Docket:
IMM-2176-13
Citation:
2014 FC 481
Ottawa, Ontario, May 20, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
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GEFRI LANDAZURI MORENO
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
Gefri Landazuri Moreno (the Applicant) seeks
judicial review of a decision dated February 28, 2013, by a Senior Immigration Officer
(the Officer) of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), whereby the Officer
rejected the application for permanent residence from within Canada on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds.
[2]
The Officer refused the application because he
determined the Applicant’s fears of kidnapping of his children, sexual
exploitation and slave labour amounted to factors that were ineligible for
consideration under subsection 25(1.3) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act), while the remaining evidence
pertaining to the best interests of the children and their establishment in
Canada were insufficient to justify granting an H&C exemption under
subsection 25(1) of that Act.
[3]
For the reasons that follow, I find that this
application ought to be dismissed.
I.
Facts
[4]
The Applicant is a 49 year old male citizen of Columbia employed in the construction industry. According to the documentation submitted
for this application, the Applicant arrived in Canada on June 15, 2008 from the
United States, where he had remained illegally since February 1, 1999.
[5]
While in Canada, the Applicant met Gabriela
Adame Camacho, a 44 year old citizen of Mexico and refugee claimant who had
arrived in Canada on May 9, 2008.
[6]
The Applicant claims to have entered into a
common law relationship with Ms. Adame Camacho as of April 1, 2009, and the
couple had two Canadian born children thereafter. The first, Isaac
Landazuri-Adame, was born in April 2010, while the second, Andrea, was born in
February, 2012.
[7]
On May 14, 2010, the Applicant’s claim for
refugee status was refused. In refusing the Applicant’s claim, the Refugee Protection
Division (RPD) panel found that he lacked credibility and a subjective fear of
persecution as a result of his failure to seek asylum in the United States
during the nine years he was in that country without status. Ms. Adame Camacho
also filed a claim for refugee status in April 2011, which was dismissed on
September 10, 2013.
[8]
On February 23, 2012, the Applicant applied for
permanent residence from within Canada on H&C grounds. In his application,
the Applicant included his common law wife, Ms. Adame Camacho, and his son,
David Eduardo Landazuri Ruiz, born September 24, 1993 in Columbia and living
with his mother in the United States as a permanent resident.
[9]
In a letter from counsel accompanying his
application, the Applicant submitted the following as H&C factors that
amount to hardship justifying the application: (1) separation of the couple and
their children should they be forced to leave Canada since the Applicant and
his common law spouse do not have status in each others’ home countries; and
(2) should the entire family return to either Columbia or Mexico, based on
submitted country condition documents, a risk of kidnapping of the children
exists in both countries, as well as risk of murder, forced prostitution, and
slave labour in Mexico.
[10]
The Applicant submitted that the ability of both
he and his spouse to maintain employment in the construction industry and the
absence of any criminal convictions, amount to evidence of positive factors
that justify remaining in Canada. In support, he submitted letters from
colleagues and employers establishing his employment in various positions in
the construction industry, copies of his 2010 Notice of Assessment from the
Canada Revenue Agency as proof of income and family photographs.
[11]
On February 28, 2013, the Applicant’s
application was ultimately refused and the Applicant seeks judicial review of
this decision.
II.
Decision under review
[12]
In rejecting the Applicant’s application, the
Officer considered the evidence submitted by the Applicant with respect to: (1)
the risk factors in the country of origin; (2) their establishment in Canada; (3) the best interests of the children; and (4) family separation.
[13]
With respect to the risks the Applicant claimed
his family would face should they return to Mexico or Columbia, the Officer
found that the submissions pertaining to kidnapping, sexual exploitation, and
slave labour in Mexico and Columbia amounted to factors to be considered in
applications for refugee status under section 96 and 97(1) of the Act. As a
result, the Officer found subsection 25(1.3) of the Act prevented consideration
of those submissions for the purposes of the Applicant’s H&C application.
