Date: 20080118
Docket: IMM-2420-07
Citation: 2008 FC 66
Ottawa, Ontario, January 18, 2008
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SIMON NOËL
BETWEEN:
LIZETTE
GUZMAN SANCHEZ
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Protection
Division (RPD) dated May 23, 2007, according to which the applicant is neither
a “Convention refugee” nor a “person in need of protection.”
I. Issue
[2]
Did the
RPD err in law or in fact in making its unfavourable ruling, to wit, that the
protection of the Mexican authorities was available?
[3]
For the
following reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed.
II. Facts
[4]
A Mexican
citizen, the applicant alleges she was the victim of sexual harassment,
insults, death threats, attempted rapes, assaults and rape at the hands of Mr.
José Alfredo Cid Garay between January 5, 2005 and March 6, 2006.
[5]
The
applicant alleges that she twice filed complaints with the Mexican authorities
and once with a human rights organization, but to no avail. Indeed, according
to her, the police are ineffectual when it comes to violence against women,
notwithstanding the good intentions of the state to address the problem.
Moreover, her assailant’s brother works for the police and dissuaded her by
threatening to go after her brother. Finally, the applicant tried to bring her
complaint to a human rights organization, but they were unable to take her
case. Therefore, as demonstrated by the documentary evidence, Mexico is unable
to provide the applicant with effective protection anywhere in the country, and
she was unable to pursue her efforts with the Mexican authorities because she
feared for her life.
[6]
The
hearing before the RPD took place on April 11, 2007, and the negative decision
that forms the subject of this judicial review application was handed down on
May 23, 2007.
III. Impugned Decision
[7]
Briefly
stated, the RPD pointed out that, while the applicant’s narrative was credible
on the whole, the explanations she provided did not satisfy the panel as to why
she returned to the same police station to file a complaint against her
assailant, knowing that on her first visit she had met her assailant’s brother
there and he had told her she should work all of this out with his brother.
The RPD would have expected her to take her complaint to higher authorities.
Noting that Mexico is making serious efforts to combat this type of offence and
to protect vicitms, the RPD found that the claimant had failed to meet her
evidentiary burden by deciding not to avail herself of what resources the
authorities were making available to her.
IV. Analysis
[8]
First of
all, the appropriate standard of review in cases involving the question of
state protection is reasonableness simpliciter: see Amiragova v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. no. 1116,
2006 FC 882. To succeed, the applicant must prove that the RPD’s decision was
unreasonable—that no evidence exists to support its finding. This is a heavy
burden for the applicant to meet.
[9]
In Cristian
Marcel Vigueras Avila and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2006]
F.C. 359, at paragraph 27, Martineau J. clearly defined the burden of proof
incumbent on the applicant in such circumstances:
In order to determine whether a refugee
protection claimant has discharged his burden of proof, the Board must
undertake a proper analysis of the situation in the country and the particular
reasons why the protection claimant submits that he is "unable or, because
of that risk, unwilling to avail [himself] of the protection" of his
country of nationality or habitual residence (paragraphs 96(a) and (b) and
subparagraph 97(1)(b)(i) of the Act). The Board must consider not
only whether the state is actually capable of providing protection but also
whether it is willing to act. In this regard, the legislation and
procedures which the applicant may use to obtain state protection may reflect
the will of the state. However, they do not suffice in themselves to
establish the reality of protection unless they are given effect in practice:
see Molnar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCTD 1081,
[2003] 2 F.C. 339 (F.C.T.D.); Mohacsi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCTD 429, [2003] 4 F.C. 771 (F.C.T.D.).
[10]
Having
considered all of the evidence, including the documentation on conditions in
Mexico with respect to the social evils of spousal violence and sexual abuse of
women, the Court is not insensitive to the applicant’s experience as she
describes it.
[11]
However,
the Court’s role is confined to examining the decision itself in light of the
appropriate standard of review. The Court is not sitting in appeal of the RPD’s
decision; rather, it is seized of an application for judicial review. Having
conducted its analysis, the Court finds that the RPD decision is supported by
its finding to the effect that “Mexico is making serious efforts to combat this
type of offence and to protect vicitms.” Furthermore, the RPD stated that it
was not satisfied by the efforts made by the applicant to file her complaint.
The evidence reveals that while staying with an aunt of hers in Mexico City,
where she alleges she was threatened, she did not lay a complaint.
[12]
The case
law is clear: a democratic state such as Mexico is assumed to be able to
protect its citizens. No one expects that protection to be perfect. The fact
that the local police proved themselves to be ineffective and threatening under
the influence of her assailant’s brother is not an indication of a lack of
state protection. The evidence does not allow us to aver that this was not
unique to the specific circumstances of a familial relationship within the
local police. Finally, the Federal Courts have also held that refugee
protection claimants must provide evidence of having done all that is required
in the circumstances to acquire the protection of their own country before
seeking the protection of a foreign country, Canada in this case: see Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v.
Villafranca, [1992] F.C.J. no. 1189; and Kadenko v. Canada (Solicitor
General),143 D.L.R. (4th) 532.
[13]
Clearly,
the RPD found that the claimant had not done so—a reasonable finding under the
circumstances. The Court may have a contrary opinion, but it is not the Court’s role to impose its opinion when the
record shows that, having regard to all of the evidence, the RPD’s decision was
reasonable.
[14]
The
parties did not submit any question for certification.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES THAT:
-
the
application for judicial review is dismissed;
-
no
question is certified.
“Simon
Noël”
Certified true
translation
Stefan Winfield,
Translator
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-2420-07
STYLE
OF CAUSE: LIZETTE
GUZMAN SANCHEZ and
MINISTER
OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
(MCI)
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: January 16, 2008
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
DATED: January 18, 2008
APPEARANCES:
Alain Joffe FOR
THE APPLICANT
Sylviane Roy FOR
THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD :
Alain Joffe FOR
THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
John Simms, Q.C. FOR
THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec