Date: 20160422
Dockets: T-1110-12
T-491-14
Citation:
2016 FC 435
Ottawa, Ontario, April 22, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Diner
Docket: T-1110-12
BETWEEN:
|
AFX LICENSING
CORPORATION
|
Plaintiff
|
and
|
HJC AMERICA,
INC
|
AND HJC CO, LTD
(KR)
|
Defendants
|
Docket: T-491-14
|
AND BETWEEN:
|
AFX LICENSING
CORPORATION
|
Plaintiff
|
and
|
ROYAL
DISTRIBUTING INC
|
Defendant
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
In this action, the Plaintiff claims that the
Defendants infringed its registered industrial design – “Helmet Face Shield”, Can ID No 133964 (10 February
2010) [ID 964] – which purports to protect the visor, or face shield, portion
of a snowmobile helmet. It seeks an injunction and damages for infringement
under the Industrial Design Act, RSC 1985, c I-9 [the Act].
[2]
The Defendants deny these allegations. They
allege by counterclaim the invalidity of the design and request that this Court
expunge it from the Register of Industrial Designs. The Defendants also allege
that in holding out the design as valid, the Plaintiff has infringed subsection
7(d) of the Trade-Marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13.
[3]
For the reasons outlined below, I find that
while the ID 964 is valid, the Defendants have not infringed it. As a result of
the design’s validity, the Defendants’ subsection 7(d) arguments are moot.
II.
Factual Background
A.
The Parties
[4]
The Plaintiff, AFX Licensing Corporation [AFX],
is an Ontario corporation. It holds all rights to ID 964, which was registered
on September 3, 2010. AFX therefore asserts that it has the exclusive right,
under the Act, to “make, import for the purpose of
trade or business, sell, rent, offer, or expose for sale or rent” any
product to which ID 964 has been applied until September 3, 2020 – the end of
the 10 year period outlined in subsection 10(1) of the Act.
[5]
HJC America, Inc. [HJC America], a California
corporation, serves as the marketing arm of HJC Co, Ltd (KR) [HJC Korea], a
South Korean corporation that manufactures and distributes the HJ-17L helmet
face shield, the product that the Plaintiff claims infringes ID 964.
[6]
Royal Distributing Inc. [RDI], a retailer in
Guelph, obtains supplies from Parts Canada – HJC Korea’s distributor in this
country – and has admitted to selling 20 HJ-17L helmet face shields. The
plaintiff originally sued RDI in a separate proceeding (Court Docket T-491-14),
though the two actions were eventually consolidated as the evidence, witnesses,
counsel, issues, and products involved were identical. This decision thus
addresses both actions.
B.
The Industrial Design and the Allegedly
Infringing Face Shield
[7]
Snowmobile helmets have been available to
consumers in North America since at least the 1960s. Helmets and their face
shields are designed primarily to protect the human head from injuries
sustained on snowmobile trails most commonly caused by collisions, falls, and
tree branches. Face shields, such as that represented by ID 964, protect an
individual’s eyes and face from wind and cold, while permitting them to see
where they are going. To prevent fogging or condensation on the inside of the
visor, some face shields (like the Plaintiff’s) contain a layer of air between
an inner and outer lens. Others employ electric heating elements.
(1)
The Industrial Design, ID 964
[8]
ID 964 was originally registered to AFX North
America Inc. [AFX-NA] on September 3, 2010, and then assigned to the Plaintiff
on November 9, 2011. It contains the following brief description:
The design consists of the features of
shape, configuration, pattern and ornament of the entire helmet face shield as
shown in the drawings.
[9]
The drawings referred to in this description are
reproduced in their entirety below, with additional clarification to describe
the perspective of each image:
ID
964 Figure 1 – Front left perspective

ID 964 Figure 2 – Perspective from
exterior

ID 964 Figure 3 – Perspective from interior

ID 964 Figure 4 – Left side perspective

ID 964 Figure 5 – Right side perspective

ID 964 Figure 6 – Perspective from above

ID 964 Figure 7 - Perspective from below
[10]
These drawings show the face shield from various
angles and perspectives. In them, one can clearly see the shape of the viewing
area, which I would describe as rectangular with rounded corners and rounding
at the top with tapered ends. The height of the viewing area retreats along the
arms.
[11]
During the trial, the Plaintiff emphasized what
it termed “the outwardly moulded projection and the
smooth contoured surface around the viewing area” [the “outwardly moulded projection”], most clearly visible
in Figures 4 and 5 of ID 964 above.
(2)
The HJ-17L Face Shield
[12]
The HJ-17L, manufactured by HJC Korea, is a dual
lens helmet face shield which, like ID 964, contains a raised lens viewing area
and which the Plaintiff asserts infringes ID 964. Photographs of the HJ-17L
corresponding to figures #1-7 of ID 964 follow:
HJ-17L Figure 1 – Front left perspective
HJ-17L Figure 2 – Perspective from
exterior
HJ-17L Figure 3 – Perspective from interior
HJ-17L Figure 4 – Left side perspective
HJ-17L Figure 5 – Right side
perspective
HJ-17L Figure 6– Perspective from above

