Docket: T-1519-15
Citation:
2016 FC 1188
Ottawa, Ontario, October 24, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott
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BETWEEN:
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BURBERRY
LIMITED; AND
BURBERRY CANADA
INC.
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Plaintiffs
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and
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WASSEEM MAHMOOD
RAMJAUN
D.B.A. LAGUNA
TRADING,
TAMASSA TRADING
LTD. AND
FASHION MARKET
USA LLC
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Defendants
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ORDER AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
This decision relates to a hearing pursuant to
an Order issued by Justice Elliot on June 6, 2016 [the Show Cause Order],
requiring the Defendant, Wasseem Mahmood Ramjaun d.b.a. Laguna Trading [Mr.
Ramjaun], to appear before a Judge of this Court to show cause why he ought not
to be found in contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of
Justice LeBlanc issued in this proceeding on September 11, 2015 and the Order
of Justice Harrington issued in this proceeding on September 23, 2015, pursuant
to Rules 466 and 467 of the Federal Courts Rules [the Rules].
[2]
For the reasons that follow, I find Mr. Ramjaun
in contempt under counts 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 of the Show Cause Order.
II.
Background
[3]
The within action which gives rise to this
contempt proceeding was commenced on September 9, 2015, by the Plaintiffs,
Burberry Limited and Burberry Canada Inc. [Burberry]. Burberry describes itself
as a global luxury brand involved in the design, manufacture, advertising,
distribution and sale of high quality apparel and accessories. It alleges that
Mr. Ramjaun and the other Defendants have engaged in various dealings with
counterfeit Burberry merchandise, constituting among other things trade-mark
infringement and passing off through unauthorized use of trade-marks owned by
Burberry.
[4]
Burberry commenced this action following its
execution in the United Kingdom in June 2015 of an Anton Piller Order against
Miles Ellingham and his business FMI/T/A Fashion Market Int Limited. Over 1100
counterfeit Burberry shirts were seized from Mr. Ellingham and his business.
Following the execution of the Anton Piller Order, Mr. Ellingham identified the
sole source of his counterfeit Burberry goods as “Laguna
Trading, 105 La Rose Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada – Waseem Mahmood”.
[5]
As a result, on September 11, 2015, the
Plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion for an interim order granting a
Mareva injunction against Mr. Ramjaun, enjoining him from dissipating his
assets and providing other relief. Justice LeBlanc issued this Order on
September 11, 2015, imposing various prohibitions against Mr. Ramjaun dealing
with his assets and requiring Mr. Ramjaun to provide a sworn statement with
certain information, including the nature, value and location of his assets,
and to submit to an examination under oath following delivery of this statement
[the Mareva Order]. The Mareva Order was served on Mr. Ramjaun on September 11,
2015. On September 23, 2015, upon the consent of the parties, Justice
Harrington ordered that the Mareva Order be extended on an interlocutory basis
until trial in this matter or further order of the Court.
[6]
Mr. Ramjaun provided a sworn statement dated
September 18, 2015, and on September 25, 2015 he was examined under oath by
Burberry’s counsel.
[7]
On February 26, 2016, Burberry filed motion
materials pursuant to Rule 467(1), seeking a show cause order against Mr.
Ramjaun based on allegations that he had dealt with his assets in contravention
of the Orders of Justice LeBlanc and Justice Harrington, that his sworn
statement was deficient, and that he lied under oath during examination on his
sworn statement. Following a hearing on June 6, 2016, Justice Elliot found that
Burberry had established a prima facie case that Mr. Ramjaun had
committed contempt and issued the Show Cause Order, requiring Mr. Ramjaun to
appear before a Judge of this Court to hear proof of the acts with which he is
charged and to be prepared to present any defence he may have. By Order dated
July 6, 2016, that hearing was set down for October 3, 2016 at Toronto [the
Contempt Hearing]. On June 6, 2016, Justice Elliot also heard a motion by
Burberry for for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 213, which decision is
currently under reserve.
