Date: 20080827
Docket: T-2208-07
Citation: 2008
FC 972
Ottawa, Ontario, August 27, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Orville Frenette
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
AMEX BANK OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
I. The Relief
[1]
This is an application by Her Majesty The Queen (the “Applicant”)
for an Order requiring that the Respondents provide the Applicant the
information and documents set out in the requirement dated May 8, 2007
(Requirement) as issued to Amex Bank of Canada (Amex or Respondent) pursuant to
subsection 289.1 (1) of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-15 (ETA
or Act). Specifically, the Applicant is requesting the production of
the following information and documents relating to American Express credit
card number 3733-202207-31 (Card):
a. the name of the individual
that holds the primary card for the supplementary card, number
3733-202207-31013, that is held by Mohamad Nizam;
b. the name of the business
associated with the primary cardholder;
c. the mailing address of the
primary cardholder;
d. a copy of the original
application for this membership and any documents relating to requests for
supplementary cards;
e. the names of all supplementary
cardholders tied to the primary card.
[2]
Of these,
only Mohamad Nizam is named. The primary cardholder, the business associated
with the primary cardholder, and the possible supplementary cardholders are not
named.
II. The Background
[3]
At the
heart of this matter is the Applicant’s assertion that the production of the
requested documentation and information is necessary to determine the
obligations of 893134 Ontario Limited, operating as Mega Distributors (Mega)
under the ETA, as well as any rebate or refund they may be entitled to.
[4]
In
relating these facts, it must not be forgotten that the Respondent in this
matter is Amex, a Schedule II Bank pursuant to the Bank Act, S.C. 1991,
c.46 (Bank Act), which is not under investigation in this matter. Amex
is, in this application, the third party for the purposes of the relevant
subsection of the ETA.
A. Events Leading to
Mega’s GST Assessment
[5]
The Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) has alleged that Mega failed to collect GST with respect
to cigarettes purportedly sold from its Windsor, Ontario warehouse and purportedly delivered to
Zelda McNaughton, a status Indian operating as Zee’s Restaurant on the Six
Nations Reserve of Grand River near Brantford.
[6]
The gist
of the allegations are that Mega purchased cigarettes from a wholesaler, sold
them at discounted prices to Windsor area retailers and did not collect the
GST. Mega then allegedly declared tax free cigarette sales to Ms. McNaughton,
filed GST credit returns calculating input tax credits on GST paid to its
wholesaler, and claimed a refund of net tax.
[7]
Mega was
investigated in 2000, and upon the termination of the investigation a GST audit
was commenced. Ultimately, the CRA concluded that the alleged sales and
deliveries to McNaughton could not have occurred. With the audit completed in
or about February 2001, Mega was informed that it would be assessed with
respect to uncollected GST on all tobacco sales during the audit and disallowed
some input tax credits claimed by Mega.
[8]
For goods,
such as cigarettes, not to be subject to GST, a vendor must provide evidence of
the sale to a status Indian residing on a reserve (which have been delivered to
a reserve by the vendor or the vendor’s agent) by producing a copy of the
invoice or sales document indicating the band number and family number of the
purchaser together with a copy of the purchaser’s certificate of Indian status.
[9]
In this
case, Mohamad Nizam was allegedly one of the Mega employees who delivered the
cigarettes.
B. Mega’s Tax Court
Appeal
[10]
Mega filed
a Notice of Appeal from the reassessment of GST to the Tax Court on March 13, 2003.
[11]
Mega eventually
undertook to provide copies of American Express statements for Costco purchases
between 1999 and 2001. Subsequently, Mega produced a Supplementary Book of
Documents which included some, but not all, American Express statements for
Amex cards held by Mega owner Francois Francis and other Mega employees that
had been used for Costco purchases during the audit period (apparently Mega
purchased the cigarettes from Costco).
[12]
Mega
asserted that it was only through the discovery process that it became aware of
the basis for the GST reassessment and further learned that it was being
defrauded by at least one, or perhaps two, of its employees whose actions were
an important basis for the reassessment. Mega then filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal dated June 30, 2006 that alleged that Mohamad Nizam and his brother
engaged in cigarette purchases and sales that were not authorized by Mega.
