Docket: T-2574-14
Citation:
2016 FC 252
Ottawa, Ontario, February 26, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson
BETWEEN:
|
CANADIAN UNION
OF POSTAL WORKERS
|
Applicant
|
and
|
CANADA POST
CORPORATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of the
decision of Appeals Officer, Michael Wiwchar [Appeals Officer] of the
Occupational Health and Safety Tribunal Canada dated November 27, 2014.
[2]
The Appeals Officer’s decision rescinds a prior
decision of a Health and Safety Officer finding the respondent, Canada Post
Corporation [CPC], in contravention of the safety inspection requirements as
set out in paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c
L-2 [CLC].
[3]
For the reasons that follow, the application is
dismissed.
I.
Background
[4]
The underlying facts are not in dispute. The
following summary is taken from the Appeals Officer’s decision.
[5]
The applicant, Canadian Union of Postal Workers [CUPW]
is the certified bargaining agent for a group of employees that includes letter
carriers across Canada. The applicant also represents employee members of Local
Joint Health and Safety Committees [LJHSC]. The respondent, CPC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the establishment and operation of postal services in Canada.
[6]
In July, 2012 CUPW LJHSC representatives at the
respondent’s Burlington, Ontario Depot [Burlington Depot] proposed, at a
committee meeting, that inspections of the individual letter carrier routes be
included as part of the Workplace Hazard Prevention Program [WHPP]. They argued
the work place included public areas while a letter carrier is on delivery.
However, in declining to follow that request, the respondent advised that,
within the WHPP, delivery agents reported hazards on letter carrier routes to
their supervisors.
[7]
In August, 2012 the then Human Resources and
Skills Development Canada [HRSDC] received a complaint from a CUPW LJHSC
representative at the Burlington Depot stating that only part of the work place
was being inspected, the physical building; whereas inspections should also
occur on letter carrier routes. A Health and Safety Officer [HSO] attended the
facility to investigate the complaint.
A.
The HSO Decision
[8]
In investigating the complaint the HSO found
four contraventions of Part II of the CLC and directed the respondent to
terminate the contraventions and take steps to ensure that the contraventions
do not continue or reoccur. This judicial review application pertains only to Contravention
No. 1.
[9]
In respect of Contravention No. 1, the HSO concludes
that, pursuant to paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC, the respondent had failed
to ensure the LJHSC inspects all or part of the work place on a monthly basis such
that inspections of each part of the work place occurs at least once a year. The
contravention finding notes that the LJHSC’s inspection activity is restricted
to the building at the Burlington Depot.
[10]
Paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC reads as
follows:
125. (1) Without restricting the generality of section 124, every
employer shall, in respect of every work place controlled by the employer
and, in respect of every work activity carried out by an employee in a work
place that is not controlled by the employer, to the extent that the employer
controls the activity,
[…]
(z.12) ensure that the work place committee or the health and
safety representative inspects each month all or part of the work place, so
that every part of the work place is inspected at least once each year;
|
125. (1) Dans le cadre de l’obligation générale définie à l’article
124, l’employeur est tenu, en ce qui concerne tout lieu de travail placé sous
son entière autorité ainsi que toute tâche accomplie par un employé dans un
lieu de travail ne relevant pas de son autorité, dans la mesure où cette
tâche, elle, en relève :
[…]
(z.12) de veiller à ce que le comité local ou le représentant
inspecte chaque mois tout ou partie du lieu de travail, de façon que celui-ci
soit inspecté au complet au moins une fois par année;
|
[11]
The respondent brought an appeal under
subsection 146(1) of the CLC of the direction issued by the HSO claiming
that the HSO had erred in citing four contraventions of the CLC.
B.
Relevant Submissions to the Appeals Officer
[12]
With respect to the contravention relevant to
this application the issue before the Appeals Officer was the interpretation of
“work place” as that term is used in paragraph
125(1)(z.12) of the CLC.
[13]
The respondent, then appellant, argued that the
HSO’s adoption of a broad interpretation of “work
place” to include the routes and each point of call for letter carriers
would create an absurd result. The respondent provided evidence to support this
position.
