Dockets: T-1468-15
T-1184-15
T-1141-15
Citation:
2015 FC 1321
Ottawa, Ontario, November 30, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
Docket: T-1468-15
|
BETWEEN:
|
HAROLD COOMBS
&
JOAN COOMBS
&
PETER G. MOSSOP
|
Applicants
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
JUSTICE (CANADA) THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (CANADA) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CANADA
|
Respondents
|
Docket: T-1184-15
|
AND BETWEEN:
|
JOAN COOMBS
&
JOHN F. COOMBS
|
Applicants
|
and
|
MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE & MINISTER OF JUSTICE &
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA
|
Respondents
|
Docket: T-1141-15
|
AND BETWEEN:
|
PERCY G. MOSSOP
&
LORNA MOSSOP
&
JOAN COOMBS
&
JOHN F. COOMBS
&
BOB WYSOCKI
&
HAROLD COOMBS
|
Applicants
|
and
|
MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE
|
Respondent
|
ORDER AND REASONS
[1]
The Respondent Ministers in these three
applications for judicial review have moved to strike the applications on the basis
that they are “so clearly improper as to be bereft of
any possibility of success” (Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan
Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250, at para 47).
[2]
I agree and will therefore grant the respondents’
motions.
[3]
The three applications are based on numerous allegations.
In essence, however, there are just three in total. The applicants allege that:
- The Minister of
National Revenue was biased and violated the Income Tax Act by
allowing an unauthorized person to participate in a search and seizure in
September 2006, resulting in a violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights,
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the applicants’
right to a fair hearing (T-1141-15 and T-1184-15).
- Crown Counsel
(Mr Ricky YM Tang) attempted to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of
justice by having discussions with two witnesses at a hearing before the
Tax Court of Canada and, in doing so, violated the Charter and the Department
of Justice Act, and denied the applicants fundamental justice and
procedural fairness (T-1184-15 and T-1468-15).
- Crown Counsel
(Ms Sonia Singh) acted improperly by bringing motions to strike the earlier
applications for judicial review. By so doing, she followed an allegedly
illegal Direction from Prothonotary Kevin Aalto, thereby violating the Charter
and the Department of Justice Act, bringing the administration
of justice into disrepute, and depriving the applicants of a fair hearing
(T-1468-15).
[4]
The first allegation has already been the
subject of numerous previous applications for judicial review and motions to
strike. Indeed, in Coombs et al v Attorney General of Canada, 2014 FC
233, Justice Catherine Kane found that it had “been the
subject of five previous proceedings, all of which were dismissed” (at
para 16) (affirmed 2014 FCA 222). And yet, the issue subsequently came before
Justice Denis Gascon, once again, as recently as July 15, 2015 (Coombs v
Canada (National Revenue), 2015 FC 869). Justice Gascon found that the
application before him “boils down to a repackaging and
variation on issues already decided by the courts” (at para 7). Further,
he concluded that the application represented an abuse of the Court’s process.
[5]
I see nothing in the materials before me that might
distinguish these three applications from the many applications previously
brought before this Court which have raised the issue of an allegedly improper
search and seizure conducted in September of 2006. All previous applications
have found no impropriety and were considered on a full record. Therefore, in
my view, this allegation cannot possibly succeed.
[6]
As for the second allegation, the alleged
improper conduct arose in proceedings before the Tax Court of Canada. The
allegation was the subject of a motion that came before Chief Justice Eugene
Rossiter, who dismissed it on July 30, 2015 (2014-16(IT)I and 2013-4882(IT)I).
The applicants would be free to raise this issue on an appeal of the decision
of the Tax Court, or of Chief Justice Rossiter’s Order.
[7]
In my view, therefore, the allegation has
already been addressed in the Tax Court and there is an alternative remedy of
an appeal. Accordingly, the allegation cannot possibly succeed in this Court. In
any case, contrary to the applicants’ submission, I highly doubt that the
allegation is the proper subject of an application for judicial review.
[8]
The third allegation has not been specifically
addressed elsewhere. However, a related question, the propriety of Prothonotary
Aalto’s Direction, did come before Justice Kane in the decision cited above.
The applicants alleged that the Direction displayed bias in that it actually
invited the respondent to bring motions to strike against the applicants.
Justice Kane found no evidence of bias; the Prothonotary’s intention, in her
view, was merely to consolidate the various applications and motions in order “to promote efficiency and access to justice so that the
identical issues could be dealt with together” (at para 25).
[9]
The allegation relating to Ms Singh is that she
acted improperly by informing the Court of her intention to bring motions to
strike a number of applications and to seek consolidation of those applications
in the interest of efficiency. She then brought those motions to strike before
Justice Kane in accordance with Prothonotary Aalto’s Direction.
[10]
Again, assuming that this allegation is a proper
subject for an application for judicial review (which I doubt), I can see no
merit in it whatsoever. Ms Singh’s conduct appears entirely consistent with her
responsibility as Crown counsel and as an officer of the Court. In my view,
therefore, the allegation against her cannot possibly succeed.
[11]
Therefore, I find that all of the allegations
contained in these applications for judicial review are “so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of
success”. Accordingly, I will grant the respondents’ motions, with
costs.