Date: 20151015
Docket: IMM-5957-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1169
Ottawa, Ontario, October 15, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Fothergill
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BETWEEN:
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ANITA FUSTOSNE CSOKE
AND DOMINIKA FUSTOS
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
Anita Fustosne Csoke and her minor daughter Dominika
Fustos have brought an application for judicial review of a decision of the
Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board. The RPD
found that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees under s 96 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the IRPA] nor persons in need of protection under s 97.
[2]
For the reasons that follow, I have concluded
that the RPD unreasonably found that adequate state protection exists in Hungary for Ms. Csoke and her daughter as victims of domestic violence. The application for
judicial review is therefore allowed.
II.
Background
[3]
The Applicants are citizens of Hungary. They entered Canada on October 27, 2011 and claimed refugee protection on November 9, 2011.
[4]
Ms. Csoke’s claim for protection was based on
the following contentions:
- Ms. Csoke has suffered ongoing and significant
domestic violence at the hands of her estranged husband, Laszlo. Their daughter
Dominika was born in 2000, and Ms. Csoke married Laszlo in 2003. Laszlo
became abusive following the marriage. In April, 2005 he was arrested in
Hungary, charged and convicted of fraud. It was at this time that Ms.
Csoke first became aware of her husband’s connections to the Ukrainian
mafia. She and her daughter went into hiding.
- Ms. Csoke filed for divorce in 2006 but she was
coerced by her husband into withdrawing the application. She filed a
police report in 2007 against her husband due to his ongoing abuse.
- In August, 2011, Laszlo attempted suicide. Shortly
afterwards, Ms. Csoke decided to flee Hungary with her daughter. Because
Laszlo worked as an international truck driver, she determined that it
would be necessary for them to seek refuge outside continental Europe.
- Ms. Csoke purchased airline tickets for Dominika and
herself to travel to Canada without informing Laszlo. He discovered her
plan, assaulted her physically and sexually, and forced her to purchase an
additional ticket so that he could accompany them.
- Ms. Csoke, Laszlo and their daughter arrived in
Canada on October 27, 2011. Laszlo was subsequently arrested in Canada on October
31, 2011 and charged with domestic assault against Ms. Csoke. He was
deported to Hungary on December 28, 2011.
III.
The RPD’s Decision
[5]
The RPD made no adverse findings of credibility against
Ms. Csoke. It found the determinative issue to be state protection, and
concluded that Ms. Csoke had failed to rebut the presumption of adequate state
protection in Hungary.
[6]
The RPD referred to the Chairperson’s Guidelines
Regarding Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Based Persecution [Gender
Guidelines] and also considered documentation regarding country conditions
in Hungary. The RPD held that the presumption of adequate state protection
could be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof, and that evidence of
inadequate protection must be reliable and probative. The RPD noted that a
state’s efforts may not always be successful, but this is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption. A subjective reluctance to engage the state is also not sufficient.
The RPD cited thisCourt’s decision in Camacho v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 830 at para 10) for the
proposition that “… absent a compelling explanation, a
failure to pursue state protection opportunities within the home state will usually
be fatal to a refugee claim.”
[7]
The RPD found that Ms. Csoke did not take all
reasonable steps to seek state protection in Hungary before she fled to Canada. The RPD noted that Ms. Csoke contacted the police on only one occasion in 2007. She
was interviewed by the police, and they then spoke to her husband and gave him
a warning. The RPD concluded that the police response was appropriate.
[8]
The RPD referred to recent legislation in Hungary that criminalizes spousal rape and domestic violence. The RPD also concluded that
police corruption and incompetence are not systemic in Hungary, and that the police are subject to meaningful oversight and review.
IV.
Issues
[9]
This application for judicial review raises the
following issues:
A.
Did the RPD fail to conduct an independent
analysis of the claim for protection advanced on behalf of Ms. Csoke’s minor
daughter Dominika?
B.
Was the RPD’s finding of adequate state
protection reasonable?
V.
Analysis
A.
Did the RPD fail to conduct an independent
analysis of the claim for protection advanced on behalf of Ms. Csoke’s minor
daughter Dominika?
[10]
The RPD, on its own motion, assigned a
designated representative and counsel for Ms. Csoke’s minor daughter. Dominika,
who was approximately 13 years of age at the time of the hearing before the RPD,
participated in the proceedings in an independent capacity. It was argued
before this Court that Dominika’s interests were distinct from those of her
mother, and that they should have been assessed separately. In particular,
Dominika testified that she feared abduction by her father in Hungary and that she was also afraid of what her paternal grandfather might do to her.
Neither of these risks was assessed by the RPD.