[14]
With respect to the best interests of the
Applicant’s two infant children born in Canada, the Officer found that it would
be in their best interests to remain with their parents, and that there was
insufficient evidence that they could not relocate with their parents. The Officer
found the Applicant had not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the
best interests of those children could not be met in Columbia or Mexico. Given their young age, the Officer found any hardship associated with relocation
would be minimal, and the Applicants had not submitted evidence establishing
the children would not have access to education, health care or other services,
or the children’s welfare would otherwise be compromised should they return to
either country.
[15]
Regarding the Applicant’s now 20 year old son
living in the United States, the Officer found the Applicant had neither made
submissions, nor submitted evidence to establish how that son would experience
hardship, should the Applicant leave Canada.
[16]
With respect to establishment, the Officer
acknowledged the positive factors related to the Applicant’s establishment in Canada, noting his employment in Canada and volunteer efforts in the community. However, the Officer
found the Applicant’s establishment did not attain the level of undue hardship
required to warrant an exemption because he found the Applicant’s establishment
was not beyond what normally would have been expected. His establishment was
neither the result of a prolonged inability to depart Canada, nor the result of circumstances beyond his control.
[17]
With respect to family separation, the Officer found
the Applicant had not met his burden to provide sufficient objective evidence
to establish the family were prevented from remaining together as a unit in
either Mexico or Columbia. Nor did the Applicant provide sufficient evidence
that returning to either country where they had each been born, raised,
educated and employed, would amount to a hardship sufficient to justify the
application.
[18]
Consequently, the Officer found insufficient
factors overall to justify granting the exemption.
III.
Issue
[19]
The only question at issue in this application
for judicial review is whether the Officer’s decision was reasonable.
IV.
Analysis
[20]
It is well established that the standard of
review to be applied to an officer’s exercise of discretion in decisions on
H&C grounds, including an officer’s application of subsection 25(1.3) of
the Act, is that of reasonableness: see Kisana v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 189 [Kisana], at para 18; Kanthasamy
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113, at para
37 [Kanthasamy].
[21]
Under subsection 25(1) of the Act, exemptions on
H&C grounds are exceptional and discretionary decisions that require
immigration officers to consider situations not envisaged by the Act: Legault
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125, at para
15. In assessing applications, officers are to determine whether the applicants
would face unusual, and undeserved or disproportionate hardship if they were to
leave Canada and apply for permanent residency abroad using the factors set out
in sections 5.10 and 5.11 of Chapter 5 of the CIC’s Inland Processing
Manual: Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian or Compassionate
Grounds (IP5 Manual) as guides: Serda v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 356, at para 20 [Serda]; Kanthasamy,
above, at paras 45-55.
[22]
There is a high threshold to meet when
requesting an exemption from the application of the Act, and the onus is on an
applicant to advance the grounds on which their H&C claims are based and
establish the facts therein: Kisana, above, at para 28; Owusu v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 38, at para 8.
[23]
In the case at bar, the Applicant submits that
the Officer made three reviewable errors, namely: (1) he erred in finding that
subsection 25(1.3) of the Act precluded him from considering the risk of
kidnapping of the Applicant’s children; (2) he erroneously applied the “similarly situated individuals” test during the course
of the establishment analysis; and (3) he did not reasonably apply the test for
the best interests of the children in his analysis.
[24]
With respect to the first argument, it was
submitted that the Officer fettered his discretion by failing to consider the
risk of kidnapping that the Applicant claims his children would face should
they return to Mexico or Columbia. Since the RPD had not yet determined the refugee
claim of the Applicant’s spouse at the time of the H&C decision, the
Officer’s failure to assess the risk of kidnapping could give rise to an absurd
result where the risk may never be assessed by either an H&C officer or by
an RPD panel. Alternatively, the RPD panel could find that the risk factors
raised by the Applicant were merely generalized risk, or that they amounted to
harassment or treatment but fell short of persecution. Finally, the Applicant
contended that the Officer failed to consider the objective documentary
evidence that was provided showing the potential risk of kidnapping for the two
children in Columbia.