[14]
The respondent submitted that the Appeals
Officer should take a purposive and contextual approach to interpreting the
provision in its entirety, by considering paragraph 125(1)(z.12)’s place within
subsection 125(1) of the CLC and within the statutory scheme. The
respondent further argued that the interpretation of paragraph 125(1)(z.12) should
be tempered by two factors: (1) the nature of the locations themselves; and (2)
the ability of the employer to control the location or any hazardous activity
at the location. The respondent submitted that it does not have control over
the actual delivery locations nor the hazards that may arise in locations which
the HSO decision had defined as a work place. The respondent argued that the Appeals
Officer should consider the question of control as central when determining what
constitutes a work place for the purposes of subsection 125(1).
[15]
In contrast the applicant, then respondent,
stressed that the objectives of Part II of the CLC and the jurisprudence
supports a broad interpretation of the term work place and that many tribunal
decisions recognize that a work place is not necessarily a single location, an interior
location or a stationary location. Furthermore, the applicant noted that while
the respondent may not control the work place locations, it does control the
activity and thus the obligations under subsection 125(1) would apply. The applicant
also stressed that the respondent’s interpretation of paragraph 125(1)(z.12)
would be unduly restrictive and would defeat the purpose of the legislation.
II.
Decision Under Review
[16]
In deciding the matter, the Appeals Officer
varied the Direction of the HSO by rescinding Contravention Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and
varying Contravention No. 3 (Canada Post Corp v Canadian Union of Postal
Workers, 2014 OHSTC 22 [the Decision]). Again, only Contravention No. 1 is
relevant to this application.
[17]
The Appeals Officer framed the issue raised by Contravention
No. 1 as being whether paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC applies to all places
where letter carriers carry out their work, including individual points of call
and the lines of route.
[18]
To address the issue the Appeals Officer considered
two questions: (1) the meaning of “work place” under
the CLC and specifically whether or not a letter
carrier’s line of route and points of call is a “work
place” within the meaning of subsection 125(1) of the CLC; and (2)
whether there is a requirement for employer control over a work place before
the obligations to inspect embodied in paragraph 125(1)(z.12) are engaged.
[19]
On the first issue, the Appeals Officer found
that the objective of health and safety legislation is the prevention of
accidents and injuries and that in keeping with section 12 of the Interpretation
Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 “work place” is to be
interpreted broadly. The Appeals Officer relied on Mowat Express v
Communications, Energy and Paper Workers Union of Canada (QFL – CLC) June
1, 1993, Decision No 94-004, to conclude that a letter carrier’s “work place” include places outside the physical
building that is the Burlington Depot and that “work
place” extended to a letter carrier’s points of call and lines of route.
[20]
Having agreed with the applicant’s position on
the need to adopt a broad definition of “work place”
the Appeals Officer considered the nature of the obligations imposed under
paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC.
[21]
After considering the language of subsection
125(1) the Appeals Officer at para 93 concludes that the obligations set out in
that section of the CLC “centre around the notion of
control”:
93. There is a clear distinction
between situations where work places are controlled by the employer and those
where they are not. It becomes clear from a plain reading of the obligations
that: (i) some obligations apply to any employer, whether or not they control
the work place, as long as they control the work activity, and (ii) other
obligations, in order to be executed, require that the employer have control of
the physical work place.
[22]
The Appeals Officer then states at paras 95 to
96:
95. The wording at the beginning of
subsection 125(1) indicates to me that the legislator drafted the section in
this way in order to ensure that the employer be bound to the fullest extent
possible by the obligations under the Code and its Regulations. Some paragraphs
under subsection 125(1) refer to obligations which can only be carried out at a
work place that is under the control of the employer. Conversely, other
paragraphs confer an obligation on any employer whether or not they control the
work place, as long as they control the work activity. One example of the
latter is found at paragraph 125(1)(t) which states:
(t) ensure that the machinery,
equipment and tools used by the employees in the course of their employment
meet prescribed health, safety and ergonomic standards and are safe under all
conditions of their intended use;
96. In my opinion, the obligation to
inspect under (z.12) belongs to the former category because the purpose of the
work place inspection obligation is to permit the identification of hazards and
the opportunity to fix them or to have them fixed. Control over the work place
is necessary to do so.