[13]
In a
letter dated November 23, 2006, counsel for the Department of Justice
challenged the completeness of Mega’s Supplementary Book of Documents of
American Express statements, questioning whether there was a Mega American
Express card for Mr. Nizam. Mr. Nizam had apparently claimed to have had such a
card, and further Costco had apparently produced an invoice to the CRA showing
Mr. Nizam using an American Express Card to pay for a Mega cigarette order.
[14]
The
completeness of the Supplementary Book of Documents remained an issue, and in
late December 2006, counsel for Mega produced more American Express statements.
Department of Justice counsel reviewed those and sent another request to Mega,
dated January 5, 2007, asking for American Express statements relating to
cigarette purchases made by Mohamad Nizam.
[15]
The
Applicant then, once it became convinced no more statements would be forthcoming,
sent 17 requirements to Amex on January 30, 2007 to provide information and
documents relating to Mega’s American Express credit cards, including one
related to Mr. Nizam, Membership No. 3722-202207-31013.
[16]
Discussions
took place between Amex and the CRA, and the CRA provided a further letter on
February 5, 2007, that outlined in a schedule the names of individuals on the
primary and supplementary cards mentioned in those requirements. The exception
was the primary cardholder of the Card at issue in the present matter. The Card
is apparently the only card one where an individual being investigated was the
supplementary cardholder on an account while the primary cardholder was not an
individual being investigated.
[17]
On March 1, 2007, Amex replied to the document
request by sending statements and records for the investigated parties to CRA
Officer Pamela Howick. However, Amex did produce a number of statements of
Lasalle Petroleum showing Costco purchases.
C. The Requirement at
Issue
[18]
The
Requirement, dated May 8, 2007, was issued by Ms. Howick and requested that
Amex produce information and documents relating to the Card. This was in
addition to the requirements that had been sent earlier. The Requirement
requested all of the information being requested in this application.
[19]
According
to the affidavit of Pamela Howick, the CRA has been able to trace a number of
the payments recorded on the Lasalle Petroleum American Express statements back
to Costco’s records of cigarette sales to Mega and to GST input tax credits
claimed by Mega for those purchases.
[20]
By letter
dated May 9, 2007, Amex declined to process the requirement, and stated that it
believes that the request was for documents and information relating to unnamed
persons and that judicial authorization pursuant to subsections 289 (2) and 289
(3) of the ETA were required before it could make such a production. The
unnamed person in this case is the holder of the primary card of which Mr.
Nizam’s card is the supplementary card. It is that individual who is unnamed,
and it is that individual’s identity – along with information and documents
about the primary card and that individual’s business - that are being sought.
Mr. Nizam is not unnamed, and much of the information being sought here does not
seem to relate to him (other than possibly the initial application and requests
for supplementary cards). No mention has been made of any further unnamed
supplementary cardholders on the primary card.
D. Supplementary
Cardholder Statements
[21]
By way of
the affidavit of Pamela Howick, the Applicant asserts its understanding of how
supplementary cardholders receive statements. Specifically, based on alleged
discussions with employees of AMEX, supplementary cardholders do not receive
separate statements from that of the primary cardholder; transactions made by
the supplementary cardholder appear as separate line items on the statement of
the primary cardholder.
[22]
They also
rely on Ms. Howick’s assertion in her affidavit that this credit card
information is required for the Tax Court appeal of Mega from the assessment of
GST. I must admit that I could not find any precise explanation in the
affidavit material or the Applicant’s submissions explaining exactly why the
requested information was required. It has simply been asserted that it is
necessary.
II. Issues
[23]
The sole
issue is whether the Applicant is entitled to an order under section 289.1 of
the ETA compelling Amex to provide the CRA with information and
documents about the primary cardholder of the Card pursuant to paragraphs 289
(1) (a) and 289 (1) (b) of the ETA, or whether the CRA must first obtain
judicial authorization for the production of such information and documents
pursuant to subsections 289 (2) and 289 (3) of the ETA.
III. Legislation
[24]
The relevant statutory provisions of the ETA
are as follows:
Requirement
to provide documents or information
289.
(1) Despite any other provision of this Part, the Minister may, subject to
subsection (2), for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement
of a listed international agreement or this Part, including the collection of
any amount payable or remittable under this Part by any person, by notice
served personally or by registered or certified mail, require that any person
provide the Minister, within any reasonable time that is stipulated in the
notice, with
(a) any information or additional
information, including a return under this Part; or
(b) any document.