HJ-17L Figure 7 – Perspective from below

III.
Issues
[13]
The three issues to be decided are:
A.
Whether the HJ-17L infringes ID 964;
B.
Whether ID 964 is valid; and
C.
Whether the Plaintiff has violated subsection
7(d) of the Trade-Marks Act in misrepresenting ID 964 as valid.
IV.
Fact Witnesses
A.
George Douglas Hill
[14]
Mr. Hill is the co-founder of AFX-NA and of the
Plaintiff. AFX-NA is a powersports helmet manufacturer. Mr. Hill started AFX-NA
in 1996 with his wife and their business partner after having worked in the
powersports industry since 1978.
Mr. Hill defined the powersports industry as that which “[c]omprises motorcycle, snowmobile, ATV, scooter, dirt bike,
[and] all areas of two-wheeled, three-wheeled and four-wheeled recreation
[vehicles]” (Condensed Trial Transcript at 9 [CTT])).
Mr. Hill testified that AFX-NA has recently shipped its two millionth helmet.
[15]
In terms of the product at issue, Mr. Hill
clarified that the term “visor” has a number of interchangeable meanings in the powersports
industry, including, for instance, the peak of a dirt bike helmet. Therefore,
he stated that one should properly refer to ID 964 and HJ-17L
as “shields” or “face shields”.
[16]
Mr. Hill testified that he started developing
his face shield design in 2009 and that at the time there were only two ways to
make a helmet face shield that was cold-weather appropriate. The first “black plastic frame” approach
required the insertion of two clear plastic pieces (the viewing area) into a
black plastic frame. The second approach required a clear stick-on application
affixed to the inside of a warm-weather face shield.
[17]
Mr. Hill stated that his sales team “pressured” him to create a new design, given
considerable success with their FX-90 motorcycle helmet, which lacked a
cold-weather version. Mr. Hill then described his “wow”
moment in envisioning how the design would work with this “landmark” helmet, describing it as follows:
What I designed was an outwardly moulded
viewing area around the full perimeter of the opening of the face shield of the
helmet, the smooth contour around the entire of the perimeter so that if, when
we look at the helmet, the outside is away from the person's face, so this is
outwardly moulded this direction, away from the rider's face, with a smooth
contoured curve around the entire visible viewing area, this was my design.
(CTT at 19)
[18]
Mr. Hill testified that he introduced his face
shield design to the market in early 2010 and that, to his knowledge, there was
nothing like it. He later admitted under cross-examination that he had not done
a patent search, although according to Mr. Hill “it is
impossible to know everything that is in the marketplace” (CTT at 32). He stated that he acquired his awareness of existing
designs through his exposure to them in his business and from regular attendance
at industry events.
[19]
Mr. Hill then sought both industrial design and
patent protection for his design. The patent application sought to protect “a face shield or a visor for a helmet with
a second spaced apart lens to thereby improve the anti-fogging property of the
face shield” (CTT at 35). However, a protest was
filed under section 10 of the Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, claiming that a similar face shield had been on the
market since 2008. The patent application was subsequently abandoned.
[20]
The industrial design application, however, was
filed on February 10, 2010 and was registered as ID 964 about seven months
later.
[21]
On November 7, 2011, Mr. Hill incorporated the
Plaintiff. Two days later, he transferred to it the ownership of ID 964 from
AFX-NA. Mr. Hill’s intention was for the Plaintiff to license ID 964 to any
interested parties, charging $1 per item sold. Then, almost two years after
introducing AFX’s face shield into the market, he saw the HJ-17L being
advertised on http://www.hjchelmets.com, a website maintained by HJC America.
He subsequently ordered one through HJC Korea’s retail dealer.
B.
George Hong
[22]
Mr. Hong is the President of the Defendant HJC
America. He testified that HJC America is a small company that is responsible
for marketing HJC brand helmets and that it does not manufacture, distribute or
sell helmets. In short, http://www.hjchelmets.com, the website maintained by
HJC America, serves as a product information source for consumers. The website
details are displayed directly on the HJ-17L helmet shield packaging when sold.
The website is also listed in a manual that comes in the box with the face
shield.
[23]
In terms of its activities in Canada, Mr. Hong
testified that HJC America occasionally assists customers with warranty and
product replacement issues. However, one can only purchase an HJC product from
a dealer and not through the company website, which contains a dealer locator.
For these marketing and customer service activities, HJC America is compensated
entirely by HJC Korea.
[24]
Finally, Mr. Hong testified that on November 16,
2011, he received a notice of infringement and the ID 964 registration from the
Plaintiff. Mr. Hong also admitted that the HJ-17L shield was introduced into
the market after the application for ID 964 was filed.
C.
Gregory Forrest
[25]
Mr. Forrest is a patent agent employed by the
Defendants’ law firm, McMillan LLP. Mr. Forrest accessed
http://www.archive.org, the Internet Archive’s “Wayback
Machine”, to date a catalogue posted on the website of Al’s Snowmobile
Parts Warehouse [Al’s], an American company. The Internet Archive is a
non-profit organization that automatically gathers data from individual
websites at irregular intervals and stores that data for retrieval later (Affidavit
of Gregory Forrest at 1). When that data is stored, the date that it was
gathered is stored along with it, as described by Justice McVeigh in Davydiuk
v Internet Archive Canada, 2014 FC 944 at para 6:
The “Wayback Machine” is a collection of
websites accessible through the websites “archive.org” and “web.archive.org”.
The collection is created by software programs known as crawlers, which surf
the internet and store copies of websites, preserving them as they existed at
the time they were visited. According to Internet Archive, users of the Wayback
Machine can view more than 240 billion pages stored in its archive that are
hosted on servers located in the United States. The Wayback Machine has six
staff to keep it running and is operated from San Francisco, California at
Internet Archive’s office. None of the computers used by Internet Archive are
located in Canada.
[26]
Mr. Forrest testified that he searched for
http://www.alssnowmobile.com, a website run by Al’s. He then went to the
October 10, 2007 version of that website and downloaded a post-script data file
[PDF] of the 2007-2008 product catalogue available on Al’s website [Al’s
Catalogue] at the time. He testified that the metadata associated with the PDF
of Al’s Catalogue indicated that it was most recently modified on September 18,
2007. That catalogue was attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Forrest’s affidavit. On
cross-examination, however, Mr. Forrest admitted that the Wayback Machine is
not definitive proof that the catalogue was available on A1’s website and/or
that the computer used to access it necessarily reflected the correct date.
V.
The Defendants’ Expert Witness: Professor
Harry Mahler
[27]
Professor Mahler holds an Associate
degree (Ontario College of Art) and a Master’s degree (University of
Birmingham) in industrial design. He has taught design since 1989 (full-time
since 2004) and previously worked in the private sector where he designed
hockey helmets and visors for Cooper Canada, Ltd (now Bauer Hockey).
[28]
As will be explained below, while
I appreciated his submissions on the functional limitations of face shield
design, Professor Mahler ultimately admitted that he was not familiar with the
concept of design as defined by the Act. Therefore, I have not placed
significant weight on his conclusions regarding both infringement and validity.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to review his testimony, which was as follows.
[29]
Professor Mahler first
outlined the similarities between hockey helmet visor design and snowmobile
face shield design:
The visor’s geometry must be modelled to
ensure clear visibility of the user, from one side to the other. The visor for
both helmets must protect the wearer’s eyes and face from any unexpected
impacts. Both visors are designed to withstand impacts by using structural
elements, such as surface modelling, to strengthen the visor and improve its
impact resistance. If a plastic visor is used in a cold environment, fogging
can be an issue in both cases. Both visors require adjustable attachment
points, release mechanisms for removal and cleaning. The shape of the visor has
to reflect the form of the helmet for attachment purposes. The visor has to be
designed to match… the helmet to prevent vibration. It is quite important that
the visor and helmet are very well-matched.
(CTT at 94-95)
[30]
Professor Mahler was asked, as an expert in the
field of industrial design, to address two questions. First, on the question of
validity, Professor Mahler examined whether the Plaintiff’s ID 964 is identical
or so similar to the designs described in the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim
(discussed in my analysis below) as to be confounded therewith. Second,
regarding the question of infringement, Professor Mahler addressed whether the
Plaintiff’s ID 964 has been applied to the HJ-17L face shield (Expert’s
Affidavit of Professor Harry Mahler at para 8 [Mahler Affidavit]).
[31]
Professor Mahler was given the following, all of
which were admitted into evidence for the trial of this action: a copy of ID
964; a copy of “anti-Condensation Visor”, US
Patent No 5765235 (20 November 1995) [the Arnold Patent]; a copy of “Helmet Having Shield”, US Patent No 5161261 (16
August 1991) [the Kamata Patent]; a copy of “Helmet
Face Shield”, US Patent No 11/148450 (application filed on 9 June 2005)
[the Douglas Patent Application]; a copy of Mr. Hill’s abandoned patent
application (“Helmet Face Shield”, Can Patent No
2731186 (application filed on 8 February, 2011)); pages from Al’s Catalogue;
and two HJ-17L face shields (Mahler Affidavit at para 9).
[32]
Professor Mahler also attached to his affidavit
Exhibit A, a “Visual Comparison of Snowmobile Visors”,
which placed a number of images of the side view of helmet shields attached to