[25]
These arguments are without merit. Subsection
25(1.3) of the Act, which came into effect on June 29, 2010 (prior to the
Applicant’s submission of his application), specifically prohibits
consideration of factors related to sections 96 and 97 of the Act in the
evaluation of H&C claims, but must consider the elements of hardship
affecting applicants. That subsection reads as follows:
Non-application of certain factors
25 (1.3) In examining the request of a foreign national in Canada,
the Minister may not consider the factors that are taken into account
in the determination of whether a person is a Convention refugee under
section 96 or a person in need of protection under subsection 97(1) but
must consider elements related to the hardships that affect the foreign
national.
[emphasis added]
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Non-application de certains facteurs
25 (1.3) Le ministre, dans l’étude de la demande d’un étranger se
trouvant au Canada, ne tient compte d’aucun des facteurs servant à établir la
qualité de réfugié — au sens de la Convention — aux termes de l’article 96 ou
de personne à protéger au titre du paragraphe 97(1); il tient compte,
toutefois, des difficultés auxquelles l’étranger fait face.
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[26]
The permissible evidence pertaining to risk, and
the manner in which officers are to consider that evidence has very recently
been explained by the Federal Court of Appeal as follows:
In my view, that is a useful way of describing
what must happen under section 25 now that subsection 25(1.3) has been enacted
– the evidence adduced in previous proceedings under sections 96 and 97 along
with whatever other evidence that applicant might wish to adduce is admissible
in subsection 25(1) proceedings. Officers, however, must assess that evidence
through the lens of the subsection 25(1) test – is the applicant personally and
directly suffering unusual and undeserved, or disproportionate hardship?
The role of the officer, then, is to consider
the facts presented through a lens of hardship, not to undertake another
section 96 or 97 risk assessment or substitute his decision for the Refugee
Protection Division’s findings under sections 96 and 97. His task is not to
perform the same assessment of risk as is conducted under sections 96 and 97.
The officer is to look at facts relating to hardship, not factors relating to risk.
Matters such as well-founded fear of
persecution, risk to life, and risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment – factors under sections 96 and 97 – may not be considered under subsection
25(1) by virtue of subsection 25(1.3) but the facts underlying those factors
may nevertheless be relevant insofar as they relate to whether the applicant is
directly and personally experiencing unusual and undeserved, or
disproportionate hardship.
Kanthasamy,
above, at para 73-75.
[27]
In the case at bar, the only evidence the
Applicant submitted in support of his assertion was objective country condition
documentary evidence of kidnapping in Mexico and Columbia. Such evidence does
not amount to evidence establishing the Applicant would personally and directly
suffer as a result of those risks as required under the Kanthasamy test.
Consequently, the Officer’s conclusion that assessment of risk was beyond the
scope of the H&C application is reasonable in light of the record.
[28]
Indeed, I note that the RPD has since dismissed the
refugee claim of the Applicant’s wife on the basis that her fear that her children
would be kidnapped should she return to Mexico was speculative. The panel found
that the alleged agents of persecution did not actually do anything other than follow
the claimant and her sister, and that the claimant had not established a
serious possibility of persecution or a risk of harm in the event she returns to
Mexico. While that decision had not been made when the Officer assessed the
H&C application, it nevertheless demonstrates that it was reasonable to
assume the RPD would consider whatever risk allegations were made on the
refugee claim. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Officer fettered his
discretion or washed his hands of the risk allegations: it was clearly beyond
his mandate to look into risk factors, and it could safely be presumed that the
RPD would make a determination in that respect.
[29]
The Applicant’s second argument is that the
Officer erred by assessing establishment against a “similarly
situated individuals” threshold. He claims that the evidence he and his
wife submitted regarding their employment in Canada, community reference
letters, leases, notice of assessment, and family photos amounts to sufficient
evidence of establishment on an individualized basis.
[30]
Once again, I am unable to agree with the
Applicant, who is in effect arguing that the Officer ought to have assigned
weight to the evidence in a different manner. As stated above, H&C
decisions are discretionary decisions where officers are to determine whether applicants
would face unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship. Section 11.5 of
the IP5 Manual clearly indicates that “[t]he fact
that the Applicant has some degree of establishment in Canada is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy the hardship test”. Applicants have the
burden of advancing the grounds underlying their claims and establishing the
facts therein.
