Docket: T-1548-12
Citation: 2015 FC 305
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
Plaintiff
|
|
and
|
|
GRACE DAPHNE EKWI
OMELEBELE,
LLOYD VINCENT OMELEBELE (AKA LLOYD VINCENT MCSTEPHENS OMELEBELE), AMY IJEOMA
OMELEBELE (AKA AMY IJEOMA MCSTEPHENS OMELEBELE
|
|
Defendants
|
ORDER
AND REASONS
STRICKLAND J.
[1]
This is a motion for summary judgment brought by
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Minister), pursuant to Rules 213
and 215 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 (Rules), seeking summary
judgment and a declaration, pursuant to s. 10 and s. 18 of the Citizenship
Act, RSC 1985, c C-29, that the defendants, Grace Daphne Ekwi Omelebele and
her son Lloyd Vincent Omelebele (aka Lloyd Vincent McStephens Omelebele)
(Defendants) have obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or
fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. The Minister also
seeks to discontinue the action against Ms. Omelebele’s daughter, the defendant
Amy Ijeoma Omelebele (aka Amy Ijeoma McStephens Omelebele), who is now
deceased.
[2]
For the reasons set out below I am satisfied
that the Minister’s motion for summary judgment should be granted and that the
requested declaration should be issued by this Court pursuant to s. 18(1)(b)
of the Citizenship Act.
Factual Background
[3]
Pursuant to s. 10(1)(a) of the Citizenship
Act, where the Governor in Council, on a report from the Minister, is
satisfied that a person obtained citizenship by false representation or by
knowingly concealing material circumstances, as is alleged in this case, the
person shall cease to be a citizen. A person shall be deemed to have obtained
citizenship in such a manner if they were lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence by false representation or by knowingly concealing material
circumstances and, because of that admission, subsequently obtained citizenship
(s. 10(2)). The Minister cannot make such report unless he has first given
notice of his intention to do so (s. 18(1)), and, upon the request of the
person concerned, this Court has determined that the person has obtained
citizenship in the manner alleged (s. 18(1)(b)).
[4]
In this case, the Minister has set out in his
Motion Record the factual basis for his allegations and the process that led to
the commencement of this motion for summary judgment. It is not necessary for
the Court to address this, as Ms. Omelebele has admitted that she made false
representations and knowingly concealed relevant facts when she applied for
refugee status for herself and her children and that their citizenship flowed
from those false representations. Accordingly, that they are prima facie
candidates for citizenship revocation pursuant to s. 10 of the Citizenship
Act.
[5]
However, while it is not denied that there is no
genuine issue for trial on that basis, the Defendants submit that there is
another genuine issue that the Court should consider, being whether the
six-year delay in commencing this proceeding constitutes an abuse of process by
the Minister, for which the remedy would be a stay of the proceeding.
[6]
By way of their written submissions in reply to
the Minister’s summary judgment motion, the Defendants request that the Court
issue summary judgment in their favour and grant a stay of the citizenship
revocation proceedings or, alternatively, that the Court dismiss the Minister’s
motion for summary judgment so that a hearing can be convened to determine the
issue of abuse of process. The Defendants have not filed a motion in support
of the requested relief.
Issues
[7]
As a preliminary matter, the Minister’s request
that the action be discontinued as against Amy Ijeoma Omelebele, who died at
age seventeen on November 15, 2012, and which was consented to by counsel for
the Defendants at the hearing of this matter, is granted without costs or necessity
of filing a Notice of Discontinuance (Rules 55, 106).
[8]
The issues are as follows:
i.
Should the Minister’s motion for summary
judgment be granted?
ii.
Does the Minister’s delay in bringing this
action constitute an abuse of process warranting a stay of the proceedings?
i. Summary Judgment
[9]
The Minister has particularized the facts and
submitted evidence that is sufficient to establish that the Defendants obtained
citizenship through false representations and knowingly concealing material
facts. Further, the Defendants have admitted that they so obtained citizenship
in their pleadings, on discovery and at the hearing of this matter and,
therefore, that they are subject to the loss of their citizenship.
Accordingly, in these circumstances, I am satisfied that there is no genuine
issue for trial arising from the Minister’s motion for summary judgment.