snowmobile helmets. He testified that he found these images through an internet
search in 2014. The Plaintiff argued, however, that those images cannot be
considered in any prior art analysis since there is no proof before this Court
that the shields depicted predated the ID 964 registration of September 3,
2010. I agree and accordingly will not consider any of Professor Mahler’s submissions
regarding these assorted snowmobile helmets.
[33]
Professor Mahler first testified that designs
that are based primarily on function are hard to differentiate and thus would
not be perceived as unique (Mahler Affidavit at para 17). He then stated that
there were several functional restrictions on helmet shield design, including
the following:
A.
The form of the shield must mirror the form of
the helmet so that (a) the shield may pass over the helmet when hinged up and
(b) the shield closely fits the helmet when covering the viewing area;
B.
Both the width and the length of the face shield
are determined by the location of the hinge points on the helmet and the size
of the helmet; and
C.
The size and shape of the shield’s viewing area
are contingent on both the user’s field of vision and the overall size and form
of the helmet, particularly its opening for the viewing area.
[34]
As a result, the form and function of the helmet
ultimately dictate the overall appearance of the shield. Prof. Mahler
concluded:
Since all visors fulfil much the same
requirement such as overall size, shape, so to fit over and fasten to a
standard helmet, meet the user's physical and visual requirements and the
location of the helmet's fastening points, the visor appearance [tends] to be
standardized. They are very similar.
(CTT at 106)
[35]
Turning to ID 964, Professor Mahler testified
that the images in ID 964 had been “simplified to their
most basic” and were “generic with no design
details, just very basic functional drawings” (CTT at 105). He took
particular issue with Figure 1, which he felt did not display an external
protrusion around the outline of the viewing area. On this point, Professor
Mahler testified that Figure 1 was a “badly done”
drawing because “[w]hen you do a drawing of this type,
you actually have to draw in perspective and in perspective, there is a
difference between the surfaces that you lay out. This drawing is not in
perspective, and it’s not laid out properly” (CTT at 151).
[36]
Professor Mahler acknowledged under cross-examination,
however, that while Figure 1 of ID 964 did not demonstrate a “change in height” in the viewing area (i.e. an “outwardly moulded projection”), Figure 4 did indeed
show such a change. The Professor further acknowledged that all of the figures
must be interpreted together for a proper understanding of ID 964.
[37]
Professor Mahler also commented specifically on
the viewing area’s edge, denoted by a dual line in the figures, which he
assumed to be a tape or adhesive “white line” connecting
the inner and outer lens in order to create an insulated, anti-fogging air gap.
On cross-examination, he admitted that he reached this conclusion by assuming
that ID 964 described a winterized face shield and not because there was
anything in ID 964 to inform his conclusion.
[38]
Professor Mahler then considered the various
designs provided to him, describing them all as being “very
similar” other than the size of the helmet’s viewing area and the
connection point to the helmet in each. He thus concluded that “[ID 964] does not meet the criteria… of being original
because this does not differentiate itself… substantially from the prior art” (Mahler
Affidavit at para 21).
[39]
In comparing ID 964 with the HJ-17L face shields
during oral testimony, Professor Mahler physically pointed to various
differences between the face shields as follows:
[I]f we compare [ID 964] to [the HJ-17L
shield], we have got the tab, which [ID 964] doesn’t have. We have got a
textured surface, which [ID 964] doesn’t have. We have a longer section that
goes back further on the [HJ-17L]. We have details here that actually are quite
interesting, they are also textured. We have the detail for the actual opening
[of the HJ-17L]. None of that is on [the ID 964] drawing.
So it’s really difficult to suggest that
they are the same because [ID 964] has no information on it.
(CTT at 111)
[40]
Professor Mahler concluded that the HJ-17L
shields infringe the Plaintiff’s ID 964 but “so does
the pre-existing prior art” (CTT at 117).
In other words, and as he responded in cross-examination, Professor Mahler
opined that “[e]verything that’s on the market that’s a
visor infringes on that design registration because that design registration is
so vague that it basically covers all the ground” (CTT at 134).
Professor Mahler returned to this assessment repeatedly, stating, for instance,
that the figures in ID 964 “were badly done” and
if a student of his had submitted them, they “would
have failed” (CTT at 148-52).
[41]
While Professor Mahler concluded that ID 964 “does not meet the criteria of being original because it does
not differentiate itself substantially from the prior art” (Mahler
Affidavit at para 21), it became clear that he lacked an understanding of
certain key elements of the term “design” as
defined by the Act. Professor Mahler admitted that he did not know about the
law or the examination procedure around industrial design protection. He also
stated under cross-examination that he did not agree with the definition of “design” as used in the Act and applied a different
definition when conducting his analysis:
Q: Would it be fair to say, Professor
Mahler, that therefore your words or use of the word “design” in your affidavit
does not reflect the definition of the word “design” in the Act?
A: No, the Act is narrower and more focussed.
And when I talk about design, I talk about [the] broader sense of design.
(CTT at 144)
[42]
This “broader sense of
design” on which he relied included, for example, functionality:
Q: So a good design, a good design
inherently incorporates an element of functionality?
A: Yes. But it’s not the entire – design is
much bigger than the function of the product.
[…]
Q: Is there a bright line, Professor,
between design and function? Or is there a point at which they blend?
A: They are all part of the same thing. But
it’s bigger than function. Function is only one aspect, that is all I’m saying.
(CTT at 124)
[43]
As will be discussed in detail below, the Act’s
protection cannot cover any solely functional or utilitarian elements of the
design at issue. The Federal Court of Appeal has stated in Zero Spill
Systems (Int’l) Inc v Heide, 2015 FCA 115 at para 24 [Zero Spill]
that “[f]eatures may be simultaneously useful and
visually appealing” but a clear understanding of the legal distinction
between utility/function and design is nonetheless an essential precondition to
speaking meaningfully on infringement and originality. Suffice it to say that
Professor Mahler’s criticisms of ID 964 for vagueness and insufficient visual
detail were rooted in his expertise as an industrial designer and professor in
that field of study, and not his expertise in Canadian industrial design protection
or what constitutes infringement of a registered design in this country.
[44]
Additionally, on cross-examination, Professor
Mahler admitted that he was not given a physical sample of any of the prior art
he was asked to examine. He asserted that this in no way affected his ability,
as an expert in design, to assess the degree of similarity between the ID 964
and the prior art. Yet it is clear from the confusion around the “white
adhesive edge” he assumed was present in ID 964 that there are limits to what
can be determined from visual depictions alone, including the images in Al’s
Catalogue.
[45]
In light of the above, I find Professor Mahler’s
evidence concerning the functional limitations on helmet face shield design to
be helpful. However, I do not give significant weight to his conclusions on whether
the ID 964 design is original, is valid, or has been infringed by the HJ-17L
face shield.
VI.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
[46]
According to section 2 of the Act:
[D]esign or
industrial design means features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament
and any combination of those features that, in a finished article, appeal to
and are judged solely by the eye;
|
[D]essin
Caractéristiques ou combinaison de caractéristiques visuelles d’un objet
fini, en ce qui touche la configuration, le motif ou les éléments décoratifs.
|
[47]
There are some essential restrictions on
industrial design protection, outlined in section 5.1 of the Act:
5.1 No protection
afforded by this Act shall extend to
(a) features
applied to a useful article that are dictated solely by a utilitarian
function of the article; or
(b) any method or
principle of manufacture or construction.
|
5.1 Les
caractéristiques résultant uniquement de la fonction utilitaire d’un objet
utilitaire ni les méthodes ou principes de réalisation d’un objet ne peuvent
bénéficier de la protection prévue par la présente loi.
|
[48]
There are also conditions of registrability of a
design outlined in section 6 of the Act:
6. (1) The Minister
shall register the design if the Minister finds that it is not identical with
or does not so closely resemble any other design already registered as to be
confounded therewith, and shall return to the proprietor thereof the drawing
or photograph and description with the certificate required by this Part.
[…]
(3) The Minister
shall refuse to register the design if the application for registration is
filed in Canada
(a) more than one
year after the publication of the design in Canada or elsewhere, in the case
of an application filed in Canada on or after the day on which this
subsection comes into force; or
(b) more
than one year after the publication of the design in Canada, in the case of
an application filed in Canada before the day on which this subsection comes
into force.
|
6 (1) Si le
ministre trouve que le dessin n’est pas identique à un autre dessin déjà
enregistré ou qu’il n’y ressemble pas au point qu’il puisse y avoir
confusion, il l’enregistre et remet au propriétaire une esquisse ou une
photographie ainsi qu’une description en même temps que le certificat
prescrit par la présente partie.
[…]
(3) Le ministre refuse d’enregistrer le dessin si la demande
d’enregistrement a été déposée au Canada :
