Docket: T-300-16
Citation:
2016 FC 350
Ottawa, Ontario, March 24, 2016
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
|
THE REGENTS OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AND TEARLAB CORPORATION
|
Plaintiffs
|
and
|
I-MED PHARMA
INC.
|
Defendant
|
ORDER AND REASONS
I.
THE MOTION
[1]
This is a motion by the Plaintiff, TearLab
Corporation [TearLab], for:
1. An order for:
(a) An interim injunction preventing the Defendant, its
officers, directors, employees, agents, servants, successors, licensees,
affiliates, subsidiaries, related companies and all those over whom it exercises
control from infringing claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, 25 and 26 of Canadian
Patent No. 2,494,540 pending the final disposition of the motion for an
interlocutory injunction in this matter;
(b) an interim injunction preventing the Defendant, its
officers, directors, employees, agents, servants, successors, licensees,
affiliates, subsidiaries, related companies and all those over whom it exercises
control from making, using, importing, marketing, offering for sale or selling
the i-Pen System, including the i-Pen Single Use Sensors, pending the final
disposition of the motion for an interlocutory injunction in this matter;
(c) costs to the Plaintiff TearLab Corporation for this motion payable
forthwith; and
(d) such further and other relief as this Honourable Court may
deem just.
II.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The facts giving rise to this motion are not in
dispute.
[3]
The Plaintiff, the Regents of the University of
California [University], owns Canadian Patent No. 2,494,540 [‘540 Patent]. The
‘540 Patent is entitled “Tear Film Osmometry”. The University consents to the
relief sought by TearLab but is not a moving party on the motion.
[4]
The Canadian patent application that resulted in
the ‘540 Patent was filed 25 March 2003 and issued on 3 June 2014. By reason of
the issuance of the ‘540 Patent, the University has the exclusive right,
privilege and liberty of making, constructing, using, importing, and vending to
others to be used, in Canada, the invention claimed in the ‘540 Patent until
the expiry of ‘540 Patent on 25 March 2023.
[5]
The ‘540 Patent generally relates to, and
claims, fluid sample receiving chips, systems for measuring osmolarity of
sample fluids, and methods for measuring osmolarity of sample fluids, including
tear fluid. The measurement of the osmolarity of tear fluid is useful in the
diagnosis and treatment of dry eye disease [DED], an affliction that will
affect up to 30% of the Canadian population at some point in their lives.
[6]
The Plaintiff, TearLab Corporation, which is the
moving party on this motion, is a public company having its shares listed on
the Toronto Stock Exchange. TearLab is the exclusive licensee under the ‘540
Patent. TearLab markets the TearLab Osmolarity System [TearLab System] to
Canadian eye-care clinicians, such as optometrists and ophthalmologists, as
well as certain Canadian eye-care research organizations.
[7]
The TearLab System includes a “pen” which is
configured for receiving a “test card” (a disposable microchip). In order to
operate the TearLab System, a clinician inserts a test card microchip into the
pen device and places the end of the chip adjacent to the lower conjunctiva of
a patient’s eye and the chip collects a sample of the patient’s tear film. The
pen and chip are then placed into a reader unit which determines the osmolarity
of the tear sample using electrical impedance (as electric current is passed
through the tear sample), and the reader unit displays an osmolarity reading to
the clinician.
[8]
Almost all users of the TearLab System have
rented or taken on loan the TearLab System from TearLab, with their only
commitment to TearLab being the purchase of a minimum number of test card chips
from TearLab per quarter or per year. Further, almost all users have a contract
with TearLab that can be cancelled at the end of the first year or at year
anniversaries. As such, current users can return the TearLab System to TearLab
fairly promptly if, for example, a competing and lower-price device comes onto
the market.
[9]
The ability of the TearLab System to accurately
and reliably determine the osmolarity of a patient’s tear film at the
point-of-care provides useful information allowing optometrists and
ophthalmologists to improve their ability to diagnose and treat DED.
[10]
Before the TearLab System was approved by
regulatory bodies for use by clinicians, it underwent a number of clinical
trials to establish that it was safe and efficacious.
[11]
TearLab spent years and millions of dollars
testing the TearLab System in a series of clinical trials to establish the
reliability, accuracy, efficacy and safety of the TearLab System. The results
of these clinical trials were submitted to the appropriate regulatory bodies to
seek approval of the TearLab System.
