Docket: IMM-5209-14
Citation:
2015 FC 730
Ottawa, Ontario, June 10, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Mactavish
BETWEEN:
|
AMARAVATHY
SRIRENGANATHAN
(A.K.A.
AMARAVATHY SRIRANKANATHAN)
SRIRANKANANATHAN
THARMALINGAM
(A.K.A.
SRIRANGANATHAN THARMALINGAM) JEYASEELAN SRIRENGANATHAN
LATHUSAN
SRIRENGANATHAN
VINUJAH
SRIRENGANATHAN
|
Applicants
|
And
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This application concerns a Tamil family who
traveled to Canada aboard the MV Sun Sea. The mother and principal
applicant, Amaravathy Srirenganathan, along with her husband, Srirankanathan
Tharmalingham, and their three children arrived in Canada on August 13, 2010,
and made their refugee claims that same day. The Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board denied the family’s claims for
refugee protection on June 17, 2014.
[2]
While the applicants have raised a number of
issues, I do not need to address all of these issues as I have decided to allow
the application on the basis that I cannot be certain that the Board applied
the correct legal test in concluding that the claims should be dismissed.
I.
Background
[3]
The applicants are from Northern Sri Lanka and
are of Tamil ethnicity. They claim that Mr. Tharmalingham’s deceased
brother was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. While it is not
at all clear from the decision whether the Board accepted the brother’s LTTE
membership as a fact, a review of the transcript shows that it did.
[4]
The applicants allege that they were threatened
by various paramilitary groups and by Sri Lankan army personnel, and that they
were displaced several times after the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan
government and LTTE broke down. The applicants further allege that the LTTE
took Mr. Tharmalingham to a labour camp in March of 2009. After Mr. Tharmalingham
escaped from the camp, the family made their way to a government-controlled
area where they were interrogated by army personnel and taken to the
Arunachalam welfare camp for refugees. Following their release from this camp
in October of 2009, the family returned to their home in Veerapuram.
[5]
In November of 2009, unidentified armed men
surrounded the applicants’ house, interrogating Ms. Srirenganathan and her son
about the family’s LTTE connections and threatening to kill Mr. Tharmalingham,
who was not home at the time. Fearing for their lives, the applicants went into
hiding. They then travelled to Colombo where they hired an agent to help them
obtain passports, air tickets and visas to Thailand.
[6]
The applicants left Sri Lanka for Thailand on
January 13, 2010. From Thailand, they boarded the MV Sun Sea, arriving in
Canada on August 13, 2010. The arrival of the MV Sun Sea received
significant domestic and international media attention, much of which reported
that the ship was owned and operated by the Tamil Tigers.
[7]
Although the Board had serious concerns with
respect to the applicants’ credibility, I do not have to address the
reasonableness of the Board’s credibility assessment because I have concluded
that the Board erred in law. It is, however, not disputed that the applicants
are Tamils from the north of Sri Lanka with a close family member who was a
member of the LTTE. Nor is it disputed that the applicants are failed asylum
seekers who travelled to Canada aboard the MV Sun Sea.
II.
Analysis
[8]
The applicants submit that the Board misstated
and misapplied the section 96 test for refugee protection. The respondents
agree that the Board misstated the test at various points in its reasons, but
argue that when the reasons are read as a whole, it is clear that the correct
legal test was applied.
[9]
Whether the Board selected and applied the right
test in determining whether an applicant meets the refugee definition is a pure
question of law reviewable on the standard of correctness: Mohammed v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 768 at para. 36,
348 F.T.R. 69.
[10]
The parties agree that in order to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution for the purposes of section 96 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, claimants must prove that
they have a subjective fear of persecution, and that this fear is well‑founded
in an objective sense: Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2
S.C.R. 689 at para. 47, [1993] S.C.J. No. 74. Although claimants must establish
their case on a balance of probabilities, they do not have to prove the
persecution would be more likely than not. In other words, “there need not be more than a 50 per cent chance (i.e., a probability)”:
Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C.
680 at para. 8, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 153. They need only show that there is more
than a mere possibility that that they will face persecution in their country
of origin.
[11]
While this Court will not intervene if the Board
has articulated “the gist of the appropriate standard
of proof”, this Court will remit a matter in circumstances where it is
unclear which test has been applied or if the wrong test has been applied: Alam
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 4 at para. 9,
41 Imm. L.R. (3d) 263; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Neubauer,
2015 FC 260 at para. 24; Arrinaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 FC 773 at para. 44, [2005] F.C.J. No. 971.
[12]
At the outset of its analysis, the Board framed
the issue before it as whether Mr. Tharmalingham’s “profile as a male Tamil puts him at personal heightened
risk in Sri Lanka today” (emphasis added). Later in its reasons, the
Board considered whether “the claimants face an
increased risk of persecution by virtue of having travelled aboard the Sun
Sea” (emphasis added). I understand the parties to agree that the
refugee analysis is not an exercise in relativity, and that an applicant is not
required to demonstrate that they face a personal heightened risk in their
country of origin.
[13]
Having carefully reviewed the Board’s reasons in
their entirety, I cannot be certain what test the Board actually applied in
reaching its conclusion. It is true that the Board stated the appropriate
standard of proof at certain points in its reasons, including in the summary of
its conclusions. At the same time, however, paragraph 13(2) of its reasons
demonstrates that it framed its entire analysis on a misstatement of the law.
Consequently, the decision must be set aside.
III.
Conclusion
[14]
For these reasons, the application for judicial
review is allowed. I agree with the parties that the case does not raise a
question for certification.