a) plus d’un an après sa publication au Canada ou ailleurs dans le
monde, dans le cas d’une demande déposée au Canada à compter de l’entrée en
vigueur du présent paragraphe;
b) plus d’un an après sa publication au Canada, dans les autres
cas.
|
[49]
Subsection 7(3) of the Act states that a
certificate of registration, which the Plaintiff possesses for ID 964, creates
a presumption of validity:
7. (3) The
certificate, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is sufficient evidence
of the design, of the originality of the design, of the name of the
proprietor, of the person named as proprietor being proprietor, of the
commencement and term of registration, and of compliance with this Act.
|
7 (3) En
l’absence de preuve contraire, le certificat est une attestation suffisante
du dessin, de son originalité, du nom du propriétaire, du fait que la
personne dite propriétaire est propriétaire, de la date et de l’expiration de
l’enregistrement, et de l’observation de la présente loi.
|
[50]
Finally, section 11 of the Act describes the
exclusive right provided to the owner of a registered design:
11. (1) During the
existence of an exclusive right, no person shall, without the licence of the
proprietor of the design,
(a) make, import
for the purpose of trade or business, or sell, rent, or offer or expose for
sale or rent, any article in respect of which the design is registered and to
which the design or a design not differing substantially therefrom has been
applied; or
(b) do, in
relation to a kit, anything specified in paragraph (a) that would constitute
an infringement if done in relation to an article assembled from the kit.
(2) For the
purposes of subsection (1), in considering whether differences are
substantial, the extent to which the registered design differs from any
previously published design may be taken into account.
|
11 (1) Pendant
l’existence du droit exclusif, il est interdit, sans l’autorisation du
propriétaire du dessin :
a) de fabriquer, d’importer à des fins commerciales, ou de vendre,
de louer ou d’offrir ou d’exposer en vue de la vente ou la location un objet
pour lequel un dessin a été enregistré et auquel est appliqué le dessin ou un
dessin ne différant pas de façon importante de celui-ci;
b) d’effectuer l’une quelconque des opérations visées à l’alinéa
a) dans la mesure où elle constituerait une violation si elle portait sur
l’objet résultant de l’assemblage d’un prêt-à-monter.
(2) Pour l’application du paragraphe (1), il peut être tenu
compte, pour déterminer si les différences sont importantes, de la mesure
dans laquelle le dessin enregistré est différent de dessins publiés
auparavant.
|
VII.
Analysis
A.
Infringement
(1)
The Status of HJC America
[51]
A preliminary issue to be discussed when
considering infringement is whether HJC America was actually engaged in any
activities that could fall under paragraph 11(1)(a) of the Act.
[52]
HJC America argues that, since it is a marketing
arm, it does not make, import, sell, rent, or offer or
expose for sale or rent the HJ-17L face shield.
[53]
The Plaintiff, by contrast, takes the position
that HJC America is, at the very least, exposing the HJ-17L face shields for
sale by displaying them on its website and directing interested customers to
dealers where they can, if they desire, then purchase those shields. The
Plaintiff further argues that even if HJC America does not make or sell the
HJ-17L, as Mr. Hong’s testimony made clear, HJC America
plays an important role in the process by which HJC Korea sells its products in
Canada. HJC America, for example, operates at a loss and exists solely to
market products that HJC Korea develops.
[54]
While this is an interesting issue and the case
law on “exposing for sale” is scant, as will be
explained below, I do not find that the HJ-17L face shields infringe ID 964. There
is thus no need to address the issue of whether the HJC America was engaged in
any of the activities listed in paragraph 11(1)(a) of the Act.
(2)
The Test for Infringement
[55]
There are four steps required to determine
infringement: (i) an examination of the prior art; (ii) an assessment of
utilitarian function and any methods or principles of manufacture or
construction; (iii) an analysis of the scope of protection outlined in the
language and figures of the registered design itself; and (iv) in light of all
of the above, a comparative analysis of the registered design and the allegedly
infringing product.
(a)
Prior art
[56]
The
analysis of infringement starts with prior art (Bodum USA, Inc v Trudeau Corporation (1889) Inc, 2012 FC
1128 at para 52 [Bodum]). This is because, pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(a) of the Act,
the owner of a registered industrial design retains exclusive rights over the
design and any design that does not differ substantially from it.
Subsection 11(2) of the Act stipulates that “the extent to which the registered design differs from any
previously published design may be taken into account”. In other words, prior art must be considered in assessing the
scope of “substantial difference”.
(b)
Utilitarian function and methods and
principles of manufacture and construction
[57]
A second consideration
in establishing the parameters of the infringement analysis is that, as
described in subsection 5.1 of the Act, a registered industrial design cannot
protect the (a) “features
applied to a useful article that are dictated solely by a utilitarian function
of the article” or (b) “any method or principle of
manufacture or construction”. As such, “the
similarities arising from the utilitarian function are not taken into account
by the Court in its infringement analysis” (Bodum at para 46), though, as the Federal
Court of Appeal clarified in Zero Spill at paras 23-27, “functional features of designs may be
protected under the Act …[o]nly those features whose form are dictated solely
by function are not protected ”. Similarly, design features that stem solely from methods
and principles of manufacture and construction are excluded from design
protection.
(c)
Scope of protection
[58]
Third, one must consider whether the registered
design covers only a portion or small feature, rather than the whole of the
protected object. If a registrant is trying to protect a single feature, the
registration must clearly limit its scope to that particular feature, either
through its written description and/or a clear indication in any associated
illustrations.
[59]
At trial, the Plaintiff directed the Court’s attention
repeatedly to one feature – the “outwardly moulded
projection” – stressing in its submissions that this is the key feature that
ID 964 protects. The answer to whether this is actually the case, however, lies
in an assessment of the contents of ID 964 itself – both the text and the
images that comprise the registered design.
(d)
Comparative (infringement) analysis
[60]
After assessing the
prior art to determine the scope of substantial difference, identifying the
purely utilitarian features and excluding them, and assessing the scope of
protection offered by the design itself, a comparative analysis must be done
between the design and the impugned article: if the latter does not differ
substantially, then infringement results. In this
comparative analysis, an “informed consumer” perspective
must be used (Bodum at para 80). An informed consumer has been described
as one “who is familiar with the … market field”
(Rothbury International Inc v
Canada (Minister of Industry), 2004 FC 578 at para 38 [Rothbury].
(3)
What is the state of the prior art?
[61]
When an industrial design is registered, the designs
that pre-existed it play an important role in determining the scope of
protection that the industrial design affords its owner. The Defendants adduced
several examples of what they alleged to be prior art, also making them
available to Professor Mahler. As explained above, Professor Mahler’s “Visual Comparison of Snowmobile Visors” will not be
considered in this analysis since the designs it contains cannot be accurately dated
to before ID 964 was registered. The rest of the prior art is considered below.
(a)
Al’s Catalogue
[62]
The Defendants drew the Court’s attention to
page 81 of Al’s Catalogue, the document attached to Mr. Forrest’s affidavit
that he found on http://www.alssnowmobile.com as dated to October 10, 2007.
That page of the catalogue contains photographs from various angles (but
primarily side views) of two snowmobile helmets with face shields. The Defendants
emphasized the face shield portion of one helmet in particular, suggesting that
“you can clearly see the transition from the lower
surface to a higher lens surface thatʼs necessary to accommodate the
double-lens construction” (CTT at 267).
[63]
I agree with the Defendants that there is little
reason to mistrust the date of publication or provenance of Al’s Catalogue in
spite of the possibilities the Plaintiff raised regarding the accuracy of the
Wayback Machine and the computer used to access it. However, the image of the
helmet to which the Defendants directed the Court’s attention is pixelated,
small, and cannot assist in the more detailed elements of prior art analysis.
Contrary to the Defendants’ submissions, I cannot clearly see the transition to
which they refer. However, the entirety of the helmets and face shields on the
page are of some assistance: they provide a general sense of the design
constraints on a face shield – that they must correspond to a helmet and are
contingent on the space provided for the viewing area, a space which can vary slightly
depending on the helmet design.
(b)
The Arnold Patent
- US Patent No 5765235
[64]
The following images come from US Patent No
5765235, issued June 16, 1998 to Derek Leslie Arnold for an “Anti-condensation visor”. The Arnold Patent’s
abstract describes the invention as follows:
An anti-condensation visor comprises an
outer visor which, relative to the user, is situated on the outermost
peripheral surface of a helmet or hood to which the visor belongs. The outer
visor is provided with openings for fitting on the helmet and with at least one
lip for the user to fold the outer visor away. An inner visor is detachably
fitted against the inside wall of the outer visor and is held against via at
least one mechanical retaining element, while the inner visor rests over
essentially its entire surface against the inside wall of the outer visor, and
the inner visor is made of hydrophilic material.


