Date:
20130916
Docket: T-616-12
T-619-12
T-620-12
T-621-12
T-633-12
T-634-12
T-635-12
Citation: 2013
FC 953
Ottawa, Ontario,
September 16, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
BETWEEN:
T-616-12
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LEANNE
BIELLI
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER),
URMA ELLIS
(RETURNING OFFICER
FOR DON
VALLEY EAST), JOE DANIEL,
YASMIN
RATANSI, MARY TRAPANI
HYNES, AKIL
SADIKALI KIDD
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Respondents
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AND BETWEEN:
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T-619-12
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SANDRA
MCEWING AND BILL KERR
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Applicants
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER), JOHANNA GAIL DENESIUK (RETURNING OFFICER FOR WINNIPEG
SOUTH CENTRE), JOYCE BATEMAN,
ANITA
NEVILLE,
DENNIS
LEWYCKY, JOSHUA MCNEIL,
LYNDON B.
FROESE, MATT HENDERSON
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Respondents
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AND BETWEEN:
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T-620-12
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KAY BURKHART
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER), DIANNE CELESTINE ZIMMERMAN (RETURNING OFFICER FOR
SASKATOON-ROSETOWN-BIGGAR),
KELLY BLOCK,
LEE REANEY,
VICKI
STRELIOFF, NETTIE WIEBE
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Respondents
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AND BETWEEN:
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T-621-12
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JEFF REID
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER), LAUREL DUPONT
(RETURNING
OFFICER FOR
ELMWOOD-TRANSCONA),
JIM MALOWAY,
ILONA NIEMCZYK, LAWRENCE TOET, ELLEN YOUNG
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Respondents
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AND BETWEEN:
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T-633-12
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KEN FERANCE
AND
PEGGY WALSH
CRAIG
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Applicants
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER), DIANNE JAMES MALLORY
(RETURNING
OFFICER FOR
NIPISSING-TIMISKAMING),
JAY ASPIN,
SCOTT EDWARD DALEY, RONA ECKERT, ANTHONY ROTA
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Respondents
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AND BETWEEN:
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T-634-12
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YVONNE KAFKA
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER), ALEXANDER GORDON (RETURNING OFFICER FOR VANCOUVER
ISLAND NORTH),
JOHN DUNCAN,
MIKE
HOLLAND, RONNA-RAE LEONARD,
SUE MOEN,
FRANK MARTIN,
JASON DRAPER
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Respondents
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AND BETWEEN:
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T-635-12
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THOMAS JOHN
PARLEE
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC MAYRAND
(THE CHIEF
ELECTORAL OFFICER),
SUSAN J.
EDELMAN
(RETURNING
OFFICER FOR YUKON),
RYAN LEEF,
LARRY BAGNELL,
KEVIN BARR,
JOHN STREICKER
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Respondents
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REASONS FOR
ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
Court issued judgment on May 23, 2013 in files T-619-12, T-620-12, T-621-12, T-633-12,
T-634-12 and T-635-12 dismissing applications to annul the results of the 2011
General Election in six ridings won by the respondent Members of Parliament
Joyce Bateman, Kelly Block, Lawrence Toet, Jay Aspin, John Duncan and Ryan
Leef.
[2]
In
addition to dismissing the applications, the Court awarded the respondent
Members of Parliament costs for the hearing in an amount to be fixed in
accordance with the directions given in the reasons for judgment and awarded the
applicants costs for the motions in which they were successful on a solicitor
and client basis. The other responding parties were to bear their own costs.
[3]
A
seventh application, in file T-616-12, was dismissed on October 26, 2012 with
costs reserved to the applications judge upon the disposition of the other
applications.
[4]
In
the Reasons for Judgment (2013 FC 525) the Court made the following comments
pertaining to the question of costs:
259 The
right of citizen electors to seek to annul election results that they
reasonably believe to be tainted by fraud is, in my view, a matter of high
public interest and analogous to Charter litigation. A concern that has
frequently been raised is that such litigation should not be beyond the reach
of the ordinary citizen. The courts have gone so far as to require that a
portion of the costs of such cases be paid by the opposing successful parties:
M v H, [1996] OJ No 2597 (QL) (Ct J (Gen Div)) at paras 17, 30; Lavigne,
above, at para 106.
260
I am mindful of the fact that in this instance the applicants have received
guarantees of indemnification by a non-governmental organization which has been
raising funds for that purpose. But it is also apparent that the respondent MPs
are supported by the resources of the party to which they belong, resources
which are underwritten by taxpayers.
