Date:
20130617
Docket:
IMM-4228-12
Citation:
2013 FC 664
Ottawa, Ontario,
June 17, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Kane
BETWEEN:
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OZAN SAHIN
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
applicant, Ozan Sahin, seeks judicial review pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act] of the April 3, 2012
decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board [the Board] which found that he was not a Convention Refugee pursuant to
section 96 of IRPA, nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section
97 of the Act.
[2]
Mr
Sahin is a citizen of Turkey who arrived in Canada in November 2010, after
spending over two years in the United States of America [USA], and sought refugee protection based on claims of abuse and mistreatment he had suffered in Turkey due to his participation in Alevi-Kurdish activism. Mr Sahin claims he was detained,
beaten and tortured in 2006, 2007, and 2008. He also claims to be a
conscientious objector to military service in Turkey.
[3]
In
2008, Mr Sahin left Turkey on a five year student Visa to study in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. In 2008 he was charged in Pittsburgh with several criminal
charges. He pleaded guilty to one and was convicted of disorderly conduct,
sentenced to 90 days probation and fined $300.
[4]
Mr
Sahin remained in the USA until November 2010 then travelled to Vancouver and shortly thereafter to Toronto where he claimed refugee status on November
15, 2010.
The
Board’s decision
[5]
The
Board found that there was no reasonable chance or serious possibility that the
applicant would be persecuted on a Convention ground if he returned to Turkey or that he would face a risk to his life or be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.
[6]
The
determinative issue for the Board was the applicant’s credibility and his
failure to provide independent corroborating evidence to support his claim.
[7]
The
Board acknowledged that Mr Sahin had participated in Alevi- Kurdish activism
but that he did not have a profile that would attract attention for such
activities.
[8]
The
Board made several credibility findings, reviewed the documentary evidence
submitted by Mr Sahin and provided reasons for finding that the specific
documents were of little weight and/ or failed to establish that he would face
a risk if returned to Turkey.
[9]
In
addition, the Board determined that the applicant was not a conscientious
objector. The Board found that the letter from the Ministry of Defence provided
after the hearing, along with the applicant’s oral testimony, did not establish
that he was a conscientious objector to military service as his service had
been deferred to a specific date and he indicated that he would fight on
certain conditions. The Board also noted that if he were a conscientious
objector, the consequences he would face are addressed by the Turkish law of
general application and would not constitute a risk to him pursuant to section
96 or 97.
[10]
The
Board also found that the applicant’s fear of persecution was not well founded
or credible due to his failure to seek asylum in the United States for the two
and a half years he remained there. The Board did not believe the applicant’s explanation
that his lawyer advised him not to seek protection due to his criminal
conviction.
[11]
I
agree with the applicant and respondent that the Board’s decision is somewhat
difficult to follow given that the Board revisited its initial decision to
refuse to consider additional documents which the applicant sought to submit
after the hearing. The Board referred to the lack of the corroborating
documents to support the claim and then specifically considered all the
documents submitted. I find that when the decision is read as a whole, it is
clear that the Board agreed to receive the documents provided shortly after the
hearing. The Board considered the documents, but attributed little weight to
them.
[12]
The
additional documents provided after the hearing included a letter from the
Social Democratic Party [SDP], the letter from the Minister of National Defence
regarding military service, and a letter from the Alevi Cultural Association.
The Issues
[13]
The applicant submits that the Board’s decision was not reasonable
with respect to the applicant’s credibility. The applicant submits that he
provided independent corroborating evidence through the affidavit of his
cousin, the letter from his Canadian doctor, the letters from the Pir Sultan
organisation and the Alevi Cultural Association, the letter from the Social
Democratic Party [SDP] and the letter from the Ministry of National Defence
regarding his military service. The applicant submits that the Board erred in
not making a clear finding regarding the credibility or authenticity of the
letter regarding his military service which the Board accepted after the
hearing.
