Docket: IMM-583-15
Citation:
2015 FC 1009
Montréal, Quebec, August 26, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
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BETWEEN:
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SOGHRA
SHARIFIAN
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1] First instance decisions are not
to be dissected by a "scalpel" but rather examined as a whole. Thus,
fact-driven credibility cases do not warrant the interference of this Court
unless the findings of the trier of fact are patently unreasonable; and, the
word, "findings", refers to conclusions reached, in light of the
complete evidence, read in context.
(Sherwani v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 37 at para 1, by the undersigned)
II.
Introduction
[1]
The Applicant challenges a decision dated
January 5, 2015, pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], wherein the Refugee
Protection Division [RPD] found that the Applicant was neither a Convention
refugee nor a person in need of protection.
III.
Background
[2]
The Applicant is a citizen of Iran who claims a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her imputed political opinion
and perceived religious beliefs of being a member or supporter of the
Nematollahi Gonabadi Dervishes.
[3]
The Applicant holds several university degrees,
namely, a bachelor’s degree in natural resources engineering and a master’s
degree in educational management. The Applicant was a teacher for ten years and
thereafter, for a period of fourteen years, was the principal of a commercial
and vocational technical high school, until her retirement in May 2009.
[4]
Since approximately 2006, the Applicant became
actively involved in a religious and social organization known as
Daravish-E-Zahabieh, which consisted of approximately twenty-five intellectual
and well-educated people who would meet on a monthly basis and hold speaker or
discussion meetings. At the top of their agenda were women’s issues, current
political issues and criticism of the Iranian regime.
[5]
The Daravish-E-Zahabieh group had developed a
relationship with the Nematollahi Gonabadi Dervishes, who constitute a
particular Shia Muslim Sufi religious sect whose members have been persecuted,
harassed and outlawed by the Iranian regime.
[6]
On April 20, 2012, the Applicant obtained a
visitor visa for Canada in order to visit her brother. She arrived in Toronto
on May 5, 2012.
[7]
During the month of June 2012, the Applicant
received a phone call from her husband indicating that on June 5, 2012, he
had received an anonymous phone call from a man asking to speak with the
Applicant. Several days later, a man and a woman appeared at the Applicant’s
home, asking to speak with the Applicant. Because similar incidents had
occurred with other friends, the Applicant’s husband advised the Applicant not
to return to Iran. The Applicant’s husband made several inquiries and learned
that two of the Applicant’s friends, who were part of the Daravish-E-Zahabieh
group, had either been captured by Sepah’s intelligence unit or had gone into hiding.
[8]
Fearing arrest upon return to Iran, the
Applicant claimed refugee protection in Montréal, on June 20, 2012.
[9]
A hearing was held before the RPD on
December 8, 2014, and the Applicant’s refugee claim was rejected on
January 5, 2015.
IV.
Impugned Decision
[10]
The RPD rejected the Applicant’s refugee claim
by finding that there is no reasonable chance or serious possibility that the
Applicant would be persecuted should she return to Iran. The RPD found that the
Applicant’s narrative is, to a large extent, a fabrication.
[11]
The RPD is of the view that the Applicant “exaggerated her implication with the Dervishes to the extent
of distortion” (RPD Decision, Certified Tribunal Record, at para 9). In
particular, the RPD made the following findings:
i.
The Applicant does not mention being a member of
the Nematollahi Gonabadi Dervishes Organization at question 26 of the Claim for
Refugee Protection in Canada form and does not mention this organization in her
response to question 1h) of her Personal Information Form [PIF]. Moreover, at
question 31 of her PIF, the Applicant does not mention attending the Dervish
temple; rather the Applicant mentions that a commemoration ceremony was held
when one of the veteran Dervishes in her group passed away and that on several
occasions in the past two years, members of the group had prayed at the Ghoba
Mosque, which is a Shia Muslim Mosque, for the release of the Dervishes who had
been imprisoned by the Iranian regime;
ii.
The RPD finds that the Applicant’s narrative
with respect to the events of June 5, 2012, and several days thereafter at
her home is not credible. Moreover, the declaration of the Applicant’s husband
recounting those events fails to mention the two people who allegedly appeared
at the Applicant’s home, that the Applicant’s husband was able to confirm that
the telephone number belonged to Sepah’s intelligence unit and that two members
of the group had gone into hiding or had been captured by Sepah’s intelligence
unit. The failure of the Applicant’s husband to include this information leads
the RPD to find that the Applicant’s allegations in those respects were
fabricated;
iii.
Relying on the documentary evidence provided by
the Applicant, the RPD finds that the Applicant possesses none of the
characteristics of those persecuted by the Iranian State that would put her at
risk of being arrested and persecuted;
iv.
The RPD finds that the update filed on
October 24, 2014, by the Applicant, alleging that a government informant
agent could be living in her and her husband’s apartment building lacks credibility
and is a fabrication, as this information is not corroborated by any written
attestation by the Applicant’s husband;
v.