[12]
After meeting the regulatory obstacles, the
United States Food and Drug Agency approved the TearLab System for sale in the
United States. In December 2009, the TearLab System was approved by Health
Canada for sale in Canada as a class III medical device.
[13]
Initially, one of TearLab’s largest obstacles
was the need to inform and educate eye-care clinicians that hyperosmolarity was
a reliable and quantitative biomarker indicator of DED. In or about 2009, this
concept was not well known or understood amongst the population of clinicians
in Canada. Among many clinicians TearLab experienced some degree of reluctance
to accept that osmolarity may be an indicator of DED.
[14]
In order to persuade Canadian eye-care
clinicians of the usefulness of the TearLab System, TearLab first had to
convincingly demonstrate to those eyecare clinicians that patient symptoms and
the pathology of DED were linked to hyperosmolarity.
[15]
To overcome the reticence and reluctance of
eye-care clinicians, and to encourage eye-care clinicians, both in Canada and
around the world, that measuring osmolarity was a useful diagnostic method for
DED, TearLab conducted numerous clinical trials and published the results in
peer reviewed journals.
[16]
TearLab has been trying to convince an
increasing number of Canadian eye-care clinicians that tear osmolarity is an effective
technique for diagnosing DED. There remains however a significant proportion of
the Canadian population of eye-care clinicians who have not yet decided to
adopt the technology. TearLab sees this as a future market opportunity.
[17]
In mid-January 2016, TearLab discovered that the
Defendant was offering for sale a tear osmolarity measuring device called the “i-Pen
System,” which the Defendant has told Canadian eye-care clinicians will be
available in March 2016.
[18]
The i-Pen System is a tear-fluid collection and
testing device for the quantitative measurement of osmolarity of tears in patients
using impedance measurements of a tear film sample. As depicted and described
in the User Manual, the i-Pen System consists of a “Single Use Sensor” and a
hand-held reader unit into which the Single Use Sensor is inserted. The
hand-held unit displays the osmolarity test result.
[19]
TearLab says that i-Pen System and its Single
Use Sensor, and the indicated methods of use thereof, each fall within the scope
of at least one of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, 25 and 26 of the ‘540
Patent.
[20]
The i-Pen System’s Single Use Sensors are
offered for sale by the Defendant at a price that is substantially lower than
that of the corresponding chips for use as part of the TearLab System.
Customers of the Defendant are not obligated to purchase a minimum number of
the Defendant’s Single Use Sensors.
[21]
The Defendant has been advising the Canadian
public that it intends to launch the i-Pen System in Canada in March 2016.
TearLab commenced the herein patent infringement proceeding by filing a
Statement of Claim on February 18, 2016, and served and filed its motion for
interlocutory relief on March l, 2016. The hearing of the motion for the
interlocutory injunction is being scheduled for a date in late April or early
May 2016.
[22]
The interim injunction being sought will prevent
the Defendant from launching the i-Pen System in Canada before the hearing of
the interlocutory injunction.
[23]
Despite requests to disclose to TearLab the launch
date of the i-Pen System, the Defendant has refused to disclose the launch
date. The Defendant has also refused to provide a minimum number of days of
advanced notice pre-launch.
III.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[24]
The following provision of the Federal Courts
Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7 is relevant to this motion:
Mandamus, injunction, specific performance or appointment of receiver
44 In
addition to any other relief that the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal
Court may grant or award, a mandamus, an injunction or an order for
specific performance may be granted or a receiver appointed by that court in
all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so.
The order may be made either unconditionally or on any terms and conditions
that the court considers just.
|
Mandamus, injonction, exécution intégrale ou
nomination d’un séquestre
44
Indépendamment de toute autre forme de réparation qu’elle peut accorder, la
Cour d’appel fédérale ou la Cour fédérale peut, dans tous les cas où il lui
paraît juste ou opportun de le faire, décerner un mandamus, une
injonction ou une ordonnance d’exécution intégrale, ou nommer un séquestre,
soit sans condition, soit selon les modalités qu’elle juge équitables.
|
[25]
The following provisions of the Federal
Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 are also relevant to this motion:
Interim
and Interlocutory Injunctions
|
Injonctions
interlocutoires et provisoires
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Availability
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Injonction
interlocutoire
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373 (1) On
motion, a judge may grant an interlocutory injunction.
|
373 (1) Un
juge peut accorder une injonction interlocutoire sur requête.
