Docket: IMM-5845-15
Citation:
2016 FC 739
Ottawa, Ontario, June 30, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Annis
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BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Applicant
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and
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CYNTHIA
ERHATIEMWOMON
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for judicial review by
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [the Minister] pursuant to subsection
72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the
Act] seeking to set aside a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division [IAD]
of the Immigration and Refugee Board which had set aside a visa officer’s
decision to refuse the Respondent’s son’s permanent resident application. For
the reasons that follow, the application is allowed.
[2]
The Respondent, Cynthia Erhatiemwomon, is a
Nigerian citizen. On December 31, 1999, she arrived in Canada and made a
refugee claim, which was ultimately denied based on a lack of credibility. After
various proceedings, on November 21, 2008, her H&C application was approved
in principle.
[3]
The Respondent was landed on June 23, 2010. In
her claim she declared that she had three sons and one daughter. On June 25,
2010, the Respondent signed an application to sponsor a further son, Kenneth
Aburime Ukhuegbe, whom she claimed to be her eldest child. Between 2000 and
2008, she had failed to declare the existence of Kenneth on at least six
occasions.
[4]
When first disclosed on November 13, 2008, as
part of her H&C application as a dependent child on her H&C
application, she gave his date of birth as November 30, 1988. According to the
information provided by the Respondent, this would have meant that Kenneth was
born only two months before his younger brother, described in the reasons as
“L.”. This discrepancy was brought to the Respondent’s attention, where after she
corrected Kenneth’s date of birth by phone to be June 30, 1988.
[5]
On December 20, 2010, the Respondent’s permanent
resident sponsor application was refused for a number of reasons leading the
immigration officer to conclude that Kenneth was not likely the Respondent’s
biological child or his declared age and therefore, not a dependent child or a
member of the family class.
[6]
It turned out that DNA testing established that
Kenneth is the Respondent’s biological son. In the appeal before the IAD, the Member
concluded that the Respondent established that Kenneth was a member of the
family class based on the corroborative evidence after rejecting that of the
Respondent and Kenneth.
[7]
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the
IAD decision, measured against the reasonableness standard of review does not
fall within the reasonable range of possible outcomes, or is intelligible in
its justification and must be set aside to be re-determined by another member
of IAD: Nawful v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011
FC 464 at para 13-15.
[8]
While the parties raised a number of issues, it
is sufficient to dispose of this matter by focusing on the Member’s reasoning
in rejecting, or better stated ignoring, the irreconcilable birth date of
Kenneth’s younger brother in concluding that Kenneth was less than 22 at the
application date of June 29, 2010. I cite the Member’s decision at paragraph
19, where the problem of the closeness of the birthdates of the two children is
considered:
[19] Although it is not common for a woman
to give birth to two children (the applicant and his brother L.) only a little
more than five months apart, which is the case if the applicant’s date of birth
is correct, it is biologically possible, although not very likely in the case
of a country such as Nigeria. I consider it more plausible than that the
appellant gave birth at the age of 10 years old. I note also that the accuracy
of the date of birth of the applicant’s younger brother L. was not questioned
as it might have been, to account for the months between births, especially
since the appellant testified to not keeping a calendar or registering the
births until much later.
[9]
In paragraph 19 of her reasons, the Member
concludes that it was “not very likely” that the
Applicant would give birth to two children only little more than five months
apart. The term “likely”, of course, is the same
as that for a finding of fact as a probability. This which would make sense
based on the objective presumptions concerning premature childbirth. It would also
be a reasonable conclusion, not only because the highly premature birth
occurred in Nigeria, but also because it means that the conception of L. occurred
shortly after the birth of Kenneth.
[10]
To support her conclusion that the premature
birth was unlikely, the Member proceeded first to speculate that it was “more plausible that the appellant (the Respondent) gave
birth at the age of 10 years old” in 1978, rather than when she was 20 in
1988, as claimed throughout the proceedings by the Respondent. If this was in
fact the case, it would mean that Kenneth was much older than 21 on the
application date of June 29, 2010.
[11]
More significantly, the Member attempted to
explain away the close birthdates of the two children by speculating that the
age difference might be accounted for due to the inaccuracy of L.’s date of
birth on the basis that the Respondent did not keep a register of births until
much later. In other words, Kenneth’s birth date of June 30, 1988 should be
accepted based upon an error in the birth date of the younger son. I can find
no basis for this highly speculative conclusion which contradicts the evidence
of the Respondent on L.’s date of birth and which was never raised or
considered as an issue.
[12]
The lack of any evidentiary basis, or even any
serious consideration of L.’s birthdate, other than the Member’s speculative
musing that it must be wrong, remains the fundamental stumbling block to
finding that Kenneth’s birthdate was June 30, 1998. It is already problematic
that evidence intended to corroborate Kenneth’s birthdate becomes the basis for
a conclusion when the principal witnesses are found not to be reliable. More to
the point however, even if this evidence was highly probative, it cannot serve
to make an after-the-fact implied conclusion on L’s inaccurate birthdate, when
this contradicts a fact apparently agreed upon by the parties and which was
never argued or vetted by them.
[13]
I conclude that in accepting the June 30, 1998
date for Kenneth’s birthday, the Member does so without any rational
explanation why L.’s birth date should also be rejected, although recognizing
that that the alleged birthdates of the two children cannot be reconciled.
[14]
As said, I also have considerable difficulty
with the Member transforming the out-of-court corroborative affidavit evidence into
the principal evidence upon which the decision was founded. Normally
corroborative out-of-court evidence would not form the basis for decision after
a negative reliability finding of the principal witnesses, who in this case normally
should be the most knowledgeable persons regarding Kenneth’s date of birth.
[15]
In addition, the Member did not consider any of factors
which undermine the weight of the corroborative evidence relied upon. The
affidavit evidence of family members regarding Kenneth’s birth was obtained
over the telephone from a relative of the Respondent’s husband described only
as a Joshua. He apparently was present at Kenneth’s birth and provided his birthdate
based on his calculations using the Nigerian Edo calendar. Besides this evidence
being double hearsay, no details are provided on the Edo calendar and how the
calculation of equivalent dates was made or why the IAD should rely upon him
the gentleman in question.
[16]
There are similar problems with respect to the
information on Kenneth’s birthdate obtained from the school in a form of a
letter. The Respondent was requested to provide Kenneth’s school leaving
certificate, which would objectively confirm his birth date. It was not provided.
Instead the Respondent filed a Nigerian police crime report dated December 13,
2010 which reported that Kenneth’s school leaving certificate went missing on
March 28, 2009. No explanation was provided from the school why such an unusual
crime would have occurred.
[17]
Ultimately, I cannot find any reasonable basis
in the evidence or the Member’s reasons that would sustain the conclusion that
the Respondent discharged her obligation to demonstrate on a balance of
probabilities that Kenneth was under 22 years of age on the application date.
[18]
Accordingly, the application is allowed. The
matter is returned for reconsideration by another member of the IAD. No
questions are certified for appeal.
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