Date:
20130129
Docket:
T-639-12
Citation:
2013 FC 87
[UNREVISED
ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario,
January 29, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Gagné
BETWEEN:
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In
the matter of the Income Tax Act
and
In
the matter of an assessment or assessments established by the Minister of
Revenue under the Income Tax Act,
AGAINST:
RÉGINALD DESCHÊNES
3699 De l’Alsace
Jonquière,
Quebec
G7X
9R3
DIANE
BRASSARD
3699 De l’Alsace
Jonquière,
Quebec
G7X
9R3
SERGE
DESCHÊNES
4081
Marc-Aurèle
Jonquière,
Quebec
G7Z
1H4
9099-5374 QUÉBEC INC.
4081 Marc-Aurèle, P.O. Box 117
Jonquière, Quebec
G7X 7W4
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|
|
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Debtors-Respondents
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REASONS
FOR ORDER AND ORDER
Introduction
[1]
This
is an application filed under subsection 225.2(8) of the Income Tax Act,
RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) (ITA), to have the jeopardy collection order made ex
parte by Justice Tremblay-Lamer on March 29, 2012, reviewed and set aside.
Under that order, the Court allowed the application by Her Majesty the Queen
in right of Canada (Her Majesty), acting on behalf of the Minister of National
Revenue, and authorized her to take forthwith any of the actions described in
paragraphs (a) to (g) of subsection 225.1(1) of the ITA in order
to collect and/or guarantee the payment of amounts assessed with respect to
Réginald Deschênes, Serge Deschênes, Diane Brassard and 9099‑5374
Québec Inc. (9099) (collectively referred to as the applicants).
[2]
At
the time the ex parte application was heard, the tax liabilities resulting
from the notices of assessment issued with respect to the applicants were as
follows:
▪ $239,505.93 resulting from five
notices of assessment issued against Réginald Deschênes on April 28, 2010,
for 2002 to 2006. (The amount was originally $341,477.67 but was reduced on
February 17, 2012, further to Réginald Deschênes’ objection);
▪ $20,045.69 resulting from four
notices of assessment issued against 9099 on March 31, 2010,
for 2004 to 2006 and 2009;
▪ $101,602.25 resulting from four
notices of assessment issued against Serge Deschênes on February 17, 2012, for
2003 to 2006;
▪ $150,000 resulting from one
notice of assessment issued against Serge Deschênes on March 14, 2012; and
▪ $30,000 resulting from one
notice of assessment issued against Diane Brassard on March 14, 2012.
[3]
The
notice of assessment against Diane Brassard (Réginald Deschênes’ spouse) and
the notice of assessment in the amount of $150,000 against Serge Deschênes
(Réginald Deschênes’ brother) are the result of the application, in
respect of them, of section 160 of the ITA, which reads as follows:
160. (1) Where
a person has, on or after May 1, 1951, transferred property, either directly
or indirectly, by means of a trust or by any other means whatever, to
(a) the
person’s spouse or common-law partner or a person who has since become the
person’s spouse or common- law partner,
(b) a
person who was under 18 years of age, or
(c) a
person with whom the person was not dealing at arm’s length, the following
rules apply:
(d) the
transferee and transferor are jointly and severally liable to pay a part of
the transferor’s tax under this Part for each taxation year equal to the
amount by which the tax for the year is greater than it would have been if it
were not for the operation of sections 74.1 to 75.1 of this Act and section
74 of the Income Tax Act, chapter 148 of the Revised Statutes of
Canada, 1952, in respect of any income from, or gain from the disposition of,
the property so transferred or property substituted therefor, and
(e) the
transferee and transferor are jointly and severally liable to pay under this
Act an amount equal to the lesser of
(i) the
amount, if any, by which the fair market value of the property at the time it
was transferred exceeds the fair market value at that time of the
consideration given for the property, and
(ii) the
total of all amounts each of which is an amount that the transferor is liable
to pay under this Act in or in respect of the taxation year in which the
property was transferred or any preceding taxation year,
but nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to limit the
liability of the transferor under any other provision of this Act.
