Docket:
IMM-11647-12
Citation: 2014 FC 297
Ottawa, Ontario, March 27, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Kane
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
MANIVANNAN YATHAVARAJAN
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
Respondent
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The applicant is a citizen
of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity who sought refugee protection upon arriving in Canada on August 13, 2010, along with 492 other passengers and crew on the MV Sun
Sea.
[2]
The Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the “Board”) denied his claim
for protection as a Convention refugee and as a person
in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act] on October 23, 2012.
[3]
He now seeks judicial review
of that decision pursuant to section 72 of the Act.
[4]
For the reasons that follow, the application for
judicial review is dismissed.
Background
[5]
The applicant described the mistreatment he
faced during the civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] and
the Government of Sri Lanka as being subjected to routine checkpoints and house
checks, harassment, arbitrary arrest, torture, and mortal danger. During the
peace talks between 2002 and 2005, the applicant and his family relocated to
government-controlled Vavuniya. During this time, the applicant hosted other
family members, including his cousin, who allegedly was a high ranking member
of the LTTE. After peace talks broke down, the applicant was requested to
report to the army for questioning on suspicion of ties to the LTTE. Fearing
persecution, he and his family relocated to a more central part of Vavuniya and
remained there largely problem-free until the end of the civil war in 2009.
[6]
After the civil war, the applicant and his
family returned to their hometown. The applicant claims that in 2010 the army
came to his house to inquire about his cousin and advised his wife that the
applicant was also suspected of ties to the LTTE and that he should report to
the army camp upon his return home. Fearing persecution, he fled to Thailand, attempted to register with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR], and
then fled to Canada on the MV Sun Sea.
[7]
Upon arrival in Canada he was detained and
interviewed by Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] officers. He did not
disclose to CBSA that the Government of Sri Lanka had linked him to the LTTE
through his cousin, but did so later in his Personal Information Form [PIF].
The Decision
[8]
The Board determined that the applicant does not
have a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground in Sri Lanka and that he would not be personally subject to a risk to his life, a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture if he were to return to
Sri Lanka.
[9]
The Board made several credibility and
implausibility findings all stemming from the key incident that led the
applicant to flee Sri Lanka:
•
The Board remarked that in all of the
applicant’s interviews with CBSA, he never mentioned that he fled Sri Lanka because the army associated him with the LTTE through his cousin, who was a high
ranking member. The Board rejected the explanation that he kept silent because
he did not want to be considered a LTTE supporter. The Board noted that it was
not logical for him to believe he should withhold this “vital information” and
that, if the events had occurred as alleged, he would be eager to disclose the
reason for his fear in the country in which he is seeking refugee protection.
•
The Board noted the discrepancy between his oral
and written testimony about why he did not tell CBSA his reasons for fleeing Sri Lanka; at the hearing, he said he was not asked by CBSA, while in his PIF, he stated
that he did not want to be thought of as a LTTE supporter. The Board noted
that, contrary to one of the applicant’s explanations, he was in fact asked by
CBSA whether he had any problems with the government or other groups and
specifically whether he had any problems with the army. The applicant never mentioned
that the army had associated him with his cousin.
•
The Board doubted whether the army had in fact
come looking for him in 2010, noting that if the army wanted to apprehend him
for suspected ties to the LTTE, they would not have alerted his wife and given
him an opportunity to escape.
•
The Board found it unlikely that, after six
years and the end of the civil war, Sri Lankan authorities would take an
interest in the applicant’s association with his cousin. The Board noted that
the applicant’s brother, who still lives in Sri Lanka, has not experienced any
problems.
•
The Board found it implausible that the
applicant was able to obtain a genuine Sri Lankan passport if he was truly
wanted by the army. The Board also noted that it was not logical for him to present
and identify himself at a government passport office if he was wanted by the
army.
[10]
The Board concluded that “[t]aken collectively
the above inconsistencies and implausibility’s [sic] have led me to the
determination that the claimant’s evidence regarding being wanted by the Sri
Lankan army is not credible.”
