Docket: T-1010-15
Citation:
2016 FC 467
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, April 26, 2016
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Harrington
BETWEEN:
|
KOMI GRATIAS GLIGBE
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Plaintiff
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN
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Defendant
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
Komi Gratias Gligbe is claiming
contract damages according to common law principles respecting labour
law. Unfortunately for him, I am bound by well-established jurisprudence
indicating that a member of the Canadian Armed Forces [CAF] is not bound to Her
Majesty the Queen by an employment contract, but, instead, serves at pleasure.
His statement of claim should be struck out in accordance with Rule 221 of
the Federal Courts Rules. However, I am granting the plaintiff time to
file a new statement to more clearly support his claims regarding the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
I.
The facts
[2]
The plaintiff joined the CAF on July 15,
2009. On May 7, 2012, the CAF decided to release the plaintiff. This
decision took effect on June 18, 2012.
[3]
On March 17, 2014, the Chief of the Defence
Staff concluded that the plaintiff had been wronged by the release and that he
would be awarded partial reparation. By so doing, he opened the door for the
plaintiff to re-enlist. However, the plaintiff never re‑enlisted in the
CAF.
[4]
On July 18, 2014, the plaintiff submitted
an application for judicial review of the decision regarding his release (in
Court file number T‑1641‑14). The application was discontinued on
January 28, 2016.
[5]
On June 17, 2015, the plaintiff instituted
a second claim for damages related to his release.
[6]
On November 12, 2015, in a detailed 52‑paragraph
order, Mr. Justice Annis ordered that the plaintiff’s statement of
claim be struck out on the grounds that this second claim did not present any
reasonable cause of action (Gligbe v. Canada, 2015 FC 1265).
Annis J. granted the plaintiff 60 days to file a new statement of
claim presenting a different cause of action with more relevant facts to
support his claim of wrongful release, failing which he could not institute a
new action based on the facts surrounding his release from the CAF without leave
of the Court.
[7]
The plaintiff, who is representing himself,
filed a new statement of claim on December 30, 2015.
[8]
The respondent now contends that this new claim
presents no reasonable cause of action because the National Defence Act
and jurisprudence prohibit a member or former member of the CAF from pursuing Her
Majesty the Queen for wrongful dismissal.
II.
Motion to strike
[9]
Rule 221 of the Federal Courts Rules
reads as follows:
Motion to
strike
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Requête en
radiation
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221 (1) On
motion, the Court may, at any time, order that a pleading, or anything
contained therein, be struck out, with or without leave to amend, on the
ground that it
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221 (1) À
tout moment, la Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner la radiation de tout ou
partie d’un acte de procédure, avec ou sans autorisation de le modifier, au
motif, selon le cas :
|
(a) discloses
no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be,
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a) qu’il ne
révèle aucune cause d’action ou de défense valable;
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(b) is
immaterial or redundant,
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b) qu’il
n’est pas pertinent ou qu’il est redondant;
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(c) is
scandalous, frivolous or vexatious,
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c) qu’il est
scandaleux, frivole ou vexatoire;
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(d) may
prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action,
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d) qu’il
risque de nuire à l’instruction équitable de l’action ou de la retarder;
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(e)
constitutes a departure from a previous pleading, or
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e) qu’il
diverge d’un acte de procédure antérieur;
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(f) is
otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court,
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f) qu’il
constitue autrement un abus de procédure.
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and may order
the action be dismissed or judgment entered accordingly.
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Elle peut
aussi ordonner que l’action soit rejetée ou qu’un jugement soit enregistré en
conséquence.
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Evidence
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Preuve
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(2) No evidence shall be heard on a motion for an order under
paragraph (1)(a).
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(2) Aucune
preuve n’est admissible dans le cadre d’une requête invoquant le motif visé à
l’alinéa (1)a).
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[10]
The Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959
decision establishes that a statement will be struck out if it is “plain and obvious” that the pleadings disclose no
reasonable claim. It is not for the Court, at this stage, to weigh the
plaintiff’s chances of success (Alani v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2015 FC 649,
at paragraph 6, affirmed in 2016 FCA 22).
III.
Analysis of the motion
[11]
First, I note that some elements on which
Annis J. based his analysis are no longer relevant. Specifically, the
plaintiff discontinued his application for judicial review (Court file number T‑1641‑14).
[12]
The stare decisis principle establishes
that the court whose decision is appealed against must follow the decisions of
higher courts. This is a basic tenet of our legal system (Carter v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, at paragraph 44).
