Docket: IMM-5051-14
Citation:
2015 FC 249
Ottawa, Ontario, February 27, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
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BETWEEN:
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FELICIE KOUAMO YOUKAP
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The Court must assess whether the Refugee Appeal
Division [RAD] conducted an independent assessment of the evidence as a whole (G.L.N.N.
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 859 at para 18
[G.L.N.N.]; Sajad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2014 FC 1107 at para 23 [Sajad]).
[2]
It emerges from the RAD’s reasons and from the
Certified Tribunal Record, that the RAD examined the Refugee Protection
Division’s [RPD] findings on the basis of the RPD’s record and the parties’
submissions, in conformity with subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, LC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
II.
Introduction
[3]
The Applicant seeks judicial review under
subsection 72(1) of the IRPA of a decision by the RAD, confirming the RPD’s decision
in which the Applicant is denied refugee protection under sections 96 and 97 of
the IRPA.
III.
Background
[4]
The Applicant is a 32-year-old woman, citizen of
Cameroon who claims a well-founded fear of persecution and risk upon return at
the hands of her suitor, whom she would be forced to marry upon return to
Cameroon.
[5]
In her Basis of Claim form dated July 16,
2013, the Applicant alleges the following facts.
[6]
After the death of her mother, the Applicant and
her brother lived with their paternal uncle and his wife in Bafoussam. The
Applicant’s uncle pressured her into marrying his employer, a 60-year-old rich
and influential man.
[7]
In 2005, the Applicant left Bafoussam to pursue
her studies in Yaoundé.
[8]
Throughout 2011, the Applicant’s suitor exerted
pressure on the Applicant and on her family to consent to their marriage;
however, the Applicant, supported by her father, refused her suitor’s official
marriage proposal.
[9]
At a party, in December 2011, the Applicant and
her boyfriend were attacked and threatened by the Applicant’s suitor’s
henchmen, who threatened to kill them both if the Applicant failed to agree to
her suitor’s marriage proposal. The Applicant’s boyfriend’s family members were
also threatened.
[10]
Following the incident, the Applicant’s father
became favourable to the marriage, out of fear of reprisals.
[11]
In September 2012, the Applicant was sexually
assaulted and threatened by her suitor. The following day, the Applicant’s
father drove her to the police station in order to file a denunciation of this
attack, to no avail.
[12]
The Applicant’s life became unbearable, as she
lived in a continuous state of fear of being abducted by one of her suitor’s
henchmen. The Applicant fled to Canada on June 4, 2013.
[13]
After her arrival in Canada, the Applicant’s
father was arrested and subsequently released after signing a document
acknowledging the dowry paid by the Applicant’s suitor for his marriage with
the Applicant.
[14]
A hearing was held before the RPD on
September 12, 2013. The RPD rejected the Applicant’s claim on
February 5, 2014, on the basis of lack of credibility and the existence of
an International flight alternative [IFA] for the Applicant.
[15]
On September 16, 2013, the Minister
intervened on credibility grounds and raised a number of concerns relating to
contradictions in evidence provided by the Applicant (Tribunal Record, at pp 257-261,
particularly at pp 258 and 259).
IV.
The Refugee Protection Division’s Decision
[16]
The RPD drew numerous negative credibility
findings in rejecting the Applicant’s claim.
[17]
Notably, the RPD found that the Applicant was
unable to provide satisfactory explanations for numerous contradictions,
incoherencies and omissions in the evidence. The RPD also found that the
Applicant failed to testify in a spontaneous and coherent manner and that her
overall testimony lacked detailed and supporting evidence.
[18]
Moreover, the RPD found the Applicant’s
behaviour to be incompatible with her alleged subjective fear. Notably, the
Applicant continued working and living in the same city (Yaoundé) as her suitor
and his henchmen who, she claims, were a constant threat until her departure.
[19]
Also, at the hearing, the Applicant was unable
to provide a reasonable explanation for the absence of certain key documents,
such as the complaint with the police following her sexual assault.
[20]
The RPD also found that the Applicant failed to
rebut the presumption of an IFA in another city. Notably, the Applicant
testified that she could find work in another city.