[11]
The Board accepted that the applicant was a
Tamil Sri Lankan who arrived on the MV Sun Sea, and considered whether
this would give rise to his refugee claim or whether his presence onboard the
ship would result in a sur place claim.
[12]
The Board considered country condition documents,
including a report of Freedom from Torture, which alleged that Tamils with
actual or perceived association at any level with the LTTE face risk of torture
upon their return. The Board noted, however, that it was not possible to assess
the credibility of this information because this NGO had declined to provide
any further information about their methodology and contacts when asked by the
British Immigration Minister. The Board also considered sources indicating that
the situation for young Tamil males has been improving since the end of the
war, noting that in 2010, the UNHCR changed its position on the eligibility of
Tamil claimants and that the Government of Sri Lanka has since released people
with suspected ties to the LTTE and has organized the return of internally
displaced persons, demonstrating that emergency and security measures have been
relaxed. Based on the lack of objective evidence of human rights abuses towards
returnees, coupled with the findings of various monitoring and fact-finding
trips by British, Canadian, and Australian officials, the Board concluded that
returnees are not being mistreated.
[13]
The Board acknowledged that, with strong
military and paramilitary presence in the North overseeing the reconstruction
process, the situation in Sri Lanka is far from perfect, but found that such
measures are reasonable to ensure that the LTTE does not regain a foothold.
[14]
The Board concluded that there is insufficient
credible evidence to establish that Sri Lankan officials would perceive this
applicant as having ties to the LTTE and that he would not be at risk as a
returning failed Tamil asylum seeker.
[15]
With respect to the sur place claim, the
Board found that, despite having a high chance of being identified as a
passenger onboard the MV Sun Sea, and expecting the applicant to be
truthful upon return, the applicant would be questioned, but would not be
associated with the LTTE. The Board noted that there was no reason for the Sri
Lankan authorities to suspect that the applicant was a LTTE supporter when he
lived in Sri Lanka. The Board further noted that “[t]here is insufficient
credible evidence […] to suggest that since he fled Sri Lanka, other than his
presence on the M.V. Sun Sea, the Sri Lankan Government has any further reason
to believe he was associated to the LTTE.”
[16]
The Board noted that, after a detailed
investigation, the applicant was released by CBSA and was not otherwise the
subject of an inadmissibility proceeding, which could corroborate the fact
that, for years, the applicant was not a person of interest to Sri Lankan
authorities. The Board noted that the result of CBSA’s investigation could
place him in a better light in the eyes of Sri Lankan authorities, although
they would come to their own conclusions.
Issues
[17]
The applicant alleges that
the Board erred in its plausibility and
credibility findings, including by engaging in speculation, and that the Board
erred by ignoring or wrongly rejecting evidence or selectively relying only on
evidence which supported its conclusions.
Standard of review
[18]
The
standard of review for the Board’s assessment of credibility and findings of
risk and for the sur place claim is that of reasonableness.
[19]
The role of the Court on
judicial review, where the standard of reasonableness applies, is to determine
whether the decision of the Board “falls within ‘a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law’ (Dunsmuir, at para. 47). There might be more than one
reasonable outcome. However, as long as the process and the outcome fit
comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and
intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view
of a preferable outcome” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,
2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 at para 59).
[20]
It is also well-established that boards and
tribunals are ideally placed to assess the credibility of refugee claimants (Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 NR 315, [1993] FCJ No 732 at para 4 (FCA) [Aguebor]);
and that given its role as trier of fact, the Board’s credibility findings
should be given significant deference (Lin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 1052 at para 13, [2008] FCJ No 1329; Fatih v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 857 at para 65, 415 FTR 82).
Were the Board’s Credibility and Plausibility findings
reasonable?
[21]
The applicant submits that the Board’s
credibility findings were based on erroneous implausibility analyses and
speculation.
[22]
The applicant argues that the Board erred in
concluding that it is implausible for people without real LTTE links to be at
risk. The applicant argues that, simply because the situation in Sri Lanka is
no longer so completely dangerous that all Tamils from the North are recognized
as refugees as a class, does not lead to the conclusion that none of them are
refugees. The applicant argues that his own undisputed experience shows that
the perception of links to the LTTE, or allegations of those links, need not be
proven or even particularly logical to draw the attention of Sri Lankan
officials.