[8]
Under Rule 470(1), evidence on a motion for a
contempt order is required to be presented orally, unless the Court directs
otherwise. In the week prior to the Contempt Hearing, Burberry requested
direction that the affidavit evidence which was filed in the motion resulting
in the Show Cause Order form part of the record at the Contempt Hearing and
that Burberry’s affiants not be required to give oral testimony on the facts
set out in the affidavit evidence. Mr. Ramjaun consented to this request, and
on September 30, 2016, I issued an Order to that effect. Based on Mr. Ramjaun’s
consent, that Order also dispensed with the requirement under Rule 467(4) for
personal service upon him of that affidavit evidence and the Orders of June 6,
2016 and July 6, 2016.
[9]
My Order of September 30, 2016 provided that,
while Burberry’s affiants were not required to attend the Contempt Hearing,
they were permitted to do so and to give oral testimony, and that Mr. Ramjaun
was required to attend and also was permitted to give oral testimony. The Court
heard oral evidence at the Contempt Hearing from Burberry’s Brand Protection
Counsel, Jennifer Colgan Halter, and from Mr. Ramjaun, both of whom were
cross-examined.
[10]
At the Contempt Hearing, the parties also
addressed the question whether the Court should receive submissions on penalty
at the Contempt Hearing, or whether such submissions should be received only at
a later stage in this proceeding if a finding of contempt is made. While
Burberry was prepared to make penalty submissions at the Contempt Hearing, Mr.
Ramjaun took the position that such submissions should be made only following a
contempt finding. Given the guidance from the Federal Court of Appeal in Winniki
v Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2007 FCA 52, at paras 12 to 16, I
concurred with Mr. Ramjaun’s position.
III.
Issue
[11]
The sole issue to be decided based on the
Contempt Hearing is whether the evidence establishes the alleged contempt on
the part of Mr. Ramjaun beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV.
Analysis
[12]
The Show Cause Order sets out the following
particulars of the acts with which Mr. Ramjaun is charged:
1.
On September 16, 2015 Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
made three bank transactions. He withdrew funds from his BMO account 3297
4971-491. He further secured a loan from National Money. He further sent an
interact e-transfer of money from his BMO account 3297 3965-622.
2.
On September 18, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
was ordered to provide a sworn statement by September 18, 2015. The sworn
statement was utterly deficient as it neither set out all his bank accounts nor
all his assets.
3.
On September 22, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
withdrew funds from his BMO account 3297 4791-491.
4.
On September 25, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
attended a cross-examination on his sworn statement. Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun repeatedly
lied under oath.
5.
On September 28, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
withdrew funds from his BMO account 3297 4971-491.
6.
On September 29, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
withdrew funds from his BMO account 3297 3965-622.
7.
On September 30, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
withdrew funds from his BMO account 3297 3965-622.
8.
On October 1, 2015, Waseem Mahmood Ramjaun
withdrew funds from his BMO account 3297 4791-491 at Branch 3995, and then
attended a different branch and withdrew additional funds from his BMO account
3297-4791-491.
[13]
Broadly speaking, the eight counts of alleged
contumacious conduct can be separated into three categories. Mr. Ramjaun is
alleged: (a) to have engaged in various transactions contrary to the Mareva
Order’s prohibition against dealing with his assets (counts 1, 3, and 5 to 8);
(b) to have provided a deficient sworn statement, failing to set out all his
bank accounts and other assets, contrary to the Mareva Order’s requirement that
he provide such a statement (count 2); and (c) to have repeatedly lied under
oath in the cross examination upon his sworn statement to which the Mareva
Order required him to submit (count 4). I will address each of these three
categories separately.
A.
Transactions (Counts 1, 3, and 5 to 8)
[14]
The documentary evidence clearly establishes
that Mr. Ramjaun engaged in the alleged transactions. Indeed, he admits that he
made these transactions. His defence is based on an argument that his conduct
was without contumacious intent. His evidence is that, prior to a meeting with
his legal counsel on October 1, 2015, he did not have a full understanding of
the terms of the Mareva Order. He states that, after October 1, 2015, he fully
understood his obligations under the Mareva Order and he stopped accessing his
assets and bank accounts and carried on in strict compliance with the Mareva
Order’s terms. Mr. Ramjaun submits that for a finding of contempt, both
“physical” and “fault” elements must be proven. He admits that he has committed
the physical element of contempt but submits that his acts do not satisfy the
fault element.