Unnamed
persons
(2)
The Minister shall not impose on any person (in this section referred to as a
“third party”) a requirement under subsection (1) to provide information or
any document relating to one or more unnamed persons unless the Minister
first obtains the authorization of a judge under subsection (3).
Judicial
authorization
(3)
On ex parte application by the Minister, a judge may, subject to such
conditions as the judge considers appropriate, authorize the Minister to
impose on a third party a requirement under subsection (1) relating to an
unnamed person or more than one unnamed person (in this section referred to
as the “group”) where the judge is satisfied by information on oath that
(a) the person or group is
ascertainable; and
(b) the requirement is made to verify
compliance by the person or persons in the group with any duty or obligation
under this Part.
Service
of authorization
(4)
Where an authorization is granted under subsection (3), the authorization
shall be served together with the notice referred to in subsection (1).
Review
of authorization
(5)
Where an authorization is granted under subsection (3), a third party on whom
a notice is served under subsection (1) may, within fifteen days after the
service of the notice, apply to the judge who granted the authorization or,
where that judge is unable to act, to another judge of the same court for a
review of the authorization.
Powers
on review
(6)
On hearing an application under subsection (5), a judge may
(a) cancel the authorization previously
granted if the judge is not then satisfied that the conditions in paragraphs
(3)(a) and (b) have been met; or
(b) confirm or vary the authorization
if the judge is satisfied that those conditions have been met.
Compliance
order
289.1
(1) On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, despite subsection
326(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance, information or
document sought by the Minister under section 288 or 289 if the judge is
satisfied that
(a) the person was required under
section 288 or 289 to provide the access, assistance, information or document
and did not do so; and
(b) in the case of information or a
document, the information or document is not protected from disclosure by
solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning of subsection 293(1)).
Notice
required
(2)
An application under subsection (1) must not be heard before the end of five
clear days from the day the notice of application is served on the person
against whom the order is sought.
Judge
may impose conditions
(3)
The judge making an order under subsection (1) may impose any conditions in
respect of the order that the judge considers appropriate.
Contempt
of court
(4)
If a person fails or refuses to comply with an order, a judge may find the
person in contempt of court and the person is subject to the processes and
the punishments of the court to which the judge is appointed.
Appeal
(5)
An order by a judge under subsection (1) may be appealed to a court having
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the court to which the judge is
appointed. An appeal does not suspend the execution of the order unless it is
so ordered by a judge of the court to which the appeal is made.
|
Présentation
de documents ou de renseignements
289.
(1) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente partie, le ministre peut,
sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et, pour l’application ou l’exécution d’un
accord international désigné ou de la présente partie, notamment la
perception d’un montant à payer ou à verser par une personne en vertu de la
présente partie, par avis signifié à personne ou envoyé par courrier
recommandé ou certifié, exiger d’une personne, dans le délai raisonnable que
précise l’avis :
a) qu’elle lui livre tout renseignement
ou tout renseignement supplémentaire, y compris une déclaration selon la
présente partie;
b) qu’elle lui livre des documents.
Personnes
non désignées nommément
(2)
Le ministre ne peut exiger de quiconque — appelé « tiers » au présent article
— la livraison de renseignements ou de documents prévue au paragraphe (1)
concernant une ou plusieurs personnes non désignées nommément, sans y être au
préalable autorisé par un juge en vertu du paragraphe (3).
Autorisation
judiciaire
(3)
Sur requête ex parte du ministre, un juge peut, aux conditions qu’il estime
indiquées, autoriser le ministre à exiger d’un tiers la livraison de
renseignements ou de documents prévue au paragraphe (1) concernant une
personne non désignée nommément ou plus d’une personne non désignée nommément
— appelée « groupe » au présent article — , s’il est convaincu, sur
dénonciation sous serment, de ce qui suit :
a) cette personne ou ce groupe est
identifiable;
b) la livraison est exigée pour
vérifier si cette personne ou les personnes de ce groupe ont respecté quelque
devoir ou obligation prévu par la présente partie.
Signification
ou envoi de l’autorisation
(4)
L’autorisation accordée en application du paragraphe (3) doit être jointe à
l’avis visé au paragraphe (1).
