently two purported
sets of Councillors, each claiming to be the “true”
Council for Sturgeon Lake and the governance of Sturgeon Lake is paralyzed.
II.
Issues
[33]
The issues are:
- Is Judicial Review the proper process for recourse and do the
Applicants have standing?
- Did the Appeal
Tribunal exceed the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Election Act
and Executive Act in rendering its Decision?
- Did the Appeal
Tribunal breach its duty of procedural fairness?
- What is the
appropriate remedy?
III.
Standard of Review
[34]
The Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine
this application as the Appeal Tribunal constitutes a “federal
board, commission or other tribunal” for the purpose of section 2 of the
Federal Courts Act (Felix 3, above, at para 34).
[35]
An administrative body’s interpretation of its
enabling statute generally gives rise to the deferential standard of review.
However, in Felix 1, above, Justice Marie-Josée Bédard concluded that
the Appeal Tribunal’s decision must be reviewed under the correctness standard,
as the issue was a question of law involving interpretation of the Election
Act. Since the Appeal Tribunal members are appointed for a time-limited
mandate, Justice Bédard found they do not have expertise in interpreting the Election
Act or in legal interpretation generally.
[36]
There is no indication in this case that the
Appeal Tribunal even considered the Election Act in rendering its
Decision. Given that the issues are either questions of law or jurisdiction or
matters of procedural fairness, correctness is the appropriate standard.
IV.
Analysis
[37]
The relevant provisions of the Election Act
and Executive Act are attached as Annex A.
A.
Is Judicial Review the proper process for
recourse and do the Applicants have standing?
[38]
As a preliminary issue, the Respondents argue
the Applicants have no standing because their positions as Councillors have
terminated. Further, the Respondents claim the Applicants have not exhausted
the available internal appeal mechanism, and thus the Court should not
intervene.
[39]
The Applicants argue their only recourse is to
seek judicial review: appealing the present matter to the Appeal Tribunal
following the March 2016 Election is not an adequate alternative remedy for two
reasons:
- Section 12.1 of
the Election Act only permits a “Candidate
at the Election or any Elector who gave or tendered his or her vote at the
Election” to bring an appeal. The Applicants were not “candidates”,
as they were deemed ineligible to run, and they did not vote in what they
considered to be an illegal election;
- Even had the Applicants
brought an appeal of the March 2016 Election to the Appeal Tribunal, the
basis of that appeal - the termination of six Councillors and the barring
of them from running in the March 2016 Election - would have been the very
issues upon which the Appeal Tribunal opined in its Decision.
[40]
I agree with the Applicants that the Court’s
intervention is warranted, and that judicial review is the proper forum in this
case for challenging the Appeal Tribunal’s Decision.
B.
Did the Appeal Tribunal exceed the jurisdiction
conferred on it by the Election Act and Executive Act in rendering its
Decision?
[41]
At the hearing, counsel for the Respondents
agreed that the Appeal Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction under the Election
Act in rendering its Decision removing the Applicants as Counsellors,
banning them from running in the March 2016 Election and for a term of the
lesser of three terms or nine years, and determining the Applicants committed a
“corrupt practice”. The Respondents also conceded
the Decision was procedurally unfair. To provide context for my decision on the
available relief, I have set out my analysis and reasons for each issue below.
[42]
Under the Election Act, the Appeal
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear a matter relating to an election before
the election takes place. Section 12 governs the procedure for appealing an
election to the Appeal Tribunal. Section 12.1 states:
12.1 Any Candidate at the Election or any
Elector who gave or tendered his or her vote at the Election may, within
fourteen (14) calendar days of the Poll, appeal the Election if he or she has
reasonable and probable grounds for believing that:
(a) error or
violation of the Election Act was made in the interpretation or
application of the Act which might have affected the outcome of the Election;
(b) a Candidate
who ran in the Election was ineligible to do so pursuant to this Act; and/or
(c) there was a
Corrupt Practice in contravention of the Election Act.