. . .
(2) The Minister may at any time assess a taxpayer in respect
of any amount payable because of this section and the provisions of this
Division apply, with any modifications that the circumstances require, in
respect of an assessment made under this section as though it had been made
under section 152.
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160. (1) Lorsqu’une
personne a, depuis le 1er mai 1951, transféré des biens,
directement ou indirectement, au moyen d’une fiducie ou de toute autre façon
à l’une des personnes suivantes :
a) son époux ou conjoint de fait ou une personne devenue
depuis son époux ou conjoint de fait;
b) une personne qui était âgée de moins de 18 ans;
c) une personne avec laquelle elle avait un lien de
dépendance, les règles suivantes s’appliquent :
d) le bénéficiaire et l’auteur du transfert sont solidairement
responsables du paiement d’une partie de l’impôt de l’auteur du transfert en
vertu de la présente partie pour chaque année d’imposition égale à l’excédent
de l’impôt pour l’année sur ce que cet impôt aurait été sans l’application
des articles 74.1 à 75.1 de la présente loi et de l’article 74 de la Loi
de l’impôt sur le revenu, chapitre 148 des Statuts revisés du Canada
de 1952, à l’égard de tout revenu tiré des biens ainsi transférés ou des
biens y substitués ou à l’égard de tout gain tiré de la disposition de tels
biens;
e) le bénéficiaire et l’auteur du transfert sont solidairement
responsables du paiement en vertu de la présente loi d’un montant égal au
moins élevé des montants suivants :
(i) l’excédent
éventuel de la juste valeur marchande des biens au moment du transfert sur la
juste valeur marchande à ce moment de la contrepartie donnée pour le bien,
(ii) le
total des montants dont chacun représente un montant que l’auteur du
transfert doit payer en vertu de la présente loi au cours de l’année
d’imposition dans laquelle les biens ont été transférés ou d’une année d’imposition
antérieure ou pour une de ces années;
aucune disposition du présent paragraphe n’est toutefois réputée
limiter la responsabilité de l’auteur du transfert en vertu de quelque autre
disposition de la présente loi.
[…]
(2) Le
ministre peut, en tout temps, établir une cotisation à l’égard d’un
contribuable pour toute somme payable en vertu du présent article. Par
ailleurs, les dispositions de la présente section s’appliquent, avec les
adaptations nécessaires, aux cotisations établies en vertu du présent article
comme si elles avaient été établies en vertu de l’article 152.
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[4]
Under
subsections 225.2(8) and (11) of the ITA, the Court must now determine the
application summarily and may “confirm, set aside or vary the authorization and
make such other order as the judge considers appropriate”. The applicants also
rely on Rule
399 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 (Rules), which states
that, in principle, any order that was made ex parte may be set aside or
varied “if the party against whom the order is made discloses a prima facie
case why the order should not have been made”. The applicants therefore have
the burden of proving that the Crown did not meet its obligation to make a full
and frank disclosure of the relevant facts before Justice Tremblay-Lamer or
that the test set out in subsection 225.2(2) of the ITA for the issuance of a
jeopardy collection order was not met (Canada (MNR) v Services ML Marengère Inc, [1999] FCJ 1840,
[2000] 1 CTC 229 (Services ML Marengère Inc)).
[5]
The test consists in establishing the existence of
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the collection of the tax debt would be
jeopardized by a delay to the taxpayers; it is a burden of proof that is less
onerous than that of the balance of probabilities (Canada v Golbeck (FCA),
[1990] FCJ No 852, 90 DTC 6575; Canada (MNR) v 514659 BC Ltd, [2003] FCJ
207 at paragraph 6, 2003 DTC 5150). The case law has specified certain
factors that could be considered when applying the test, including fraudulent
actions by the taxpayer, liquidation or transfer of the taxpayer’s assets,
evasion of the taxpayer’s tax liabilities or assets of the taxpayer that could
lessen in value over time, deteriorate or be easily transferred (Canada
(MNR) v Cormier-Imbeault¸ 2009 FC 499 at paragraph 7, [2009] FCJ No 618).