Révision
de l’autorisation
(5)
Le tiers à qui un avis est signifié ou envoyé conformément au paragraphe (1)
peut, dans les 15 jours suivant la date de signification ou d’envoi, demander
au juge qui a accordé l’autorisation prévue au paragraphe (3), ou, en cas
d’incapacité de ce juge, à un autre juge du même tribunal de réviser
l’autorisation.
Pouvoir
de révision
(6)
À l’audition de la requête prévue au paragraphe (5), le juge peut annuler
l’autorisation accordée antérieurement s’il n’est pas convaincu de
l’existence des conditions prévues aux alinéas (3)a) et b). Il peut la
confirmer ou la modifier s’il est convaincu de leur existence.
Ordonnance
289.1
(1) Sur demande sommaire du ministre, un juge peut, malgré le paragraphe
326(2), ordonner à une personne de fournir l’accès, l’aide, les
renseignements ou les documents que le ministre cherche à obtenir en vertu
des articles 288 ou 289 s’il est convaincu de ce qui suit :
a) la personne n’a pas fourni l’accès,
l’aide, les renseignements ou les documents bien qu’elle en soit tenue par
les articles 288 ou 289;
b) s’agissant de renseignements ou de
documents, le privilège des communications entre client et avocat, au sens du
paragraphe 293(1), ne peut être invoqué à leur égard.
Avis
(2)
La demande n’est entendue qu’une fois écoulés cinq jours francs après
signification d’un avis de la demande à la personne à l’égard de laquelle
l’ordonnance est demandée.
Conditions
(3)
Le juge peut imposer, à l’égard de l’ordonnance, les conditions qu’il estime
indiquées.
Outrage
(4)
Quiconque refuse ou fait défaut de se conformer à l’ordonnance peut être
reconnu coupable d’outrage au tribunal; il est alors sujet aux procédures et
sanctions du tribunal l’ayant ainsi reconnu coupable.
Appel
(5)
L’ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) est susceptible d’appel devant le
tribunal ayant compétence pour entendre les appels des décisions du tribunal
ayant rendu l’ordonnance. Toutefois, l’appel n’a pas pour effet de suspendre
l’exécution de l’ordonnance, sauf ordonnance contraire d’un juge du tribunal
saisi de l’appel.
|
[25]
The relevant statutory provisions of the Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1 ( ITA) are
as follows:
Requirement
to provide documents or information
231.2
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Minister may,
subject to subsection (2), for any purpose related to the administration or
enforcement of this Act (including the collection of any amount payable under
this Act by any person), of a comprehensive tax information exchange
agreement between Canada and another country or jurisdiction that is in force
and has effect or, for greater certainty, of a tax treaty with another
country, by notice served personally or by registered or certified mail,
require that any person provide, within such reasonable time as stipulated in
the notice,
(a) any information or additional
information, including a return of income or a supplementary return; or
(b) any document.
Unnamed
persons
(2)
The Minister shall not impose on any person (in this section referred to as a
“third party”) a requirement under subsection 231.2(1) to provide information
or any document relating to one or more unnamed persons unless the Minister
first obtains the authorization of a judge under subsection 231.2(3).
Judicial
authorization
(3)
On ex parte application by the Minister, a judge may, subject to such
conditions as the judge considers appropriate, authorize the Minister to
impose on a third party a requirement under subsection 231.2(1) relating to
an unnamed person or more than one unnamed person (in this section referred
to as the “group”) where the judge is satisfied by information on oath that
(a) the person or group is
ascertainable; and
(b) the requirement is made to verify
compliance by the person or persons in the group with any duty or obligation
under this Act.
(c)
and (d) [Repealed, 1996, c. 21, s. 58(1)]
Compliance
231.7
(1) On summary application by the Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide any access, assistance,
information or document sought by the Minister under section 231.1 or 231.2
if the judge is satisfied that
(a) the person was required under
section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access, assistance, information or
document and did not do so; and
(b) in the case of information or a
document, the information or document is not protected from disclosure by
solicitor-client privilege (within the meaning of subsection 232(1)).
Notice
required
(2)
An application under subsection (1) must not be heard before the end of five
clear days from the day the notice of application is served on the person
against whom the order is sought.
Judge
may impose conditions
(3)
A judge making an order under subsection (1) may impose any conditions in
respect of the order that the judge considers appropriate.
Contempt
of court
(4)
If a person fails or refuses to comply with an order, a judge may find the
person in contempt of court and the person is subject to the processes and
the punishments of the court to which the judge is appointed.