[43]
This provision clearly indicates that an
election having taken place is a precondition to the Appeal Tribunal having
jurisdiction to hear a matter. The Appeal Tribunal’s role is to adjudicate upon
grievances of an election that has already occurred. No election had
taken place when the Appeal Tribunal rendered its Decision, and thus it acted
without authority.
[44]
As well, under section 12.1, the Appeal Tribunal
has no authority to engage its own appeal powers: that can only be done by a “Candidate at the Election or any Elector who gave or
tendered his or her vote at the Election”.
[45]
The Election Act also does not confer on
the Appeal Tribunal authority to make disciplinary decisions unless expressly
reconvened by the Elders EAC pursuant to section 11.3 of the Election Act,
and section 11 of the Executive Act. The Elders EAC did not call upon
the Appeal Tribunal at all, and thus the Appeal Tribunal had no authority to
determine disciplinary matters.
[46]
Subsection 3.3(a) of the Election Act
provides that the Appeal Tribunal “shall serve for a
period equal to the term of office of the Chief and Council”. Thus,
until March 29, 2016, the Appeal Tribunal appointed for the prior election was
the only body authorized to make decisions relating to discipline “during an Elected Official’s term of office” (Election
Act, section 11.3) and only upon being called upon by the Elders EAC (Executive
Act, section 11.1).
[47]
The Appeal Tribunal derives its powers from the Election
Act and had no authority whatsoever in this instance to act upon the CEO
and DEO’s request prior to the election or to decide upon the issues it did. In
failing to abide by the provisions that both grant and restrict its power to
act, the Appeal Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction.
[48]
As a result of this invalid Decision, the Applicants
were prematurely removed from their positions as Councillors and were
unlawfully prevented from running in the March 2016 Election. Pursuant to the
procedures set out in the governing Acts, the Applicants were eligible to be
nominated to run in the March 2016 Election, and the results of that election
cannot be valid.
C.
Did the Appeal Tribunal Breach its duty of
procedural fairness?
[49]
It is well established that the Applicants were
entitled to due process and procedural fairness in being dismissed from their
positions as Councillors (Sparvier v Cowessess Indian Band No 73, [1993]
FCJ No 446 at para 57; Felix 3, above, at para 76; Orr v Fort McKay
First Nation, 2011 FC 37 at para 14). In this context, the Applicants were
entitled to know the case against them, and be given an opportunity to be heard
(Duncan v Behdzi Ahda First Nation, 2003 FC 1385 at para 20; Desnomie
v Peepeekisis First Nation, 2007 FC 426 at paras 33, 34).
[50]
Even if the Appeal Tribunal did have
jurisdiction to render a disciplinary decision, it Decision would have been set
aside on the basis of failing to adhere to principles of procedural fairness
and non-observance of the procedures set out in section 11 of the Executive
Act. The Applicants were given no notice at all, nor were they provided any
opportunity to address the allegations against them prior to the Decision being
made purporting to remove them from office.
[51]
Essentially, the manner in which the Appeal
Tribunal rendered their Decision in this case reveals not only an indifference
to their authorized role under their governing statutes and the procedures to
which they are bound to adhere, but more importantly it shows a disregard for
the power entrusted in them by their Band.
D.
What is the appropriate remedy?
[52]
The real crux of this judicial review involves
fashioning an appropriate remedy.
[53]
Notwithstanding efforts by Justice Bédard in
2011 (Felix 1) and Justice Kane in 2014 (Felix 3) to guide the Sturgeon
Lake election process, it is apparent the offered advice has been ignored and
that the election process, as it stands, has been ineffective.
[54]
In Felix 3, Justice Kane found she could
not order relief that was not specifically conferred upon the Appeal Tribunal
under the Election Act. At paragraph 121 she writes:
As noted by Justice Bédard in Felix #1,
Rules 3 and 4 [of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106] do not permit
the Court to order the substantive relief the applicants seek. At para 56:
[56] The Court does not have
jurisdiction to set aside the election results and order a new election. Rules
3 and 4 of the Rules do not allow the Court to go as far as creating a
substantive relief that is not provided for in the Election Act. Rule 3
is an interpretation rule and Rule 4, often called the "Gap Rule", is
procedural in nature and does not allow the Court to invent relief not
contemplated in the applicable legislation. The responsibility of deciding
whether the election results should be set aside and if a new election is
warranted rests with the Appeal Tribunal and the Court must not usurp that
role.