261
These proceedings have had partisan overtones from the outset. That was
particularly evident in the submissions of the respondent MPs. In reviewing the
procedural history and the evidence and considering the arguments advanced by
the parties at the hearing, it has seemed to me that the applicants sought to
achieve and hold the high ground of promoting the integrity of the electoral
process while the respondent MPs engaged in trench warfare in an effort to
prevent this case from coming to a hearing on the merits.
262
Despite the obvious public interest in getting to the bottom of the
allegations, the CPC made little effort to assist with the investigation at the
outset despite early requests. I note that counsel for the CPC was informed
while the election was taking place that the calls about polling station
changes were improper. While it was begrudgingly conceded during oral argument
that what occurred was “absolutely outrageous”, the record indicates that the
stance taken by the respondent MPs from the outset was to block these
proceedings by any means.
263
The preliminary stages were marked by numerous objections to the evidence
adduced by the applicants. The respondent MPs sought to strike the applications
on the ground that they were frivolous and vexatious, to have them dismissed as
champertous and to require excessive security for costs, in transparent
attempts to derail this case.
264
There have been interlocutory decisions made by the case management
prothonotaries during the proceedings with related costs awards. The applicants
are, in my view, entitled to be awarded costs on each of the pre-hearing
motions in which they have been successful on a solicitor and client basis to
be paid jointly and severally by the respondent MPs. This applies also to the
champerty motion and the motion to exclude the Graves evidence which was
brought initially in relation to the Don Valley East application and then
deemed to apply to each of the other applications.
265
Apart from the motion costs, and with the above considerations in mind, I am
inclined to order a modest fixed amount for the costs of the hearing. Absent an
agreement as to the amount, the respondent MPs may make written submissions
limited to ten pages within thirty days of the date of this judgment. The
applicants will then have fifteen days in which to respond and the respondent
MPs another five days to reply. I will then award a fixed sum in an amount I
consider appropriate given the foregoing comments. The other respondents will
bear their own costs.
[5]
The
respondent Members of Parliament submit that they should be awarded
compensation in the amount of $120,000 based on the lowest tariff rate, or
$60,000 if based on one-half of the lowest tariff rate, for the costs of
preparing and filing written submissions, and the cost of two lawyers preparing
for one week and attending at court. They also seek disbursements of
$235,907.56. The largest part of the claim for disbursements relates to payment
for the services of an expert witness, Dr. Ruth Corbin, in the amount of
$166,363.79. The bulk of this would have been incurred prior to the hearing.
Disbursements claimed for the hearing, without further explanation, are
$54,202.35. The balance relates to travel and accommodation costs prior to the
hearing ($9,134.84), cross examination transcripts ($6,064.71), delivery costs
($112.49) and a driver’s license search ($29.38).
[6]
Noting
that the applicants have not served any submissions concerning their costs on
the motions with respect to which they were successful, the respondent Members
of Parliament submit that their costs ought to be awarded and offset against
the costs to be awarded to the applicants on a solicitor and client basis for
their success on the motions. The Court has no basis at present, apart from the
amount of time spent on the motions at the hearing, upon which to determine
what those costs may be.
[7]
The
applicants submit that in making a determination as to costs, access to justice
should be the Court’s paramount consideration, recognizing the public interest
nature of the case and the principle that the ability of citizens to bring such
matters before the courts should not be deterred. They ask that the Court
consider whether, in light of its findings of fact in this matter and the
fundamental constitutional issue at stake, this is an appropriate case for the
Court to decline to award any costs. In the alternative, the applicants
submit, that should the Court remain inclined to award “a modest fixed amount
for the cost of the hearing” the amount should be small and considered modest
from the point of view of individual citizens so as not to deter electors from
seeking to defend their democratic franchise.
[8]
With
respect to the quantum of costs proposed by the respondent Members of
Parliament, the applicants submit that the amounts claimed are unjustified and
inconsistent with the modest fixed amount yardstick. By their calculation,
total legal fees under the Column I of Tariff B guidelines would be no more
than $7,995.Any award for disbursements should exclude the
$54, 202.35 claimed for “hearing
costs” and the entire amount claimed as expert witness costs in light of the
Court’s findings with regard to the nature and presentation of Dr. Corbin’s evidence
and the lack of any detailed account upon which the reasonableness of the claim
could be assessed.