[14]
The applicant further submits that the Board erred in finding that
he did not have a subjective fear of persecution in Turkey due to his delay in
seeking protection. The applicant notes that he had a five year Visa and he
had planned to remain in the US to study. The Board unreasonably rejected the
applicant’s explanation that he relied on the advice of his US lawyer in not seeking asylum in the US.
[15]
The applicant further submits that the Board erred in finding that
he was not a conscientious objector. The applicant’s status as a conscientious
objector would put him at risk and, even if this did not amount to persecution,
it was relevant to the section 97 analysis. The applicant submits that the
Board erred in failing to conduct a separate section 97 analysis.
[16]
Finally, the applicant submits that the interpretation at the
hearing was not accurate and that this amounts to a breach of procedural
fairness.
[17]
The respondent’s position is that the Board’s decision read as a
whole is reasonable. The Board considered each document submitted to support
the applicant’s claim and reasonably attributed little weight to them and did
not find these documents to be sufficiently credible to corroborate the claim.
The respondent also submits that the Board reasonably found that the applicant
did not have a subjective risk of persecution on a Convention ground pursuant
to section 96 nor did he face a risk pursuant to section 97.
Standard
of review
[18]
The appropriate standard of review applicable to credibility
assessments is that of reasonableness: Saleem v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 389 at para 13; Malveda v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 447 at paras 17-20; Lin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1052 at para 13 [Lin]
at para 13-14. Given
that the Board’s analysis of credibility is central to its role as trier of
fact, its findings should be given significant deference: Lin at para 13; Fatih v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 857 at para 65.
[19]
It is trite law that the role of the court in judicial review
where the standard of reasonableness applies is not to substitute any decision
it would have made but to “determine if the outcome falls within ‘a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law’: (Dunsmuir, at para 47). There might be more than one reasonable
outcome. However, as long as the process and the outcome fit comfortably with
the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, it is not
open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome”: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59.
[20]
A
breach of procedural fairness and other issues raising questions of law are
reviewable on the standard of correctness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) v Abou-Zahra, 2010 FC 1073, [2010] FCJ no 1326 at para 16;
Chowdhury v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC
709, [2009] FCJ no 875 at para 29; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434 at para 43; Dunsmuir,
supra at para 79.
Preliminary
Issue - interpretation errors
[21]
The
applicant submits that there were errors in the interpretation of Turkish and
English at the oral hearing. This assertion was made
after leave was granted and by way of an affidavit of another interpreter, who
was not cross examined and who did not appear to have a copy of the transcript
of the hearing.
[22]
In
oral submissions, counsel for the applicant agreed that some of the passages
claimed to be inaccurate were not inaccurate. With respect to other passages referred
to, I find that there were no significant errors. The wording questioned
related to nuances in the language and did not affect the meaning of the terms.
[23]
In
addition, as noted by the respondent, any issues with respect to inaccurate
interpretation should have been raised at the first opportunity (Benitez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 461 at para 235).
[24]
In
Dhaliwal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC
1097 at para 15, Justice de Montigny noted:
… It is well established that complaints about the quality of
interpretation must be made at the earliest opportunity (Mohammadian v Canada (MCI), [2000] 3 FC 371 at para 27, [2000] FCJ no 309 (QL) [Mohammadian]).
Failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to object to the
interpretation on judicial review (Bal v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 1178 at
para 31, [2008] FCJ no 1460 (QL)).