It was also established that a taxpayer’s failure to conduct his or her
affairs “in an orthodox fashion” may be grounds for justifying the
issuance of an authorization under subsection 225.2(2) of the ITA (Canada
(MNR) v Rouleau, [1995] FCJ 1209 at paragraphs 6‑7, 95 DTC 5597).
[6]
In
this case, after reviewing all of the evidence, the applicants’ arguments and
the affidavits submitted in support of their application, I find that the
impugned order must not be set aside or varied. For the following reasons, this
application is therefore dismissed.
(a) Factual
background
Facts
raised in support of Her Majesty’s ex parte
application
[7]
According
to the evidence before Justice Tremblay-Lamer, Réginald Deschênes filed his
2009 to 2010
income tax returns late and was imposed penalties for filing those returns
late. He was also in default on a tax debt of $2,995.12 for the 2008 taxation
year, although a notice of objection was sent to the Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA) by his accountant in July 2010. Furthermore, the CRA had already taken
collection actions against Réginald Deschênes with respect to part of his tax
debt for 2005, and his accountant, Sylvain Gravel, had told the CRA that
Réginald Deschênes would declare bankruptcy if the assessments were upheld.
[8]
The
evidence established that, even if the CRA’s appeals division reduced the
amount in the assessments issued against Réginald Deschênes, his tax debt would
still be more than $230,000, as he is retired and his only income is an
annual pension of $51,377.22, his only seizable asset. Her Majesty claimed that
most of Réginald Deschênes’ valuable assets were encumbered by several charges,
leaving practically zero net worth. Other creditors had already taken actions
to collect their debts from Réginald Deschênes, so he transferred the undivided
half of an immovable to his spouse, Diane Brassard, and an immovable to his
brother, Serge Deschênes.
[9]
Diane
Brassard’s only seizable asset, that is, the undivided half of the family
residence in Jonquière, was encumbered by two hypothecs, one legal hypothec and
one conventional hypothec, in favour of the Caisse populaire. Her Majesty
claimed that Réginald Deschênes’s income was low and that he was effectively
insolvent, while Diane Brassard declared income varying between $4,096 and
$21,007 for the 2002 to 2008 taxation years (no returns were filed for 2005,
2009 or 2010).
[10]
Regarding
Serge Deschênes, Her Majesty claimed that he engaged in unorthodox behaviour by
concealing from the CRA a bank account in which 9099 (which he is the sole
shareholder and director of) deposited its income, while it had failed to
report its business income for the 2003 to 2006 taxation
years. Serge Deschênes and his spouse, Lynne Mimeault, had both already
declared bankruptcy, and their family income was insufficient to reimburse
Serge Deschênes’ tax debt of $250,000. According to the evidence, some
creditors had already taken collection actions against the assets of Serge
Deschênes. Almost all of 9099’s valuable assets were encumbered by several
charges and its creditors had taken collection actions against it. Furthermore,
Lynne Mimeault and Serge Deschênes had provided false tax returns for 2002 to
2010. Lynne Mimeault reported an income varying from $1 (for 2002, 2003,
2007, 2009 and 2010) to $20,166 to the CRA, even though she received $620,000 in
financing following the transfer of the undivided half of Serge Deschênes’ immovable.
[11]
Moreover,
Her Majesty claimed in her application that she had doubts with respect to the
credibility of Réginald and Serge Deschênes. While Serge Deschênes mentioned in
a conversation with Thérèse Gauthier on February 20, 2012, that his
brother Réginald acts as a nominee for him and 9099 and is a surety for
financing, he refused to respond to the questions of the auditor, Bruce Aziz,
on this point and Réginald Deschênes made no mention of this fact in his notice
of appeal regarding his reassessments. According to Her Majesty, Réginald and
Serge Deschênes lacked transparency by refusing to cooperate with the
auditor and refusing to disclose all of the relevant facts, which affected
their credibility.
