Docket: IMM-5465-14
Citation:
2015 FC 328
Ottawa, Ontario, March 16, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
BETWEEN:
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WILLIAMS KAVIHUHA AND
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GLADYS UNAANI KAKUNDE AND
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MATJIUA UAKOTOK KAKUNDE
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(AKA MATJIUA UAKOTOKA KAKUNDE)
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The applicants are challenging a decision of the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board [the Board], concluding that they
are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. They submit that
they were denied procedural fairness and natural justice because their counsel
was incompetent.
Background
[2]
The applicants are all citizens of Namibia. The adult members of the
family, Williams and Gladys, were married in June 2007, and their daughter Matjiua
was born on October 23, 2010.
[3]
In early November 2010, a man named David threatened to rape Matjiua because
in Namibia it is believed that raping babies is a cure for HIV/AIDS. David
made physical threats against the adult applicants as well as constant
telephone threats, both on their home phone and cell phones. They reported the
threats to the police and the case is still under investigation.
[4]
On or about December 11, 2010, David came to their home while they were
away and stole Matjiua’s clothing. He called them later and threatened to kill
all three of the applicants. In March 2011, the applicants moved from their
house because they feared for their lives.
[5]
In May 2011, they reported the matter to police. They entered Canada on
May 9, 2011, and made inland claims for refugee protection the next day.
[6]
The applicants retained Toronto lawyer Tricia Simon to assist them in seeking refugee protection (including
filing the PIF) and representing them at the Board hearing.
[7]
The applicants met with Ms. Simon once at her office for the preparation
of the PIF, which was filed on June 6, 2011. The PIF narrative lacks detail
and includes the statement that the applicants would “provide full evidence at [the] hearing.”
[8]
In or around June 2013, the applicants moved to Saskatchewan, on the
recommendation of Ms. Simon, and she was advised of their new contact
information. The applicants attempted to contact Ms. Simon by telephone on
several occasions, but they were told that she was either busy or unavailable. Ms.
Simon never returned their calls and messages.
[9]
The applicants were notified by the Board of their hearing date. Ms.
Simon did not contact them about being notified about the hearing date nor did
she meet with or speak to them in preparation for the hearing, as she had
previously agreed to do.
[10]
The applicants traveled to Toronto for their hearing before the Board on
May 6, 2014. They met Ms. Simon for the second time on the day of the hearing,
at the Board’s offices, but say that they had no opportunity or time to discuss
their claim with her prior to the hearing. When asked by the Board which of
the adult applicants would testify as the main witness, Ms. Simon indicated that
“it doesn’t matter” and
the Board directed Williams to testify first. Ms. Simon did not submit any
documentary evidence to the Board prior to or at the hearing, although the applicants
had provided her with some. Williams himself submitted some newspaper articles
to the Board. When Ms. Simon was asked by the Board why she had not submitted
this documentary evidence, Ms. Simon stated:
Well there’s been a little bit of a – what
happened is I was not properly retained from a financial perspective, and so
I was waiting for the clients to properly retain me to complete the work on the
file. And then when I was properly retained I think was, what? Actually
I’m still not properly retained but I’m still here. [emphasis added.]
[11]
The transcript of the hearing reveals that it was quite brief and Ms.
Simon’s offered what can only be charitably described as a perfunctory submission
following the testimony.
[12]
The Board found that Williams was not credible. He was not able to
remember relevant dates about when the telephone threats started and in
response to questions by the Board, he provided dates that preceded the birth
of Matjiua. He also was unable to recall how he knew that David had HIV/AIDS.
The Board acknowledged that he may have been nervous and gotten those dates
mixed up, but he also made further errors about subsequent incidents (e.g. the
alleged break-in and assault) such that did not “provide any measure of reliability that could have assisted
negative inferences drawn regarding his hesitance when answering questions or
inconsistencies between his testimony and the PIF narrative.”
[13]
The Board found that Gladys was more credible but she
never saw David. The Board also notes that she testified that she thought they
could live in Walvis Bay, Namibia, the city where Williams was born. In
fairness, it is not clear that her evidence was that the family could live
there without risk to Matjiua, because she does go on to testify that “this [raping of babies] is happening
everywhere.”
[14]
The Board further found that the applicants had failed to rebut the
presumption of state protection. Specifically, the Board acknowledged
that “child abuse is a serious problem in Namibia and
that there are those who believe that raping a baby can cure HIV/AIDS,”
but found that such crimes are prosecuted if reported, and that there are a
wide range of support services for women and children who are victims of
abuse. The Board found that the government’s legislation and efforts are being
implemented, albeit imperfectly.
[15]
On August 8, 2014, the applicants, through new counsel provided Ms.
Simon with Williams’s affidavit filed in this application and advised her that
they had commenced an application for leave and judicial review on the basis
that her incompetence caused a breach of natural justice and procedural
fairness. She was provided with an opportunity to respond to that affidavit
but has not done so. Accordingly, I accept as truthful the applicants’ account
of their interactions with Ms. Simon.
[16]
Following the granting of leave to judicially review the decision, the
applicants chose to represent themselves, and they discharged their new
solicitor.
Issue and Analysis
[17]
The only issue is whether these applicants were
denied procedural fairness and natural justice due to the incompetence of their
counsel.