[25]
In
Francis v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 636,
Justice Snider addressed the same issue where an applicant claimed that his
story was not understood due to poor translation and that this was a breach of
procedural fairness. Justice Snider noted:
[5] It is well established that a claimant for refugee
protection in Canada has the right to “continuous, precise, competent,
impartial and contemporaneous” interpretation during the course of the refugee
hearing before the Board (Mohammadian v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2001 FCA 191, [2001] 4 FC 85). This is a right that arises
pursuant to s. 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
[6] Translation cannot be expected to be perfect. Simply
asserting that the translation was inadequate may not be sufficient grounds on
which to overturn a decision. An applicant must raise the issue at the earliest
opportunity or risk a conclusion that the right to procedural fairness was not
breached. Moreover, it is not enough to show that there were errors: there will
always be errors. A translation mistake will translate into a procedural
fairness error where an incorrect translation results in a decision or
determinative finding that might have been different had the words been correctly
translated. In Khatun v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 159 at para 51, [2012] FCJ No 169, a case where the Court concluded
that the applicant’s right to a fair hearing had been breached by the poor
quality of translation, Justice Russell described the situation as follows:
The errors in interpretation went to the very essence of the RPD’s
rejection of the Applicant’s claim. The RPD relied, at least in part, on the
translation errors to support its conclusion that she was not credible. As the
main reason the RPD rejected her claim was its finding that she was not
credible, her right to procedural fairness was breached, so the Decision must
be reconsidered.
[26]
In
the present case the applicant did not raise his concerns about translation at
the first opportunity, and more importantly, the passages or words noted to be
inaccurate were not significant and did not result in any misunderstanding on
the part of the Board.
Credibility and
lack of independent corroborating evidence to overcome adverse credibility
findings
[27]
The
Board found that the applicant was generally not credible and, to overcome that
negative credibility finding, sought independent corroborating evidence from
the applicant. The Board’s findings regarding the applicant’s credibility are
owed a significant degree of deference.
[28]
The
Board found that the applicant is not an individual who had a profile such that
he would be targeted for persecution simply because of his involvement in
Alevi-Kurd activities. The Board found that the evidence the applicant
submitted did not constitute independent corroborating evidence. The Board
clearly indicated that it attributed little weight to these documents and the
findings of the Board are reasonable.
[29]
The
Board reasonably rejected the affidavit of the applicant’s cousin because the
information was outdated and second hand. The cousin had left Turkey in 1995 and his affidavit was based on information relayed by the applicant’s
mother. The Board concluded that the affidavit did not support the applicant’s
claims about his political activities or the problems he faced in Turkey.
[30]
The
Board considered the letter provided by the applicant’s Canadian doctor which
described scars the doctor observed and noted that these were consistent with
injuries the applicant had described to his doctor. The Board reasonably
attributed little weight to the letter because the doctor examined the
applicant years after the alleged incident and could not establish how, when or
by whom the scars were inflicted.
[31]
The
Board found that the document from the Alevi Association was merely a
membership application and reasonably concluded that it did not establish that
he was a member or that, if he were a member, he would be at risk.
[32]
Similarly,
the letter from the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association was found to only
acknowledge and thank the applicant for his support to their youth branch and did
not describe any activities or indicate any risk the applicant faced due to his
participation.
[33]
The
Board noted that the letter from the Ministry of Defence, which was provided
after the hearing, was not an original. While the applicant submits that the
Board did not make a clear finding about the document, I do not agree. The
Board clearly stated that it gave the document low weight and that the
provision of the document did not change the Board’s earlier finding with
respect to the applicant’s claim that he was a conscientious objector.
[34]
The
Board found that the letter from the Social Democratic Party [SDP] provided after
the hearing, which indicated that the applicant had been a member and had
participated in cultural and democratic activities, contained little
information to suggest that the applicant’s life was at risk or would be at
risk due to his activities in Turkey. The Board found that the letter did not
alleviate its concerns about the well-foundedness of the applicant’s claim of
persecution, particularly since the applicant had spent two and a half years in
the US without seeking protection.
[35]
The
Board’s conclusions about the SDP letter are reasonable. The Board noted
earlier in its reasons (and before it had decided to accept the post hearing
documents) that it did not believe the applicant’s story that the SDP could not
provide the letter and could not set out the problems faced by the applicant in
Turkey due to the SDP’s fear of the letter being intercepted and resulting in
problems for the SDP. The letter was in fact provided and it did mention that
Mr Sahin had been detained by the police. However, the letter did not provide
any details for the Board to rely on and the Board’s finding that the letter
was of little weight was reasonable.