Enforcement
of the jeopardy collection order
[12]
Further
to the order dated March
29, 2012,
the CRA took enforcement actions against each of the applicants. It
obtained two certificates under section 223 of the ITA in dockets ITA-3531-12
and ITA-3532-12, for claims of $150,000 and $101,602.25 against Serge Deschênes, and
registered a notice of legal hypothec on two immovables that he owns, including
his family residence in Jonquière.
[13]
The
CRA also obtained a certificate for $239,505.93 against Réginald Deschênes in
docket ITA-3531-12,
and registered a notice of legal hypothec on four immovables that he owns,
including his family residence in Jonquière. Requirements to pay were sent to
third parties (mainly tenants) as well as to the financial institutions that
Serge and Réginald
Deschênes
deal with.
[14]
With
respect to Diane Brassard, the CRA obtained a certificate in docket ITA-3529-12
claiming $30,000,
and seized an amount of $5,738.59 held with the Caisse populaire Desjardins in
Jonquière.
[15]
The
CRA obtained a final certificate against 9099 in docket
ITA-3528-12, for $20,522.44,
and registered a notice of legal hypothec on nine vacant lots and two immovables
it owns. It also sent requirements to pay to financial institutions, including
a requirement to pay and seize an amount of $16,260.53 held in 9099’s bank
account with the Bank of Montreal (BMO), pursuant to the Excise Tax Act,
RSC (1985), c E-15.
[16]
Since
the issuance of the jeopardy collection order, the CRA has collected $11,670.62 against
Réginald Deschênes’ debt, including $7,336.08 collected from the assets of his
spouse, Diane Brassard; $1,951.44 against Serge Deschênes’ debt; and
$2,211.53
against 9099’s debt (see the affidavit of Thérèse
Gauthier, CRA complex case officer).
[17]
With
their application, the applicants are essentially asking the Court to set aside
the jeopardy collection order issued against them by Justice Tremblay-Lamer,
including the awarding of costs, and vacate all of the notices of assessment
that are the subject of it and the certificates issued in application of
section 223
of the ITA. They are also asking the Court to order the CRA to withdraw all of
the collection actions taken under subsection 225.1(1) of the ITA and to allow
their personal action for damages against the two CRA officers responsible for
their file, Thérèse Gauthier
and Bruce Aziz.
b.
Issues
[18]
In
an application for review based on subsection 225.2(8) of the ITA, the Court
must respond to the following questions and, in doing so, must consider all of
the evidence submitted from both parties:
i.
Did the applicants meet their initial burden of proving
that the CRA did not make a full and frank disclosure of the factual elements
before it or that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the test for
issuing a jeopardy collection order was not met?
If
the response to these two questions is negative, the analysis stops here and
the applicants’ application must be dismissed.
ii.
If the response to one (or both) of the previous questions
is positive, did Her Majesty demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the collection of the applicants’ tax debt would be jeopardized
by a delay for exercising the measures set out in paragraphs 225.1(1)(a)
to (g) of the ITA?
[19]
The applicants raise an additional question, that is,
whether the notices of reassessment issued against them were in violation of
section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c
11 (Charter), or whether they were the result
of evidence obtained in violation of their Charter rights?
c.
Analysis
Review
of the jeopardy collection order
[20]
The
parties agree on the law that applies in this case. The applicants instead
challenge the presentation of the facts reported in the affidavits of Thérèse
Gauthier and Bruce Aziz on which the impugned order was issued. They allege
that Her Majesty did not succeed in establishing that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that the collection of her debt was in jeopardy and that the
Minister did not meet his obligation to make a full and frank disclosure of the
facts at the time of the filing of the ex parte application. The applicants
also challenge the validity of the reassessments established by the CRA, and
they claim that auditor Bruce Aziz was in conflict of interest, that he carried
out his audit so that criminal charges would be brought against them and that
the collection officer Thérèse Gauthier acted in an arbitrary and inappropriate
manner while executing the collection actions taken against them.