The RPD notes that the Applicant departed
legally from Iran on May 3, 2012, with a valid passport as well as a valid
Canadian visitor visa. In the past two and a half years, there is no indication
that Sepah’s intelligence unit or any other security force from the Iranian
regime is looking for the Applicant or has attempted to arrest or summon the
Applicant.
V.
Legislative Provisions
[12]
The relevant provisions of the IRPA in respect
to refugee determination are as follows:
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Convention refugee
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Définition de « réfugié »
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96. A Convention refugee is a person
who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
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96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
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(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
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a) soit
se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
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(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the
country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
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b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
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Person in need of protection
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Personne à protéger
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97. (1) A person in need of protection
is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
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97. (1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
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(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist,
of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture;
or
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a) soit
au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
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(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment if
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b) soit
à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
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(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling
to avail themself of the protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of
that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that
country,
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(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
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(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country
to provide adequate health or medical care.
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(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité
du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
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(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
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(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve
au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu
par règlement le besoin de protection.
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VI.
Issue
[13]
Is the RPD’s decision in respect to the
Applicant’s credibility and well-founded fear of persecution reasonable?
VII.
Positions of the Parties
A.
Position of the Applicant
[14]
In respect to credibility, the Applicant
contends that, contrary to the RPD’s finding, she did raise her affiliation
with the Gonabadi Dervish group upon initially claiming refugee protection and
that in negating the Applicant’s credibility, the RPD failed to consider the
Applicant’s evidence in its entirety. According to the Applicant, the RPD was
overzealous in its credibility findings, by attempting to find discrepancies
and contradictions in the Applicant’s refugee claim.
[15]
The Applicant also contends that it was
unreasonable for the RPD to negate the Applicant’s credibility on the basis of
information lacking from her husband’s declaration. The Applicant also argues
that the RPD failed to observe the principles of natural justice in failing to
give the Applicant an opportunity to address the RPD’s concerns regarding the
perceived vagueness of her husband’s letter.
[16]
According to the Applicant, the RPD erred in
failing to consider documentary evidence demonstrating that supporters of the
Dervish community, or any other minority group, are being sought and persecuted
by the government, such as the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom 2013 Annual Report and the article “International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran”,
among others (Applicant’s Record, at pp 35 and 52-54).
[17]
Moreover, the Applicant contends that the RPD
erred in negating the Applicant’s credibility based on the fact that no summons
or arrest warrant was issued by the Iranian authorities against the Applicant,
considering the evidence demonstrating that such documents are not always
issued.
B.
Position of the Respondent
[18]
The Respondent submits the RPD reasonably found
that the Applicant lacked credibility in her allegations of being a member of
an illegal group whose intent is to disrupt national security. The Applicant
filed a letter drafted by her husband, containing general allegations. The
silence in the letter regarding certain facts that are central to the
Applicant’s claim reasonably lead the RPD to question the truthfulness of her
allegations.
[19]
The Respondent contends that although the RPD is
at fault for mentioning that the Applicant never mentioned in her point of
entry notes that she is a member of the Daravish-E-Zahabieh group, this issue
error does not warrant the Court’s intervention, and the decision must be read
in its entirety. According to the Respondent, the RPD reasonably noted that the
Applicant did not mention in her PIF that she had attended the Dervish temple,
despite this being a significant element of her claim.
[20]
As such, the Federal Court has held that it is
reasonable for the RPD to doubt the truthfulness of an account when an
applicant fails to mention important facts in his or her PIF and subsequently
adds them to his or her testimony.
[21]
In respect of the Applicant’s argument of a
breach of procedural fairness, the Respondent argues that it is well
established that “[a] failure by a claimant to fulfill
his obligations and assume his burden of proof cannot be imputed to the Board
so as to make it a Board’s failure” (Ranganathan v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), (C.A.), [2001] 2 FC 164 at para 11 [Ranganathan]).
[22]
Finally, the Respondent contends that the RPD is
presumed to have considered all evidence on file. The RPD’s failure to specify
every piece of evidence before it does not constitute a reviewable error.
VIII.
Analysis
[23]
This Court has consistently maintained that
credibility of a narrative is in serious jeopardy when an Applicant omits key
or central elements, significant to the narrative in a PIF; and, only,
subsequently inserts elements to a narrative that substantially change the
original narrative (Grinevich v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1997] FCJ No 444 at para 4).
[24]
In analyzing the evidence as a whole and the
chronology of its presentation, as well as significant lacunae, the Court cites
the Federal Court of Appeal which has clearly stated that “[a] failure by a claimant to fulfill his obligations and
assume his burden of proof cannot be imputed to the Board so as to make it a
Board’s failure” (Ranganathan, above at para 11).
IX.
Conclusion
[25]
For all these reasons, the Court rejects the application
for judicial review.