[65]
The design in the Arnold Patent features a
smooth outer visor with no external projection. Instead, the anti-fogging
effect is achieved by pressing an inner shield fully up against the inside of
the outer visor, which appears to be similar to the “stick-on application”
approach that Mr. Hill described in his testimony. The Arnold Patent also
clearly describes a hinge point to connect the face shield to the helmet and a
tab so that the wearer may raise it above the helmet’s viewing area. The Arnold
Patent is rounded and contoured to the helmet and a line, created by the shape
of the inner visor and corresponding to the viewing area of the face shield, is
visible from the outside. The arm of the face shield ends and its edge veers
abruptly up to the hinge point, which protrudes out slightly from the rest of
the arm.
(c)
The Kamata
Patent - US Patent No
5161261
[66]
The following image comes
from US Patent No 5161261, issued November 10, 1992 to Eitaro Kamata for a “Helmet having shield”, the abstract of which reads in part:
A recess is provided in the inner surface
of a primary shield plate which is connected to a
cap body of a helmet through a pivotal mounting means, and a step depressed
from the inner surface of the primary shield plate is formed at the entire
peripheral edge of an opening of the recess. An inner shield is fitted to
the step and bonded thereto with a soft adhesive, so that a heat insulating
space tightly closed in the recess is defined by the primary shield plate and
the inner shield plate. The inner surfaces of the primary shield plate and
the inner shield plate are formed into a continuous surface which comes into
close contact with a sealing member provided at a peripheral edge of a window
opening in the cap body. This ensures that clouding of the inner surface of the
shield can be prevented regardless of conditions of use such as the presence
and absence of travel wind and the temperature of the open air.
(Emphasis added)

