Docket: IMM-7036-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1076
Toronto, Ontario, September 15, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
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BETWEEN:
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FANG LIU
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
In 2002, Ms Fang Liu arrived in Canada from
China based on her successful application for permanent residence, after
marrying a Canadian citizen. In 2013, she attempted to sponsor her son from a
previous marriage, but an immigration officer concluded that her son was not
eligible because he had not been examined at the time of Ms Liu’s application
for permanent residence (applying s 117(9)(d) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] – see Annex for
enactments cited).
[2]
Ms Liu appealed the officer’s decision to the
Immigration Appeal Division. The IAD upheld the decision, finding that s
117(9)(d) prevented sponsorship of Ms Liu’s son, and concluding that no
exceptions to that rule applied in the circumstances.
[3]
Ms Liu submits that the IAD’s decision was
unreasonable because she had mentioned her son in her 2002 application and,
therefore, the officer who processed that application must have concluded that
her son did not have to be examined. Ms Liu asks me to quash the IAD’s decision
and order another panel to reconsider the issue of sponsorship.
[4]
I agree with Ms Liu that the IAD’s decision was
unreasonable.
II.
The IAD’s decision
[5]
In an earlier 1998 application for permanent
residence, Ms Liu disclosed that she had a dependent son. However, in the later
2002 application, she mentioned her son but did not describe him as a
dependent. On these facts, the IAD found that the rule in s 117(9)(d)
applied – Ms Liu’s son could not be considered a member of the family class
because he was a non-accompanying family member at the time of Ms Liu’s
application for permanent residence, and had not been examined.
[6]
The IAD noted that the officer who dealt with Ms
Liu’s permanent residence application in 2002 informed her that she would not
be able to sponsor her son in the future if he was not named as a dependent. It
appeared to the IAD that Ms Liu had been informed of the need for her son to be
examined and she did not present him for that purpose, triggering the
application of the rule in 117(9)(d) (s 117(11)(a)). The IAD did
not agree with Ms. Liu’s submission that the officer had determined that her
son did not have to be examined, which is an exception to the rule in s 117(9)(d)
(s 117(10)).
[7]
Therefore, the IAD dismissed Ms Liu’s appeal.
III.
Was the IAD’s decision unreasonable?
[8]
Ms Liu points out that her case presents a
fairly novel circumstance. Most cases in which the rule in s 117(9)(d)
arises deal with situations where a sponsor had failed to disclose the
existence of a child or other family member, and then sought to sponsor that
person later. Here, Ms Liu clearly disclosed the existence of her son. The
question then is whether the failure to examine her son was a product of a
decision by the officer not to examine him, or the result of her failure to
present him for examination. If the former, the exception in s 117(10) applies
and her son is eligible for sponsorship; if the latter, he is ineligible under
s 117(11)(a).
[9]
Ms Liu points out that she had no duty to
present her son for examination without being informed of the need to do so.
She submits that she was not informed of the possibility of having her son
examined and therefore is not caught by s 117(11)(a) (117(10)).
[10]
Further, she argues that the officer who handled
her permanent residence application had to make a determination not only about
whether she was inadmissible, but also about whether her non-accompanying
dependent son was inadmissible (s 23 IRPR). To make that determination, the
officer would have had to decide whether the child should be examined, and must
have concluded that an examination was unnecessary. Otherwise, the officer
would not have issued her a visa as she would have been inadmissible under s 23
for having custody of or legal responsibility for a non-accompanying, inadmissible
dependent child. Therefore, she says, her case falls within the exception in s
117(10).
[11]
At the heart of Ms Liu’s position is a factual
question – did the officer waive the examination, or did the officer inform her
of the need to present her son for examination and she failed to do so? The IAD
found the latter. I can overturn the IAD’s decision only if its findings of
fact and analysis were unreasonable.
[12]
With respect to the officer’s notes stating that
Ms Liu was informed that she would not be able to sponsor her son if he was not
named as a dependent child, Ms Liu submits that the notes are ambiguous and, in
any case, are poor evidence compared to her sworn testimony. Further, she notes
that it is standard practice in these situations not just to inform applicants
verbally of the consequences of not having a person examined but to have them
sign a letter acknowledging their understanding of those consequences. No such
letter exists here.
[13]
The IAD found that, since the notes were made
contemporaneously with Ms Liu’s application, they should be given considerable
weight. Therefore, according to the IAD, there was no evidence supporting Ms
Liu’s contention that the officer had determined that her son did not have to
be examined.
[14]
In fact, there are a number of notations on the
record from immigration officers. The officer who interviewed Ms Liu in 2002
stated that she had been advised that by not declaring her son as a dependent
she would not be able to sponsor him in the future. Later, an officer who
reviewed Ms Liu’s sponsorship application noted that it appeared that Ms Liu
had “failed to declare/examine” her son at the time she applied for permanent
residence. A second reviewing officer stated that Ms Liu had been counselled
about the consequences of not having her son examined.
[15]
Ms Liu’s application was then sent to the
Canadian Consulate in Hong Kong for a decision. Again, two officers were
involved. One stated that Ms Liu had been advised that her son would be
permanently excluded from future sponsorship if he did not undergo an
examination, and noted that Ms Liu had opted not to have him examined. The
second officer was even more definitive. He stated that Ms Liu had determined
not to have her son examined and “therefore chose to
permanently exclude him”. Accordingly, the officer concluded that the
exclusion was “a direct and foreseeable result of [the]
sponsor’s own choice”.
[16]
These entries are confusing. The very first
officer, the one who actually interviewed Ms Liu in 2002, simply stated that Ms
Liu had been advised that she could not sponsor her son if she did not declare
him as a dependent child. Over a decade later, an officer interpreted that
entry as proof that Ms Liu had been told that her son had to be examined and
would be permanently ineligible for sponsorship if he were not, and that Ms Liu
had decided that she did not want him to be examined, being fully aware of the
consequences.
[17]
Ms Liu had made the interviewing officer aware
of her son and of grounds for concluding that he was a dependent. Yet the
officer’s note does not say anything about the need for the son to be examined,
does not indicate that Ms Liu was informed of the consequences of failing to
present her son for an examination, and does not record any statement from Ms
Liu reflecting her understanding of those consequences, or any decision on her
part one way or the other about her son. And yet, by the time her file was
reviewed in Hong Kong, officers read into the original note inferences in
respect of all of these matters.
[18]
In light of this evidence, it is difficult to
accept the IAD’s conclusion that the evidence shows that Ms Liu had been fully
informed of the consequences of not presenting her son for examination. Over
time, the officers’ notes seem inexplicably to have evolved toward greater
precision and certitude on this point. In my view, in the face of this
evidence, the IAD’s conclusion that Ms Liu was caught by s 117(11)(a)
was unreasonable. In the IAD’s own words, this issue was at “the heart of this matter”. Accordingly, at a minimum,
the IAD was obliged to resolve the factual issue before it with reference to
the relevant evidence.
IV.
Conclusion and Disposition
[19]
The evidence before the IAD did not support its
conclusion that Ms Liu had been informed of the need to present her son for
examination and that she failed to do so. Accordingly, its conclusion that s
117(11)(a) applied did not represent a defensible outcome based on the
facts and the law. Therefore, I must allow this application for judicial review
and order another panel of the IAD to reconsider the matter. Neither party
proposed a question of general importance for me to certify, and none is
stated.