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Undertaking
to abide by order
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Engagement
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(2) Unless a
judge orders otherwise, a party bringing a motion for an interlocutory
injunction shall undertake to abide by any order concerning damages caused by
the granting or extension of the injunction.
|
(2) Sauf
ordonnance contraire du juge, la partie qui présente une requête pour
l’obtention d’une injonction interlocutoire s’engage à se conformer à toute
ordonnance concernant les dommages-intérêts découlant de la délivrance ou de
la prolongation de l’injonction.
|
Expedited
hearing
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Instruction
accélérée
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(3) Where it
appears to a judge that the issues in a motion for an interlocutory
injunction should be decided by an expedited hearing of the proceeding, the
judge may make an order under rule 385.
|
(3) Si le
juge est d’avis que les questions en litige dans la requête devraient être
tranchées par une instruction accélérée de l’instance, il peut rendre une
ordonnance aux termes de la règle 385.
|
Evidence
at hearing
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Preuve à
l’audition
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(4) A judge
may order that any evidence submitted at the hearing of a motion for an
interlocutory injunction shall be considered as evidence submitted at the
hearing of the proceeding.
|
(4) Le juge
peut ordonner que la preuve présentée à l’audition de la requête soit
considérée comme une preuve présentée à l’instruction de l’instance.
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Interim
injunction
|
Injonction
provisoire
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374 (1) A
judge may grant an interim injunction on an ex parte motion for a period of
not more than 14 days where the judge is satisfied
|
374 (1) Une
injonction provisoire d’une durée d’au plus 14 jours peut être accordée sur
requête ex parte lorsque le juge estime :
|
(a) in a case
of urgency, that no notice is possible; or
|
a) soit, en
cas d’urgence, qu’aucun avis n’a pu être donné;
|
(b) that to
give notice would defeat the purpose of the motion.
|
b) soit que
le fait de donner un avis porterait irrémédiablement préjudice au but
poursuivi.
|
Extension
|
Prolongation
|
(2) A motion
to extend an interim injunction that was granted on an ex parte motion may be
brought only on notice to every party affected by the injunction, unless the
moving party can demonstrate that a party has been evading service or that
there are other sufficient reasons to extend the interim injunction without notice
to the party.
|
(2) Lorsque
l’injonction provisoire a été accordée sur requête ex parte, tout avis de
requête visant à en prolonger la durée est signifié aux parties touchées par
l’injonction, sauf si le requérant peut démontrer qu’une partie s’est soustraite
à la signification ou qu’il existe d’autres motifs suffisants pour prolonger
la durée de l’injonction sans en aviser la partie.
|
Limitation
|
Période
limite
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(3) Where a
motion to extend an interim injunction under subsection (2) is brought ex
parte, the extension may be granted for a further period of not more than 14
days.
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(3) La
prolongation visée au paragraphe (2) qui est accordée sur requête ex parte ne
peut dépasser 14 jours.
|
IV.
ARGUMENTS
A.
TearLab
[26]
TearLab says that an interim injunction is urgent
and necessary in this case for the following reasons:
a) The Defendant has told the public that it will launch the i-Pen
System in March 2016. The interlocutory injunction is scheduled for late April
or early May 2016. Without an interim injunction, the Defendant will launch
its i-Pen System prior to the hearing of the interlocutory injunction motion;
b) There is a serious issue to be tried in that the Defendant’s i-Pen
System, and the indicated methods of use, each fall within the scope of at
least one of the claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, 25 and 26 of the ‘540
Patent.
c) TearLab will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction as a
result of
i.
An unquantifiable loss of market opportunity;
ii.
A loss of an industry opportunity and potential
customer opportunity;
iii.
The impossibility for TearLab to calculate its
lost sales because there is no methodology;
iv.
Harm to the goodwill and reputation of TearLab
that is impossible to determine;
d) The balance of convenience favours granting the injunction because:
i.
Damages would not provide TearLab with an
adequate remedy but would provide the Defendant with an adequate remedy
recoverable under TearLab’s undertaking to pay damages;
ii.
The Defendant is proceeding with full knowledge
of TearLab’s patent rights and with “eyes wide open”;
iii.
It is prudent to preserve the status quo in this
case;
iv.