[67]
One clearly sees various defining features,
including the rectangular shape of the viewing area, which extends above the
edge of the viewing area of the underlying helmet. The arms have almost square,
flat ends with rounded corners. Unlike the Arnold Patent, a recess in the Kamata
Patent’s outer lens creates an outward projection. An inner lens is placed over
this recess, forming an insulating space. The angle of the face shield and its
contour mirror those of the helmet itself. The contour of the outward
projection is edged, not smooth. The contour of the inner lens does not match
the contour of the underlying helmet viewing area.
(d)
The Douglas
Patent Application –
US Patent No 11/148,450
[68]
US Patent No 11/148450 for a “Helmet face shield” was published on January 19, 2006,
containing the following abstract and images:
A face shield for headgear comprises a
generally transparent main lens, adapted for engagement to the headgear. The
main lens comprises a curved inner and outer main lens surfaces and has a central
recessed portion with a curved recessed inner lens surface and a curved
recessed outer lens surface. The recessed inner lens surface and the
recessed outer lens surface are respectively offset from the curved inner and
outer main lens surfaces. The recessed portion is adapted to receive a
secondary lens such that a sealed air gap is formed between the secondary lens
and the main lens, thereby forming a sealed double pans lens having
condensation reduction properties.
(Emphasis added)


[69]
The Douglas Patent Application, in simple terms,
features an outwardly moulded projection with an inner lens which creates an
insulating air gap. The corners and edges of that projection, however, are
square, rather than the smoothly curved “outwardly
moulded projection” of ID 964. The area of the outward projection, as in
the Kamata Patent, does not match up to the viewing area of the helmet. The
arms of the face shield have a rounded end, with the lower edge of the arm
bending up, passing behind the hinge point, and curving around that point to
meet the upper edge. The upper edge of the shield has a slight upward rounded
slope as it moves from the arm to the middle of the helmet. The lower edge is
straight.
(e)
The Black-Rimmed Face Shield
[70]
At trial, the Plaintiff adduced a physical
sample of a black-rimmed face shield which Mr. Hill asserted was the dominant
winterized helmet face shield design before he registered ID 964. Unfortunately,
the Plaintiff did not provide the Court with information on the manufacturer or
model name.
Black-rimmed face shield – Front left perspective