[9]
As
stated by Justice Paul Perell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Incredible
Electronics Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [2006] 80 OR (3d) 723 [Incredible
Electronics] at para 63:
As a matter of general principle, costs compensate
the successful litigant for the expense to which he or she has been put by the
suit having been improperly resisted or improperly brought: Ryan v. McGregor,
[1925] O.J. No. 126, 58 O.L.R. 213 (App. Div.). The court's discretion to award
costs is designed to further three fundamental purposes in the administration
of justice: (1) to indemnify successful litigants for the costs of litigation,
although not necessarily completely; (2) to encourage settlements; and (3) to
discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants in their conduct
of the proceedings: British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian
Band, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76; Fong v. Chan (1999), 46 O.R.
(3d) 330, [1999] O.J. No. 4600 (C.A.); Fellowes, McNeil v. Kansa General International
Insurance Co. (1997), 37 O.R. (3d) 464, [1997] O.J. No. 5130 (Gen. Div.);
Skidmore v. Blackmore, [1995] B.C.J. No. 305, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 330 (C.A.).
[10]
This
is not a case in which the applications were improperly brought or where the
applicants engaged in inappropriate behaviour in their conduct of the
proceedings. In
contrast, as noted above, I found that the respondent MPs “engaged in trench
warfare in an effort to prevent this case from coming to a hearing on the
merits” and adopted a stance aimed at blocking the applications “by any means”.
Settlement
was not at any time a realistic outcome in light of the nature of the
allegations and the evidence that attempts had been made by parties unknown to
interfere with the democratic process.
[11]
The
Supreme Court has affirmed the importance of access to justice in public
interest cases and the duty of the courts to craft costs orders that support
and promote this goal. As stated by Justice Lebel for the majority in British
Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band 2003 SCC 71, [2003] 3
SCR 371, [2003] SCJ No 76 (QL), at para 27, courts should exercise the power to
award costs in a manner that:
…helps
to ensure that ordinary citizens have access to the justice system when they
seek to resolve matters of consequence to the community as a whole.
[12]
Rule
400(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, confers
full discretionary power on the Court to determine the amount and allocation of
costs. Rule 400(3) provides a list of factors the Court may consider in
awarding costs, including: the result of the proceeding; the importance and
complexity of the issues, the amount of work involved; whether the public
interest in having the proceedings litigated justifies a particular award of
costs; and any conduct that tended to unnecessarily lengthen the duration of
the proceeding. Rule 400(4) allows the Court to award a lump sum in
lieu of, or in addition to, any assessed costs. Rule 400(6)(c) provides
that the Court's discretion includes the power to "award all or part of
costs on a solicitor-and-client basis."
[13]
Criteria
for determining the circumstances where costs should not be awarded against a
person who commences public interest litigation were identified by the Ontario
Law Reform Commission in its Report on the Law of Standing (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1989):
a)
The proceeding involves issues the importance of which extends beyond the
immediate interests of the parties involved.
b)
The person has no personal, proprietary or pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the proceeding, or, if he or she has an interest, it clearly does not justify
the proceeding economically.
c)
The issues have not been previously determined by a court in a proceeding
against the same defendant.
d)
The defendant has a clearly superior capacity to bear the costs of the
proceeding.
e)
The plaintiff has not engaged in vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct.
[14]
These
factors have been approved in a number of Canadian jurisdictions including the
Federal Court: see Harris v Canada, 2001 FCT 1408 at para 222; Guide
Outfitters Association v British Columbia (Information and Privacy
Commissioner), 2005 BCCA 368 at para 8; Miller v Boxall, 2007 SKQB 9
at para 5; Hastings Park Conservancy v Vancouver (City), 2007 BCSC 147
at para 4; Victoria (City) v Adams, 2009 BCCA 563 [Victoria (City)]
at para 185; R v Griffin, 2009 ABQB 696 at para 183; Georgia Strait
Alliance v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) [2011] FCJ No 587 (QL)
(TD) at para 3.11, appeal allowed in part but not on the question of costs, 2012
FCA 40 Georgia Strait Alliance.
[15]
In
the Georgia Strait Alliance decision, Justice James Russell concluded at
paragraph 3.14 that an order for costs on a solicitor and client basis was
justified because of the “unjustifiably evasive and obstructive approach”
undertaken by the respondents in the case that “unnecessarily lengthened and
complicated the proceedings”. Similarly, in this matter I concluded that an
order for costs on a solicitor and client basis against the respondent Members
of Parliament was justified because of the manner in which they had defended
against the applications including the bringing of motions that unnecessarily
lengthened and complicated the proceedings.
