Docket: IMM-2699-15
Citation:
2015 FC 1324
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Montréal, Quebec, November 27, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
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BETWEEN:
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DHARMVIR PAUL
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Preliminary comments
[1]
It should be noted that the Court owes deference
to findings of credibility made by the RPD. In Rahal v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319 at para 42 [Rahal],
Justice Mary J. L. Gleason set out the following principle:
[42] First,
and perhaps most importantly, the starting point in reviewing a credibility
finding is the recognition that the role of this Court is a very limited one
because the tribunal had the advantage of hearing the witnesses testify,
observed their demeanor and is alive to all the factual nuances and
contradictions in the evidence.
II.
Introduction
[2]
This is an application for judicial review
pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of
the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, dated June 2, 2015, rejecting the
applicant’s claim for protection as a refugee or as a person in need of
protection within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.
III.
Facts
[3]
The applicant, Paul Dharmvir, is a 33-year-old
citizen of India.
[4]
He alleged that he had to leave India following persecution
he reportedly suffered at the hands of police authorities, who believed that the
applicant was harbouring his brother, who was accused of being involved in a
bombing in October 2007.
[5]
On October 21, 2007, the applicant was arrested
and held for four days, during which he was purportedly beaten and tortured.
Following his detention, the applicant was harassed by the police and was
forced to pay a bribe to the authorities.
[6]
On January 27, 2008, the applicant was arrested
once again, detained for three days and tortured. He was released with
conditions, which included having to pay a bribe to the authorities.
[7]
Finally, on April 27, 2008, equipped with a
Canadian work visa, the applicant left India and travelled to Canada, via
England. It was not until February 6, 2012, that the applicant claimed refugee
protection in Canada.
[8]
In a decision dated June 2, 2015, the RPD
rejected the applicant’s refugee protection claim, determining that he was
neither a Convention refugee (section 96 of the IRPA) nor a person in need of
protection (section 97 of the IRPA).
[9]
The RPD’s findings are largely based on the
blatant lack of credibility on the part of the applicant. In particular, the
RPD found that during his testimony the applicant had provided a narrative that
was fundamentally implausible; the applicant occasionally contradicted himself with
respect to the dates on which significant incidents in his narrative had
supposedly occurred; the applicant provided explanations that were not
credible; and the applicant became embarrassed when the contradictions in his
testimony were pointed out to him. In addition, the RPD found that the lengthy
delay between the applicant’s arrival in Canada and his submitting a refugee
protection claim undermined his credibility and showed behaviour that was
contrary to that of someone with a genuine fear of persecution. Lastly, the RPD
dismissed the applicant’s documentary evidence, finding that it was not credible.
IV.
Analysis
[10]
The applicant submits, primarily, that the RPD
erred in its assessment of his credibility and made factually incorrect
conclusions. The Court must dismiss the applicant’s arguments on this point.
[11]
In light of the fact that the RPD’s findings
with respect to credibility must be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness,
the Court finds the RPD’s decision to be reasonable.
[12]
The RPD, as was noted above, based its
conclusion that the applicant lacked credibility on a number of factors:
implausible explanations, contradictions with regard to important dates, the
prolonged delay in claiming refugee protection in Canada, and documentary
evidence that was not credible.
[13]
It should be noted that the Court owes deference
to findings of credibility made by the RPD. In Rahal, above, at para 42,
Justice Gleason set out the following principle:
[42] First,
and perhaps most importantly, the starting point in reviewing a credibility
finding is the recognition that the role of this Court is a very limited one
because the tribunal had the advantage of hearing the witnesses testify,
observed their demeanor and is alive to all the factual nuances and
contradictions in the evidence.
[14]
The RPD made negative findings with regard to
the applicant’s credibility based specifically on the behaviour of the
applicant when his own contradictions in his testimony were pointed out to him.
Given the privileged role of the RPD in being able to hear and observe the
witness, the Court must recognize that it has only a limited role in assessing
the applicant’s credibility.
[15]
In addition, the delay in claiming refugee
status, while not determinative in and of itself, is a factor that must be
taken into consideration and may affect the applicant’s credibility (Exantus
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 39 at para 29).
It is true that there is no obligation to claim refugee protection immediately
upon arriving in Canada (Papsouev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] FCJ No 769, 168 FTR 99); however, a claimant’s failure
to regularize his or her status as soon as possible, though not decisive in and
of itself, remains a relevant element (Nijjer v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1259 at paras 24-25).
[16]
In this case, it appears from the evidence that the
applicant was in Canada for nearly four years before he claimed refugee
protection. The applicant’s work visa was valid only until May 15, 2009,
yet he felt no need to regularize his status before his work visa expired. The
RPD also did not accept the applicant’s explanations.
[17]
Given all of the evidence in the record, the
Court finds the RPD’s decision to be reasonable. Thus, the application for judicial
review is dismissed.
V.
Conclusion
[18]
The Court finds the RPD’s decision to be
reasonable. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
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