[10]
This leaves the question of whether there was an
abuse of process by the Minister that constitutes a genuine issue for trial as
alleged by the Defendants.
ii. Abuse of Process / Stay of Proceedings
[11]
As a preliminary point and as noted above, the
Defendants seek summary judgment only in reply to the Minister’s motion. It is
clear that a party seeking summary judgment must do so by way of serving and
filing a notice of motion and motion record (Rules 213(1) and (3)). This
affords the responding party an opportunity to file a motion record in reply
(Rule 213(4)). The Defendants have not brought such a motion nor have they
requested that the Court dispense with compliance with Rule 213. Accordingly,
on a procedural basis, the Defendants’ request for summary judgment is
refused.
[12]
However, because in their Statement of Defence
the Defendants have pled that the unexplained delay caused them severe
psychological and emotional harm, the Court will consider whether the
Defendants’ submissions in that regard amount to a genuine issue for trial
(Rule 215(1)).
Defendants’ Position
[13]
The Defendants submit that delay can constitute
an abuse of process (Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission),
2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 [Blencoe]) and that the delay in this case
was unreasonable, inordinate and caused them substantial prejudice. Further,
that it met the three criteria set out in Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v Parekh, 2010 FC 692, [2012] 1 FCR 169 [Parekh]
(Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Bilalov, 2013 FC 887 at para 22,
19 Imm LR (4th) 265 [Bilalov]). Here the Defendants admitted to making
false representations during the initial proceedings held before the IRB to
vacate their refugee status and this was a simple case that should have been
quickly resolved. Further, that Citizenship and Immigration Canada (“CIC”)
knew in January 2003 that vacation proceedings were in motion and the
Immigration and Refugee Board (“IRB”) revoked the Defendants’ status in October
2005. However, this was followed by an unexplained six-year gap before any
further action was taken. As to prejudice, the affidavit of Ms. Omelebele
states that the stress of her uncertain citizenship status caused increased
anxiety, more frequent migraine headaches and depression.
[14]
The affidavit of her son, Lloyd Omelebele,
states that he grew up in Canada and feels that he has been living in limbo or
on borrowed time during the period between when his refugee status was vacated
and when he was informed that citizenship revocation proceedings had begun.
[15]
The Defendants also assert that the response
they received from CIC to a 2005 application by Ms. Omelebele for permanent
residence on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds meant that no
action would follow to change that status. This aggravated the hardship that
the delay caused when the revocation proceedings were commenced.
[16]
The Defendants submit that the abuse of process
in this circumstance merits the remedy of a stay (Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 at para 90, 151
DLR (4th) 119 [Tobiass]; Parekh, above).
The Minister’s Position
[17]
The Minister submits that the request for a stay
should not be considered in the absence of a formal motion. In any event, the
test for a stay has not been met (Tobiass, at paras 89-90; Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Obodzinsky, [2000] FCJ No 1675,
14 Imm LR (3d) 184 [Obodzinsky], aff’d 2001 FCA 158, leave to appeal to
SCC refused, [2002] 289 NR 390).
[18]
To stay the proceeding on the ground of delay
the Court must also be satisfied that there was inordinate delay that caused
prejudice of such magnitude that the public’s sense of decency and fairness is
affected (Blencoe, above, at paras 101, 115, 120–22, 133). The
determination of a reference pursuant to s. 18 of the Citizenship Act
should not be discontinued solely due to delay if prejudice cannot be shown (Bilalov,
above, at paras 23-24; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Campbell,
2014 FC 40 at paras 19-20 [Campbell]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) v Kawash, 2003 FCT 709 at paras 15-16).
[19]
Here the Defendants’ evidence has failed to
establish significant prejudice due to delay, either medical or otherwise.
Further, the delay was not oppressive to the point of tainting the proceedings,
the public interest is best served by obtaining a declaration, and, the
Governor in Council can consider delay or the passage of time before deciding
whether to revoke an individual’s citizenship (Oberlander v Canada (Attorney
General), 2004 FCA 213 at paras 11-17; Oberlander v Canada (Attorney
General), 2009 FCA 330 at para 10, [2010] 4 FCR 395; Obodzinsky,
above, at paras 15-16).
