Docket: IMM-4388-15
Citation:
2015 FC 1146
Montréal, Quebec, October 6, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice LeBlanc
BETWEEN:
|
MUSTAPHA
TILIOUINE
NACERA KEBLADJ
CERINE ASSIA
TILIOUINE
MOHAMED SOFIANE
TILIOUINE
|
Applicants
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
|
Respondent
|
ORDER AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicants are seeking a stay of their
removal to Algeria, scheduled to take place on October 10, 2015, until such
time as their Application for leave and judicial review of a decision of a
removal officer (the Officer), dated September 28, 2015, not to defer the said
removal, is to be finally determined by the Court.
[2]
The Applicants, Nacera Kebladj, her husband
Mustapha Tiliouine, and their two children are citizens of Algeria. They
entered Canada in the Fall of 2012 and filed for refugee protection shortly
thereafter on the basis of the threats the family had received from religious
extremists and of the abuse Ms. Kebladj had faced from her in-laws in Algeria.
In late January 2015, the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (the RPD) dismissed their claim on the ground that the family had
an internal flight alternative in Algeria. Leave to apply for judicial review
of the RPD’s decision was denied by this Court on April 28, 2015.
[3]
On April 17, 2015, the Applicants submitted an
in-land application for permanent residence based on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds pursuant to subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) (the H&C application). The
H&C application was largely based on the family’s traumatic past in
Algeria, in particular that of Ms. Kebladj who was raped and experienced extreme
physical violence at the hands of her father from the age of 12 until her
mid-thirties when she married Mr. Tiliouine, and who endured, from that point
on, 12 years of constant psychological abuse and occasional physical abuse at
the hands of her in-laws, with whom she lived and who were opposed to her
marriage to Mr. Tiliouine because of her ethnicity. The H&C application
indicates that Ms. Kebladj had been under the care of a psychiatrist in Algeria
since 1999 as a result of these events, and that, while under the
psychiatrist’s care, she had made two attempts on her life, one of them while
her son was present. She also had to be hospitalized in Canada following the
refusal of the family’s refugee claim since the news caused her to lapse into
another suicidal state. Psychiatrists in Canada following Ms. Kebladj believe
that the Applicant suffers from severe and chronic post‑traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) with dissociative psychosis caused by the trauma suffered in
Algeria.
[4]
On September 15, 2015, the Applicants were
informed that their removal from Canada had been set for October 10, 2015. Two
days later, they submitted a deferral request seeking that they not be removed
until they received a decision on their pending H&C application in light of
the harm and risk of suicide to Ms. Kebladj if removed and in light of the children’s
immediate interests. Shortly after the filing of the deferral request, Ms.
Kebladj was forcibly hospitalized for 24 hours as she was suicidal and considered
to be in immediate danger.
[5]
The Applicants’ deferral request was refused on
September 27, 2015. The Officer noted that “if he was
able to detect sufficient evidence of H&C motives that would require a more
in depth study by a H&C Officer” he may exercise his discretion to
defer the removal. He found that the evidence consistently demonstrated that “Mrs. Kebladj is suicidal, especially if she is to return to
Algeria.” The Officer accepted Ms. Kebladj’s traumatic experiences and
medical interventions and found that the Applicants would suffer hardship if
they were to return to Algeria. However, the Officer found that the family
situation did not rise to a level of “undue hardship”
or “irreparable harm” since Ms. Kebladj will
have access to medical treatment before removal from Canada and upon her return
to Algeria. The Officer considered the best interest of the children and found
that it was in the children’s interest to remain with the family, noting that
it is the “responsibility of the parents to provide a
safe environment for them”.
[6]
The Applicants claim that the Officer erred in
two ways. First, they contend that the Officer misdirected his analysis by
focussing on the availability of medical care in Algeria and Canada instead of
focussing on whether the removal itself, given the evidence of Ms. Kebladj’s
acute mental health problems and the removal’s potential for possibly leading
to suicide, amounted to undue, undeserved or disproportionate hardship. Second,
the Applicants claim that the Officer failed, in those peculiar circumstances,
to reasonably consider the best interest of the children as this very real risk
to their mother’s life certainly engenders serious compromise to their best
interests.