The ‘540 Patent is presumed to be valid and the
Defendant has proceeded with full knowledge of TearLab’s rights, while refusing
to disclose its launch date or to provide TearLab with advance notice prior to
the launch of the i-Pen System in Canada;
v.
Since the Defendant has not yet marketed its
i-Pen System, it would suffer relatively little inconvenience compared to the
harm that would be sustained by TearLab if the interim injunction is refused;
vi.
The Defendant sells a variety of other products
and is not reliant exclusively upon the i-Pen System, while TearLab’s revenue
is derived solely from the sale and rental of the TearLab system and the
TearLab Test Cards;
vii.
The TearLab System had been sold in Canada since
late 2009/early 2010, while the Defendant has not yet launched its product in
Canada;
viii.
TearLab will suffer more harm as a result of the
refusal to grant an interim injunction than the Defendant will suffer as a
result of granting the interim injunction.
B.
The Defendant
[27]
The Defendant says that TearLab has not
established grounds for the interim injunction requested for the following
reasons:
a) TearLab has not satisfied the “urgency” requirement, and any urgency
was created by TearLab’s delay in seeking relief;
b) TearLab has not satisfied the conjunctive test established in RJR
- MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR
MacDonald], in that:
i)
There is no serious issue to be tried. Mr.
Sullivan’s evidence in this issue is inadmissible and TearLab has offered no
other evidence on the issue;
ii) TearLab has not established irreparable harm because it has put
forward no evidence by a qualified expert to support its allegation that
damages could not be quantified. The Defendant, on the other hand, has provided
evidence from a qualified expert – Mr. Rosenblatt – that any damages are
quantifiable;
iii) In addition, TearLab’s evidence on irreparable harm does not refer
to harm that will be suffered during the period for which an interim injunction
is sought;
iv) TearLab relies on three witnesses to support its claim that it will
suffer irreparable harm if an interlocutory injunction is refused. Mr. Tierney
and Dr. Jackson are put forward as expert witnesses. Neither of them has
expertise relating to any of the grounds upon which TearLab alleges it will
suffer irreparable harm. Mr. Smith is a TearLab employee whose evidence is
speculative. None of TearLab’s evidence establishes that it will suffer
irreparable harm;
v) Irreparable harm does not exist where an applicant claims to suffer
harm because of a purely speculative adverse effect on its reputation or on
market share. Patent rights confer the right to earn all the profits derived
from the sale or use of an invention. “Lost profits” are always calculable and
compensable. This Court has consistently ruled that the type of harm that
TearLab had alleged it will suffer is not irreparable;
vi) Because damages are a suitable remedy, it is not necessary to
consider the balance of convenience. However, on the facts of the present case,
the balance of convenience clearly favours the Defendant. If the interim
injunction is granted, the Defendant will be excluded from the market while
TearLab will simply be exposed to completion if it is refused. TearLab is
attempting to use this Court to protect itself from legitimate completion in a market
where it has failed to establish its product.
C.
The Undertakings
[28]
TearLab has provided an undertaking to pay any
damages suffered by the Defendant in respect of the i-Pen System if it should
turn out that the interim injunction sought by this motion is found to have
been wrongly issued. TearLab will abide by an Order concerning damages caused
by the granting of the injunction sought.
[29]
The Defendant has undertaken to maintain records
of sales of all i-Pens and single user sensors through to the final resolution
of this litigation in order to facilitate the determination of TearLab’s
damages should it ultimately prevail.
V.
ANALYSIS
[30]
It is trite law that in RJR - MacDonald,
above, the Supreme Court of Canada approved the test for an interim or
interlocutory injunction as articulated by the House of Lords in American
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd, [1975] RPC 513 [American Cyanamid]. This
means that TearLab must establish:
a) A serious issue to be tried;
b) That they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not
granted; and
c) That the balance of convenience favours the granting of an
injunction.
[31]
It is also well established that these factors
are interrelated and should not be assessed in isolation from one another. See Movel
Restaurants Ltd v E.A.T. at Le Marché Inc, [1994] FCJ No 1950 (TD)
at para 9.
[32]
In the case of an interim injunction, the moving
party must also establish that sufficient urgency exists to require the
injunction. See Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc, 2006 FC 1443 at para
17.
[33]
As far as urgency and serious issue are
concerned, TearLab’s position is at least debatable but, in my view, TearLab
has not established irreparable harm and balance of convenience under the RJR
MacDonald test and the governing jurisprudence of this Court.