[23]
The applicant submits that the Board did not
make a specific credibility finding about any of his experiences prior to the
incident which led him to flee; therefore, his long history of allegations of
LTTE involvement was believed and supports his assertion that he continues to
be perceived to be linked to the LTTE.
[24]
The applicant also submits that the Board erred
in concluding that the discrepancy between his written and oral testimony
rendered his story implausible. The applicant submits that the failure to give
a complete or correct story on the first telling is not sufficient reason to
impugn his credibility and that the Board must consider his personal
circumstances and history.
[25]
The applicant also submits that his story was
not inconsistent, rather it was incomplete, and that he offered a plausible
explanation for failing to provide the complete story at his interviews with
CBSA.
[26]
The applicant submits that the Board erred in
focussing on his failure to advise CBSA of his cousin’s connection to the LTTE.
He argues that an analogous situation arises when an asylum seeker does not
disclose his intention to make a claim for refugee status when applying for a
visa. In that situation, the applicant notes that the jurisprudence has found
that it is not inconsistent with a genuine claim for refugee protection to not
be forthcoming with Canadian officials who can obstruct that claim (Kukhon v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 69 [Kukhon];
Bhatia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 2010
[Bhatia]). The applicant notes similar case law on refugee claimants who
are not entirely forthcoming at a port of entry interview (Okoli v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 332 [Okoli]).
[27]
The applicant also relies on Valtchev v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776 at para 6,
208 FTR 267 [Valtchev] to highlight that plausibility findings should
only be made in the clearest of cases and should not be based on a solely
Canadian perspective of what is plausible.
[28]
Relying on these principles, the applicant now
submits that his experience with law enforcement in Sri Lanka, and his
observations of how passengers on the MV Sun Sea were treated upon
arrival to Caanda, formed the basis for his lack of faith in CBSA officers,
which influenced his choice to withhold a part of his testimony. The applicant
further submits that he simply did not volunteer the information because he was
never asked.
[29]
The respondent submits that the applicant has
mischaracterized the Board’s decision. The Board did not reach a blanket
conclusion that those with no real links to the LTTE would not be at risk in Sri Lanka; rather the Board found that key aspects of the applicant’s claim were
implausible, that the Government of Sri Lanka was not in fact interested in him
and, therefore, he would not be at risk.
[30]
With respect to the discrepancy between the
applicant’s oral and written testimony, the respondent notes that the applicant
has raised a new explanation that was not presented to the Board. The
respondent submits that the Board’s credibility and implausibility findings are
reasonable based on the evidence and explanations before it.
[31]
The respondent also notes that it is undisputed
that the applicant provided two different explanations for his failure to
mention that his cousin was associated with the LTTE, that he did not explain
the inconsistent answers to the Board at all, and that the explanation he now
offers on judicial review, which is his fear of the CBSA, was not presented to
the Board.
[32]
The respondent submits that the present
circumstances are unlike those in Valtchev. The Board has not
“improperly injected its own version of events without evidence to support its
conclusions” but has based its findings on common sense and the evidence.
The Board’s
implausibility and credibility findings were reasonable
[33]
It is well established that the Board can
determine the plausibility of testimony, and that its findings are entitled to
deference. In Aguebor, supra at para 4, the Court of Appeal
noted:
There is no longer
any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has
complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a
better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an
account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences
drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention,
its findings are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the Court merely
observed that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision
may be more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account
appears on the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the
burden that rests on an appellant of showing that the inferences drawn by the
Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the
appellant has not discharged this burden. [Emphasis added]
[34]
The Board’s conclusion was not, as the applicant
claims, that it was implausible for those with no real links to the LTTE to be
at risk in Sri Lanka, but that the applicant’s story was implausible, which
undermined his credibility and led to the conclusion that he would not be at
risk upon return to Sri Lanka, as he would not be perceived to be connected to
the LTTE. This conclusion was clearly articulated by the Board after it
considered the applicant’s story and made clear credibility and implausibility
findings, which, “taken collectively” undermined the credibility of the
applicant’s claim about being wanted by the Sri Lankan army.
