Docket: IMM-7439-14
Citation:
2015 FC 954
Ottawa, Ontario, August 7, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
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BETWEEN:
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BAHRAM
OMIDSORKHABI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is a judicial review under section 18.1 of
the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, of a decision dated October 30,
2014 by a Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] Enforcement Officer [the Officer]
declining to grant the Applicant a deferral of removal to Afghanistan.
[2]
For the reasons that follow, I have come to the
conclusion that this application for judicial review must be dismissed. I come
to this conclusion with some reluctance, considering the predicaments of the
Applicant and the challenging situation he will no doubt face upon return to
Afghanistan; that being said, this Court is bound to apply the law as enacted
by Parliament, and is not at liberty to disregard the provisions of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the IRPA or the Act]
and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
[the Regulations], however harsh the result may be.
I.
Facts
[3]
The Applicant is a 38 year old citizen of Afghanistan. He arrived in Canada as a permanent resident in 1995. Shortly afterwards, he
was involved in a car accident and sustained severe head injuries which left
him completely deaf, with serious mental health challenges, and with a changed
personality.
[4]
Since the accident, the Applicant has developed
an addiction to crack cocaine and has amassed a criminal record comprising
approximately 25 criminal convictions. These include convictions for theft
under $5,000, assault, breaking and entering, possession of a substance
pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC
1996, ch 19, possession of property obtained by crime, and possession of a
weapon for a dangerous purpose. His mother is his de facto guardian and
has communicated on his behalf with CBSA.
[5]
Following two convictions on October 27, 2008
for breaking and entering a dwelling home to commit an indictable offence and
for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, which led to a ten month
jail sentence, he was found inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality. As
a result of the first conviction, an officer issued a report under subsection
44(1) of the IRPA in which he opined that the Applicant was inadmissible
for serious criminality pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(a) of the Act. On
June 2, 2009, a Minister’s delegate provided the Applicant with a warning
letter.
[6]
On July 24, 2013, after twelve additional
convictions between May 2010 and June 2013, the Applicant was again reported
under section 44 of the IRPA on the basis of the second October 2008
conviction. On April 1, 2014, the Immigration Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada issued a deportation order against him.
[7]
On May 8, 2014, an enforcement officer
interviewed the Applicant with the assistance of a sign language interpreter
and provided him with Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] materials.
[8]
On July 3, 2014, Mr. Omidsorkhabi’s PRRA
application was refused. The PRRA Officer considered the Applicant’s hearing
impairment resulting from the car accident in 1995, and his submission that he
would be subject to persecution and risk of death if returned to Afghanistan
because of his disabilities, addiction to crack cocaine and the general climate
in Afghanistan. The PRRA Officer found that there was limited information
regarding the Applicant’s hearing impediment and noted that Mr. Omidsorkhabi
had basic writing, reading and oral comprehension abilities in Farsi. The PRRA
Officer reviewed challenges faced by the deaf and disabled in Afghanistan, but
also noted the availability of protection and services to assist them. Finally,
the PRRA Officer considered the country conditions evidence and situation of
drug users in Afghanistan, but found that the Applicant had not established a
connection between the overall situation in Afghanistan and his personal
circumstances.
[9]
On August 22, 2014, the Enforcement Officer
interviewed the Applicant with the assistance of a sign language interpreter
and provided him with a copy of the negative PRRA decision. The Officer
explained that the Applicant must be removed as soon as possible and informed the
Applicant and his nephew that he or his family needed to make arrangements.
This was reiterated to the Applicant and his family on September 2 and
September 30, 2014.
[10]
The Applicant’s removal was originally scheduled
for October 29, 2014 and was then postponed until November 2, 2014. On October
29, 2014, the Applicant’s counsel requested a deferral of removal so that his
client could submit a claim on humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds.
On October 30, 2014, the Enforcement Officer sent a letter to counsel in which
he explains his reasons for deciding not to defer the Applicant’s removal to Afghanistan. On October 31, 2014, the Applicant’s motion for a stay of removal was heard
and granted by this Court. At the hearing, counsel also indicated that an
H&C application had recently been filed.
II.
The impugned decision
[11]
In his decision dated October 30, 2014, the
Officer noted that the Applicant and his family had known that his removal was
imminent for some time. He considered the Applicant’s submissions that he would
be unable to cope in Afghanistan due to his mental health issues and drug
addiction, but noted that these issues were not new and numerous steps had been
taken to mitigate the effects of removal. Furthermore, the Officer noted that
the Applicant had ample opportunity to submit an H&C application after his
PRRA was initiated in May of 2014. The Officer noted that the current
processing time for an H&C application is two years and a deferral of that
length would be inconsistent with the Officer’s statutory obligations and
limited discretion. The Officer further found that it was not appropriate for
him to conduct a mini-H&C assessment and found that there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the Applicant would face a risk of death, extreme
sanction or inhumane treatment in Afghanistan.
III.
Issues
[12]
The Applicant has raised the following two
issues:
•
Has the Enforcement Officer breached the
principles of procedural fairness by making a negative credibility finding
against the Applicant’s mother without first conducting an inquiry to assess
her credibility?
•
Was the refusal of the Enforcement Officer to
defer removal reasonable?
IV.