[15]
Mr. Ramjaun’s evidence is that he immigrated to
Canada from the Republic of Mauritius less than 10 years ago, that his native
language is French and that his schooling in Mauritius was in French. He speaks
Urdu to his parents, Creole French with his Canadian wife, and English and
French with his Canadian born son. He communicates in English with his business
customers and with his lawyer. He argues that, having only a high-school
education and having English as only his third or fourth language, his
understanding of the legal terms of the Mareva Order during the first 2-3 weeks
after he was served with the Order on September 11, 2015 was vague. He states
that he misinterpreted the meaning of the English word “assets”,
which in Creole French has a narrower meaning of “tangible
goods” or “physical assets”. He further
states that he wrongly understood the term “the Bank”
in the Mareva Order to refer only to the TD Bank (which bank the Mareva Order
expressly directed to freeze Mr. Ramjaun’s assets).
[16]
Mr. Ramjaun’s evidence is that he retained legal
counsel on September 16, 2015, had the precise meaning of the terms of the
Mareva Order explained to him on October 1, 2015, and as a result of his
lawyer’s explanations had a full understanding of those terms on that date. He
therefore submits that transactions in which he engaged up to October 1, 2015
were performed with a lack of understanding of the Mareva Order and were done
without intent to disobey its terms. Noting that he had the benefit of counsel
as of September 16, 2015, Mr. Ramjaun submits that in the period between then
and October 1, 2015, the focus was on preparing the required sworn statement
and preparing for cross-examination thereon, and that he received only a
summary explanation of the terms of the Mareva Order prior to October 1.
[17]
Burberry has referred the Court to authorities
related to the “fault” element required to be
proven in a proceeding for civil contempt. In Merck & co. v Apotex Inc. 2003
FCA 234, at para 56, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that a lack of intent to
interfere with the orderly administration of justice or to act with contempt is
not a defence to a finding of contempt, but is only potentially relevant as a
mitigating factor in the determination of penalty. In LifeGear Inc. v Urus
Industrial Corp., 2004 FC 21, at paras 22-24, aff’d 2005 FCA 63, this Court
held that the fault element of contempt is knowledge of the terms of the Court
order that was disobeyed.
[18]
The test for civil contempt, including the fault
element, has also been considered recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carey
v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17. At paragraph 38, the Court explained the required
intent as follows:
[38] It is well settled in
Canadian common law that all that is required to establish civil contempt is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional act or omission that is in
fact in breach of a clear order of which the alleged contemnor has notice: Prescott-Russell,
at para. 27; College of Optometrists, at para. 71; Sheppard,
at p. 8; TG Industries, at paras. 17 and 32; Bhatnager, at
pp. 224-25; Sharpe, at ¶ 6.190. The Court of Appeal followed this approach. As
it noted, to require a contemnor to have intended to disobey the order would
put the test “too high” and result in “mistakes of law [becoming] a defence to
an allegation of civil contempt but not to a murder charge” (para. 59).
Instead, contumacy or lack thereof goes to the penalty to be imposed following
a finding of contempt: para. 62; see also Sheppard; and Sharpe, at ¶
6.200.
[19]
Thus, to establish the fault element of civil contempt,
it must be proven that the defendant intentionally did an act which is
prohibited by an order of which the defendant had notice. However, it is not
necessary that the defendant intended to disobey the order.
[20]
In the present case, Mr. Ramjaun does not
dispute that he had knowledge of the Mareva Order, having been served with it
on September 11, 2015. The alleged acts are the transactions in which Mr.
Ramjaun engaged between September 16, 2015 and October 1, 2015. These
transactions are admitted by Mr. Ramjaun, and he has not contested that they
represent clear violations of the Mareva Order’s prohibition against dealing
with his assets. It need not be proven that Mr. Ramjaun intended to breach the
Mareva Order through these transactions, only that he intended to perform the
acts themselves, which again is not contested. I also note that, while Mr.
Ramjaun states that he did not fully understand the terms of the Mareva Order,
in part due to what he argues to be limited English language skills, he has not
alleged that these terms were unclear. Where an order is clear and the
defendant had knowledge of it, intentionally doing an act that is prohibited by
the order is sufficient to establish contempt, and I find that Mr. Ramjaun did
intentionally engage in the transactions that are the subject of the contempt
allegation.