[18]
Refugee claimants have a statutory right to be represented by counsel
during Board proceedings. The applicants submit that legal counsel are
required to act with reasonable care, skill and knowledge: Nagy v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 640 [Nagy] and
that incompetence of counsel will cause a breach of natural justice if it can
be shown that the counsel’s acts or omissions constituted incompetence and that
this resulted in a miscarriage of justice: R v G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22 at
para 26.
[19]
With regard to the performance component of the legal test, the applicants
submit that they have provided evidence to support their allegations of incompetence
or negligence and that Ms. Simon was given an opportunity to respond to the
allegations and explain her conduct, but she has not done so.
[20]
The applicants cites several analogous cases where there was a breach of
procedural fairness because counsel did not assist a claimant in preparing for
their hearing, provide details to supplement or support a PIF, or enter
supporting documentation into evidence: See for example El
Kaissi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1234, Galyas v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2013 FC 250, and Shirwa v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 FC 51. The applicants submit that
they were incompetently represented by Ms. Simon because she failed to properly
prepare herself or the applicants for the hearing, to advise them of the
applicable legal test, the evidence required to make out their claim, to obtain
and file corroborative and additional supporting documentation, or to have
adequate knowledge of their claim. The applicants submit that Ms. Simon did
not exercise reasonable care in representing them.
[21]
With respect to the prejudice component of the test, the applicants note
that the Board found that there were inconsistencies between Williams’s
testimony and PIF narrative and that he was unable to recall relevant dates. They
argue that if he had been adequately prepared by Ms. Simon, he would have been
in a better position to answer the Board’s questions and inconsistencies would
have been properly addressed at the hearing.
[22]
The Board also found that the applicants did not provide sufficient
corroborative and objective documentary evidence to rebut the presumption of
state protection. The applicants submit that they expected Ms. Simon to have
documentary evidence in support of their claim, so her incompetence meant that
they could not present critical evidence pertaining to state protection. In
short, they say that Ms. Simon’s lack of preparation led to a negative
credibility finding against the applicants and the cumulative effect of her
conduct was inherently prejudicial.
[23]
The respondent submits that there is insufficient evidence of
incompetence. First, it is argued that Ms. Simon was not given a reasonable
opportunity to respond as the affidavit stating that there had been no response
was sworn only four days after the notice had been sent to Ms. Simon. There is
little merit in this submission. Ms. Simon was provided with the materials
filed in this application and a release from her former clients permitting her
to respond to them if she chooses. Although the applicants are no longer represented
by their Saskatoon counsel, she would have been under a duty to the court to
advise if anything was ever received, and the court has not been advised that
Ms. Simon has responded.
[24]
Secondly, the respondent notes that the applicants did not make a
complaint to the law society or governing body and it submits that the case law
advocates that a law society complaint should be filed or at the very least,
adequate notice must be given so that counsel has an opportunity to respond.
The authorities cited by the respondent (Pusuma v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1025 at paras 55-56 and Nuenz v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2000] FCJ No 555 (FCTD) at
para 19), do not explicitly require that a law society complaint be made;
rather, the issues that have to be considered by the court are whether the
complaint is bona fide and whether the former counsel had an opportunity
to respond. This may be adequately demonstrated where, as here, the applicants
provide adequate notice to their former counsel.
[25]
The respondent further submits that even if there was a breach, it is
not reasonably probable that the result would have been different. The
respondent points out that the Board made several negative credibility findings,
which were central to the applicants’ claim. The respondent likens this to Nagy
where the court found that, despite the incompetence of her counsel,
the applicant’s evidence was not credible and her application was dismissed.
[26]
Lastly, the respondent notes that the Board reviewed country condition
evidence about Namibia and even if there was a failure of counsel to seek and
present documentary evidence, its conclusion was not based on any lack of such documentary
evidence.
[27]
There is a reason competent counsel meets with
and prepares witnesses for their testimony. This is especially the case where,
as here, the process is new and in a foreign country. Where, as here, the
relevant events occurred years before the hearing, it is only common sense that
memory will not be as sharp on dates of those events if the witness has not had
an opportunity to review those facts with counsel. Here, on the evidence of
the applicants, there was no such opportunity. I add that it is no answer for
counsel to assert that she was waiting to be “properly
retained.” Ms. Simon acted for these applicants in making their claim
and if she was not prepared to do a competent job representing them because of
a lack of a financial retainer, then she ought to have removed herself as counsel
of record. I do not accept the respondent’s submission that the result would
necessarily have been the same in regards to the credibility finding had the
solicitor done a competent job of representing these applicants.
[28]
I am also unable to agree that the result was,
at least in part, dependent on the lack of the documents that counsel ought to
have obtained herself or advised her clients to obtain. It is impossible to
reach that conclusion without seeing what those documents are.
[29]
For these reasons, this application must be
allowed. The applicants would be well advised to retain counsel for the
redetermination and, at a minimum, ask that it be held in Saskatoon, where they
now reside, and not in Toronto.
[30]
The parties were asked if they had a question to
propose for certification but only the applicants proposed a question, which
was more in the nature of a plea to the court. No question is certifiable on
these facts.