[23]
In holding that paragraph 125(1)(z.12) does not
apply to any place where a letter carrier is engaged in work outside the
physical building the Appeals Officer, at para 100 of the Decision notes that
the respondent “has many policies, programs and
assessment tools that evaluate and promote the health and safety of their
employees in all the elements of their work”.
III.
Relevant Legislation
[24]
The relevant portions of the CLC and the Canada
Occupational Health and Safety Regulations, SOR/86-304 [Regulations] are
reproduced at Appendix “A” to this Judgment and
Reasons.
IV.
Applicant’s Submissions
[25]
The applicant seeks an order in the nature of
certiorari, quashing and setting aside the Appeals Officer’s decision with
respect to Contravention No. 1 and reinstating the HSO’s finding that the respondent
is in contravention of paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC.
[26]
The applicant submits the Appeals Officer’s
interpretation of paragraph 125(1)(z.12) lacks justifiability and
intelligibility as a result of internal inconsistencies in the reasons. The
applicant argues that the decision falls outside the range of outcomes that are
acceptable within the constraints of the language, scheme and purpose of the CLC
and the decision-maker’s interpretation of the facts.
[27]
The applicant submits that upon finding that:
(1) letter carrier routes and points of call are part of the work place for purposes
of subsection 125(1); (2) the respondent controls the work activities on letter
carrier routes and points of call right down to how they walk the routes; and
(3) the respondent can take steps to identify and resolve hazards on letter carrier
routes and points of call, the Appeals Officer could not logically conclude that
paragraph 125(1)(z.12) does not oblige CPC to conduct annual inspections of
letter carrier routes and points of call. The Appeals Officer’s failure to
reconcile his factual findings with his narrow definition of “control” resulted
in a decision that lacked justification.
[28]
The applicant argues that the purpose of health
and safety legislation is to protect the health and safety of workers, and this
is well-established in the jurisprudence. As a result any doubt or ambiguity
arising from the language of the CLC is to be resolved in a manner that
favours the protection of employees. The applicant then notes that the Appeals
Officer properly interpreted the term “work place”
in subsections 122(1) and 125(1) of the CLC to include letter carrier routes
and points of call.
[29]
The applicant then addresses the Appeals
Officer’s consideration of subsection 125(1) of the CLC. The applicant argues
that on a plain reading of the subsection, the duties listed in subsection
125(1) apply both where an employer controls the work place and where the
employer does not control the work place but does control the work activity.
[30]
Relying on the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
decision in R v Huggins, 2010 ONCA 746 at para 17, 326 DLR (4th) 720, the
applicant submits that a decision-maker should not limit a statute’s
application by reason of a belief that the application is impractical, as the
practicality of application of the statute belongs to the legislature not an
administrative decision-maker or the Courts. Furthermore, the applicant argues
that the limited exception of cases where the application of a provision would result
in absurdity does not apply here as one cannot conclude that requiring
employers to adhere to all obligations in subsection 125(1), to the extent of
their control over a work activity, would lead to ridiculous or inequitable
consequences that are incompatible with the purposes of the legislation (Rizzo
& Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para 27).
[31]
The applicant argues further, or in the
alternative, that the Appeals Officer unreasonably adopted an unduly
restrictive interpretation of “control”. The
applicant submits that determining “control” was
limited to circumstances where an employer has exclusive access and/or a right
to alter the physical work place in combination with the Appeals Officer’s
determination that paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC applies only where an
employer controls a work place absolves the respondent of its obligation to
inspect work places to identify and take steps to fix hazards. The applicant
submits the respondent’s substantial functional control over letter carrier
routes and points of call amounts to a level of control over the work place sufficient
to attract the obligation under subsection 125(1) even if the Appeals Officer
has not committed a reviewable error in holding that the obligation applies only
where an employer controls a work place.
[32]
Finally, the applicant argues that an
interpretation of subsection 125(1) that relieves federal employers from
identifying and resolving safety hazards in a work place where they do not have
exclusive access is contrary to the scheme of the CLC. The applicant argues
that subsection 125(1) seeks to enhance not derogate from the general duty of
employers under section 124 of the CLC to ensure safety in the work place.