Appeal
(5)
An order by a judge under subsection (1) may be appealed to a court having
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the court to which the judge is
appointed. An appeal does not suspend the execution of the order unless it is
so ordered by a judge of the court to which the appeal is made.
|
Présentation
de documents ou de renseignements
231(2).
(1) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente partie, le ministre peut,
sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et, pour l’application ou l’exécution d’un
accord international désigné ou de la présente partie, notamment la
perception d’un montant à payer ou à verser par une personne en vertu de la
présente partie, par avis signifié à personne ou envoyé par courrier
recommandé ou certifié, exiger d’une personne, dans le délai raisonnable que
précise l’avis :
a) qu’elle lui livre tout renseignement
ou tout renseignement supplémentaire, y compris une déclaration selon la
présente partie;
b) qu’elle lui livre des documents.
Personnes
non désignées nommément
(2)
Le ministre ne peut exiger de quiconque — appelé « tiers » au présent article
— la livraison de renseignements ou de documents prévue au paragraphe (1)
concernant une ou plusieurs personnes non désignées nommément, sans y être au
préalable autorisé par un juge en vertu du paragraphe (3).
Autorisation
judiciaire
(3)
Sur requête ex parte du ministre, un juge peut, aux conditions qu’il estime
indiquées, autoriser le ministre à exiger d’un tiers la livraison de
renseignements ou de documents prévue au paragraphe (1) concernant une
personne non désignée nommément ou plus d’une personne non désignée nommément
— appelée « groupe » au présent article — , s’il est convaincu, sur
dénonciation sous serment, de ce qui suit :
a) cette personne ou ce groupe est
identifiable;
b) la livraison est exigée pour
vérifier si cette personne ou les personnes de ce groupe ont respecté quelque
devoir ou obligation prévu par la présente partie.
Signification
ou envoi de l’autorisation
(4)
L’autorisation accordée en application du paragraphe (3) doit être jointe à
l’avis visé au paragraphe (1).
Révision
de l’autorisation
(5)
Le tiers à qui un avis est signifié ou envoyé conformément au paragraphe (1)
peut, dans les 15 jours suivant la date de signification ou d’envoi, demander
au juge qui a accordé l’autorisation prévue au paragraphe (3), ou, en cas
d’incapacité de ce juge, à un autre juge du même tribunal de réviser
l’autorisation.
Pouvoir
de révision
(6)
À l’audition de la requête prévue au paragraphe (5), le juge peut annuler
l’autorisation accordée antérieurement s’il n’est pas convaincu de
l’existence des conditions prévues aux alinéas (3)a) et b). Il peut la
confirmer ou la modifier s’il est convaincu de leur existence.
Ordonnance
231.7
(1) Sur demande sommaire du ministre, un juge peut, malgré le paragraphe
326(2), ordonner à une personne de fournir l’accès, l’aide, les renseignements
ou les documents que le ministre cherche à obtenir en vertu des articles 288
ou 289 s’il est convaincu de ce qui suit :
a) la personne n’a pas fourni l’accès,
l’aide, les renseignements ou les documents bien qu’elle en soit tenue par
les articles 288 ou 289;
b) s’agissant de renseignements ou de
documents, le privilège des communications entre client et avocat, au sens du
paragraphe 293(1), ne peut être invoqué à leur égard.
Avis
(2)
La demande n’est entendue qu’une fois écoulés cinq jours francs après
signification d’un avis de la demande à la personne à l’égard de laquelle
l’ordonnance est demandée.
Conditions
(3)
Le juge peut imposer, à l’égard de l’ordonnance, les conditions qu’il estime
indiquées.
Outrage
(4)
Quiconque refuse ou fait défaut de se conformer à l’ordonnance peut être
reconnu coupable d’outrage au tribunal; il est alors sujet aux procédures et
sanctions du tribunal l’ayant ainsi reconnu coupable.
Appel
(5)
L’ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) est susceptible d’appel devant le
tribunal ayant compétence pour entendre les appels des décisions du tribunal
ayant rendu l’ordonnance. Toutefois, l’appel n’a pas pour effet de suspendre
l’exécution de l’ordonnance, sauf ordonnance contraire d’un juge du tribunal
saisi de l’appel.