[36]
The
Board canvassed all of the documents submitted and reasonably concluded that
there was no credible evidence to support the applicant’s claim that he would
face persecution if returned to Turkey.
Lack of
subjective fear
[37]
The
applicant submits that the Board erred in finding that the applicant did not
have a subjective fear of persecution because he did not seek asylum in the United States during his two and a half year stay.
[38]
The
Board clearly stated that it disbelieved the applicant’s explanation that he
relied on the advice of his US lawyer in not seeking asylum in the US. The Board reasonably concluded that his failure to seek asylum detracted from his
credibility in claiming he would face persecution upon return to Turkey.
[39]
The
Board also found that even if his lawyer had so advised, the applicant had no
subjective or objective fear in the first place. The Board noted that his
refugee claim in Canada was made two and a half years after his alleged last
beating in Turkey and described this as an “afterthought”.
[40]
The
applicant submits that the Board erred in relying on selective passages from
the decision of Justice Pinard in Matos Quintana v Canada, 2011 FC 579, [Matos
Quintana], to conclude that the delay undermined the applicant’s
subjective fear and that this case can be distinguished.
[41]
The
relevant passages are set out below, including the full text of the part paraphrased
by the Board:
[4] The panel also found that the fact that the applicant never
sought asylum in the United States during his stay there, which was close to
three months, undermined his credibility. It found that the applicant had
invented his story in order to come to Canada and join his family after his two
visa applications had been refused.
….
[6] After reviewing the evidence and hearing counsel for the
parties, the panel’s findings with respect to the contradictions and omissions
attributed to the applicant seem generally reasonable. It is clear that the
panel was entitled to compare the applicant’s testimony to the information in
the newspaper article in question. The fact that the panel did not interpret
this article in the same way as the applicant is not an error in itself.
[7] I therefore agree with the respondent that, given the
obvious lack of credibility with respect to the claim’s central event, it was
not unreasonable for the panel to attach no probative value to the exhibits
submitted by the applicant. To this end, it is important to reproduce the
following excerpt from the decision I rendered in docket IMM-3590-95, Satinder Pal
Singh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration of Canada, on October 18, 1996:
. . . As the Federal Court of Appeal held in Sheikh v. Canada,
[1990] 3 F.C. 238, 244, the perception that an applicant is not credible on a
fundamental element of his claim in fact amounts to a finding that there is no
credible evidence sufficient to justify the refugee claim in question.
[8] In particular, there is nothing unreasonable with the way
the abduction report and the psychological report were dealt with. The panel
was entitled to interpret them as it did. The same can be said for the two
reports without letterhead or coat of arms, as the panel noted that it had
specialized knowledge of Peruvian documents and that the documents did not
possess these elements. With respect to the applicant’s two police notices to
appear, even though the panel did not find that they were not authentic, I do
not find its decision to attach no probative value to them unreasonable. The
notices to appear are short and merely state that the applicant must present
himself at the police station to answer questions about the murder. I do not
find, as alleged by the applicant, that these documents necessarily prove that
he was present at the murder.
[9] I further find that it was not unreasonable for the panel
to find that the applicant’s failure to claim asylum in the United States, where he stayed from April 15 to June 20, 2008, and for which he had a
5-year visa, could be used to undermine his credibility.
[42]
Contrary
to the applicant’s submissions, I find Matos Quintana to be applicable
to the present circumstances given that the Board in the present case also made
several credibility findings about the applicant, Mr Sahin, and these findings
were about the key allegations of detention and beatings he alleged in Turkey.
[43]
In Trejos
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FC 170 at
para 48, Justice Kelen noted that, “Whether a delay
in claiming refugee protection will on its own be sufficient for finding a lack
of subjective fear of persecution and disposing of a refugee claim depends upon
the facts of the case.”