[16]
Adapting
the principled approach set out in the Ontario Law Reform Commission report to
any case in which the court was being asked to depart from the normal rules as
to costs, the British Columbia Court of Appeal distilled the test into four
elements at paragraph 188 of Victoria (City), above:
1. The case involves
matters of public importance that transcend the immediate interests of the
named parties, and which [had] not been previously resolved;
2. The [claimant] has no
personal, proprietary or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation
that would justify the proceeding economically;
3. [The party opposing
the claimant] has a superior capacity to bear the cost of the proceeding; and
4.
The
[claimant] has not conducted the litigation in an abusive, vexatious or
frivolous manner.
[17]
According
to Perell J. in Incredible Electronics, above, where a litigant is
seeking relief from adverse costs liability these factors should be resolved by
a single question namely, whether the party is a genuine public interest
litigant. Justice Perell stated at paragraph 83:
In my opinion, in the case at bar, the proposition
that public interest litigation requires special treatment should guide the
exercise of my discretion. Put differently, in my opinion, the applicants
should not be subject to the normal two-way costs regime if they can satisfy
the court that they are special interest litigants.
[18]
I
am satisfied that the applicants in this matter were genuine public interest
litigants motivated by a higher purpose. These proceedings fell squarely within
the criteria endorsed by in Harris and the other decisions cited above.
The applications involved issues, the importance of which extended beyond the
immediate interests of the parties involved. The applicants had no personal,
proprietary or pecuniary interest in the outcome that would have justified the
proceedings economically. They stood to gain nothing other than the vindication
of their electoral rights. The issues had not been previously determined by a
court in proceedings against the same defendants and the applicants did not
engage in vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct. This was not a case of unwarranted
election challenges. There was a factual foundation, albeit one which I
ultimately found fell short of meeting the statutory threshold required to
annul the election results in their ridings.
[19]
The
question of whether the applicants or the respondent MPs have a clearly
superior capacity to bear the costs of the proceedings is a neutral factor in
this matter. Much was made of the involvement of a third party organization,
the Council of Canadians, in raising funds to indemnify the applicants from an
adverse costs award. As I noted, however, at para 260 of the Reasons for
Judgment, it was also apparent that the respondent Members of Parliament were
supported by the extensive resources of the political party to which they
belong - resources which are underwritten by Canadian taxpayers. That argument
was not challenged during the hearing nor was anything provided to me in the
costs submissions to call it into question.
[20]
The
respondent Members of Parliament are, therefore, in a position analogous to that
of government respondents and defendants who have not been awarded costs in
cases where they have been successful in the result. See for example Harrison
v University of British of Columbia, [1986] BCJ No 2201 (QL), 30 DLR (4th)
206 (SC), additional reasons on costs [1986] BCJ No 1172 (QL), [1987] 2 WWR 378 (SC), rev’d [1988] BCJ No 13 (QL),
21 BCLR (2d) 145 (CA), aff’d [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451, [1990] SCJ No 123 (QL); Canadian
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), 2004
SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76; Sierra Club of Western Canada v British Columbia
(Attorney General), [1991] BCJ No 2613 (QL), 83 DLR (4th) 708 (SC).
[21]
This
is not a case such as Opitz
v Wrzesnewskyj,
2012 SCC 55, [2012] SCJ No 55 (QL) [Opitz], where a losing candidate
challenged an election result based on clerical errors in voter registration. In
that case, the parties bore their own costs at first instance and on the
appeal. Here, the allegations were far more serious, being of electoral fraud. It
would be incongruous, in my view, to impose a greater burden upon the
applicants who stepped forward to present those allegations, than that
considered appropriate in a contest between two candidates in which the
challenger had clear personal interests, including an economic interest, in the
outcome.
[22]
The
applicants have argued that to impose any significant measure of costs against
them would have a chilling effect on electors who might be the victims of voter
fraud in the future. I agree. The fact that a third party has stepped forward
to indemnify the applicants in this case can not be counted upon as a solution
for any case that might arise again. The respondent Members of Parliament had
the financial support of a major political party to conduct an aggressive no
holds barred defence against the applications and are not in jeopardy of
absorbing the costs themselves. I note also that Parliament has seen fit to fix
a modest amount ($1,000) as the security for costs to be paid when an election
challenge is filed to discourage nuisance applications.
[23]
I
do not accept the respondent MPs’ contention that a ruling that unsuccessful
applicants should be relieved of the obligation to pay costs would clearly increase
the “litigation margin”, of which the Supreme Court warned in Opitz, with
a resulting decrease of confidence by the public in the finality of elections.
The Canada Elections Act, LC 2000 c.9 provides a mechanism in s 531(1)
for the early dismissal of applications that are “vexatious, frivolous or not
made in good faith”.