[21]
I should also note that
Mr. Ramjaun’s evidence is that these transactions
involved withdrawals to pay for living expenses such as medicine and legal fees
and to fund automatic withdrawals from his bank account to the Canada Revenue
Agency [CRA], pursuant to an
arrangement he had negotiated with CRA related to taxes owing for a previous
taxation year. In response, Burberry notes that the Mareva Order expressly
provides that Mr. Ramjaun may
apply for an order on short notice permitting him to spend funds on ordinary
living expenses and legal advice and representation, but that Mr. Ramjaun did not seek such an order. Burberry
also points out that the record demonstrates that, during Mr. Ramjaun’s cross examination on
September 25, 2015, Burberry’s counsel explained to him that he was required to
request an order from the court if he wanted to spend money on living or legal
expenses. Mr. Ramjaun refers to requests made of Burberry that they consent to
an order of this nature and explains that Burberry did not consent to the
specific terms proposed. He acknowledges that he did not require Burberry’s
consent to seek such an order but says that the decision was made not to incur
the cost associated with seeking an order on a contested motion.
[22]
The nature of the expenses that resulted in the
impugned transactions may be relevant to penalty. However, I do not consider
the nature of these expenses, or the fact that Burberry did not consent to
Ramjaun’s request, to represent a defence to the allegations of contempt.
[23]
I therefore find that the evidence establishes,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Ramjaun is guilty
of contempt in connection with counts 1, 3, and 5 to 8
of the Show Cause Order. As his alleged lack of contumacious intent is not
relevant to this determination and is potentially relevant only to penalty, and
as the parties expressed intention to make further submissions as to penalty in
the event contempt was found, I decline to make a finding as to his
contumacious intent at this stage of this proceeding.
B.
Deficiency of Sworn Statement (Count 2)
[24]
This allegation relates to the requirement in
the Mareva Order that Mr. Ramjaun
provide to Burberry, within five days of service of the Order, a sworn
statement describing and identifying, among other things, the nature, value,
and location of his assets worldwide, whether in his own name or not and
whether solely or jointly owned. Mr. Ramjaun provided a statement sworn on
September 18, 2015, stating that he did not own any assets outside Canada and
stating that in Canada his only assets were his car, personal bank account with
a balance of approximately $10, business bank account at the Toronto Dominion
Bank (which account was expressly referenced in and frozen by the Mareva Order), laptop computer, and various
other household items of minor value.
[25]
One of the affidavits sworn by Burberry’s Brand
Protection Counsel, Ms. Halter, refers to Bank of Montreal [BMO] accounts that
were not disclosed by Mr. Ramjaun. Two of Mr. Ramjaun’s
BMO accounts are those in which the transactions referred to in the Show Cause
Order occurred. He brought records relating to those two accounts to his cross-examination
on September 25, 2015. Ms. Halter’s affidavit also attaches records related to
other accounts that Burberry received directly from BMO.
[26]
During Mr. Ramjaun’s
cross-examination, he testified that the personal bank account with a balance
of approximately $10 referenced in his sworn statement was one of the BMO
accounts, with a balance of $9. He also testified that he had one US dollar
account and one Canadian account. It appears from the banking records attached
to Ms. Halter’s affidavit that the personal account disclosed in Mr. Ramjaun’s
sworn statement is the Canadian dollar BMO account 3297 3965-622, which in
mid-September 2015 had a balance of $9.39. Ms. Halter is correct in asserting
that the sworn statement did not disclose the US dollar BMO account 3297
4791-491.
[27]
Ms. Halter is also correct in asserting that the
sworn statement did not disclose the other accounts, records of which Burberry
obtained directly from BMO. However, based on my review of the documents
attached to her affidavit, those accounts (3297-8959-790;
3297-1991-640; and 3297-4791-221) all show a zero balance, at least as of the
date of October 20, 2015 to which the records relate. Mr. Ramjaun’s obligation under the Mareva Order was to disclose his
assets, and I cannot conclude that a bank account with a zero balance
constitutes an asset such that failure to disclose the account would warrant a
finding of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[28]
Returning to the US dollar BMO account 3297
4791-491, the records indicate this account to have had a nominal balance of
$1.05 as of the date Mr.