Analysis
[20]
As held in Blencoe, delay alone will not
warrant a stay of proceedings as an abuse of process at common law. There must
be proof of significant prejudice which results from unacceptable delay (at
para 101).
[21]
There, the Supreme Court of Canada was
considering a state caused delay in a human rights proceeding. It held that
where delay impairs a party’s ability to answer the complaint against him, such
as where essential witnesses have died or evidence is lost, then administrative
delay may be invoked to impugn the validity of the proceeding and provide a
remedy. In this case, the Defendants do not assert that their right to a fair
hearing or their ability to respond to the action has been compromised.
[22]
However, in Blencoe the Supreme Court
also stated that it would be prepared to recognize that unacceptable delay
might amount to abuse of process in certain circumstances, even where the
fairness of the hearing had not been compromised.
[115] …Where inordinate delay has
directly caused significant psychological harm to a person, or attached a
stigma to a person’s reputation, such that the human rights system would be
brought into disrepute, such prejudice may be sufficient to constitute an abuse
of process. The doctrine of abuse of process is not limited to acts giving rise
to an unfair hearing; there may be cases of abuse of process for other than
evidentiary reasons brought about by delay. It must however be emphasized that
few lengthy delays will meet this threshold. I caution that in cases where
there is no prejudice to hearing fairness, the delay must be clearly
unacceptable and have directly caused a significant prejudice to amount to an
abuse of process. It must be a delay that would, in the circumstances of the
case, bring the human rights system into disrepute. The difficult question
before us is in deciding what is an “unacceptable delay” that amounts to an
abuse of process.
[23]
The Court stated that to find an abuse of
process a court must be satisfied that the damage to the public interest in the
fairness of the administrative process, should the matter proceed, would exceed
the harm to the public interest in the enforcement of the legislation if it
were halted. For there to be an abuse of process the proceedings must be
unfair to the point that they are contrary to the interests of justice, and
such cases will be extremely rare (para 120).
[24]
In that regard, the delay must have been
unreasonable or inordinate:
[122] The determination of whether a
delay has become inordinate depends on the nature of the case and its
complexity, the facts and issues, the purpose and nature of the proceedings,
whether the respondent contributed to the delay or waived the delay, and other
circumstances of the case. As previously mentioned, the determination of
whether a delay is inordinate is not based on the length of the delay alone,
but on contextual factors, including the nature of the various rights at stake
in the proceedings, in the attempt to determine whether the community’s sense
of fairness would be offended by the delay.
[25]
Given this backdrop, it is first necessary to
review the timeline of events leading up to the commencement of the revocation
proceeding in this matter:
▪
The Defendants arrived in Canada in 1999
(Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 38);
▪
In June 2000, they were granted Convention
refugee status (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 57);
▪
In March 2001, the Defendants obtained permanent
residence (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 62-67);
▪
On December 23, 2002, CIC received information
alleging that Ms. Omelebele had misrepresented herself and material
circumstances when she entered Canada (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 120-41);
▪
On May 30, 2003, Ms. Omelebele applied for
citizenship for herself and her children (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p.
68-78);
▪
On February 23, 2004, the Minister made an
application to reconsider and vacate the Defendants’ refugee status;
(Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 85-86);
▪
On March 17, 2004, the Defendants filed a
Request for Exemption from Permanent Residence Visa Document on H&C grounds
(Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 184-91);
▪
On July 15, 2004, the Defendants were granted
citizenship (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 82-84);
▪
On January 13, 2005, the IRB advised CIC that
proceedings were underway to vacate the Defendants’ refugee status (Plaintiff’s
Motion Record at p. 174);
▪
On October 5, 2005, the IRB vacated the
Defendants’ refugee status (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 159);
▪
On July 7, 2008, CIC denied the Defendants’
application for permanent residence from within Canada on H&C grounds
(Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 183);
▪
On October 11, 2011, a certified copy of the
IRB’s vacation decision was received at CIC (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p.
174: Defendants’ written submissions at para 9);
▪
Notices in Respect of Revocation of Citizenship
were issued on February 1, 2012 and served on February 21, 2012 indicating that
the Minister intended to make a report to the Governor in Council pursuant to
s. 10 of the Citizenship Act (Plaintiff’s Motion Record at p. 167-72;
Defendants’ written submissions at para 10);
▪
On March 9, 2012, the Defendants requested that
the matter be referred to this Court; and
▪
The Statement of Claim that is the subject of
the Minister’s motion of summary judgment was issued on August 15, 2012.