[7]
As is well established, a stay of a removal
order shall only be granted if (i) the underlying application for leave and
judicial review raises a serious issue, (ii) the moving party will suffer
irreparable harm if the stay is not granted and the removal order is executed,
and (iii) the balance of convenience lies in favour of the moving party (RJR-MacDonald
Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, SCJ No 17 [RJR-MacDonald];
Toth v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1988), 86 NR
302 (FCA) [Toth].
[8]
In cases such as this one, where the decision
being challenged through the underlying application for leave and judicial
review is a decision to refuse to defer removal, the standard for establishing
a serious issue is more stringent since granting the relief sought in the stay
motion will give the applicant the relief sought in the application for
judicial review. Therefore, the test to be met in not whether the issues raised
in the underlying application for leave and judicial review are neither
frivolous nor vexatious, but rather whether the said application is likely to
succeed (Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2001
FCT 148, 204 FTR 5 [Wang], at para 11; Valdez v Canada (Citizenship
& Immigration), 2013 FC 697, at para 20).
[9]
Here, I find that the Applicants have met this
tripartite test.
[10]
Pursuant to subsection 48(2) of the Act, removal
orders are to be enforced “as soon as possible”.
The discretion to defer removal is therefore narrow and limited. However,
removal officers do have such discretion where “failure
to defer will expose the applicant to the risk of death, extreme sanction or
inhumane treatment” (Wang, above at para 48; Baron v Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FCA 81, [2010] 2 FCR 311,
at para 51 [Baron]).
[11]
In the context of pending H&C applications,
deferral will be justified where such applications are based upon a threat to
personal safety (Baron, at para 51). In such context, the Court has
ruled that where, as here, there is evidence of irreparable psychological harm
resulting from the removal itself, it is not enough for the removal officer to
simply examine the availability of health care and treatment in the home
country (Sha v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1269, at
para 58; Davis v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 97, at para
19).
[12]
Here, the deferral request was based on the fact
that the removal itself placed Ms. Kebladj at risk of serious psychological
damage and suicide, not that medical care or treatment was not available in
Algeria or, for that matter, that medical care was superior in Canada. In my
view, the Applicant’s claim that the Officer failed to consider whether the
very fact of removal to Algeria would trigger suicide or cause serious
psychological damage such that a deferral of removal may be warranted, raises a
serious issue within the meaning of Wang, above. I am also inclined to
conclude that such a serious issue arises with respect to the Officer’s
findings regarding the best interests of the children. In particular, it seems
to me that to hold that it is ultimately the responsibility of parents going
through a suicidal crisis to protect their children, raises some serious
concerns with respect to the reasonableness of the Officer’s decision.
[13]
With respect to the second branch of the test
applicable to a stay motion, I am satisfied that the Applicants would suffer
irreparable harm if removed to Algeria at this point. As counsel for the
Applicants pointed out in her submissions, the Court has found on numerous
occasions that significant psychological damage and suicidal behavior
constitute irreparable harm (Melchor v Canada (Solicitor General), 2004
FC 372, at para 12; Bodika-Kaninda v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 1484, at para 13; Sparhat v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2011 FC 1384; Koca v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2009 FC 473, at para 25; Mazakian v Canada (Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FC 1248, at para 33).
[14]
There is clear and convincing evidence on record
that Ms. Kebladj is at risk because of her mental health conditions since the
evidence demonstrates that Ms. Kebladj is at high risk of suicide, should
removal become imminent.
[15]
Being satisfied that a serious issue has been
raised and that irreparable harm has been established, the balance of
convenience lies with the Applicants (Figurado v Canada (Solicitor General),
2005 FC 347, [2005] 4 FCR 387, at para 39).
[16]
Given the above, this case presents, in my view,
extreme circumstances which require that removal be deferred.