The Court must follow the clearly established legal rules.
[13]
It is recognized that members of the CAF serve
at pleasure. There are many examples of decisions, including one from the
Federal Court of Appeal, confirming that they are not bound to Her Majesty the
Queen by an employment contract (Mitchell v. The Queen, [1896] 1 QB 121
(UK) (QL); Gallant v. The Queen in Right of Canada (1978), 91 DLR (3d) 695
(FCT); Sylvestre v. R (1986), 30 DLR (4th) 639
(FCA); McClennan v. Canada, 2002 FCT 244, at paragraph 11;
Donoghue v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2004 FC 733,
at paragraph 35; MacLellan v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 NSSC 280,
at paragraph 59). I, myself, acknowledged this principle in Bissonnette
v. Canada, 2007 FC 281, at paragraphs 7‑8.
[14]
Case law is well established and clear on the
subject of the relationship between a soldier and Her Majesty the Queen. I am
bound by this. Given the current state of the law, the plaintiff has no
reasonable cause of action under common law for wrongful and unfair
dismissal. The application in its present form cannot succeed.
[15]
Trial courts may reconsider settled rulings of
higher courts in certain situations, specifically, where a new legal issue is
raised or where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” (Carter,
at paragraph 44; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72,
at paragraph 42). In the context of a motion to strike, the Courts must be
generous and, to the extent possible, err on the side of permitting a novel but
arguable claim to proceed to trial (R v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,
2011 SCC 2, at paragraph 21). In my opinion, this does not
constitute a change in circumstance.
[16]
I recognize that common law is an
evolving branch of law and that “stare decisis is not a
straitjacket that condemns the law to stasis.” (Carter, at
paragraph 44). The Courts may make incremental changes to common law
to further the requirements of justice and fairness (Secunda Marine
Services Ltd. v. Fabco Industries Ltd., 2005 FC 1565, at
paragraph 49). Ignoring the established jurisprudence in this case would
not constitute a “responsible, incremental change to
the common law” but would, instead, completely throw into doubt the
outcomes of previous cases, which Mr. Justice Stratas warns against
in Paradis Honey Ltd. v. Canada, 2015 FCA 89, at
paragraphs 116‑118. In short, this is a question for the legislator,
as acknowledged in Gallant and restated in McClennan (at
paragraph 9).
[17]
Therefore, I would allow the plaintiff’s motion
to strike.
IV.
Leave to amend
[18]
The Court may order striking out with or without
leave to amend. The leave to amend will be rejected if the pleading involves a
defect that cannot be cured by amendment (Collins v. Canada, 2011 FCA 140,
at paragraph 26).
[19]
The plaintiff contends that he has a valid
argument based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However,
the Charter is only mentioned in passing in paragraphs 69, 76 and
81 of his statement of claim filed on December 30, 2015. His response to
the defendant’s motion to strike implies that he plans to base his recourse on
section 15 and subsection 24(1) of the Charter He also refers
to the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Employment Equity Act.
[20]
A new argument based on Charter
provisions could constitute a new legal issue (Bedford, at
paragraph 42). The argument based on the Charter was addressed by
the Federal Court of Appeal in Sylvestre, above. In this case, a former
CAF member claimed that her release violated the rights provided for in
section 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal ruled that section 7
did not apply in this case, but did not rule on the application of section 15
of the Charter.
[21]
In short, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff
has fully and accurately presented his arguments based on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Having regard to the circumstances, the
defendant was unable to address the Charter and the Court is unable to
determine whether it is plain and obvious that this motion would have no chance
of success.
[22]
Therefore, I am granting the plaintiff 30 days
to file, if he wishes, a new statement of claim based on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and including all the relevant facts to
support his claims, without prejudice to the defendant’s rights to object or
not to this new statement of claim. Only then will the Court be able to
consider whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated and if he can obtain the
requested reparation.
[23]
I suggest the plaintiff familiarize himself with
the rules on formulating constitutional questions, specifically, section 57
of the Federal Courts Act, if this becomes necessary given the
assumption that Acts of the federal Parliament follow the Canadian
constitution. It would also be advisable that the plaintiff consult the rules
regarding layout and the appropriate font for documents submitted to the Court.
[24]
Although it is appropriate to accord some
latitude to someone who is representing himself, the Court is not a faculty of
law. The defendant is entitled to costs.