[34]
TearLab must satisfy the Court that it will
suffer irreparable harm during the interim period for which this injunction is
sought. As the Defendant points out, the affidavit evidence submitted by
TearLab does not directly speak to this period of time and is not provided by
individuals who are qualified to convince the Court that the harm TearLab’s
fear cannot be compensated in damages.
[35]
It is entirely understandable that, given the
context of this dispute, TearLab fears it will suffer an unquantifiable loss of
market opportunity, loss of an industry opportunity and potential customer
opportunity, lost sales, and loss of goodwill. However, these fears need
objective support from someone with the expertise to say that they cannot be
quantified in the event that the injunction is not granted. Without such
evidence, the alleged harm remains speculative.
[36]
The individuals who speak to irreparable harm on
behalf of TearLab are corporate witnesses and/or witnesses who provide
unsupported opinions outside of their expertise. TearLab has said that it
primarily relies upon Mr. Tierney for this issue.
[37]
Mr. Tierney is a retired Business Director of
Allergen Eye Care with considerable experience in the Canadian Eye Care market.
Based upon his experience, he provides the Court with his opinion on what will
happen if the i-Pen system is launched in Canada by the Defendant and is then
removed from the market following an injunction after a patent infringement
trial. That is not the issue before me in this motion.
[38]
Mr. Tierney tells the Court that the “impact of i-Pen being on the market prior to trial cannot be
quantified.” He also says “there is no model to
determine what impact I-Med’s presence in the Canadian Market will have on
TearLab” and that “overall losses will be
unquantifiable.” He asserts as follows:
23. The impact of i-Pen being on the
market prior to trial cannot be quantified. TearLab is within a growing market
and it has not yet had the time or opportunity to try and convince all eye-care
professionals to switch to using osmolarity testing in the clinic to diagnose
DED. There are many eye-care professionals who will take further convincing to
start using the TearLabTM Osmolarity System.
24. I have had decades of experience
in the pharmaceutical industry and I know that when pharmaceutical products
face generic competition in the pharmaceutical markets after patent expiry,
there is a wealth of modelling to determine changes in price on market share
and what happens when competitors enter the market. With respect to the
situation with the i-Pen and the TearLabTM Osmolarity System, this
is the first time such a situation has ever happened in Canada and, as such,
there is no model to determine what impact I-Med’s presence on the Canadian
market will have on TearLab. Without being able to determine how many
opportunities it has lost, or might have lost, but for the sales of the i-Pen,
TearLab’s overall losses will be unquantifiable.
25. Moreover, if an injunction issues
that prevents eye-care professionals from using an i-Pen that they had purchased
(and prevents them from getting more single-use microchip sensors) the same
doctors will likely blame TearLab and this will harm the reputation of TearLab.
As such, the presence of I-Med on the market prior to trial will inevitably
cause in irreparable damage to the goodwill and reputation to TearLab that will
crystalize when an injunction issue after trial.
[39]
Mr. Tierney does not establish in his affidavit
that, notwithstanding his broad experience in the Canadian eye-care market, he
has the experience and the expertise to render this type of opinion on what is
quantifiable in damages and what is not. He has no expertise to offer in market
forecasting or damages assessment. He also makes assertions for which he
provides no real factual basis. For example, how does Mr. Tierney know that
doctors will blame TearLab? Experts are required to provide a factual basis for
their assertions. Mr. Tierney simply asks the Court to accept that his “decades of experience” will suffice, but this is not
decades of experience in market forecasting and damage assessment. We are not
told what he has done to ensure that there is no model, and he gives no
evidence that he knows anything about market forecasting and damage assessment.
He provides no curriculum vitae.
[40]
Dr. Jackson is a practising ophthalmologist who
was also asked:
…to provide my opinion on what will happen
in the Canadian Market if I-Med is allowed to market their I-Pen and associated
disposable sample chips pending a trial in this patent infringement proceeding
and then after trial an injunction issues preventing I-Med from selling its I-Pen
and preventing optometrists with further supplies of disposable sample chips.
Once again, this is not the issue before me
in this interim motion.
[41]
Also, Dr. Jackson’s opinions are speculative and
he nowhere speaks to quantification issues, in which he obviously has no
experience. Dr. Jackson’s evidence is of no real assistance to the Court on the
issue of irreparable harm, which is why, I presume, TearLab asked the Court to
rely upon the evidence of Mr. Tierney for this issue.