Ramjaun swore his statement on September 18, 2015. However, an account with a
nominal balance still represents an asset, as did the Canadian dollar BMO
account with the balance of $9.39 which Mr. Ramjaun did disclose. Moreover, as noted by Burberry, the US dollar
BMO account is one of the two accounts used to conduct the impugned
transactions in September 2015. That account had had a balance of over $1000.00
as of the date Mr. Ramjaun was
served with the Mareva Order.
[29]
I therefore find the evidence to establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that failure to disclose this account in the sworn
statement does represent a violation of the Mareva Order. While one might
consider this a minor violation because of the nominal balance in the account,
it is nevertheless a violation of an order of the Court which is intended to be
a complied with and complied with carefully and therefore does support a
finding of contempt. In so finding, I am conscious that
Mr. Ramjaun brought records of this account to his
cross-examination a week after providing the deficient sworn statement such
that, at least as of the time of his cross-examination, he does not appear to
have had any intention to hide this account. However, as with my analysis
related to the impugned transactions, lack of contumacious intent may be
relevant to penalty but is not a defence to an allegation of contempt.
C.
Lying under Oath (Count 4)
[30]
At the Contempt Hearing, I asked Burberry to
identify the specific testimony given by Mr. Ramjaun at his September 25, 2015 cross-examination which Burberry
alleged was untrue, as the Show Cause Order does not provide any such detail.
This might raise a question whether, on this particular count, the Show Cause
Order obtained by Burberry described the act with which Mr. Ramjaun was charged
with sufficient particularity to enable him to know the nature of the case
against him, as required by Rule 467(1) as a condition to a finding of
contempt. However, as this argument has not been raised by Mr. Ramjaun in
defence, I have addressed this count on the merits, based on the evidence and
the parties’ submissions, and have found that the evidence does not support a
finding of contempt, beyond a reasonable doubt, in relation to the particular
testimony to which Burberry refers the Court.
[31]
First, Burberry refers to Mr. Ramjaun’s
testimony at his September 25, 2015 cross-examination that he did not sell
Burberry dress shirts to Miles Ellingham. Burberry
argues that this testimony was false, based on the evidence that Burberry dress
shirts were seized in the raid upon Mr. Ellingham’s business and the evidence
in an affidavit provided by Mr. Ellingham pursuant to the UK Anton Piller Order
that “Laguna Trading, 105 La Rose Avenue, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada – Waseem Mahmood” was his supplier of Burberry polo and dress
shirts. Burberry also notes that Mr. Ramjaun had access
to Burberry dress shirts from his supplier in Peru, as he has acknowledged that
he obtained and provided samples of such shirts to Mr.
Ellingham. Burberry also relies upon errors in the labels affixed to the shirts
found in Mr. Ellingham’s possession, which match errors in labels that Mr. Ramjaun’s estranged wife, Farhat Ramjaun, testified by affidavit
she had found in boxes stored in their home’s garage.
[32]
At the Contempt Hearing, I raised the question
whether, in pursuing allegations of this sort, Burberry was asking the Court to
make findings resulting from the Contempt Hearing that might duplicate, or
theoretically could conflict with, findings that Justice Elliott may be making
in deciding Burberry’s pending motion for summary judgment. Burberry did not
disagree that this was a possibility, although it noted the different standards
of proof applicable to findings of contempt and findings in a summary judgment
motion. Mr. Ramjaun took the position that the possibility of duplicative or
inconsistent findings was a concern, such that the Court should not rule on
these allegations in the context of the Contempt Hearing.
[33]
Mr. Ramjaun provided no authority for the
proposition that the Court should decline to rule on allegations relevant to
the contempt proceeding. However, being conscious of the pending summary
judgment motion, I will restrict my findings to those which are strictly necessary
to dispose of the contempt proceeding.
[34]
There is evidence in the record demonstrating
that Mr. Ramjaun and Mr. Ellingham discussed a transaction involving the sale of
Burberry dress shirts and that Mr. Ramjaun offered to
sell such shirts and provided related pricing. Mr. Ramjaun acknowledges that this took place and that he provided
samples of Burberry dress shirts to Mr. Ellingham in
contemplation of this transaction. However, Mr.
Ramjaun’s testimony and position is that this transaction did not proceed and
that he has sold only Burberry polo shirts, not dress shirts, to Mr. Ellingham.