[21]
Finally,
the applicants claim that, because the order dated March 29, 2012, contains no
conditions, it does not meet the requirement in subsection 225.2(2) of the ITA
that states that “the judge shall, on such terms as the judge considers
reasonable in the circumstances, authorize the Minister to take forthwith any
of the actions described in paragraphs 225.1(1)(a) to 225.1(1)(g)
with respect to the amount”.
[22]
For
the following reasons, I am of the opinion that the applicants did not meet
their initial burden of demonstrating that the CRA did not make a full and
frank disclosure of the facts before it or that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the test for issuing
a jeopardy collection order was not met. Thus, it is unnecessary to move on to
the second component of the test, that is, whether Her Majesty
demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the collection
of her debt would be jeopardized by a delay of payment, even though the
applicants are essentially trying to argue that they are not insolvent (Canada (MRN) c Fiducie
Dauphin,
2010 CF 1144 at paragraph 23, [2010] ACF No 1430 (Fiducie Dauphin)).
[23]
In
their written arguments and in the submissions made before the Court, the
applicants reviewed all of the allegations in Thérèse Gauthier’s affidavit and
tried to demonstrate their falsity. At the very most, they succeeded in explaining
certain facts or rectifying others that the CRA was not aware of when the ex
parte application was filed. They did not succeed in demonstrating that, if
the facts, as explained or rectified, had been submitted to Justice Tremblay‑Lamer,
the jeopardy collection order would have been different.
Réginald
Deschênes
[24]
The
applicants submit that, contrary to the CRA’s claims, Réginald Deschênes filed
his tax returns for 2009 to 2011
and never received a notice of assessment or an explanatory draft with respect
to his tax debt for the 2005 taxation year, for which he was the subject of a
prior collection action, and that, if he had, he would have filed an objection
like he did for 2008. Réginald Deschênes claims that he never received a letter
explaining the assessments issued against him for 2002 to 2006.
He denies that he knew about the details of the assessments dated September 7,
2010, totalling $431,350.38, which he characterizes as arbitrary, and claims
that he was not informed of the considerable subsequent corrective actions,
like the withdrawal of an amount of $134,550 in capital gains from his income
for 2004.
[25]
Contrary
to what the applicants claim, the impugned collection order is limited to $236,770.20,
plus interest from November 25, 2011 (that is, the amount of the previously
established assessments minus a reduction of $218,878.92 for 2002 to 2006). All of the facts with respect to
the modifications made by the CRA were entered into evidence before the Court
and there is nothing to indicate that Her Majesty did not make a full and frank
disclosure of them. Regarding
the certificate obtained in docket ITA-3531-12 for $239,505.93, it did not
correspond to a notice of assessment, but rather a summary assessment of
Réginald Deschênes’ total tax debt according to the calculation done
by the audit division. Whether or not to follow that
recommendation is up to the appeals division, even if Réginald Deschênes
maintains his objection with respect to his current tax debt of $236,770.20. In
any event, the fact that Réginald Deschênes objected to the notices of
assessment issued against him does not prevent Her Majesty from protecting her
debt or obtaining a jeopardy collection order.
[26]
Réginald
Deschênes also contends that he is not insolvent. Even if the evidence before
me does not allow me to rule on this issue, it shows that, on October 5, 2012,
the BMO published, on one of the immovables that he owns, a prior notice of the
exercise of the hypothecary right to take in payment. Réginald Deschênes also
argues that his accountant never mentioned to the CRA that he intended to
declare bankruptcy if the assessment was upheld. However, unlike
Thérèse Gauthier, he does not have personal knowledge of that fact and
Ms. Gauthier’s testimony on this point should be favoured.
[27]
Réginald
Deschênes submits that the undivided half of the immovable was transferred to
his spouse in January 2006, when the CRA audits had not yet started or been
announced, and that, in any event, that transaction would not have affected the
CRA, which can rely upon section 160 of the ITA to track the property in the
patrimony of his spouse.