[33]
The applicant also takes issue with the respondent’s
use of hypothetical examples relating to other federally regulated work places and
evidence relating to CPC employees who take taxis to their routes, and eat
meals on route. The applicant argues that there is insufficient evidence before
the Court in relation to these examples to justify their use in interpreting
the CLC and as such the only focus should be the Burlington routes and points
of call.
V.
Respondent’s Submissions
[34]
The respondent submits that the Appeals
Officer’s interpretation of subsection 125(1) and paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the
CLC fell within the range of possible acceptable outcomes and was supported by
the evidence before him and therefore was reasonable.
[35]
At the outset of oral submissions the respondent
noted that the applicant’s position that Part II of the CLC is a public
welfare statute and thus generally requires a broad and purposive
interpretation was not in dispute. However, relying on Blue Mountain Resorts
Ltd v Bok, 2013 ONCA 75 at para 26, 114 OR (3d) 321 [Blue Mountain
Resorts] the respondent submits that a broad and generous interpretation of
the CLC does not necessitate a limitless interpretation.
[36]
The respondent advanced the view that subsection
125(1) of the CLC requires one to first determine if the place in
question is a work place. However, unlike the applicant, the respondent argues
that in assessing the duties and obligations imposed by subsection 125(1) the
determination that a location is a “work place” does
not end the inquiry. Rather the respondent argues that the obligations imposed
by subsection 125(1), will differ depending upon whether or not the employer
controls the work place or alternatively only controls the work activity.
[37]
The respondent also takes issue with the applicant’s
position that in interpreting subsection 125(1) the Appeals Officer’s focus should
have only been on the letter carrier routes at the Burlington location. The respondent
argues that an inquiry into the interpretation of subsection 125(1) requires
assessing not only where the employees go but also how they get there.
[38]
The respondent then sets out the evidence it put
before the Appeals Officer related to CPC employees at the Burlington Depot and
to CPC’s employees generally for the purpose of demonstrating the ramifications
of the finding that paragraph 125(1)(z.12) applies in the manner the applicant advanced.
For example, the respondent submits that the applicant’s interpretation would
include an obligation to inspect public transportation used to transport a
letter carrier to the beginning of a route because many letter carriers are transported
to their first point of call by public transportation or taxis.
[39]
The respondent, again relying on Blue
Mountain Resorts at para 38, submits that it was also appropriate
for the Appeals Officer to consider hypothetical circumstances in assessing the
impact of the applicant’s proposed interpretation of paragraph 125(1)(z.12). The
respondent argues that these hypothetical circumstances involving Parks Canada
Agency, the National Research Council and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
demonstrate the potential absurdity in interpreting paragraph 125(1)(z.12) as
requiring federally regulated employers to conduct inspections of work places
not under control of the employer.
[40]
The respondent argues that the Appeals Officer
reasonably recognized the necessity of the concept of control in respect to the
application of paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC by agreeing with the respondent’s
position that CPC could not enforce the requirement to ensure all permanent and
temporary buildings and structures meet the prescribed standards with respect
to structures it neither owns nor has a right to alter. In turning his mind to
the possible absurdities arising from a finding that a work place is anywhere a
person performs work, the Appeals Officer’s approach of not adopting a narrow
interpretation of work place as the Ontario Court of Appeal did in Blue
Mountain Resorts but rather focusing on the element of employer control led
to a similarly reasonable and logical conclusion.
[41]
The respondent also argues that the Appeals
Officer did not lose sight of the employer’s obligation to ensure the
protection of the health and safety of employees and considered the evidence
before him to the effect that the respondent had many policies and programs in
place to deal with outdoor and delivery related hazards, noting particularly
the WHPP. The respondent stressed that the Appeals Officer’s reference at para
100 of the Decision to the WHPP was an implicit finding that CPC is effectively
working to comply with Part XIX of the Regulations, and that compliance
assuaged the Appeals Officer’s concerns of potential consequences relating to
hazard identification that could arise from the interpretation adopted on
paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC.
VI.