[26]
The Defendants assert that CIC arguably should
have become aware of the misrepresentation as early as December 2002, when the
local immigration office in Toronto received information alleging this from Ms.
Omelebele’s husband, but that the Minister has not indicated whether he was
aware of that information. However, in January 2005 the Minister received
notice in a communication from the IRB to CIC, that the revocation proceedings
with respect to the Defendants’ refugee status were in progress. While the IRB
decision was rendered on October 5, 2005, there was no further activity until a
copy of that decision was provided to CIC in October 2011. This six-year gap
is entirely unexplained by the Minister.
[27]
In Bilalov, as in this case, the Minister
brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that Bilalov had
obtained citizenship by a false representation or fraudulent concealment.
Bilalov admitted to this but in his defence asserted that delay in proceeding
amounted to an abuse of process and that a stay of the proceeding was an
appropriate remedy. The Minister provided no explanation for the delay of more
than five years.
[28]
Justice Zinn referred to Parekh, where
Justice Tremblay-Lamer set out three main factors to be balanced in assessing
the reasonableness of a delay: 1) the time taken compared to the inherent time
requirements of the matter; 2) the cause of the delay beyond the inherent
requirements of the matter; and 3) the impact of the delay (at para 28).
Justice Zinn noted that the facts had been admitted by Bilalov when he pled
guilty to the crime of making a false statement for citizenship and that it was
not a complex case or one requiring further investigation. Thus, the first two
factors weighed in favour of Bilalov for a stay. The fact that the Minister
had offered no explanation for the delay was very disturbing and also weighed
in Bilalov’s favour. However, Bilalov had offered no evidence as to the impact
that the delay had on him. Accordingly, the Court could not conclude that the
damage to the public interest in the fairness of the administrative process,
should the proceeding go ahead, would exceed the harm to the public interest in
the enforcement of the legislation if the proceedings were halted. Therefore,
a stay was denied. Also see Campbell, where a stay was denied in
similar circumstances following an unexplained six-year delay.
[29]
In my view, while in this case the six-year
delay was unacceptable given that the case was not complex and the delay was
entirely unexplained, the Defendants have not established significant prejudice
arising directly from the delay.
[30]
In that regard, while the Defendants rely on Parekh,
I do not think that in their circumstances it is of assistance to them. In
that case, the defendants had legally acquired permanent residence but fraudulently
acquired citizenship. They pled guilty to charges of false representations on
their applications for citizenship. All facts being admitted, the case for
revoking citizenship was straightforward. However, the state’s five-year delay
in prosecuting what was a simple case was found to have caused real prejudice
to the defendants. They not only lost the opportunity to apply again for
citizenship, which was available to them as permanent residents not subject to
deportation, but were also denied passport services as a result of the pending
proceedings, and, their application to sponsor their daughter for permanent
residence was put on hold for the same reason.
[31]
By contrast, the Defendants in this case do not
allege interference with their rights as citizens. Unlike the defendants in Parekh,
they obtained and renewed their Canadian passports and travelled to Nigeria on
at least two occasions to visit family. Also unlike the defendants in Parekh,
they have not lost any opportunity to apply again for citizenship.
Furthermore, during the delay, the Defendants worked, studied and maintained
access to all government services, including health care.
[32]
As noted above, Blencoe does contemplate
circumstances in which a lengthy delay may constitute an abuse of process by
causing “significant psychological harm … or … a stigma
to a person’s reputation” (at para 115). Although the Defendants take
the position that the delay has caused them significant prejudice in the form
of emotional and mental suffering and associated deterioration in physical
health, in my view, this is not established on the evidence.
[33]
Ms. Omelebele states in her affidavit that her
appended medical file from her family physician serves to demonstrate how
frequently she visited her doctor because of complaints that were related to
her stress “caused by the citizenship issue”.
In fact, that record is wide ranging and records various health complaints. It
also starts in 2005, therefore, it is not possible to compare the frequency of
her visits to the period before her refugee status was vacated and her
citizenship was in question.
