Docket: IMM-7522-12
Citation:
2014 FC 384
Ottawa, Ontario, April 28,
2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
BETWEEN:
|
MANICKAVASAGAR KANAGENDRAN
|
Applicant
|
and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The Immigration Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada [ID] found the Applicant inadmissible under paragraph
34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]
for being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to
believe engages, has engaged or will engage in terrorism, and also inadmissible
under paragraph 35(1)(a) of IRPA for being complicit in the commission
of crimes against humanity.
[2]
The Minister concedes that the decision of the
judicial review should be granted with respect to the ID’s finding that the
Applicant is inadmissible under paragraph 35(1)(a) of IRPA due to the
failure to determine whether the Applicant made a voluntary, significant and
knowing contribution to any crime or criminal purpose as is now required
following the decision of the Supreme Court in Ezokola v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 678, [Ezokola].
[3]
Therefore, the only issue is whether the ID’s
decision is reasonable with respect to whether the Applicant was a member of an
organization for which there are reasonable grounds to believe, engaged in acts
of terrorism. The outcome turns on whether or not it was reasonable for the ID
to find that membership in the Tamil National Alliance [TNA], a political
party, was tantamount to being a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
[LTTE].
[4]
The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, born in 1932. He was and admits to having been a member of the TNA. He joined the TNA
in 2002 and served as a TNA-appointed Member of Parliament from 2004-2007.
Members of the TNA, including himself, occasionally attended meetings and
lunches organized by the LTTE. LTTE members also attended rallies and meetings
held by the TNA. The Applicant had met with LTTE leaders several times both
before, and while he was with the TNA. He knew that the LTTE used violent
means to achieve their goals, and does not dispute that the LTTE committed acts
of terrorism and crimes against humanity.
[5]
The Applicant says that during his time with the
TNA, he was not sure whether the LTTE’s actions could be considered crimes
against humanity because he had reason to doubt the accuracy of reporting by
the Government of Sri Lanka, and he also believed, based on international law,
that an oppressed people could legitimately take up arms against their
oppressors, although this was not a method he personally supported.
[6]
The Applicant says that he has a history of
advocacy through non-violent means. He joined the Ilankai Tamil Arasuk Kachchi
[ITAK], whose leader believed in furtherance of Tamil rights by non-violent,
political means. In 1979, he was detained for speaking out against the
government. He was eventually released because the government determined it
could not justify charging him based on his ardent belief in non-violent means.
[7]
In 1980, he joined the Tamil Eelam Liberation
Front [TELF] which was an open-operation movement devoted to non-violent
political change. In 2000, he became involved with the TNA. In 2002, peace
talks began between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.
[8]
The Applicant came to Canada in early August
2009 and filed a claim for refugee protection claiming fear for his life due to
the rise in murders of Tamil activists in Sri Lanka. The ID found that, by
virtue of his membership with the TNA, the Applicant was in fact a member of
the LTTE.
[9]
The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal
have consistently held that the concept of “membership” must be interpreted
broadly: Poshteh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FCA 85 at paras 26-32; Ismeal v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 198 at para 20.
[10]
After the release of Ezokola, Justice
O’Reilly in Joseph v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 1101, [2013] FCJ No 1171 (QL), stated at paras 14-15 that it was his
view that “membership” should be read more narrowly in light of Ezokola.
However, as the Respondent points out, Justice O’Reilly does not provide any
reasons for this finding, and his statement is in obiter. Moreover, Justice
Strickland in Nassereddine v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FC 85, [2014] FCJ No 79 (QL) [Nassereddine] found
his view to be contrary to prior jurisprudence. I agree with Justice
Strickland that Ezokola does not change the test for admissibility
pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of IRPA.
[11]
Ezokola dealt
with section 98 of IRPA, which excludes refugee protection for those who
fall under Articles 1E and 1F of the Refugee Convention. Neither article deals
with membership in a terrorist organization:
E. This Convention shall not apply to a person
who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has
taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the
possession of the nationality of that country.
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not
apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a
war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political
crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
[12]
While section 98 of IRPA is concerned
with international criminal culpability, paragraph 34(1)(f) of IRPA is
concerned with national security, and in this respect, Parliament has seen fit
to make membership in an organization that has engaged in acts of terrorism
sufficient to render a person inadmissible to Canada.
[13]
The Federal Court of Appeal has determined that
it is not a requirement for inadmissibility under s. 34(1)(f) of IRPA
that the dates of an individual’s membership in the organization correspond
with the dates on which that organization committed acts of terrorism or subversion
by force: Gebreab v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2010 FCA 274, [2010] FCJ No 1312 (QL). The Applicant
emphasizes that at the time that he was a member of parliament, the LTTE was
engaged in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. This is irrelevant
because the LTTE at some point was engaged in terrorist activities; it
does not matter that the Applicant may not have been a member when those
activities were occurring. Regardless, evidence in the record indicates that
during the elections in 2004 (at the time that the Applicant was a member of
the TNA), the LTTE continued to use tactics such as intimidation and murder to
forward their goals.