[21]
Moreover, relying on the objective documentary
evidence, the RPD noted that forced marriages in Cameroon occur mostly in
Muslim families in the northern part of the country and in rural regions. The
RPD further noted that socio-economic factors play an important role in forced
marriages in Cameroon; they are more frequent in poorer and less educated
families.
[22]
In contrast, the evidence demonstrates that the
Applicant and her father, who is a surgeon and a businessman, both earned
comfortable livings and were well-educated. The Applicant’s student visa
applications reveal that the Applicant’s father had spent thousands of dollars
in order to finance the Applicant’s studies in Canada, over the course of three
years.
[23]
The RPD also drew a negative inference from the
Applicant’s delay in claiming refugee protection after her arrival in Canada.
[24]
Finally, the RPD concluded that the Applicant’s
intention was to continue working in Yaoundé until her departure, in order to
study in Canada, as evidenced from her multiple student visa applications to
Canada.
V.
The Refugee Appeal Division’s Decision
[25]
By reasons dated May 7, 2014, the RAD
rejected the Applicant’s appeal.
[26]
First, the RAD found that there was no basis
upon which a hearing could be held, pursuant to subsections 110(3), 110(4) and
110(6) of the IRPA.
[27]
Upon review of the jurisprudence, the RAD
determined that the applicable standard in assessing the RPD’s credibility
findings is that of reasonableness. The RAD reasoned that its “role is not to reweigh the evidence or to proceed with a
microscopic analysis of the RPD’s decision, but rather to evaluate whether or
not an error was committed by the RPD and to determine whether, when analyzed
as a whole, the RPD’s findings that the appellant is not credible falls within
a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law” (RAD’s Decision, at para 48).
[28]
The RAD noted that the RPD considered the
Immigration and Refugee Board’s Chairperson’s Guidelines 4: Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, as required; the RAD observed
that it is incumbent on the RPD member to exhibit and apply this understanding
and knowledge in a sensitive manner when deciding issues of violence against
women.
[29]
On the merits of the appeal, the RAD determined
that the RPD did not err in its assessment of the Applicant’s credibility or in
respect of the evidence.
VI.
Applicable Legislation
[30]
The following provisions of the IRPA are
relevant to a determination of refugee protection:
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Convention refugee
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Définition de « réfugié »
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96. A Convention refugee is a person
who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
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96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
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(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
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a) soit
se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
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(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the
country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
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b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
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Person in need of protection
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Personne à protéger
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97. (1) A person in need of protection
is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality
or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former
habitual residence, would subject them personally
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97. (1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
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(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist,
of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture;
or
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a) soit
au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
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(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment if
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b) soit
à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
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(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling
to avail themself of the protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of
that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that
country,
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(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
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(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country
to provide adequate health or medical care.
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(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité
du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
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(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
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(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est
reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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[31]
The following provisions of the IRPA relating to
the RAD’s jurisdiction and the procedure on appeal before the RAD are
applicable:
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Appeal
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Appel
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110. (1) Subject to subsections (1.1)
and (2), a person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of
the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the
Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division
to allow or reject the person’s claim for refugee protection.
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110.
(1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (1.1) et (2), la personne en cause et le
ministre peuvent, conformément aux règles de la Commission, porter en appel —
relativement à une question de droit, de fait ou mixte — auprès de la Section
d’appel des réfugiés la décision de la Section de la protection des réfugiés
accordant ou rejetant la demande d’asile.
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Procedure
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Fonctionnement
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(3) Subject to subsections (3.1), (4) and (6), the Refugee Appeal
Division must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the
proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division, and may accept documentary
evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the
subject of the appeal and, in the case of a matter that is conducted before a
panel of three members, written submissions from a representative or agent of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and any other person
described in the rules of the Board.
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(3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3.1), (4) et (6), la section
procède sans tenir d’audience en se fondant sur le dossier de la Section de
la protection des réfugiés, mais peut recevoir des éléments de preuve
documentaire et des observations écrites du ministre et de la personne en
cause ainsi que, s’agissant d’une affaire tenue devant un tribunal constitué
de trois commissaires, des observations écrites du représentant ou mandataire
du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés et de toute autre
personne visée par les règles de la Commission.