[35]
Although the Board must be cautious in not
applying North American logic and reasoning to the applicant's behaviour, it
was reasonable for the Board to conclude that the
applicant’s story was implausible.
[36]
The discrepancy between the
applicant’s PIF and his testimony before the Board, as well as the different
explanations about why he did not tell CBSA about the events which precipitated
his departure from Sri Lanka, reasonably led the Board to make adverse
credibility findings. This discrepancy was not related to his interviews and
other interactions with CBSA officers, who he now states he could not trust.
The explanation that he did not disclose to CBSA because he feared being linked
to the LTTE does not address why he provided two other and different
explanations for this omission. Moreover, it is reasonable for the Board to
conclude that it was not logical for the applicant to withhold the key reason
that he feared persecution from those who he seeks to protect him.
[37]
As noted, the explanation the applicant now
offers for not disclosing his cousin’s link to the LTTE was not presented to
the Board during the hearing. He also asserts that he was never asked about his
fear of the authorities or the army, but we know this to not be the case, as
CBSA probed this issue.
[38]
The applicant referred to the jurisprudence,
including Kukhon, Bhatia, and Okoli, where the Court found
that it was unreasonable to undermine the applicants’ credibility on the basis
of their failure to disclose their intention to seek asylum to visa officers when
seeking a visa. I do not find the current case to be analogous to the situation
of the asylum seeker who does not disclose his or her intention to claim
refugee status when seeking a visa. In those circumstances, a disclosure of an
intention to seek asylum would defeat the applicant’s visa application. In the
present circumstances, the applicant was already in Canada, and disclosing to
CBSA about his cousin’s link to the LTTE would not have prevented him from
making an asylum claim. Moreover, it was a critical element to his claim.
[39]
The applicant stated that he had no subjective fear
until the army came to his house in 2010. His earlier incidents, which he seeks
to rely on as credible evidence of the risk he faced, are all random events and
would not inform any risk he would face now.
[40]
This case is also unlike Valtchev. Given
that the Board’s implausibility findings were based on reason and evidence, it
cannot be said that the Board “improperly injected its own version of events
without evidence to support its conclusions” or engaged in “pure speculation”.
In Valtchev, the Court found many erroneous findings, noting at para 17,
with respect to plausibility:
[17] The tribunal did not apply
the principle elaborated in Maldonado, supra, to this applicant. The
tribunal wrongly rejected the applicant's plausible testimony, and improperly
injected its own version of events without evidence to support its conclusions.
Finally, it was perverse for the tribunal to blame the applicant for
complaining to officials about forcibly removing his mother from his apartment,
thereby implying that he was responsible for his own predicament. [Emphasis
added]
[41]
However, more generally, the Court also noted at
para 7:
[7]
A tribunal may make adverse findings of credibility
based on the implausibility of an applicant's story provided the inferences
drawn can be reasonably said to exist. However, plausibility findings should be
made only in the clearest of cases, i.e., if the facts as presented are outside
the realm of what could reasonably be expected, or where the documentary
evidence demonstrates that the events could not have happened in the manner
asserted by the claimant. A tribunal must be careful when rendering a decision
based on a lack of plausibility because refugee claimants come from diverse
cultures, and actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian
standards might be plausible when considered from within the claimant's milieu.
[see L. Waldman, Immigration Law and Practice (Markham, ON: Butterworths,
1992) at 8.22].
[42]
In the present case, the Board was in the best
position to make credibility and implausibility findings based on the evidence
before it. The findings are justified, transparent and intelligible and are
reasonable.
Did the
Board ignore or selectively rely on evidence?
[43]
The applicant submits that the Board ignored
evidence indicating that he would face a risk of persecution upon his return.