[31]
The Applicant in this matter failed to satisfy
the Officer that his personal circumstances were such that the hardship of
having to apply for permanent residence from outside of Canada in the normal manner would be unusual and undeserved or disproportionate. The
Officer considered the evidence submitted by the Applicant in support of his
establishment in Canada, namely the Applicant and his spouse’s record of
employment and their efforts to volunteer in the community. He also noted that
their establishment was not the result of prolonged inability to depart Canada, or due to circumstances beyond their control. Analyzing all these factors, the
Officer concluded the Applicant’s establishment did not attain an exceptional
level.
[32]
I find the Officer’s conclusion was reasonable
based on the record before him, as it clearly falls within the range of
possible, acceptable outcomes defensible on the law and facts of the
Applicant’s circumstances. In the letter supporting the Applicant’s H&C
application, counsel asserted that the couple is facing separation should they
be forced to leave Canada. However, the letter is brief and contains no
evidence or explanation as to why the family could not be reunited either in Columbia or Mexico. When specifically questioned at the hearing on this matter, counsel
for the Applicant acknowledged that she was not aware of any obstacle preventing
either spouse to sponsor each other and their children in Columbia or in Mexico.
[33]
Finally, the Applicant contended that the
Officer erred in finding insufficient evidence existed to conclude the
children’s best interests could not be met in either Columbia or Mexico. The Applicant claims that their documentary evidence, namely the Child
Development Index Report by Save the Children (an NGO), establishing that Canada ranks higher in development factors than either Columbia or Mexico, amounts to such evidence.
Since the Officer failed to refer to that report explicitly, it is submitted
that he was not “alert, alive and sensitive” to
all issues related to the best interests of the children and that he failed to
consider relevant evidence.
[34]
I cannot accede to this argument. The legal test
for assessing the best interests of the child do require that officers
considering H&C applications be “alert, alive, and
sensitive” to the children’s interests: Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para 75. However, this
analysis does not occur in a vacuum, and must be done as part of an officer’s
assessment of an applicant’s H&C application: Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Hawthorne, 2002 FCA 475, at para 5.
[35]
In light of the limited information submitted by
the Applicant regarding his minor children, the Officer’s application of this
test was reasonable. The Applicant’s H&C application makes no reference to
his two minor children as being part of his application. In the letter from his
counsel accompanying his H&C application, the only reference to the
children (apart from the generalized risk of kidnapping already alluded to) is
the fact that they do not have status in the country of either of the parents.
The Applicant did not explain how his children’s personal best interests would
not be served should they return either to Mexico or Columbia.
[36]
It is not enough to simply describe general
conditions which are worse in the country of removal than conditions in Canada. The Applicant must show that he and the children would likely be subject to these
conditions personally. As I wrote in Serda at para 31:
Finally, the Applicants have argued that
conditions in Argentina are dismal and not good for raising children. They
cited statistics from the documentation, which were also considered by the
H&C Officer, to show that Canada is a more desirable place to live in
general. But the fact that Canada is a more desirable place to live is not
determinative on an H&C application (…); if it were otherwise, the huge
majority of people living illegally in Canada would have to be granted
permanent resident status for Humanitarian and Compassionate reasons. This is
certainly not what Parliament intended in adopting section 25 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act.
[37]
In the absence of any personalized evidence to
the contrary, the Officer could reasonably conclude that the best interests of
the children were to remain in the care of their parents, and that the
hardships associated with relocation could reasonably be expected to be minimal
given their young ages. There was no evidence that the children would not be
able to access health care and education in Columbia or Mexico, and it was certainly not sufficient to show that Canada is a more favourable country to live
than the country of origin of their parents. It is also to be presumed that the
Officer considered the report submitted by the Applicant, even though he did
not specifically address it.
[38]
For all of the above reasons, I find that there
is no basis for judicial intervention and the application for judicial review
is dismissed. The Applicant has failed to persuade me that the Officer erred in
the exercise of his discretion, or that his decision is unreasonable in light
of the facts that were before him and of the applicable law. No question has
been proposed for certification purposes, and none will be certified.