Issues
[42]
The sole issue arising in this application is
whether or not the Appeals Officer’s interpretation of subsection 125(1) and
consequently paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC was reasonable. Specifically the
Court asks whether the Appeals Officer’s determination that the obligations
under paragraph 125(1)(z.12) only apply to work places where the employer
exercises control falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes
defensible in respect of the facts and law.
VII.
Standard of Review
[43]
The parties agree that the reasonableness
standard of review applies to the Appeals Officer’s decision, inclusive of the
interpretation and application of paragraph 125(1)(z.12) of the CLC, as the
Appeals Officer was interpreting his home statute, an area in which he has
considerable expertise (Canada Post v Canadian Union of Postal Workers,
2011 FCA 24 at paras 17-18, 28, 330 DLR (4th) 729).
[44]
In concluding that the decision is to be
reviewed on a reasonableness standard, the Court is mindful of the Federal
Court of Appeal’s decision in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society
of Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 75 at para 14, 444 NR 120.
In that decision, the Court of Appeal establishes that in the context of reviewing
a decision that involves the interpretation of a statute the range of possible
and acceptable outcomes can be relatively narrow since “The
Tribunal’s decision primarily involves statutory interpretation – a matter
constrained by the text, context and purpose of the statute.”
VIII.
Analysis
A.
Statutory Interpretation
[45]
In reviewing a decision interpreting a statutory
provision it is helpful to first review the core underlying principle of
statutory interpretation as identified in Supreme Court of Canada
jurisprudence. In Bell ExpressVU Limited Partnership v Rex, [2002] 2 SCR
559 [Bell ExpressVU], a unanimous decision of the Court, Justice
Iacobucci states the following at paras 26 and 27:
26 In
Elmer Driedger’s definitive formulation, found at p. 87 of his Construction of
Statutes (2nd ed. 1983):
Today there is only one principle or
approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context
and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
Driedger’s modern approach has been
repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred approach to statutory
interpretation across a wide range of interpretive settings [sources omitted].
I note as well that, in the federal legislative context, this Court's preferred
approach is buttressed by s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. I-21, which provides that every enactment “is deemed remedial, and shall be
given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best
ensures the attainment of its objects”.
27 The preferred approach
recognizes the important role that context must inevitably play when a court
construes the written words of a statute [emphasis added]: as Professor
John Willis incisively noted in his seminal article “Statute Interpretation in
a Nutshell” (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 6, ‘words, like people, take
their colour from their surroundings’. This being the case, where the
provision under consideration is found in an Act that is itself a component of
a larger statutory scheme, the surroundings that colour the words and the
scheme of the Act are more expansive [emphasis added]. In such an instance,
the application of Driedger’s principle gives rise to what was described in R.
v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, 2001 SCC 56, as “the
principle of interpretation that presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency
between statutes dealing with the same subject matter”.
[46]
In Bell ExpressVU at paras 29 to 30, Justice
Iacuobucci then addressed the issue of ambiguity in a statutory provision:
29 What,
then, in law is an ambiguity? To answer, an ambiguity must be “real” (Marcotte,
supra, at p. 115). The words of the provision must be “reasonably capable of
more than one meaning” (Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang, [1966] A.C. 182
(H.L.), at p. 222, per Lord Reid). By necessity, however, one must consider the
“entire context” of a provision before one can determine if it is reasonably
capable of multiple interpretations. In this regard, Major J.’s statement in CanadianOxy
Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, at para.
14, is apposite: “It is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more
plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the
statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretive aids”
(emphasis added), to which I would add, “including other principles of
interpretation”.
30 For this
reason, ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that several courts -- or, for
that matter, several doctrinal writers -- have come to differing conclusions on
the interpretation of a given provision. Just as it would be improper for one
to engage in a preliminary tallying of the number of decisions supporting
competing interpretations and then apply that which receives the “higher score”,
it is not appropriate to take as one's starting point the premise that
differing interpretations reveal an ambiguity. It is necessary, in every case,
for the court charged with interpreting a provision to undertake the contextual
and purposive approach set out by Driedger, and thereafter to determine if “the
words are ambiguous enough to induce two people to spend good money in backing
two opposing views as to their meaning” (Willis, supra, at pp.