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IV. Arguments
A. Applicant’s
Arguments
[26]
The Applicant took the position that a judge of this Court may
order a person to provide any information and documents sought by the Minister
under sections 288 or 289 of the ETA if the judge is satisfied that: (a)
the person was required to provide the information under sections 288 or 289
and did not do so; and (b) the documents are not protected from disclosure by
solicitor client privilege within the meaning of subsection 293 (1) of the ETA.
[27]
The Applicant insists that pursuant to subsection 289 (1) of the ETA,
any person who receives a notice by registered mail to provide the Minister
with information or documents requested must do so if it appears that the
Minister was acting for any purpose related to the administration or
enforcement of the Act and the person was given a reasonable amount of
time for production of the information or documents (Canada (Minister
of National Revenue) v. Marshall, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 25 at para. 16 which
deals with section 231 of the ITA). The Applicant insists that in
interpreting “almost identical” provisions under the ITA, it has been
determined that the Minister requires such broad powers to ensure the integrity
of the self-assessing Canadian income tax system (R. v. McKinlay Transport
Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, 68 D.L.R. (4th) 568 at paras. 18 and
35 - 38; Redeemer Foundation v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue -
M.N.R.), 2006 FCA 325, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 40 at paras. 38-39).
[28]
The Applicant notes that the authority under
subsection 289 (1) extends to third parties, and insists that the only
stipulation under the Act is that the purpose of the requirement be
“related to the administration or enforcement of this Part, including the
collection of any amount payable or remittable under this Part” (Canada
(Minister of National Revenue) v. Cornfield, 2007 FC 436).
[29]
In this regard, the Applicant submits that Amex
was personally served with the Requirement, had 30 days to provide the
information, and that the Requirement was issued for a purpose related to the
administration of the ETA.
[30]
The CRA claims that it requires credit card
information and documents from Amex for the Tax Court Appeal launched by Mega.
[31]
The Applicant submits that no prior judicial
authority pursuant to subsections 289 (2) or 289 (3) are required to compel
Amex. The basis for this position is that in interpreting section 231.7 of the ITA,
the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that where unnamed persons are not
themselves under investigation – but where the names of unnamed persons are
necessary for the investigation of a known party – then a third party served
with a requirement must provide that information (including the name of the
unnamed person (Artistic Ideas Inc. v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency),
2005 FCA 68, [2005] 2 C.T.C. 25 at para. 21 (Artistic Ideas); Canada
(Minister of National Revenue) v. Morton, 2007 FC 503, [2007] 4 C.T.C. 108
at paras. 9 – 12 (F.C.) (Morton); AGT Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [1997] 2 F.C. 878, [1997] 2 C.T.C. 275 at para. 27 (F.C.A.); and
in contrast see Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Toronto Dominion
Bank, 2004 FCA 359, [2005] 2 C.T.C. 37 at paras. 7 – 8 (F.C.A.) (Toronto
Dominion)).
[32]
The Applicant also asserted that the information and documents are
not protected by solicitor-client privilege. Amex insisted that it had not
taken the position that this was an issue and had not asserted that the
information and documents were so protected.
B. Respondents’
Arguments
[33]
The Respondent, Amex, asserts that the CRA is seeking information
concerning the primary cardholder of the Card, and that the CRA has given no
indication to Amex as to that identity of that individual. Therefore, that
person is an unnamed person and, Amex insists, the CRA cannot impose on a third
party like Amex the requirement to provide information or documents relating to
that unnamed person without prior judicial authorization.
[34]
Amex also insists that it has a statutory
obligation not to disclose the records unless there is established legal authority
to do so, and points to paragraph 244 (d) of the Bank Act and subsection
7 (3) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
S.C. 2000, c. 5 (PIPEDA) to support this assertion. Additionally, Amex
expresses concern about possible liability under PIPEDA if it is not
diligent with respect to testing any “questionable authority” (Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Case Summary #62, p. 2).