[28]
First,
the evidence shows that the first letter addressed to Réginald Deschênes by the
auditor Bruce Aziz was dated December 8, 2005 (Bruce Aziz’s supplementary
affidavit dated June 27, 2012). The case law has established that [translation] “the liquidation or
transfer of the assets by the taxpayer regardless of his intention” is one of
the factors that can justify a jeopardy collection order (Fiducie Dauphin,
above, at paragraph 24; Services ML Marengère Inc, above, at
paragraph 63; Canada (MNR) v Delaunière, 2007 FC 636 at paragraph 6).
Serge
Deschênes, 9099 and Diane Brassard
[29]
Serge
Deschênes claims that he did not behave in a way that could be characterized as
unorthodox, that he never concealed a BMO bank account in 9099’s name, that the
auditor Bruce Aziz had access to all of the accounts for 9099 and that,
after all, the tax claim against it was only $20,045.69 and does not require
any collection action given the company’s income. Serge Deschênes submits
that 9099 owns lots that are under development in Jonquière, Kénogami and
Arvida, that it invested in the construction of 132 residential units, which
are each valued at $75,500, and that those lots are almost unencumbered and have
a resale value that is amply sufficient to cover Her Majesty’s tax debt.
[30]
During
examinations held on July 18, 2012, the accountant for 9099 stated that it did
not have an account with BMO or, at the very least, that such an account did
not appear in 9099’s assets and that none of its returns mentioned it. That
testimony confirmed the CRA’s suspicions that 9099 had “double accounts” that
allowed it to shelter part of its income from taxation (Canada (MNR) v Robarts, 2010 FC 875 at
paragraph 61, [2010] FCJ 1082; Services ML Marengère,
above, at paragraph 67).
[31]
The
applicants claim that Serge Deschênes receives, for each 14-day period, a
non-taxable income replacement benefit from the Société de l’Assurance
Automobile du Québec, that he holds all of the shares of 9099 and that the CRA
did not establish that he would be insolvent if the impugned assessments were upheld.
They also claim that the family residence that he co‑owns with his spouse
has a market value of $470,000 and a net equity of over $90,000. They add that
the immovable in Jonquière that Serge Deschênes co-owns with his brother is
valued at $362,500 on the City of Saguenay’s assessment role and that it is
encumbered by only an hypothec of $250,000 in favour of Secure Capital MIC,
which also encumbers two other immovables.
[32]
Regarding
the legal proceedings brought against Serge Deschênes by his creditors, the
applicants submit that the only creditor likely to concern the CRA should be
the Caisse populaire Arvida-Kénogami, which benefits from a judgment in the
amount of $115,000 in capital, interest and costs. Serge Deschênes alleges that
that debt has been settled since the jeopardy collection order was issued.
[33]
Finally,
regarding Diane Brassard’s tax debt, the applicants submit that it involves, like
for a portion of Serge Deschênes’ debt, an assessment based on section 160 of
the ITA and not a debt separate from that of Réginald Deschênes and as such it
should reduce the fear that Her Majesty’s debt is in jeopardy.
[34]
Several
of the applicants’ claims are challenged by Her Majesty and it is far from
clear that the applicants succeeded in demonstrating that they are solvent
enough to meet their tax debts to Her Majesty if the notices of assessment are upheld.
Regardless, solvency is but one factor to consider and it is not determinative
in itself. Double accounts, not declaring all income, a lifestyle that does not
correspond to a declared income (fact raised with respect to
Serge Deschênes and Lynne Mimeault) and the provision of false statements
are more determinative in this case.
Liability
of the CRA representatives
[35]
Regarding
the applicants’ allegations against Bruce Aziz and Thérèse Gauthier, the Court
believes that they are unfounded and not credible with respect to the evidence
in the record. The applicants claim that, during his lengthy audits, Bruce Aziz
lost or misplaced documents that belonged to them (copies of bank account
statements, cheques, lines of credit statements, etc.), which thus prevented
them from adequately challenging the assessments issued against them. According
to Serge Deschênes’ affidavit, some of those documents were found in the
possession of the accountant Sylvain Gravel, whereas, according to Bruce Aziz,
all of the documents that were the subject of an audit were returned to Serge
Deschênes in person on February 20, 2009, and May 14, 2009. In any
event, all of the relevant documents are available from the file that is still
pending before the CRA appeals division and, given the nature of those
documents, I am not satisfied that they are essential to understanding the
assessments issued against the applicants or challenging them.