[34]
Further, while there are some references over
the years to complaints of migraines, there is no indication in the record as
to an increase in their frequency or severity nor to a specific cause. The
record from her family doctor does indicate stress at work and anxiety arising
from work related issues, including suspension from her employment. It also
references the death of her daughter and her grief reaction to this. However,
it was not until 2013, subsequent to issuance of the Notices in Respect of
Revocation of Citizenship, that any reference was made to concerns about her
citizenship. That record indicates that on April 18, 2013 she reported being
very upset and that her lawyer had advised her that her citizenship would be
revoked she sought a letter from her doctor stating that she would not be able
to attend an immigration hearing because of her mental status. That record
also indicates that in December 2013 she reported “a
lot of issues with immigration” and that she “went
for immigration hearing, lawyer will ask for reports. since 2004 ongoing issues
with immigration. Has been advised to apply for compassionate ground letter. pt
is already a canadian citizen”.
[35]
This does not establish that because of the
delay in proceeding with citizenship revocation Ms. Omelebele suffered direct
psychological and physical harm. The significant causes of stress identified
in that record were her employment related issues and, understandably, the
death of her daughter. Her immigration status is not even raised until 2013
and no connection is made between it and worsening of her mental or physical
health.
[36]
A letter of May 24, 2011 from a consulting
neurologist to Ms. Omelebele’s family doctor notes that “She has had headaches since the end of high school … Typical
triggers include menses, weather changes, sleep deprivation, stress, chocolate,
nuts, spicy foods, and florescent [sic] lighting”. No reference
is made to her immigration status, and the letter concludes that her migraines “are occurring in a frequency that does not necessarily
warrant preventative therapy”.
[37]
A letter of April 19, 2013 from a consulting
psychiatrist to Ms. Omelebele’s family doctor states that she presented for
depression/anxiety. She reported that since the death of her daughter she had
developed depression. Further, that she lost her job immediately after her
daughter’s death. The letter also records that
…There are some
immigration issues. Her ex-husband was quite abusive in U.S. so they all came
to Canada. She came with her daughter and a son. The daughter has died, but the
son is with her. Her ex-husband wrote a very nasty letter to the immigration
authorities. A couple of social events have impacted her mood and caused her
severe depression…”.
As to stressors, these were recorded as “Nonspecific”. A medical history of migraines was also
noted.
[38]
This letter was also written after the Notice in
Respect of Revocation of Citizenship was served on Ms. Omelebele on February
21, 2012. And, while it references “immigration
issues” it does not address the question of whether the delay in
pursuing citizenship revocation caused or contributed to the depression. The
notice of revocation could have been the triggering factor as opposed to the
delay.
[39]
In short, while Ms. Omelebele has established
that she suffers from anxiety and depression, there would appear to be multiple
contributing causes and she has not established that the delay was one of
them. She has failed to establish that the delay has directly caused her
significant psychological harm.
[40]
As to Lloyd Omelebele, his affidavit states that
he has grown up in Canada and made decisions for his future and education based
on being able to continue to live here. He claims to have suffered prejudice
from the Minister’s delay, as “If I had known earlier
that I was going to have to leave Canada, I might have made different choices”.
For instance, he “may have” chosen to study
elsewhere than at York University. He states that he has “suffered anxiety and worry over making these decisions over
the past 7 years, not knowing if my citizenship would some day be revoked”.
[41]
Lloyd Omelebele submits no medical or other
evidence in support of this statement. Further, it is not consistent with his
discovery evidence:
A. Since that report was filed we didn’t
really know like how secure we were to living here, so that was just an
uncertainty that we had at the back of our heads.
Q. Did that affect you from your day-to-day
life?
A. No.
Q. Okay. You also state there at paragraph
57 that this uncertainty has caused you prejudice which is severe and real. Can
you explain all the ways in which you have suffered prejudice from the
uncertainty, if there’s anything else?
A. I haven’t suffered any prejudice.
Q. At paragraph 61 it states that you have
been seriously distressed by the delay to bring this action since 2005. Can you
explain what this distress was?
A. Around that time I was still young. I
didn’t – this stuff, that didn’t really worry me. I always depended on my mom
for stuff because she was able to pull through for us, so I would never worry
much, but, you know.