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Evidence that may be presented
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Éléments de preuve admissibles
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(4) On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may
present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that
was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have
been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the
rejection.
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(4) Dans le cadre de l’appel, la personne en cause ne peut
présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet de sa demande
ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient,
qu’elle n’aurait pas normalement présentés, dans les circonstances, au moment
du rejet.
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Hearing
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Audience
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(6) The Refugee Appeal Division may hold a hearing if, in its
opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3)
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(6) La section peut tenir une audience si elle estime qu’il existe
des éléments de preuve documentaire visés au paragraphe (3) qui, à la fois :
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(a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the
credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal;
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a)
soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité de la
personne en cause;
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(b) that is central to the decision with respect to the
refugee protection claim; and
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b) sont
essentiels pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande d’asile;
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(c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting
the refugee protection claim.
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c) à
supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que la demande d’asile soit
accordée ou refusée, selon le cas.
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Decision
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Décision
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111. (1) After considering the appeal,
the Refugee Appeal Division shall make one of the following decisions:
(a) confirm the determination of the Refugee Protection Division;
(b) set aside the determination and substitute a determination
that, in its opinion, should have been made; or
(c) refer the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for
re-determination, giving the directions to the Refugee Protection Division
that it considers appropriate.
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111.
(1) La Section d’appel des réfugiés confirme la décision attaquée, casse la
décision et y substitue la décision qui aurait dû être rendue ou renvoie,
conformément à ses instructions, l’affaire à la Section de la protection des
réfugiés.
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VII.
Issue
[32]
Is the RAD’s decision in confirming the RPD’s
credibility findings reasonable?
VIII.
Analysis
[33]
The central issue on appeal before the RAD is
whether the RPD erred in its assessment of the Applicant’s credibility and
whether the RPD considered the evidence as a whole.
[34]
In the context of judicial review of a RAD
decision, following the pragmatic approach applied by the Court in its recent
jurisprudence, the Court finds that the standard applicable to the RAD’s
credibility findings, which are determinations of fact and of mixed fact and
law, is that of reasonableness (Yin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FC 1209 at para 34 [Yin]; Nahal v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1208 at para 25 [Nahal]; Siliya
c Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 120 at para 20
[Siliya]; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] SCC 9 at para 53).
[35]
In its reasons, the RAD adopted the reasonableness
standard, and thus, a judicial review framework, in determining the Applicant’s
appeal of the RPD’s decision.
[36]
Although the Court has condemned this approach
by the RAD, the standard by which the RAD reviewed the RPD’s decision is not
dispositive of the present application (Nahal, above at para 26; Genu
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 129 at para 31;
Siliya, above at para 19; Yin, above at para 33).
[37]
Rather, the Court must assess whether the RAD
conducted an independent assessment of the evidence as a whole (G.L.N.N.,
above at para 18; Sajad, above at para 23).
[38]
The Court notes that the RPD has the
considerable advantage of hearing the witnesses’ testimonies, allowing it to
weigh the probative value of the evidence first-hand (Alyafi v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952 at para 12; Akuffo
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1063 at paras
34 and 50 [Akuffo]; G.L.N.N., above at para 14; Cienfuegos v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1262 at para 2).
[39]
As a result, the RAD may show a certain level of
deference towards the RPD’s findings, when credibility issues are involved (Akuffo,
above at para 50).
[40]
It emerges from the RAD’s reasons and from the
Certified Tribunal Record, that the RAD examined the RPD’s findings on the
basis of the RPD’s record and the parties’ submissions, in conformity with
subsection 110(6) of the IRPA.
[41]
It is this Court’s view that the RAD did not
limit itself to simply confirming the RPD’s findings, unreservedly.
IX.
Conclusion
[42]
The Court finds that the RAD’s decision is
reasonable.
[43]
Therefore, the application for judicial review
is dismissed.
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