[55]
Justice Kane remitted the matter back to the
same Appeal Tribunal, with a caution:
128 Given that the same Appeal Tribunal must
determine the appeal of the decision which they have taken part in, it will be
essential that the Appeal Tribunal meets its duty of procedural fairness, seeks
submissions from counsel for the parties on the proper interpretation of the Election
Act, particularly regarding the qualifications of candidates, the role of
the CEO and the role of the Appeal Tribunal, and should make every effort to
approach the appeal with an open mind to avoid the inherent apprehension of
bias.
[56]
Although the above comments were made in the
context of the same Election Act, they arose in the context of a dispute
emanating from an appeal of an election. I agree with the Applicants that the Court
is not bound by those findings in this particular instance, as the present case
is distinguishable from Felix 1 and Felix 3. Rather than being an
appeal of election results, the Decision at hand is one that was made without
jurisdiction, and which ultimately had further-reaching ramifications on the
validity and fairness of the March and April 2016 Elections.
[57]
Both parties argue these are exceptional
circumstances. I agree.
[58]
The selection of Band governance is an inherent
right and the electors of Sturgeon Lake should determine their leadership. In
crafting an appropriate remedy, I have considered Justice
Barnes’ caution in Sweetgrass First Nation v Gollan, 2006 FC 778 at para
53 (also cited in Felix 3, above, at para 135):
53 There is much to be said for the Court
adopting the least intrusive path into the affairs and decisions of Sweetgrass
in fashioning a remedy for the electoral impasse which has arisen. Like most
other democratic institutions, the electors and elected representatives of
Sweetgrass are fully capable of conducting their business without outside
involvement and, except in a limited way, this case is no exception.
[59]
I also find instructive Justice Noël’s obiter
comment in Pelican Lake Band Council v Thomas, 2007 FC 1152 at paras
31-34, in which he quashed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal relating to an
election under a similar Election Act, following the below guiding
comments:
31 In the normal course of a judicial
review, the reviewing Court would have the option to return the matter to a differently
and properly constituted Appeal Board to re-determine the matter. However, the Election
Act makes no provision for such a possibility, as my colleague Mr. Justice
John O'Keefe concluded in Bill v. Pelican Lake Band Appeal Board, [2006]
F.C.J. No. 877, 2006 FC 679 (F.C.), and which was affirmed by Mr. Justice
Létourneau on appeal, as cited above. Mr. Justice O'Keefe stated at paragraph
59:
59 The matter cannot be referred to a
differently constituted Appeal Board as there is no provision to constitute
another Appeal Board. Subsection 11(1) of the Act requires the Appeal Board to
be appointed as follows:
11(1) An Appeal Board shall be
appointed by the membership at the Nomination Meeting immediately after the
close of nominations has been announced by the Chief Electoral Officer or
his/her designate.
32 I also add that the Court's finding of
apparent bias makes it impossible to return the matter to the Appeal Board as
it was constituted after the March 2007 election. What can a Court do in such a
situation?
33 This exceptional situation calls for
exceptional measures. To put an end to this vicious cycle and allow the
democratic will of Band members to run its course, this Court therefore
allows the appeal. In obiter therefore, the Court is of the studied
opinion that the applicants should take all means possible to correct the
present situation. The Pelican Lake Band Council, under the direction of the
applicants, Chief Peter Bill and Councillors Romeo Thomas, Frederick Whitehead,
David Thomas, Gilbert Chamakese, Sidney Bill and Jimmy Bill, elected for a
three year term on March 9, 2007, are encouraged to take the decision of the
electoral process back to the people according to Band custom, and decide how
best the Band will be governed pursuant to the amendments deemed to be in the
best interests of the Band and its people.
34 In so doing, the Court would encourage
the Band Council to turn its mind to the people within six (6) months of these
reasons, and using the amending formula provided under section 16 of the Election
Act put in place clear, fair and just procedures to assure that the
democratic will of the Band members is respected and allowed to run its course
and effectively stop the revolving door of judicial proceedings.