[11]
The Minister notes that no application was made
to sever Dominika’s claim from that of her mother. According to the Minister, it
may be inferred that the RPD’s finding regarding the adequacy of state
protection extended to any risks that Dominika might face due to the actions of
her father or grandfather. The central issue was Ms. Csoke’s failure to avail
herself of state protection. The RPD found that on the one occasion that Ms. Csoke
complained to the police, their response was appropriate.
[12]
I agree with the Minister that the claim for
protection advanced on behalf of Dominika was not sufficiently distinct from
that of her mother to require a separate analysis. Given that the central issue
was the adequacy of state protection, and in particular the RPD’s finding that Ms.
Csoke failed to avail herself of state protection, it was reasonable for the
RPD to assess the two claims together. This ground of judicial review does not
disclose a reviewable error.
B.
Was the RPD’s finding of adequate state
protection reasonable?
[13]
The RPD placed significant emphasis on
Ms. Csoke’s decision to seek police protection on only one occasion. The RPD
concluded that the police response was adequate, and that Ms. Csoke’s had not
made sufficient “efforts to seek state protection in
Hungary.” Indeed, the RPD criticised Ms. Csoke for her delay in
contacting the police and for not being more forthcoming about the nature of
the abuse she faced:
[30] … The crime
was reported to the police three days after the incident occurred and the
principal claimant withheld critical information. She did not tell the police
about Laszlo’s history of abuse, his criminal record or his threats. This type
of complaint where the victim withholds important information from the police
are [sic] difficult to investigate and the perpetrator may not receive
the same type of scrutiny by police since police would not be aware of the full
scope of the abuse. Even the most effective, well-resourced and highly
motivated police forces will have difficulty investigating complaints and
providing effective protection where the victim, and typically the sole
witness, withholds significant information.
[14]
There was extensive documentary evidence before
the RPD regarding the social and cultural mores in Hungary that act as a
significant impediment to victims of domestic violence seeking state
protection. To highlight just one example, a report authored by the Hungarian
Association of Women Judges and included in the Immigration and Refugee Board’s
National Documentation Package for Hungary includes the following observations:
Most of the
legislative reform that has been implemented was based on the need to join the
EU and to harmonise Hungary’s legal system with EU norms. The Criminal Code,
the Criminal Procedure Code, and other laws have been amended also.
But accession to the EU did not solve all
the problems; it could not change the people’s thinking or the attitudes of
experts in relation to violence in the home. Many rules incorporated in several
laws ensure the enforcement of human rights and generally provide adequate
guarantees. But it is still important to question whether these legal
regulations offer effective protection for victims of domestic violence. These
questions have special relevance in transitional societies like Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. […]
I am afraid the change of rule is not
enough. It is rather easy to draft legislation in general, but very difficult
to change social attitudes, especially on issues that have long traditions in a
given country. An evaluation of domestic violence provides a perfect example of
this.
[15]
Contrary to the RPD’s conclusion, Ms. Csoke did
in fact offer an explanation for her reluctance to seek police protection:
Member: … And why didn’t you go back to police? Why didn’t you call police
or report to them as they indicated you should if it happened again?
Claimant: Because
… because it was pointless. What I mean by that [is] that in the legal system
in Hungary these kinds of incidents were simply not considered being a crime
and all I would have achieved is to get him more worked up and getting him more
abusive.
[16]
Nor did the RPD consider Ms. Csoke’s attempts to
obtain assistance from two women’s shelters without success. Her experience in
this regard was corroborated by documentary evidence. Nevertheless, the RPD
relied upon the existence of women’s shelters to buttress its conclusion that
Ms. Csoke would not be at risk if she were to return to Hungary. It is, in any event, an error for the RPD to cite the availability of services offered by
non-governmental organizations in support of a finding of adequate state
protection (Garcia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007
FC 79 at para 15; Gender Guidelines at page 401).
[17]
Where credibility is not in issue, an applicant’s
testimony is presumed to be true (Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302 (CA) at para 5; Agranovski v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] FCJ No 923 at para 12). While
the RPD may prefer documentary evidence over testimony, if an applicant’s
credibility is accepted then a clear explanation must be provided for doing so (Okyere-Akosah
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 157 NR 387 at para 5,
[1992] FCJ No 411(QL)).
[18]
In my view, the RPD failed to properly assess
the reasons for Ms. Csoke’s reticence to disclose all of her personal
circumstances to the police, and her reluctance to seek police protection in
general. The RPD commented favourably upon the enactment of new legislation in
Hungary that augments the legal protections offered to victims of domestic
violence. However, it failed to analyse the extent to which social and cultural
mores in Hungary may impede the effective implementation of this legislation.
The application for judicial review is therefore allowed.
VI.
Conclusion
[19]
For the foregoing reasons, the application for
judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to a
differently-constituted panel of the RPD for re-determination.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the
application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to a
differently-constituted panel of the RPD for re-determination. No question is
certified for appeal.
"Simon Fothergill"