[24]
Having
considered the matter further, I have reached the conclusion that the “modest
fixed amount for the costs of the hearing” that should be awarded the
respondent MPs is the amount paid into court for the seven applications, $7,000,
plus disbursements of $6,206. I make no award for the other costs incurred by
the respondent MPs in preparation for and conduct of the hearing.
[25]
In
their reply submissions, the respondent MPs noted that it was to be expected
that their much higher costs on a lower scale and the applicants’ much lower
costs on a higher (solicitor client) scale would roughly balance each other.
That was the Court’s intent. Given the conclusions reached above, there is no
longer any need to consider the award of solicitor and client costs to the
applicants for their success on the motions.
ORDER
THIS
COURT ORDERS that:
1.
the
respondent Members of Parliament are awarded costs of $7,000 for the hearing
and disbursements of $6,206.
2.
the
amounts paid into court by the applicants may be released to the respondent
Members of Parliament in partial payment of the costs award; and
3.
the
Court will not determine an amount of costs to be paid on a solicitor and
client basis to the applicants for their success on the motions in this matter.
“Richard G. Mosley”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-616-12,
T-619-12 (T-620-12, T-621-12,
T-633-12, T-634-12,
T-635-12)
STYLE OF CAUSE: LEEANNE
BIELLI
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
URMA ELLIS (RETURNING
OFFICER
FOR DON VALLEY EAST),
JOE
DANIEL, YASMIN RATANSI,
MARY
TRANPANI HYNES,
AKIL
SADIKALI, RYAN KIDD
AND BETWEEN: SANDRA
MCEWING AND BILL KERR
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
JOHANNA GAIL DENESIUK
RETURNING
OFFICER FOR WINNIPEG
SOUTH
CENTRE) JOYCE BATEMAN,
ANITA
NEVILLE, DENNIS LEWYCKY,
JOSHUA
MCNEIL, LYNDON B. FROESE,
MATT
HENDERSON
AND BETWEEN KAY
BURKHART
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
DIANNE CELESTINE ZIMMERMAN
(RETURNING
OFFICER FOR SASKATOON-
ROSETOWN-BIGGAR),
KELLY BLOCK,
LEE
REANEY, VICKI STRELIOFF, NETTIE WIEBE
AND BETWEEN JEFF
REID
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
LAUREL DUPONT (RETURNING
OFFICER
FOR ELMWOOD-TRANSCONA),
JIM
MALOWAY, ILONA NIEMCZYK,
LAWRENCE TOET, ELLEN YOUNG
AND BETWEEN KEN FERANCE
AND PEGGY WALSH
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
DIANNE JAMES MALLORY
(RETURNING
OFFICER FOR NIPISSING-
TIMISKAMING),
JAY ASPIN, SCOTT
EDWARD
DALEY, RONA ECKERT,
ANTHONY
ROTA
AND BETWEEN YVONNE
KAFKA
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
ALEXANDER GORDON
(RETURNING
OFFICER FOR VANCOUVER
ISLAND NORTH), JOHN DUNCAN,
MIKE
HOLLAND, RONNA-RAE LEONARD,
SUE
MOEN, FRANK MARTIN, JASON DRAPER
AND BETWEEN THOMAS
JOHN PARLEE
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
MARC
MAYRAND (THE CHIEF ELECTORAL
OFFICER),
SUSAN J. ELELMAN (RETURNING
OFFICER
FOR YUKON), RYAN LEEF,
LARRY
BAGNELL, KEVIN BARR,
JOHN
STREICKER
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: June
25, 2013 (costs submissions in writing)
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER: MOSLEY
J.
DATED: September
16, 2013
APPEARANCES:
Steven Shrybman
Peter Engelmann
Benjamin Piper
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
Barbara McIsaac
Marc Chenier
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(Marc Mayrand, Chief
Electoral Officer)
|
Arthur Hamilton
Ted Frankel
Jeremy Martin
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(Responding
Parliamentarians)
|
W. Thomas Barlow
Nick Shkordoff
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(Responding Market
Group Inc)
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
SACK GOLDBLATT
MITCHELL LLP
Ottawa, Ontario
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
BORDEN LADNER
GERVAIS LLP
Ottawa, Ontario
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(Marc Mayrand, Chief
Electoral Officer)
|
CASSELS, BROCK & BLACKWELL
LLP
Toronto, Ontario
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(Responding
Parliamentarians)
|
FASKEN MARTINEAU
DUMOULIN LLP
Toronto, Ontario
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(Responding Market
Group Inc)
|