[Emphasis added]
[60]
This too is an exceptional and complex
situation, which calls for exceptional remedies. The remedy of remitting the
matter back to the Appeal Tribunal has had limited long term success, as
evinced by the personal and financial resources spent within the last five
years on litigation in relation to election matters.
[61]
Moreover, the present case is unique in that
there are two Appeal Tribunals; one which has acted beyond their jurisdiction,
acted without procedural fairness, and which would no doubt generate a reasonable
apprehension of bias if the matter were remitted to them, and the other,
constituted while the initial and duly appointed Appeal Tribunal still held
office.
[62]
The Court is entitled to fashion a remedy
appropriate to the circumstances (Ballantyne v Nasikapow, [2000] FCJ No
1896 at para 79).
[63]
The Decision to remove the Applicants from their
position as Councillors, and banning them from participation in the March 2016
Election and for the lesser of three terms or nine years is quashed. The inevitable
consequence is that the processes ancillary to that Decision are also
invalidated.
[64]
The Councillors who were unlawfully banned from
running in the March 2016 Election and in future elections should have been
eligible as nominees and their wrongful preclusion from participating
invalidates the results of the March 2016 Election.
[65]
Likewise, for the electoral process to be
democratic and fair, the results of the April 2016 Election must also be quashed.
The members supposedly elected in the March 2016 Election did not participate
in the April 2016 Election, and the voters were split.
[66]
Given that the Band is left without a duly
elected Chief and Council, a new election is necessary and should be instituted
in accordance with section 3 of the Election Act. A new election should
be overseen by a fresh and differently constituted election committee and should
be undertaken by the Band as soon as is reasonably possible. The March 2016
Election, from initiation to completion, had it not been illegally interfered
with, spanned approximately three months, and I fail to see why a new election
cannot be carried out within three months of the date of this judgment.
[67]
In an attempt to ensure, as far as possible,
that the effect of this order does not unnecessarily disrupt administration of
the Band, governance of Sturgeon Lake until the new electoral process is
complete necessitates preserving the “status quo” of the four Applicants, Anita
Parenteau, Danny Moosehunter, Micah Daniels, and Wesley Ballantyne, and Jonas
Sanderson (not party to this application) as Councillors for interim oversight.
They are the only Councillors duly elected and valid at law at the time of the Appeal
Tribunal Decision, which has been quashed.
[68]
The termination of Elaine Vandall, Sturgeon Lake’s
External Manager, by the Chief and Councillors elected in the March 2016 Election
is also invalid, as the Chief and Councillors had no authority to act. Elaine
Vandall is under contract to Sturgeon Lake until January 2019, pursuant to an
Independent Service Contract, requested by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development Canada [AANDC], which sets out her authority and responsibilities,
principally involving the oversight of financial affairs relating to the Band.
[69]
The Court’s repeated recommendations for the
Band to promptly enact amendments to the Election Act that would help
prevent yet another return to the Court each election have been disregarded and
have been evidently ineffective.
[70]
Nevertheless, in addition to Justice Kane’s
suggestions of potential Election Act amendments in Felix 3 (at
paras 130-136), not yet heeded, the present scenario has also illuminated the
need for an independent or disciplinary review mechanism for the CEO and DEO if
they act outside their authority. By way of guidance, for instance, their
powers could be defined by the BCR that commences an election and upon which
they are appointed (Election Act, section 3). A further check on that
power could ensue through an amendment to the Executive Act, such that
the CEO and DEO are included under disciplinary provisions (sections 11 and 12
of the Executive Act). Any amendment will of course require that the
amendment procedures under section 16 of the Election Act be followed.
[71]
As I have indicated to the parties, this
scenario cries out for mediated settlement in order to effect meaningful
changes to the Election Act and Executive Act, and avoid futile
and repeated returns to this Court. The Court has not proven to be an effective
forum for achieving a fair and undisputed election process for Sturgeon Lake,
as unfortunately it has been unable to provide lasting resolutions to internal
disputes caused by sharp divisions among the membership.