Black-rimmed face shield – Perspective from interior

Black-rimmed face shield – Left
side perspective

[71]
This black-rimmed face shield has a somewhat
rectangular viewing area with curved edges, although the viewing area grows in
height towards the middle of the shield. Most of the frame is made of black,
non-transparent plastic, except for the viewing area and a space around the
connection point, which is transparent. As is clear from a side view, the
plastic of the recessed viewing area sits at a different angle from the top of
the frame itself, instead of a smooth continuous transition. There are also two
holes at the top of the face shield in a recessed space with a small projection
above them. The entire viewing area is surrounded by smooth, curved, raised
outline of black plastic.
(4)
What are purely functional elements of a
face shield?
[72]
There are a number of functional constraints on
the design of a winterized helmet face shield. These constraints play an
important role is assessing the scope of protection afforded by ID 964 since
the Act excludes purely utilitarian or functional features from protection.
[73]
There are various ways in which a face shield is
contingent on the shape of the helmet to which it is attached, which in turn is
contingent on the shape of the human head on which it sits. This includes the
overall length and width of the face shield. These contingencies mean that shield
design is constrained by utilitarian, non-aesthetic considerations. A shield
must closely fit on its associated helmet to prevent cold air from entering and
affecting the wearer’s eyes and face. Otherwise, the design is of little use to
the consumer.
[74]
Further constraints were discussed at trial: the
face shield, for example, must have some connection point attaching it to the
helmet so that it can be raised above the helmet’s viewing area, and face
shields often feature a small tab, at their bottom edge, which the wearer can
hold to raise or lower the shield over the viewing area. Neither connection
points nor a tab are present in ID 964, though they are present on all the
physical exhibits that this Court examined, including the HJ-17L.
[75]
In considering whether the HJ-17L differs substantially
from ID 964, I must acknowledge that these contingencies and constraints
significantly limit the overall variability available in helmet face shield
design and thus impact directly on the infringement analysis.
[76]
Having considered the prior art and functional
aspects of various shield designs, I find that the following features are
dictated solely by function:
•
a shape that is contingent upon the helmet to
which it must be affixed;
•
a tab to raise the shield (as in the Arnold
Patent);
•
hinge(s) to attach the shield to the helmet; and
•
a viewing area that conforms to and facilitates
human vision and sightlines.
[77]
There is, of course, also the question of the
double-walled viewing area. This feature prevents fogging, which, as mentioned
above, is a purely utilitarian consideration. The Plaintiff argued at trial that
this double-walled component – a functional feature for which it had failed to
obtain patent protection – was a protectable element of design. The Plaintiff’s
position was that since there are varying methods and approaches to achieving anti-fogging
in a face shield (the inner application or the black-plastic frame style, as
described by Mr. Hill) the choice to create a double-walled space necessarily
involves aesthetic considerations.
[78]
This position, however, casts too broad a net. Protecting
the double-walled anti-fog component would blur the Act’s fundamental
distinction between function and design. Just because a designer has a range of
purely functional options to choose from in achieving a particular utilitarian
outcome in their design does not make those options aesthetic.
[79]
What can be protected, however, is the way in
which the double-walled feature is incorporated into the shield, including the
shape, contour, and height of the projection and the style of its edges. In
other words, whereas ID 964 cannot protect any purely utilitarian design
elements of a double-walled anti-fogging face shield, it can protect the way
those elements are expressed, so long as that expression involves an original “shape, configuration, pattern or ornament”, per
section 2 of the Act. In other words, the “outwardly
moulded projection and the smooth contoured surface around the viewing area”
is not a purely functional feature but a protectable aesthetic design element
of the double-walled design.
(5)
What is the scope of protection described
in ID 964?
[80]
The third step in the infringement analysis is
to examine the scope of ID 964 itself. The Plaintiff took the position
throughout that ID 964 only protected the “outwardly
moulded projection and a smooth contoured surface around the viewing area”
– in other words, the raised area, most visible in Figures 4 and 5 of ID 964,
that defines the viewing area of the helmet shield and more specifically the
curved, rather than sharp or square-edged, nature of the contour of that raised
area.
[81]
I do not agree with this interpretation for three
reasons. First, nothing in ID 964 suggests that this is the only element
of the design subject to protection. The totality of the written description
accompanying the seven figures that comprise ID 964 state that the design “consists of the features of shape, configuration, pattern
and ornament of the entire helmet fact shield as shown in the drawings”
(emphasis added). Had the Plaintiff wished to uniquely highlight that element
of the shield for protection, that could have been done in a variety of ways,
including through additional explanatory text, diagrammatic detailing (such as
dotted lines, shading or highlighting), or a combination of both.
[82]
The singular focus on the outward projection
seems even stranger when one observes that Figure 1 of the ID 964 does not
demonstrate an outward projection at all: if this were the sole innovative
design feature contained within the design and the explicit focus of the
protection, one would assume the drafter would be more cautious to ensure it
was amply exhibited, where possible, in each figure.
[83]
The second reason that I find that ID 964
protects the entire design rather than simply the “outwardly
moulded projection” is that the Plaintiff stated, in oral submissions,
that certain elements such as the “hinged connection of
the visor to the helmet” and the “attachment
means” were left out of the design because they were purely utilitarian
and thus “not susceptible to design protection” (CTT
at 197).
[84]
The logical extension of this position, then, is
that if some elements were excluded from the
design, it is reasonable to assume that whatever was included in the design was
something that the Plaintiff sought to have and believed would be protected,
including whatever appears in the entirety of the seven figures. As depicted in
those figures, the entirety of the design includes the shape of the arms and of
the viewing area. In other words, ID 964 goes well beyond the “outward projection”, which is only clearly visible in
two of the seven figures (4 and 5). Since the ID 964 describes, in its own
words, “the entire design” of the face shield,
this Court’s infringement analysis cannot be restricted to one feature alone.
[85]
Finally, I note that the Canadian Intellectual
Property Office itself suggests that applicants indicate whether protection of
all, or only some, of a design is being sought:
The description must
indicate whether the design relates to the appearance of the entire
article or to the appearance of a portion of the
article. Further, if the design relates only to a portion, that portion must be clearly
identified.
(Canadian
Intellectual Property Office, Industrial Design Office Practices
(Ottawa: Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2013) at para
6.4.5).
[86]
While this is only a guideline and not binding
law, I find that this extract is nonetheless helpful in the assessment of the
scope of the design. Here, the Plaintiff did not restrict the coverage of the
registration to only a portion of the design. As a result, the entire shield is
included in the industrial design protection.
(6)
Comparison: does the HJ-17L infringe the
Industrial Design?
The
design and the allegedly infringing face shield
|
ID
964
|
HJ-17L
|
Figure 1 – Front left perspective