4-5).
[47]
Furthermore in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd
(Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para 27, Justice Iacobucci, again writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, addresses the principle of statutory interpretation
avoiding absurd consequences:
27 It is a
well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature
does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Côté, supra,
an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or
frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it
is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or
with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes
these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to
interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of
it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra, at p.
88).
B.
Reasonableness of the Decision
[48]
Based on these principles of statutory
interpretation I will now consider the reasonableness of the Appeals Officer’s
interpretation of subsection 125(1) and paragraph 125(1)(z.12) within the
broader context of the CLC.
[49]
As noted above, the applicant argues that it was
unreasonable for the Appeals Officer to conclude that the obligations set out
in subsection 125(1) do not apply equally to employers who control the work
place or work activity within a work place. I respectfully disagree.
[50]
In interpreting subsection 125(1) of the CLC the
Appeals Officer was required to consider the words of subsection 125(1) in
their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with
the scheme of the CLC (Bell ExpressVU paras 26 and 27).
[51]
In this case the Appeals Officer closely examined subsection 125(1) of the CLC and, after concluding
that for CPC letter carriers’ work place included places outside the physical
building controlled by the employer and included points of call and lines of
route, he then considered the specific obligations enumerated in subsection
125(1) of the CLC. He notes the subsection draws a clear distinction between
work places that are controlled by the employer and those that are not. He
further concludes, based on a plain reading of the subsection that not all
obligations apply where the employer does not control the work place. To
demonstrate this he notes the obligation set out in paragraph 125(1)(a),
requiring that all permanent and temporary buildings and structures must meet
prescribed standards and concludes that this is an obligation that an employer
can only satisfy where the employer controls the physical work place and can
thus alter structures. He contrasts this with the obligation set out in
paragraph 125(1)(t), to ensure the safety of all machinery, equipment and tools
used by the employees in the course of their employment, noting that this obligation
can be respected both where the employer controls the work place and where the
employer only controls the work activity. It is on this basis that the Appeals
Officer concludes that the inspection obligation at paragraph 125(1)(z.12) only
arises where the employer controls the work place, as the purpose of the
125(1)(z.12) inspection is the identification and opportunity to fix hazards. This,
the Appeal Officer concludes requires control of the work place.
[52]
The applicant argues that this interpretation
fails to reflect the need for a broad generous interpretation of the CLC and
that the mere fact that an interpretation might be viewed as impractical by a
decision-maker is not sufficient to allow the decision-maker to limit its
application. In this case I am of the view that the Appeals Officer has adopted
a reasonable interpretation of subsection 125(1) and paragraph 125(1)(z.12), based
on a harmonious reading of the words in their context. The Appeals Officer’s determination
that the employer can only satisfy certain obligations imposed by the
subsection when in control of the work place is not driven by an impracticality
assessment but rather a determination that the underlying purpose of paragraph
125(1)(z.12) can only be achieved where the employer is in a position to both
identify and fix hazards. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Blue
Mountain Resorts at paras 26 and 27 a generous interpretation of public
welfare statues cannot justify extending the reach of legislation beyond the
intent of the legislator:
26. This generous approach to the
interpretation of public welfare statutes does not call for a limitless
interpretation of their provisions however.
27. One of the problems with what is
otherwise an understandable approach to the interpretation of public welfare
legislation is that broad language, taken at face value, can sometimes lead to
the adoption of overly broad definitions. This can extend the reach of the
legislation far beyond what was intended by the legislature and afford the
regulating ministry a greatly expanded mandate far beyond what is needed to
give effect to the purposes of the legislation.
[53]
In the context of this review I need not
determine whether or not the Appeals Officer was correct in his interpretation
but rather whether or not the interpretation was reasonable keeping in mind
that the range of reasonable acceptable outcomes may be relatively narrow. In
this case I am satisfied that the Appeals Officer’s interpretation was
reasonable.
[54]
Similarly, I cannot agree with the applicant’s
position that the Appeals Officer adopted an unreasonable interpretation of “control” in considering subsection 125(1) of the CLC.