[36]
Similarly,
it does not appear to me that the auditor unduly delayed or prolonged his
audits. The facts in this case are not particularly complex, but were
complicated by the applicants, who provided several version of them. For
example, it is very difficult to know who owns the different immovables at
issue in this case, or if, during the relevant period, Réginald Deschênes acted
as a nominee for his brother. It is also difficult to know whether, before the
sale in February 2006, Réginald Deschênes held 9099’s shares as a nominee for
his brother or whether he actually owned them. The applicants are also
responsible in part for the delays and the length of the audit because they
were late in replying to several of the CRA’s requests. Regardless, the
applicants’ argument that the collection of the CRA’s debt cannot be
jeopardized by a delay to pay if that delay is owing to a lengthy audit cannot
be accepted. The delay experienced before the issuance of the notices of
assessment and the sending of a requirement to pay is of little relevance.
[37]
The
applicants’ allegation that Thérèse Gauthier was vengeful and acted arbitrarily
and capriciously after the impugned order is also unfounded. Instead, the
evidence before me shows that the CRA succeeded in collecting only minimal
amounts with respect to the amounts in the certificates issued. Ms. Gauthier
made seizures on two of Diane
Brassard’s bank
accounts and on three of Réginald
Deschênes’ bank
accounts and took no action subsequent to the registration of the legal
hypothecs on the different immovables belonging to the applicants.
[38]
The
applicants claim that the collection actions taken cause them prejudice in that
they prevent them from honouring the payment agreements that 9099 entered into
with the Agence de revenu du Québec (RQ). Even if such prejudice could justify
a review of the jeopardy collection order, which is not the case in my view,
the evidence shows that 9099’s failure to pay RQ preceded both the collection
actions taken by Her Majesty and the impugned order.
The
lawfulness of the CRA’s tax audits
[39]
The
applicants claim that the auditor Bruce Aziz breached the principles from R v Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73, [2002]
3 SCR 757 (Jarvis), in that the objective of his actions was possible
criminal charges against them; that he verified Serge Deschênes’
criminal record;
that, during the audit, he sent the applicants’ file to the department
of special investigations without
informing them and collaborated with its representatives; and that he failed to
give the applicants formal warnings and inform them of their rights throughout
the process.
[40]
In Jarvis, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to
draw a distinction between the income tax audits and the criminal
investigations set out in subsection 231.2(1) of the ITA. The Supreme
Court accepted that, because of an adversarial relationship between the
taxpayer and the CRA, which exercises its investigative powers, and because of
the protection provided by the Charter, there must be some measure of
separation between audit and investigative functions within the CRA.
[41]
In
this case, the evidence establishes that, even if the auditor Bruce Aziz found
in his audits that there were facts that could potentially give rise to
criminal proceedings against the applicants (such as evidence of undeclared
income or the use of double accounts by 9099) and consulted the department of
special investigations in that respect, no such action was undertaken by the
CRA. The applicants could raise Charter protection and the application of the
principles articulated in Jarvis if they face criminal proceedings,
which is not the case here.
[42]
I
find that none of the facts alleged by the applicants are a departure from the
principles in Jarvis and that they did not establish any infringement of
their section 8 Charter rights.
[43]
For all of the above-mentioned reasons, this application to review
the jeopardy
collection order dated March
29, 2012, is dismissed.
[44]
Considering the result, costs shall be awarded to Her
Majesty.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS that:
(i)
the
application to have the jeopardy collection order dated March 29, 2012, set aside
is dismissed;
(ii)
with
costs to Her Majesty.
“Jocelyne Gagné”
Certified
true translation
Janine
Anderson, Translator