|
Figure 1 – Front left perspective

|
Figure 2 –Perspective from exterior

|
Figure 2 – Perspective from exterior

|
Figure 3 – Perspective from interior

|
Figure 3 – Perspective from interior

|
Figure 4 – Left side perspective

|
Figure 4 – Left side perspective

|
Figure 5 – Right side perspective

|
Figure 5 – Right side perspective

|
Figure 6 – Perspective from above

|
Figure 6 – Perspective from above

|
Figure 7 – Perspective from below

|
Figure 7 – Perspective from below

|
[87]
To summarize the above sections of analysis, a
review of the prior art presented by the Defendants suggests that the
Plaintiff’s ID 964 entered a crowded field in which the notion of an outwardly
moulded viewing area was already present in some forms and where the general
contouring and shape of a helmet face shield was also well-defined. Thus, the
degree of difference necessary for a newer design to evade the protection
afforded ID 964 is small:
If only small differences separate the
registered design from what has gone before then equally small differences
between the alleged infringement and the registered design will be held to be
sufficient to avoid infringement.
(Sommer Allibert (UK) Limited v Flair
Plastics Ltd, [1987] RPC 599 at 623 (UKCA))
[88]
Turning to the question of functionality, as was
demonstrated by Professor Mahler, helmet face shield design operates under a
great number of utilitarian constraints. Furthermore, the double-walled
anti-fogging feature is not, as explained above, a protectable design feature,
even if certain aspects of the way that feature is manifested are protectable.
As a result, most helmet face shields will share a degree of similarity in
overall shape and size, which is again why the amount of variation necessary to
render a design substantially different from its competitors is relatively
small:
When an industrial design incorporates
fundamentally functional features even small differences in ornamentation may
be sufficient to take the second design out of the ambit of an earlier design
registration.
(John S McKeown, Fox on Canadian Law of
Copyright and Industrial Designs (Toronto, Ont: Carswell, 2012) (loose-leaf
updated 2015, release 4), ch 31 at 38; see also Carr-Harris Products Ltd v
Reliance Products Ltd (1969), 58 CPR 62 at 84 (Ex Ct)).
[89]
Finally, despite the Plaintiff’s submissions on
this point, I am unable to accept that ID 964 was ever intended to solely protect
the “outwardly moulded projection”. Instead, I
find that it protects the entire design, and “where
emphasis is on the entirety of the design, in order to establish infringement,
the article in question will have to be quasi identical” (Bodum at para 50).
[90]
Given that
the entire design forms the basis for the comparative analysis that will
establish whether infringement has occurred, the key features to be examined,
after having examined the prior art, are: the shape of shield’s viewing area;
the shape of the arms; any distinctive features on the item that are not purely
functional; and the shape of any outward projection.
[91]
With these design considerations in mind, I turn
my attention to the question of the alleged infringement and the question of
substantial difference, by comparing ID 964 with HJ-17L.
[92]
Simply put, the HJ-17L face shield is different
enough that it does not infringe ID 964. Ignoring the various unprotectable
elements – the colour of the adhesive lining that connects the two lenses and
frames the viewing area, the presence of the tab, the presence of the hinge
points – there are substantial differences that the eye is drawn to upon comparison.
[93]
The first is the shape of the viewing area. ID
964 has an almost rectangular viewing area – tallest in the middle, but with
only slightly shorter ends on each arm. The HJ-17L, by contrast, has considerably
shorter arm ends and narrows more steeply from the middle point at the centre
of the viewing area. The viewing area also extends further back onto the arms
of the face shield on the HJ-17L than in ID 964.
[94]
The second is the shape of the arms. The arms
of the face shield depicted in ID 964 end in a circular curve after a gradual
and continuous slope down from the front of the shield. The arms of the HJ-17L
terminate in much smaller ends, raised upward from the lower edge of the shield,
so that they round off the rectangular feature. If one cut off the two arms of
ID 964 at each end of the rectangular portion and placed them together, they
would form a circle, due to the circular curve. This is not the case with the
HJ-17L, where the same process would form more of a heart.
[95]
Third, there is a speckled patterning on the
plastic around the viewing area of the HJ-17L that is entirely absent from the ID
964. This patterning terminates where the viewing area does and it renders the
plastic outside the viewing area opaque rather than transparent. There is no
suggestion in the ID 964 of any patterning whatsoever.
[96]
As for similarities, there are few that
can be distinguished from the restrictions of prior art and functionality. Both
must abide by the general shape of a helmet shield, including a large viewing
area, and both are contingent upon the dimensions and requirements of helmet
design. Both do have “outwardly moulded projections”, protectable
design features that, unlike those in the prior art, are smoothly contoured around
their viewing areas. Yet there are differences between the outward projections
of the HJ-17L and ID 964. In the former, for example, the projection’s height clearly
and distinctly expands the further one goes from the centre of the shield frame
toward the arms; put another way, the projection is thinnest in the middle of
the shield. In ID 964, however, the height remains constant, at least per the figures
that illustrate the outward projection (Figures 4 and 5). As a result, even the
presence of this one similarity is insufficient to ground a finding of
infringement. HJ-17L is, overall, substantially different in appearance from ID
964.
[97]
Before concluding on the issue of
infringement, there are two broad observations vis-à-vis design that merit
mention. First, the protection offered by the industrial design regime is
different from that of the patent regime, which may be commensurate with the
amount of effort required to qualify under each. It is interesting to take this
very case as an example: while the Plaintiff obtained a design registration (ID
964), the corresponding patent application, which contained a more detailed
written description than ID 964, was not granted. The reason for the
unsuccessful patent application was not canvassed in full; as mentioned above,
the Court only heard that an objection was filed under Section 10 of the Patent
Rules. Suffice it to say that patent protection would have provided a more
appropriate platform for the Plaintiff to protect the double-walled anti-fogging
feature. It must be remembered that, stated broadly, the patent regime protects
functionality and the design regime protects the aesthetic features of any
given product. As this Court articulated in Bodum at para 46:
[t]he protection offered by industrial
designs should also not be confused with the protection obtained for a product
or a process through a patent. As admitted by the plaintiffs, industrial
designs do not confer on them monopoly over double wall glasses in Canada.
[98]
Similarly, ID 964 should not confer on
AFX a monopoly over double-walled anti-fogging face shields in Canada. Rather,
it provides a measure of protection for any shield that is substantially
similar to that depicted in the ID 964 illustrations, and it cannot be said
that the HJ-17L meets that threshold.
[99]
The second observation is that face shield
design is contingent on helmet design. A face shield is not a stand-alone
product: on its own, it has little to no use. This diminishes the designer’s scope
to introduce ‘sparks of originality’ into the product’s design. The
relationship between originality and contingency is generally an inverse one:
the more contingent a design is on another product, the less room for aesthetic
differentiation is available. This consideration played a role in my conclusion
that the differences outlined above were sufficient to avoid infringement.
[100] In summary, an informed consumer would conclude that there are
significant substantial differences between the HJ-17L and the design described
in the ID964. The HJ17-L does not infringe the Plaintiff’s design.
B.
Validity
[101] Under subsection 7(3) of the Act, a certificate of industrial design
is, absent proof to the contrary, sufficient evidence to establish the validity
of the design itself. As noted in Zero Spill at para 18, “[s]ubsection 7(3) creates a blanket presumption of
compliance with the entire Act”. The onus is
thus on the Defendants, AFX and RDI, to bring sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that, on a balance of probabilities, ID 964 is invalid.
[102] There was some debate at trial as to what grounds for invalidity in
relation to prior art were set out in the Act. The Plaintiff focused on the grounds
outlined in subsection 6(1) and paragraph 6(3)(a). Subsection 6(1) of the Act
states that “[t]he Minister shall register the design
if the Minister finds that it is not identical with or does not so closely
resemble any other design already registered as to be confounded
therewith” (emphasis added). Subsection
6(3)(a), by contrast, states that “[t]he Minister shall
refuse to register the design if the application for registration is filed in
Canada… more than one year after the publication of the design in Canada
or elsewhere” (emphasis added).
[103] Plaintiff’s counsel argued that these provisions suggest that there
are two separate standards to consider. First, the design must not be identical
with or so closely resemble as to be confounded with a design that has already
been registered. Second, the design – that is to say, the exact design and no
variation thereto – cannot have been published more than a year before the
application for registration. In this light, the Act extends a broader range of
protection to registered prior art than it does to unregistered prior art.
[104] Defendants’ counsel, by contrast, argued that the wording in subsection
6(1) and paragraph 6(3)(a) must be interpreted in the context of paragraph
11(1)(a), which states that an article infringes a valid, registered design if
it does not differ “substantially therefrom”.
Defendants’ counsel submitted that there must be parity in the validity and
infringement analyses: a design should only be registered if it differs
substantially from what came before, and an article is not infringing if it
differs substantially from any registered design. The differences in language
between subsection 6(1) and paragraph 6(3)(a), according to this
interpretation, are meaningless.
[105] I agree with the Plaintiff that the words of subsection 6(1) and
paragraph 6(3)(a) must be read to have distinct meanings. This is consistent
with the basic principle of statutory interpretation that “when different terms are used in a single piece of
legislation, they must be understood to have different meanings … If Parliament
has chosen to use different terms, it must have done so intentionally in order
to indicate different meanings” (Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para 81; see also Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan
on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014) at 218).
Having said that, there is a third ground upon a design may be invalidated that
is relevant to this assessment: subsection 7(3) states that the industrial
design must be “original”.
[106] Unlike the grounds in subsection 6(1) and paragraph 6(3)(a), which
the Act clearly describes, originality is a criterion of validity that is
mentioned, but not defined, in the Act. Instead, its definition is found in the
case law. In Clatworthy & Son Ltd v Dale Display Fixtures Ltd,
[1929] S.C.R. 429 at 433[Clatworthy] , the Supreme Court described it as
follows:
…to constitute an original design there must
be some substantial difference between the new design and what had theretofore
existed. A slight change of outline or configuration, or an unsubstantial
variation is not sufficient to enable the author to obtain registration.
[107] Originality in industrial design is a higher threshold than
originality in copyright: “[i]t seems to involve at
least a spark of inspiration on the part of the designer either in creating an
entirely new design or in hitting upon a new use for an old one” (Bata Industries Ltd v Warrington Inc,
[1985] FCJ No 239, 5 CPR (3rd) 339, at 347 (FCTD)); see also Bodum at
para 97).
[108] There are similarities between
the infringement analysis and the originality analysis for the purposes of determining
validity. As with infringement, the role of functionality in a design plays a
role (“when an article is
primarily functional, minimal differences may suffice for a conclusion of
originality”
(Rothbury at para 38)), as does prior art (“to constitute an original design there must
be some substantial difference between the new design and what had theretofore
existed” (Clatworthy
at 433)). Furthermore, as with infringement, the review of the features of
the design relative to the prior art must be from the perspective of the
informed consumer (Rothbury at para 31).
[109] Originality, per subsection 7(3), is thus a broader criterion than
either subsection 6(1) or paragraph 6(3)(a), since it requires that the
applied-for design be “substantially different”
from the prior art (see Bodum at para 96) and applies even if the prior
art in existence is not registered. It is distinct from the condition under
subsection 6(1), which gives an additional level of protection to already
registered designs, and it is distinct from paragraph 6(3)(a), which speaks
specifically to the publication of the exact design and which I interpret as a mechanism
to encourage applicants to seek registration of their new designs in a timely
fashion.
[110] To sum up, a registrable design (i) must differ substantially from
the prior art (be “original”), (ii) cannot
closely resemble any registered designs (as per subsection 6(1)), and (iii) cannot
have been published more than a year before application for registration (as
per paragraph 6(3)(a).
[111] By way of obiter, I note that one might ask how a design
could differ substantially from the prior art (i.e. be “original”
and thus survive on subsection 7(3) grounds), but then so closely resemble a
previously registered design as to be confounded with it (i.e. fail on
subsection 6(1) grounds). A separate and distinct ground of originality, in
other words, appears to render subsection 6(1) superfluous. I note only that expected
amendments to the Act appear to make no distinction between registered and
unregistered prior art in the assessment of the registrability of an
applied-for design.
[112] Turning back to the facts evinced at trial, the Defendants adduced
no evidence of previously registered industrial designs, nor does the evidence
suggest that the exact design itself was published a year before its registration.
[113] There is consequently nothing in the evidence presented to this
Court on prior art to suggest that either paragraph 6(3)(a) or section 6(1) of
the Act apply. As such, I will confine my infringement analysis to two lines of
the Defendant’s counterclaim:
1.
That ID 964 lacks originality;
2.
That, per subsection 5.1(a) of the Act, the
design is invalid because it seeks to protect functional, rather than
aesthetic, features.
(1)
Originality
[114] The Defendants rely on the prior art they submitted – the helmets in
Al’s Catalogue, the Arnold Patent, the Kamata Patent, and the Douglas Patent
Application. As discussed above in the infringement analysis, a review of this prior
art suggests that winterized helmet face shield design is a crowded field under
a number of functional constraints. Nonetheless,
to determine whether the shield in dispute was sufficiently original
necessitates a short review of the prior art.
[115] ID 964 substantially differs in design from the prior art in the Arnold
and Kamata Patents and the Douglas Patent Application (see figures and/or
abstracts from these patents reproduced in the infringement analysis above). The
Arnold Patent design has a different viewing area than ID 964, created by an
inner panel which presses up against the exterior pane, as well as differently
shaped arms and a small protrusion at the hinge point; in addition, there is no
outward projection. The Douglas Patent Application design has sharp edges and
corners and a rectangular viewing area. The design in the Kamata Patent is notably
straighter and squarer in shape, including in the arms.
[116] With respect to the one physical sample of prior art that was in
evidence before the Court, the black-rimmed plastic frame shield, there were
clear differences between it and ID 964, including the viewing area, which was depressed
into the frame rather than protruding outwards, and the two holes in the raised
surface above the viewing area. There was no evidence before the Court to
suggest whether those holes were functional or not, but certainly the form they
take and the shape of the face shield around them goes beyond the purely
utilitarian.
[117] Finally, the page from Al’s Catalogue, as discussed above, is of the
same limited value to this validity analysis as it was to the infringement
analysis above: its images are small, pixelated, and do not offer the multiple
perspectives necessary to assess any degree of substantial difference or
similarity. What is clear from the page from Al’s Catalogue is that the shields
generally share a common overall form which must correspond in large part to
the shape of the helmet.
[118] Ultimately, I could not find anything in the prior art made
available to me that clearly contained an outwardly moulded projection and a
smooth contoured surface around the viewing area or otherwise did not differ
substantially from ID 964. Therefore, I find that ID 964 meets the degree of
originality necessary to uphold its registration.
(2)
Subsection 5.1(a) of the Act
[119] The Defendants also took the position that the “outwardly moulded projection” is a purely utilitarian
feature due to it being a necessary part of the double-walled anti-fogging
feature.
[120] It is true, as noted above, that both the double-walled anti-fogging
feature and certain other features of face shield design are purely functional
and accordingly cannot receive industrial design protection.
[121] However, there are equally several shield design features that can
be protected, including the shape of the arms, the shape of the viewing area,
and the expression of the double-walled anti-fogging feature as an “outwardly moulded projection” with a “smooth contoured surface around the viewing area”. Furthermore,
as was clear from a review of the Douglas Patent Application, for instance,
there is no reason why this outward projection needed to have smooth contouring
and the decision to do so reflects an effort to appeal to the eye.
[122] For these reasons, I find that the ID 964 is not invalid on the ground
of utility.
[123] As a final note, the Defendants argued at trial that the raised
projection was a “method of manufacture” which
would make it invalid per subsection 5.1(b) of the Act. However, there was neither
much time spent on this ground, nor evidence adduced to support this
allegation. I therefore find no basis to invalidate the design registration on
this ground either. At its core, ID 964 does not in any way describe or point
to any method of manufacture.
C.
Subsection 7(d) of the Trade-Marks Act –
Unfair Advantage
[124] Lastly, Defendants’ counsel raised a novel cause of action at trial,
alleging that the Plaintiff, in holding out their industrial design as valid,
breached subsection 7(d) of the Trade-Marks Act, which states that:
7. No person shall…
(d) make use, in
association with goods or services, of any description that is false in a
material respect and likely to mislead the public as to
(i) the
character, quality, quantity or composition,
(ii) the
geographical origin, or
(iii) the mode of
the manufacture, production or performance
of the goods or
services.
|
7 Nul ne peut :
d) employer, en liaison avec des produits ou services, une
désignation qui est fausse sous un rapport essentiel et de nature à tromper
le public en ce qui regarde :
(i) soit leurs caractéristiques, leur qualité, quantité ou
composition,
(ii) soit leur origine géographique,
(iii) soit leur mode de fabrication, de production ou d’exécution.
|
[125] While their submissions on this issue were interesting, without a
finding of invalidity, they are moot.
VIII.
Conclusion
[126] The Plaintiff, at trial, stated that it was seeking $20 in damages –
or one dollar per infringing face shield sold by RDI – along with an
injunction. The Defendants were seeking expungement of the Plaintiff’s ID 964
and damages for misrepresentation. I find that, on the evidence before me, none
of these remedies are merited. The Plaintiff’s industrial design is valid and the
Defendants have not infringed it.
[127] The Court wishes to thank the parties’ counsel for their able
representation and courtesy shown, including providing the images used in these
reasons.
IX.
Costs
[128] Costs are awarded to the Defendants.