[44]
The applicant argues that the Board erred in
rejecting the report of Freedom from Torture on the basis that the organisation
did not respond to inquiries from the British government. The applicant submits
that the NGO described its methodology in a different report which the Board
also had and that other credible NGOs, including Amnesty International, corroborate
that being a returnee is a risk factor. The applicant submits that the
documentary evidence as a whole indicates that both returned asylum seekers and
anyone who can be linked in any way to the LTTE is at risk. The applicant
argues that the Board uncritically accepted the conclusions of government
investigations, but accorded little credence to reports of NGOs.
[45]
The applicant further submits that recent case
law has highlighted the appropriate analysis of group-based persecution of
Tamils in Sri Lanka.
[46]
The applicant submits that he is at risk due to being a failed refugee claimant, a Tamil from the North, a passenger
on the MV Sun Sea and past accusations of being associated with the
LTTE. The applicant submits, in particular, that the Board did not consider
whether his passage onboard the MV Sun Sea would show a link or
perceived link to the LTTE.
[47]
The applicant also argues that the Board’s
reference to the fact that Sri Lankan authorities could put some reliance on
the fact that he was cleared in Canada of suspicion of LTTE involvement is
unreasonable, because the case law has held that the investigative results of
Canadian authorities, whether negative or positive, are not conclusive of how
Sri Lankan authorities would treat failed asylum seekers upon their return (Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v B272, 2013 FC 870 at paras
69-70, 19 Imm LR (4th) 93 [B272]).
[48]
The respondent submits that the Board
assessed all the relevant evidence and did not ignore or reject evidence that
contradicted its conclusion. The respondent notes that documentary evidence
from Amnesty International merely states that failed asylum seekers would be at
risk only if suspected of having ties to the LTTE. The respondent further
submits that the Board did not “reject” the report of Freedom from Torture;
rather it placed little weight on it given the lack of detail on the alleged
victims and the impossibility to assess the credibility of this information.
[49]
The respondent reiterates that there is no
general duty on the Board to refer to all country documentation which may not
support its decision. The Board adequately considered the applicant’s past
experience and his profile as a Tamil male who travelled on the MV Sun Sea
and found that he was not, and would not, be perceived to have ties to the
LTTE.
[50]
The respondent notes that the Board’s decision
is not unreasonable simply because other Tamil claimants and passengers on the MV
Sun Sea have been accepted as refugees, as each case must be assessed on
its own facts. The Board considered the key issue, being whether this applicant
would be perceived to have ties to the LTTE, and reasonably concluded that he
would not.
The Board did
not ignore evidence
[51]
The Board thoroughly considered the documentary
evidence concerning the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka. It acknowledged that
the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka remained challenging, but concluded,
based on the individual assessment of the applicant, that the applicant did not
have a profile that would not put him at risk if he returned.
[52]
The Board is not required to refer to every
piece of evidence; however, it is required to consider the evidence that
directly contradicts its ultimate findings (Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No
1425 at paras 16-17). In the present case, the Board addressed the contrary
evidence but gave it less weight, as it was entitled to do, and provided its
reasons for so doing.
[53]
Even if the Board had given greater weight to the
reports of Freedom from Torture and Amnesty International, it would not have
affected the Board’s ultimate conclusion that the applicant did not have a
profile that would put him at risk upon return. These reports indicate that
returnees suspected of ties to the LTTE would be at risk. However, the Board
considered many factors, including the credibility of the applicant’s story,
the time elapsed since the end of the war, and the relatively problem-free
reality of his brother in Sri Lanka, before concluding that the applicant was
never actively wanted by the army and would not be linked to the LTTE.
[54]
The Board clearly considered
the applicant’s status as a passenger on the MV Sun Sea – this could
hardly be ignored. The Board found that failed asylum seekers will not be
presumed to have LTTE connections upon their return to Sri Lanka on the basis that they were on the MV Sun Sea alone. Rather, LTTE
connections could be based on being a passenger on the MV Sun Sea
for those that the government has concluded had previous LTTE connections. As
noted, the Board found that the applicant had no such connections.
[55]
In PM v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 77, [2013] FCJ No 136 [PM],
and SK v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 78,
[2013] FCJ No 137, Justice Snider found the Board’s determination to be
reasonable following its individualized assessment of whether the particular
applicant faced a risk due to perceived links to the LTTE. Justice Snider
reiterated the long-standing principle that it is the risk to the particular
applicant that must be assessed.