[14]
Further, it is irrelevant whether or not the
Applicant was in any way involved with the LTTE’s activities as paragraph
34(1)(f) of IRPA is not a determination as to complicity. If the ID’s
finding that the TNA is effectively the same organization as the LTTE is
reasonable, it is sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f) that the
Applicant was a member of the TNA. I turn then to the nature of the TNA.
[15]
The Applicant testified that in his view, the
TNA was collaborating with the LTTE, but they were operating in parallel; the
TNA was not a proxy for the LTTE. He also testified that at no time in his
service as a member of parliament did he ever receive directives from the LTTE,
nor did the TNA have any involvement in the activities of the LTTE.
[16]
He testified that he personally believed in a
non-violent struggle, but that the LTTE’s (violent) actions were inevitable.
While he supported the same end goal of the liberation of Tamils, he never
considered himself a member of the LTTE. He never raised support, either
financial or otherwise for the LTTE and never endorsed their use of violence to
forward their agenda.
[17]
The Applicant’s own stance may have been a
peaceful one; however one must consider, as the ID did, the documentary
evidence in the record which indicates that:
(i) The
LTTE campaigned for the TNA in 2004;
(ii) The
LTTE worked to sabotage the 2004 elections in order to ensure that the TNA
would secure seats in parliament by intimidating members of opposing parties;
(iii) Members
of the TNA were themselves involved in the violence and intimidation;
(iv) Candidates
from the TNA were screened and approved by the LTTE to help the LTTE achieve
its own goals, or were active members of the LTTE;
(v) Some
members of the TNA were of the view that “the LTTE is
ours and we are LTTE-ers” (CTR at p 490);
(vi) Members
of the TNA who were not avid supporters of the LTTE were sidelined and snubbed
by LTTE leadership and kept in the dark regarding certain decisions;
(vii) The
TNA is subservient to the LTTE; and
(viii) The
TNA “explicitly served as the proxy of the LTTE.”
In my view, this
constitutes evidence that reasonably grounds the ID’s conclusion that the TNA
was subservient to, or equivalent to the LTTE.
[18]
The Applicant submits that the ID erred:
1. In
failing to give context to the TNA’s expressions of support for the LTTE: at
the time, the TNA was advocating acceptance of the LTTE as the only legitimate
representative of the Tamil people in the context of peace talks with the Sri
Lankan government;
2. In
not considering whether members of the TNA had any involvement in the LTTE activities;
3. By
ignoring that claims that the TNA was created by the LTTE originated from
opposing parties;
4. In
failing to appreciate that references to the LTTE in the TNA’s 2004 Election
Manifesto were made in the context of encouraging peace talks between the LTTE
and the government, and that the TNA called for the “immediate
cessation of the war being currently waged in the northeast”; and
5. Failing
to consider statements in the TNA’s 2004 Election Manifesto that specifically
identified political solutions to the Tamil national problem.
[19]
In my view, the Applicant has not identified any
specific evidence that contradicts or brings into serious question the ID’s
finding that the TNA was intimately related to the LTTE. That the TNA may have
supported the LTTE in the context of encouraging peace talks, or had a peaceful
political agenda, does not undermine the evidence that the LTTE supported the
TNA through intimidation and murder during the 2004 elections. It also does
not undermine the evidence that members of the TNA viewed themselves equally as
members of the LTTE, that the LTTE vetted candidates of the TNA, and that some
members of the TNA (albeit not the Applicant) were themselves engaged in
violent acts against opposing parties.
[20]
While it is true that the evidence relating to
the LTTE’s involvement in the creation of the TNA came predominantly from
members of opposing parties, there is independent evidence from the “Political Handbook of the World: 2005-2006” by CQ Press
(A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.), that the TNA “explicitly served
as the proxy of the LTTE.”
[21]
The legitimate goals of an organization may be a
factor to be considered in cases under section 98 or 35, where international
criminal culpability through complicity is at issue, and the Supreme Court of
Canada’s comments in Ezokola are instructive; however, that is not a
factor to be considered under section 34. The statutory language is explicit:
an applicant is inadmissible for being a member of an organization that there
are reasonable grounds to believe engages, or has engaged in acts of
terrorism. That there may have been legitimate objectives or agendas is an
irrelevant consideration.
[22]
In this case, there was sufficient evidence to
support the ID’s conclusion that the LTTE was sufficiently connected with the
TNA such that membership in the TNA was tantamount to membership in the LTTE.
The decision is therefore reasonable.
[23]
The Applicant proposed that a question be
certified that is the same as or similar to that certified by Justice
Strickland in Nassereddine. In that case, the Minister proposed the
question. In this case, the Minister opposes the certification of any
question. In my view, it is appropriate to certify the following question:
Does Ezokola v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, [2013] 2 SCR
678, change the existing legal test for assessing membership in terrorist
organizations, for the purposes of assessing inadmissibility under paragraph
34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27?