[44]
In the present case, the applicant remained for well over two
years in the US without seeking asylum. The Board found that if the applicant
had feared persecution in Turkey he would have sought protection shortly after
arriving in the US, even though he had a five year visa.
[45]
The
finding that the applicant did not have a subjective or objective fear of
persecution was reasonably open to the Board to make given the delay and the
applicant’s overall lack of credibility and failure to provide other credible
documents to support his claim.
Conscientious
Objector
[46]
The
applicant submits that the Board erred in finding that he was not a
conscientious objector to military service. The applicant argues that the
letter from the Ministry of National Defence which was provided at his own request
and indicates that the applicant has no objection to military service until
February 21, 2011 is not inconsistent with his submission that he is a
conscientious objector.
[47]
The
applicant also submits that the Board failed to make a finding about the
authenticity of this letter and may have considered it to be fraudulent because
it was not an original.
[48]
As
I noted above, the Board did accept and consider the letter, although it was
provided after the hearing. The Board noted that it was not an original and
stated that it attributed low weight to the document based on its content. The
Board also referred to the testimony of the applicant regarding his military
service. The Board did not accept the applicant’s explanation that he did not
object to all military service, only military service that would involve him
fighting Kurds, but that he still should be considered as a conscientious
objector.
[49]
The
Board asked the applicant “if Turkey was invaded by a foreign nation would you
assist Turkey in defending itself?” The applicant replied:
“It depends, like, the situation of Turkey at that time. I have to first check who is invading Turkey and what for, and if I
have equal rights as Turks, if my people have equal rights as Turks, then I
will defend Turkey… but in a country if I have the equal rights in that I’m
treated as a human being, then of course I will defend that country. I would be
proud of that.”
[50]
Based
on the oral testimony and the documentary evidence, the Board reasonably found
that the applicant is not a conscientious objector.
[51]
I
would also note that it is well established that even if the applicant were a
conscientious objector, this would not be a basis for his section 96 claim.
[52]
In
Ates v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 322,
the Court of Appeal held that repeated prosecutions and incarcerations of a
conscientious objector for the offence of refusing to do his military service
do not constitute persecution on a Convention refugee ground.
Failure to
conduct a Section 97 analysis
[53]
The
applicant submits that the Board failed to conduct a section 97 analysis by
failing to turn its mind to whether the applicant’s membership in an opposition
political party and a pro-Kurdish group merits protection under section 97 IRPA.
The applicant submits that his status as a
conscientious objector would also put him at risk and, even if this did not
amount to persecution, it was relevant to the section 97 analysis.
[54]
I
do not agree that the Board failed to conduct a section 97 analysis. When the
decision is read as a whole, it is apparent that the Board considered both Mr
Sahin’s risk of persecution under section 96 and his risk under section 97 and
found that he would not be at risk due to his political activities nor would he
face a risk to his life or to cruel and unusual punishment or to torture if
returned to Turkey. The Board noted that even if the applicant was a
conscientious objector (which the Board found not to be so) this would not
amount to persecution. The Board noted that in Turkey, refusal to serve in the
military would result in criminal prosecution, but that this is a law of
general application.
[55]
The
case law has established that refusal to serve in the military of one’s country
does not, on its own, justify refugee protection and that failing to comply
with a law of general application, although it may result in prosecution, does
not constitute persecution.
[56]
These
principles were noted by Justice Shore in Ozunal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 560:
[16] The Board noted that while Mr. Ozunal had clearly
expressed his aversion to military service, his explanations were not
sufficient to lead to the conclusion that he is a conscientious objector.
Refusal to serve because one bears aversion to combat or military action cannot
in and of itself justify granting refugee status. (Marek Musial v. Minister
of Employment and Immigration, [1982] 1 F.C. 290; Popov v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 75 F.T.R. 90, [1994]
F.C.J. No. 489 (QL).)