[56]
In this case, the Board
thoroughly considered the particular applicant’s risk profile in assessing his sur
place claim. This included consideration of the risks he faced before he
left Sri Lanka and also the risks he would face based on events which occurred
after he left, including being a passenger on the MV Sun Sea.
[57]
Although the applicant has
pointed to decisions where the Board found that similar applicants were in need
of protection, no two cases are identical and each must be assessed by the
Board on their own facts.
[58]
The fact that other Tamil claimants and
passengers on the MV Sun Sea had their claims accepted does not render
the contrary finding in this case unreasonable.
[59]
Justice Snider in PM,
supra at para 17, considered a similar argument and noted:
[17] Moreover, and more importantly, the
decision is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness. It is possible for
different conclusions to be reached on similar facts. I acknowledge that the
Applicant put forward a rational line of reasoning for finding that the
Applicant was at risk because of his passage on the M/V Sun Sea.
However, that does not mean that the line of reasoning followed by the Board is
unreasonable. The existence of a range of possible outcomes is the hallmark
of the reasonableness standard and is the foundation of the deference owed to
decision makers. Whether this Applicant would face more than a mere
possibility of persecution is a factual question to be determined by the Board.
While I or another panel member might have come to a different conclusion, the
decision of this Board was reasonably open to it on this particular evidentiary
record. The Court should not intervene. (emphasis added)
[60]
Similar facts can result in
different outcomes which may or may not be found to be reasonable upon judicial
review. The issue before the Board in this case was whether this applicant
would be perceived as having ties to the LTTE and the Board found that he would
not. The issue for this Court is whether this is a reasonable finding.
[61]
The applicant also took exception to the Board’s
reference that Sri Lankan authorities would be aware of how he was not found to
have LTTE connections by the Canadian authorities. I agree that this Court has
held that the investigative results of Canadian authorities, whether negative
or positive, would not be conclusive of how Sri Lankan authorities would treat
failed asylum seekers upon their return.
[62]
In B272, which dealt with the Minister’s appeal of a positive refugee
finding, the board member rejected the Minister’s argument that clearance of
suspicion in Canada would hold weight upon return, noting that Sri Lankan
authorities would do their own inquiries. The claimant in B272 possessed
other risk factors as well. At para 70, Justice de Montigny remarked:
[70] It goes
without saying that the Sri Lankan authorities, concerned as they are with the
potential resurgence of the LTTE, will want to reach their own conclusions as
to who is and who is not an LTTE member or sympathizer. They would not
necessarily rely on a foreign government’s determination in that respect, if
only because they would be applying different laws as well as different legal
standards, rules of procedure and evidentiary norms. Such a conclusion
undoubtedly falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.)
[63]
However, there is no error on the part of the
Board. In fact, the principle in B272 is exactly what the Board
ultimately acknowledged at paragraph 73 of its decision; that Sri Lankan
authorities will come to their own conclusions independent of Canadian
officials:
Sri Lankan
authorities will obviously come to their own conclusions independent of what
Canadian officials might have determined, however, that does not preclude them
from considering the findings of Canadian officials. Indeed the claimant being
on the M.V. Sun Sea and hence subjected to extremely close scrutiny by Canadian
officials may very well place him in a better light should he return to Sri
Lanka as now Canada has verified the conclusion the Sri Lankans obviously came
to prior to him fleeing the country.
Conclusion
[64]
The Board did not ignore any evidence; rather,
it attached greater weight to some evidence, identified the evidence that it
did not rely on and provided reasons for doing so. The Board conducted an
individualised assessment of the applicant and concluded that upon return to
Sri Lanka, he would be questioned, but that he would not face a risk to his
life, or a risk of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, or a danger of
torture, because he would not be suspected or perceived to have ties to the
LTTE. The Board’s decision is reasonable.
[65]
The application for judicial review is dismissed. The
applicant had considered proposing a question for certification but did not do
so.
Email this Content