As the Appeals Officer notes the parties did not dispute the fact that the
employer does not exercise physical control over points of call or lines of
route. Similarly, there was no dispute with respect to the fact that many
points of call are private property. As such it was not unreasonable for the
Appeals Officer to conclude that an employer did not control the work place and
in turn could not effectively carry out an inspection and accomplish the
underlying purpose of paragraph 125(1)(z.12). The hypothetical examples from
the record which the respondent provided above supported this interpretation (Blue
Mountain Resorts at para 38).
[55]
Further, I am of the opinion that the Appeals
Officer’s finding that the respondent exercises substantial control over the
work activity is neither internally inconsistent with the decision, nor does it
undermine the reasonableness of the decision. The Appeals Officer identifies
that subsection 125(1) draws a clear distinction between control over the work
place and control over the work activity. He found that distinction to be
significant and meaningful in interpreting subsection 125(1). Having concluded
that the subsection distinguishes between work place control and work activity
control, and having determined that work place control was the determinative
factor in respect of the obligations imposed by paragraph 125(1)(z.12) there
was no need, in my opinion, for the Appeals Officer to address the question of
employer control over work activity.
[56]
Of course to be reasonable the interpretation
must also not run contrary to or defeat the statutory objective of the CLC, the
protection of the health and safety of employees. The applicant submits this is
exactly what the Decision does. However, I am satisfied that the Decision
reflects a contextual consideration of subsection 125(1) within the scheme of
the CLC that both recognizes and promotes the underlying principle of the CLC. Section
124 imposes a general duty on every employer to ensure the health and safety at
work of every person employed by the employer is protected. Subsection 125(1)
of the CLC supplements rather than limits that general duty (Laroche v
Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1454 at para 8, 401 FTR 287). An
interpretation limiting any of the obligations set out at subsection 125(1) therefore
does not limit the broader duty articulated at section 124, nor necessarily
undermine or contravene the purpose of the Code. Nor, does the Decision
with respect to paragraph 125(1)(z.12) affect Part XIX of the Regulations
relating to the employer’s obligations with respect to the creation and
implementation of a hazard prevention program.
[57]
I recognize that the Appeals Officer did not did
not specifically refer to section 124 of the CLC or to Part XIX of the Regulations
in the analysis but the failure to do so does not lead me to conclude that the
provision was not considered. As Justice LeBel held for a unanimous Supreme
Court of Canada in Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 at para 57, citing Alberta (Information
and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654:
“a decision maker’s decision on the merits may imply a
particular interpretation of the statutory provision at issue even if the
decision maker has not expressed an opinion on that provision’s meaning”.
I am satisfied that the role of section 124 of the CLC and Part XIX of
the Regulations was implicit in the Appeals Officer’s interpretation of subsection
125(1) and paragraph 125(1)(z.12). This is reflected in the finding at
paragraph 100 of the Decision:
100 In any event, the evidence has
demonstrated that Canada Post has many policies, programs and assessment tools
that evaluate and promote the health and safety of their employees in all
elements of their work. Notably, the WHPP developed by Canada Post is
exemplary in its protocol for identifying and reporting hazards that are
encountered at the points of call. In my opinion the program is an
excellent example of how the Code and its Regulations are implemented to
protect the health and safety of employees performing all kinds of activities
in all kinds of work places [emphasis added].
IX.
Conclusion
[58]
In my opinion the Decision reflects that
preservation of the broad obligations of the CLC was at the forefront of
the Appeals Officer’s interpretation of the CLC. He implicitly recognized that
adopting the respondent’s restrictive interpretation of the term “work place”
could have the effect of diluting the remedial effects of the CLC. The Appeals
Officer recognized that Parliament intended to give the broadest possible
protection to employees including to those performing work in a place which the
employer may not control. In my view the Appeals Officer’s interpretation of subsection
125(1) and paragraph 125(1)(z.12) demonstrates sensitivity to preserving the
broad nature of the employer’s obligations to ensure the health and safety of
its employees without placing obligations upon the employer that the latter
would be unable to fulfill.
[59]
I am satisfied that the Appeals Officer decision
is justified, transparent and intelligible, and falls within a range of possible
acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and law (Dunsmuir v
New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para 47). The application is therefore
dismissed with costs to the respondent.