Analysis
[13]
Decisions by CBSA enforcement officers not to
defer removal are reviewable on the reasonableness standard: Baron v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FCA 81, [2010] 2
FCR 311 [Baron], at para 67. To the extent that procedural fairness
issues arise in this case, it is well established that such issues are
reviewable on the correctness standard: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 at para 43; Mission
Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502 at para 79.
[14]
The Applicant submits that the Officer breached his
right to procedural fairness. Counsel points specifically to the Officer’s
statement that “I find it difficult to submit to the
fact that neither the subject nor his mother could fully appreciate that
removal was imminent and, as such, not seek legal advice until approximately 5
days prior to scheduled removal to help them understand” and argues that
it was unfair because the Officer had no basis for rejecting the Applicant’s
mother’s credibility regarding her good faith attempts to make arrangements for
her son and did not give her an opportunity to respond to his concerns.
[15]
I agree with counsel for the Respondent that the
duty of fairness in the context of a deferral request is at the low end of the
spectrum. By the time a deferral request has been made, an applicant has
already had access to a number of other procedures under the Act, each
with their own procedural safeguards. Mr. Omidsorkhabi’s circumstances have
been considered by both a PRRA Officer and the Immigration Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Moreover, removal officers have very
limited discretion to defer removal, as subsection 48(2) of the IRPA
mandates that removal orders be enforced “as soon as
possible”. In those circumstances, it is clear that an enforcement
officer has no duty to conduct an interview with an applicant or family
members. The burden is on the Applicant to provide the necessary evidence and
justification for his request.
[16]
Moreover, Mr. Omidsorkhabi did not make his
deferral request until October 29, 2014. In that letter, his counsel requested
a decision by noon that same day, and advised the Enforcement Officer that he
would be out of the office between 8:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. With such a tight
timeframe, it was virtually impossible to conduct an interview with the
Applicant’s mother.
[17]
In any event, the Enforcement Officer did not
find that Mr. Omidsorkhabi’s mother was untruthful, only that her statement
could not justify deferral in the circumstances. It may be, as explained by
counsel for the Applicant, that she was focused on making arrangements to
ensure her son’s survival upon his return to Afghanistan until she was actually
notified of the Applicant’s removal date on October 21, 2014. The Officer could
nevertheless find that the Applicant and his mother could have appreciated that
removal was imminent and should have sought legal advice earlier, as they had
been repeatedly told since the end of August, 2014 that removal was fast
approaching. This was not a credibility finding, but merely an explanation as to
why deferral was not justified in the circumstances.
[18]
Counsel for the Applicant further submitted that
the Officer’s decision is inconsistent and unreasonable. After he gave the
Applicant's mother time and instructions to make arrangements for the Applicant’s
arrival and safety in Afghanistan, he declined to take note of the Applicant’s
mother’s inability to make arrangements for her son, despite her best efforts
and intentions. Had the Officer not seen the Applicant’s disabilities as an
impediment to removal, he would have had to enforce his removal as soon as the
negative PRRA decision was made. If it was impossible to remove the Applicant
without making prior arrangements, the fact that the Applicant’s mother was
incapable of making any arrangements warranted the deferral of his removal.
[19]
Unfortunately for the Applicant, I am unable to
accept that argument. Once again, an enforcement officer has a very narrow
discretion. Where a deferral request has been made following a negative PRRA,
enforcement officers are not to make or re-make PRRA or H&C decisions and
may only consider any risk that has arisen after the PRRA: Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Shpati, 2011 FCA 286, [2012]
2 FCR 133, at paras 44-45. In certain circumstances, an officer may defer
removal based on a timely H&C application. However, there is no authority
for the Applicant’s submission that the Officer should have deferred removal
based on an unfiled, nonexistent application.
[20]
Furthermore, where there are new allegations of
risk, enforcement officers may only consider allegations where the alleged risk
is obvious and where the failure to defer will expose the applicant to the risk
of death, extreme sanction or inhumane treatment: Jamal v Canada (MCI),
2001 FCT 494, at para 7; Vargas v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 938, at para 17; Haghighi v Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2006 FC 372, at paras 31 and 34;
Baron, supra, at para 51. In my view, the Officer correctly noted it was
outside the ambit of his discretion to conduct a mini-H&C analysis: see,
for example, Chetaru v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2009 FC 436, at paras 18-19; Charles v Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 1096, at para 29.
[21]
In this case, there is no basis for overturning
the Officer’s decision. Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the Applicant
did not in fact make any new allegations of risk beyond those considered in his
PRRA or demonstrate any material change in his circumstances. The risk to the
Applicant as a disabled person suffering from mental illness and drug addiction
had already been assessed in the context of the PRRA, and the need for the Applicant’s
mother to make arrangements for him in Afghanistan had been apparent since the
deportation order was issued and certainly since the negative PRRA decision was
received.
[22]
Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the
Enforcement Officer is not estopped from removing him because the Officer had
previously granted both he and his family time to make any necessary
arrangements. The Enforcement Officer did not acknowledge that it was “impossible” to remove Mr. Omidsorkhabi, absent
arrangements having been made for his life in Afghanistan, but rather
urged him and his family to make those arrangements in his best interests.
[23]
For all of the foregoing reasons, I have no
other option but to dismiss this application for judicial review.
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