[17] As a conscientious objector, Mr. Ozunal was required to
demonstrate not only the possession of such conviction but also the existence
of a reasonable chance that he, if conscripted, would be required to
participate in military activities considered illegitimate under existing
international standards. (Atagun v. Canada(Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 612, [2005] F.C.J. No. 820 (QL), at
paragraph 7.)
….
[22] The Board found that the Turkish law is a law of general
application and that Mr. Ozunal's claim had to be considered in the context of
the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Zolfagharkani v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 540 (F.C.A.), [1993]
F.C.J. No. 584 (QL).
[23] Compulsory military service alone cannot be a ground for
Convention refugee status as it is not inherently persecutory. (Popov,
above, at paragraph 6.)
[24] Furthermore, prosecution for failing to comply with a law
of general application, such as a law requiring military service, does not
generally constitute persecution. (Talman v. Canada (Solicitor General)
(1995), 93 F.T.R. 266, [1995] F.C.J. No. 41 (QL); Perez de Gomez v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 558, [2005] F.C.J. No.
681 (QL), at paragraph 11.)
[57]
Similarly
in Usta v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC
1525, Justice Phelan noted that the Turkish law which required military service
was of general application and found that the applicant’s failure to serve
would not amount to persecution. Justice Phelan set out general principles to
determine whether a law of general application may constitute persecution:
[14] The Board gave proper consideration to the four principles
applicable to determining whether an ordinary law of general application may
constitute persecution:
After this review of the law, I now venture to set forth some
general propositions relating to the status of an ordinary law of general
application in determining the question of persecution:
(1) The statutory definition of Convention refugee makes the
intent (or any principal effect) of an ordinary law of general application,
rather than the motivation of the claimant, relevant to the existence of persecution.
(2) But the neutrality of an ordinary law of general application,
vis-a-vis the five grounds for refugee status, must be judged objectively by
Canadian tribunals and courts when required.
(3) In such consideration, an ordinary law of general
application, even in non-democratic societies, should, I believe, be given a
presumption of validity and neutrality, and the onus should be on a claimant,
as is generally the case in refugee cases, to show that the laws are either
inherently or for some reason persecutory.
(4) It will not be enough for the claimant to show that a
particular regime is generally oppressive but rather that the law in question
is persecutory in relation to a Convention ground. Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1993] 3 F.C. 540, paras. 18-22
(F.C.A.).
[15] The Board also gave consideration to whether such law or
its application constituted cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The fact
that the law is more harsh than laws in Canada or that Turkish prisons are not
of the same standard as Canadian prisons is not sufficient to establish this
ground under section 97.
[16] It is not for Canada to comment upon or give protection to
those who break the law of their own land and would be subject to harsher
treatment than in Canada unless such treatment rises to the level of torture,
creates a risk to life or is inherently cruel. The requirement to meet one's
citizenship duties, even after imprisonment, does not, in and of itself, rise
to that level. It was open to the Board to find, on the evidence, that the
Turkish law, its application and its consequences, including prison treatment,
did not rise to the section 97 threshold.
[58]
In
the present case, the Board did not accept that the applicant was a
conscientious objector nor did the Board accept that the applicant would face
any consequences beyond prosecution in the event that he refused to serve in
the military. The Board concluded that the applicant faced no danger if he
returned to Turkey and rejected the section 97 claim.
Conclusion
[59]
As
noted above, the Board’s findings with respect to credibility warrant a high
degree of deference. The Board found the applicant to be lacking in credibility
and reasonably found that the evidence submitted by the applicant to overcome
the negative credibility findings and to support his claim failed to do so.
Contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the Board did not fail to conduct a
section 97 analysis. The Board considered whether the applicant faced a risk of
persecution pursuant to section 96 and found that he did not, for the reasons
stated, including a lack of subjective fear. With respect to the section 97
claim, the Board reasonably found that the applicant would not face any risk
upon his return, even if he were considered a conscientious objector, as the
law was one of general application.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1. The application for
judicial review is dismissed;
2. No question is
certified
"Catherine M.
Kane"
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