Q. So was there any distress for you?
A. No.
(July 3, 2013 Examination for Discovery at
56–57)
[42]
In my view, the evidence does not support the
Defendants’ position that Lloyd Omelebele suffered significant prejudice
because of the delay.
[43]
On March 17, 2004 the Defendants made an
application for permanent residence from within Canada on H&C grounds. In
response to this application they received a letter dated July 7, 2008 advising
that the circumstances of their request had been reviewed and a decision had
been made that an exemption would not be granted. It further stated that:
This is an administrative decision based on
the fact that you are already a Canadian Citizen of Canada and thereby no
longer a foreign national in need of assessment under Humanitarian and
Compassionate grounds.
[44]
Ms. Omelebele’s affidavit states that she
understood from this that no action was underway to take citizenship away from
her or her children, as otherwise the Minister would have informed her of this
when she made her H&C application.
[45]
The purpose of an H&C application is to
permit, in exceptional circumstances, foreign nationals to apply from within
Canada for permanent residence status, the normal course being for them to
apply from outside Canada. The Defendants may well have made the application
as a precautionary measure, which explanation is supported by Ms. Omelebele’s
discovery evidence (December 4, 2013, at 219). The reasoning being that, if
their refugee status was vacated and, therefore, their citizenship status was
at risk, by making the H&C application before a revocation decision was
made then they would already be “in the queue”
to have their H&C application considered. However, it is difficult to see
how a refusal to consider an H&C application for permanent residence, on
the basis that the Defendants were, in fact, Canadian citizens when the
application was processed, can reasonably be relied upon by the Defendants as
an indicator that their citizenship was not under review.
[46]
To the extent that the Defendants may have
relied on the reply to mean that no future action would be taken to change
their citizenship status, this was not a reasonable interpretation of the
document, and any such reliance was misplaced. This is particularly so because
Ms. Omelebele’s discovery evidence was that she showed the letter to her lawyer
and they had discussed it. Her discovery evidence was that her lawyer’s advice
was that the letter was from immigration and to just hold on. It can
reasonably be inferred that counsel would have known that the letter did not
offer any assurance that the Defendants’ citizenship was no longer under review.
Accordingly, I do not accept the Defendants’ assertion that this letter
aggravated any hardship that they allege the delay caused them.
[47]
On summary judgment the moving party bears the
legal onus of establishing the facts necessary to obtain summary judgment. The
Minister has done so in this case. When that onus was met, the responding
party, the Defendants, had the evidential burden of showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Each side must put its best foot forward (Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Schneeberger, 2003 FC 970 at
para 18; Rule 214). Here the evidence put forward by the Defendants did not
meet their burden.
[48]
Further, given the evidence, I am satisfied that
the damage to the public interest in the fairness of the administration process
by continuing the revocation proceedings would not exceed the harm to the
public interest in the enforcement of the Citizenship Act if the
proceedings were halted at this stage. It is also of note that while a
declaration issued by this Court may form the basis of a report by the Minister
to the Governor in Council requesting revocation of the Defendants’
citizenship, the ultimate decision with respect to revocation rests with the
Governor in Council, who has broad discretion in that regard, and which
decision is subject to judicial review (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
v Rogan, 2011 FC 1007 at para 16, 100 Imm LR (3d) 235; League for
Human Rights of B’nai Brith Canada v Odynsky, 2010 FCA 307 at paras 76-82,
86-87, 409 NR 298).
[49]
For these reasons, a stay of proceedings is not
appropriate in these circumstances. However, as the Minister failed to offer
any explanation for the delay, although his motion for summary judgment will be
granted, it will be without costs (Bilalov at para 28).
THIS COURT
ORDERS THAT:
1. This proceeding is hereby discontinued as against the Defendant, Amy
Ijeoma Omelebele (aka Amy Ijeoma McStephens Omelebele), with no order as to
costs;
2. The Minister’s motion for summary judgment is granted, without
costs; and
3. The Court declares that each of Grace Daphne Ekwi Omelebele and
Lloyd Vincent Omelebele (aka Lloyd Vincent McStephens Omelebele) obtained
Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly
concealing material circumstances with the meaning of s. 18(1)(b) of the
Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29.
"Cecily Y. Strickland"
Email this Content