[42]
The evidence of Mr. Berg (TearLab’s Vice
President of Regulatory) provides nothing that is relevant to the irreparable
harm issue before me, and the evidence of Mr. Smith (Vice President of
International Markets for TearLab) tells the Court the i-Pen system of the
Defendant is already having an impact on the TearLab system in Canada, but he
says nothing (even if he was qualified to do so) about quantification issues
relevant to this interim motion.
[43]
I summarized the test for irreparable harm in Aventis
Pharma S.A. v Novopharm Ltd, 2005 FC 815 at paras 59-61 and 113 [Aventis]:
[59] As Mr. Justice Kelen pointed out
in Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals, at para. 25, it is well established
in the jurisprudence that an interlocutory or interim injunction should only be
granted in cases where there is clear evidence of irreparable harm. The
Plaintiffs must adduce "clear and not speculative" evidence that irreparable
harm will follow the entry of Novopharm's Novo-enoxaparin into the
market.
[60] It is also well understood that
irreparable harm refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its
magnitude. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in RJR-MacDonald,
it is "harm which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which
cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the
other." (p. 341)
[61] Furthermore, difficulty in
precisely calculating damages does not constitute irreparable harm, provided
there is some reasonably accurate way of measuring those damages. See Merck
& Co. v. Nu-Pharm Inc (2000), 4 C.P.R. (4th) 464 at 476 para. 32
(F.C.T.D.).
…
[113] A review of the allegations and
evidence put forward by the Plaintiffs for irreparable harm suggests that there
is insufficient clear evidence that irreparable harm will occur if the
injunction is not issued. For the most, the suggestions as to how irreparable
harm could occur lack elucidation and remain unsubstantiated, speculative and
theoretical. In face of the information that the Plaintiffs have chosen not to
provide, and their general approach to problematizing the damages issue rather
than providing clear evidence of unquantifiable harm and loss, Ms. Loomer
asserts that none of the categories of loss claimed by the Plaintiffs are
beyond the realm of quantification "or are other than ordinary components
of the standard exercise undertaken by the Courts." Consequently, there is
no adequate basis to warrant an injunction.
[44]
The same problems arise in the present motion.
The Court cannot infer irreparable harm for the interim period from the
unsupported allegations of corporate and/or unqualified witnesses who are not
in a position to address the quantification issue.
[45]
On the other hand, the Defendant has provided
direct evidence on this issue from Dr. Rosenblatt who seems to me well
qualified to express an opinion on whether TearLab will suffer irreparable harm
if I refuse the injunction and, in particular, on the quantification problems
raised by TearLab. Dr. Rosenblatt explains how and why the damages feared by
TearLab are quantifiable. Dr. Rosenblatt’s evidence is the best evidence before
me on this issue.
[46]
TearLab raises several objections to that
evidence. First of all, TearLab says that Dr. Rosenblatt’s experience and
expertise reside in the pharmaceutical industry and he does not have the
wherewithal to provide expertise in this context where we are dealing with a
medical device that is marketed in the particular way that TearLab markets its
system. But although Dr. Rosenblatt does have experience with
pharmaceuticals, he clearly establishes that he is “an
expert in marketing, in general, and marketing and forecasting in the
pharmaceutical and health industry….” None of TearLab’s affiants have
this kind of expertise.
[47]
TearLab also says that Dr. Rosenblatt makes
speculative assertions and provides no basis for his opinions and conclusions.
For reasons that are not before me, Dr. Rosenblatt was not cross-examined on
his affidavit. It may well be that Dr. Rosenblatt’s evidence could be
challenged, but any problems that arise from his evidence do not cure the
problems with TearLab’s evidence. Problems with Dr. Rosenblatt’s evidence do
not make Mr. Tierney into an expert on marketing and forecasting who can
provide the Court with the clear and convincing evidence it needs that any
losses TearLab might suffer cannot be quantified and recoverable as damages.
See Aventis, above, at paras 59-61.
[48]
Consequently, I have to conclude that TearLab
has not established irreparable harm if an interim injunction is refused. This
means that, under the conjunctive, tri-partite test established in RJR MacDonald,
above, the Court cannot intervene at this stage.
[49]
Both parties have requested that the Court not
deal with costs until after the interlocutory decision is decided.