[35]
Amex takes the position that the Federal Court
of Appeal’s decision in Toronto Dominion is entirely relevant to the
matter at hand. In that case, a taxpayer who was being investigated deposited a
cheque into an account at the Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) held by an individual
who was not being investigated. The CRA sought to rely on subsection 231.2(1)
of the ITA in issuing its requirement, a provision that also has the
requirement of prior judicial authorization in related subsections. The Federal
Court – Trial Division dismissed the CRA’s application and the Federal Court of
Appeal dismissed the CRA’s appeal. Amex notes that, in doing so, the Federal
Court of Appeal explained the purpose of subsection 231.2(2) as offering
protection to both the third party with the information and the unnamed person
about whom the information was being sought. Specifically, the Court wrote at
para. 8:
The very purpose of
subsections 231.2(2) and (3) is to protect unidentified persons who are not
being investigated while making it possible in the interests of justice, and
subject to judicial review, for information to be obtained on persons who are
in fact under investigation.
[36]
Amex insists that section 231.2 of the ITA
is essentially identical to section 289 of the ETA. Amex further argues
that it is in the same position as TD was, while the primary cardholder on the
card is in the same position as the account holder was. Therefore, Amex’s
position is that the CRA is obliged to obtain judicial authorization for
requirements for information concerning unnamed third parties.
[37]
Amex also submits that the Applicant has
misinterpreted Artistic Ideas and suggests that it is “clearly”
distinguishable from Toronto Dominion. In Artistic Ideas, the CRA
was auditing a company – Artistic Ideas – that arranged the sale of art work to
taxpayers, who would then donate that art to charities. The donors obtained tax
deductions for the donations based on the appraised value of the work. The
appraised value, however, exceeded the amount paid and thus a net financial
benefit was obtained by the donors. The CRA required production of information
and documents pursuant to subsection 231.2 (1) of the ITA, but Artistic
Ideas would not provide the names of the donors or charities involved and
challenged the matter in the Federal Court – Trial Division. The Trial Division
found that the CRA was entitled to the names of the charities but not the names
of the donors. This decision was appealed and the appeal was dismissed.
[38]
Amex notes that the Court of Appeal determined
that the evidence presented in the case indicated that the donors were intended
to be subject of investigation by the CRA and therefore they were the type of
person who were subject to subsections 231.2 (2) and (3) and thus judicial
authorization was required. This was because the scheme of section 231.2 allows
the Minister to require third parties to present information and documents
pertaining to their compliance, but prevents the Minister from imposing a
requirement on a third party to provide information or documents relating to
unnamed persons whom he wishes to investigate, unless he first obtains the
authorization of a judge.
[39]
At the same time, Amex notes that the court
reached a different decision regarding the charities, as subsections 231.2 (2)
and (3) did not apply where the unnamed parties are not themselves under
investigation and there was no evidence that the Minister wished to have their
names to verify their compliance.
[40]
Given the above, Amex distinguished Toronto
Dominion and Artistic Ideas on the basis that Amex is not under
investigation by the CRA the way that Artistic Ideas was, and suggests that the
comment from the Court of Appeal that “where unnamed persons are not themselves
under investigation, subsections 231.2 (2) and (3) do not apply” was made in
the context of the CRA investigating the third party itself. Amex notes that
the court qualified its comment by stating that “in such cases the names of
unnamed persons are necessary solely for the Minister’s investigation of the
third party”.
[41]
Amex suggests that the logic of the court
appears to be that if unnamed persons are not subject to investigation
themselves, the information concerning the unnamed persons was, by inference,
necessary for the investigation of the third party itself (a finding made by
the Trial Division regarding the charities in Artistic Ideas). Thus in an
Artistic Ideas-like situation the unnamed party’s privacy is lawfully
compromised as an incidental part of an authorized investigation, while in Toronto
Dominion-like situation an unnamed party’s privacy would be violated without
any express connection to any investigation.
[42]
Amex notes that Artistic Ideas makes no
mention of Toronto Dominion.
[43]
Finally, Amex suggests that the summary of the
CRA’s position in Capital Vision, Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue - M.N.R.), 2002 FCT 1317, 226 F.T.R.
159 at paras. 46- 47 , bolsters its position in that it suggests that the
Minister has previously interpreted the section as being meant to avoid a
“fishing expedition” where neither of the parties served with the requirement,
nor any person at whom the requirement was targeted, were under investigation.
V. Analysis
[44]
I accept that section 289 of the ETA is similar to section
231.2 of the ITA. Therefore, the result in this case is dependent on
determining the applicability of Toronto Dominion and Artistic Ideas.
[45]
Considering both Toronto Dominion and Artistic
Ideas, I find that the present matter has a factual basis similar to what
occurred in Toronto Dominion.