[35]
Mr. Ramjaun points out
that he has admitted to selling Burberry polo shirts to Mr. Ellingham. Indeed, he has admitted that those shirts were
counterfeit, although he takes the position that he thought they were genuine
at the time he was supplying them. He therefore argues that he would have no
motivation to lie about the sale of Burberry dress shirts in particular. He
says that he has denied supplying such shirts, other than samples, simply
because this is the truth.
[36]
While Burberry is correct that Mr. Ellingham states, in an affidavit
attached as an exhibit to Ms. Halter’s affidavit, that Mr. Ramjaun supplied him with dress shirts, I note that Mr. Willingham
has not been cross-examined in this proceeding. I have considered the
documentary evidence relied upon by Burberry but cannot conclude that this
evidence, including that which was seized in the Anton Piller raid executed
upon Mr. Ellingham, establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Ramjaun sold Burberry dress shirts to Mr. Ellingham, contrary to Mr. Ramjaun’s
assertion that he sold only Burberry polo shirts, along with providing Burberry
dress shirt samples. I therefore find that Burberry has not established beyond
a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Ramjaun lied in this aspect of his cross-examination evidence.
[37]
Burberry’s second allegation relates to Mr.
Ramjaun’s testimony at his September 25, 2015 cross-examination that the goods
he was buying from his Peruvian supplier, for sale to Mr. Ellingham, were “stock lots”. Mr. Ramjaun testified that “stock lots” referred in this case to shirts that are
already completely finished including labels and packing. Burberry argues that
Mr. Ramjaun lied in giving this testimony and supports its position by
reference to documents in the record that purport to be Release Certificates
issued by “Laguna Trading Ltd.”, showing a New
York address and certifying that Laguna Trading Ltd. is the authorized
distributor for the Burberry brand in the United States. Documents of this sort
were seized from Mr. Ellingham in execution of the Anton Piller order, and such
a document is also attached to Farhat Ramjaun’s affidavit. Her evidence is that
she found this document on her laptop computer, which she says Mr. Ramjaun
sometimes used for his business purposes.
[38]
Burberry’s argument is that Mr. Ramjaun’s
testimony about the purchase and sale of stock lots is an effort to distance
himself from knowing participation in the sale of counterfeit goods. Burberry
argues that the Release Certificates are acknowledged even by Mr. Ramjaun to be
fake documents (although he denies knowledge of them) and that the fact that
such documents have been found both in his customer’s possession and on his
wife’s laptop demonstrate that Mr. Ramjaun was aware he was dealing in
counterfeit goods.
[39]
I find that the evidence upon which Burberry
relies does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ramjaun was lying
when he testified that the shirts he bought for sale to Mr. Ellingham were
stock lots. Even if Mr. Ramjaun was aware at the time of the purchase and sale
that these shirts were counterfeit, it does not necessarily follow that the
shirts were not completely finished when supplied to him by the Peruvian
factory. I therefore cannot find that the evidence supports a finding, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Mr. Ramjaun was lying in making the particular
statements to which Burberry refers in his September 25, 2015
cross-examination.
[40]
I therefore find that the evidence does not
establish Mr. Ramjaun to be in contempt under count 4 of the Show Cause Order.
In so concluding, I am making no findings, one way or the other, as to whether
Mr. Ramjaun was knowingly dealing in counterfeit goods.
V.
Conclusion
[41]
Having found Mr. Ramjaun to be in contempt under
counts 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 (but not count 4) of the Show Cause Order, it is
necessary for the Court to receive submissions from the parties on an
appropriate penalty for the established contempt, as well as the appropriate
disposition of costs resulting from the overall contempt proceeding. My Order
will so reflect.
ORDER
THIS COURT’S ORDERS that:
1. The Defendant, Wasseem Mahmood Ramjaun d.b.a. Laguna Trading, is
found to be in contempt of the Orders of this Court dated September 11, 2015
and September 23, 2015.
2. The parties shall contact the Administrator to schedule a date for a
hearing on penalty resulting from this finding of contempt.
3. If the parties wish to file written submissions in advance of the
hearing on penalty, they shall confer and shall propose to the Court timing for
the filing of such submissions, following which the Court will provide
directions on such timing.
4.
Costs of this motion, and the motion for the
Show Cause Order under Rule 467(1), are reserved to be addressed at the hearing
on penalty.
“Richard F. Southcott”
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