[46]
In the present case, as it was in the case of Toronto
Dominion, there is an unrelated third party who is not the subject of an
investigation being asked to provide information about an unnamed party who is
the subject of an investigation. Further, Toronto Dominion was also
decided in the context of a third party bank being asked to provide
information; information for the improper production of which it could be held liable.
In Artistic Ideas, and in Morton where Deputy Justice Strayer
asserted his preference for the approach taken in Artistic Ideas, the
“third party” was the party being investigated. In those cases, the unnamed
parties whose information was found not to be covered by subsections 231.2 (2)
and (3) were parties who were not being investigated and whose information was
required for the investigation of the “third party”.
[47]
As noted above, in Morton Deputy Justice
Strayer preferred the approach to subsection 231.2 (2) taken in Artistic
Ideas. He preferred it because he took the view that it better expressed
the intention of susection 231.2(2). Indeed, the approach taken in Artistic
Ideas has some appeal.
[48]
The idea that the purpose of the subsection is
to prevent “fishing trips” by the Minister - without prior judicial
authorization – only for information about individuals who will the subject of
an investigation is reflected in the requirements in subsection 231.2(3).
There, as in the section at issue in this case, in order to receive judicial
authorization, the Minister must satisfy a judge that the requirement is made
to verify the compliance by the person or persons in the group with any
duty or obligation under the Act.
[49]
Reading that in connection with 231.2 (2), it
is easy to see how one could take the view that the unnamed person or group of
persons being referred to must be the intended subject of an investigation. The
alternative approach, whereby subsection 231.2 (2) is read such that it covers
all unnamed persons or groups of persons, would mean that the Minister could
never receive information about unnamed parties that is incidentally necessary
for an investigation because the Minister could not meet the requirements of
subsection 231.2 (3). Indeed, given the situation in Artistic Ideas, I
can see why the Court followed the path that it did. In that case, a third
party under investigation could have benefited from the protection being
afforded to others who were not the subject of investigation – and therefore
unattainable under subsection 231.2 (3) - but whose information was necessary
for the investigation of the third party.
[50]
However, in Toronto Dominion this sort
of problem was almost explicitly contemplated. At para. 6 the court wrote:
As he does not know the
holder of the account, the Minister clearly could not say on oath that he was
certain the requirement of information was made to verify compliance by that
individual with any duty or obligation under the Act, and if he appeared before
a judge it would be impossible for him to meet the requirements of paragraph
231.2 (3)(b). Accordingly, as I understand the argument, subsecction 231.2(2)
could not be relied on by the Minister …
[51]
The Court then goes on to reject the argument
that subsection 231.2 (1) could be used to act without judicial authorization
on the basis that it would invalidate 231.2 (2) and (3) and the protection they
provide to third parties (such as banks) that want to be sure that they have a
legal duty to provide information and those individuals who provided the
information who want to ensure their privacy is protected. Meeting those
objectives through the requirement to obtain prior judicial authorization was
the purpose of those provisions according to the Court. Indeed, at para. 8 the
Court noted:
The very purpose of
subsections 231.2(2) and (3) is to protect unidentified persons who are not
being investigated while making it possible in the interests of justice, and
subject to judicial review, for information to be obtained on persons who are
in fact under investigation.
[52]
Therefore, the question arises as to what kind
of “fishing trip” were sections 231.2 of the ITA and 289 of the ETA
aimed at? As noted above, Toronto Dominion and Artistic Ideas
provide completely different answers to that question, and it is difficult to
reconcile these cases as to the applicability of subsection 231.2.
[53]
In summary, both answers found in Toronto Dominion
and Artistic Ideas are persuasive and both recognize the broad powers
the Minister possesses to obtain information required to apply the provisions
of these Acts.
[54]
I believe, as my colleagues did, that Artistic
Ideas governs the matter involved in this case (Morton, above; Canada
(Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Advantage Credit, 2008 FC 853, [2008]
F.C.J. No. 1095 (QL) by Justice Mandamin). The principle of judicial comity should
apply here, see: Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2007 FC 446, (2008) 1 F.C.R. 62 at paras. 684 to 691.
[55]
Furthermore, the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Redeemer Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue),
2008 SCC 46, 2008 D.T.C. 6474, confirms that the Minister’s broad powers to inspect,
audit and examine tax payers’ records authorize the obtaining of information
about unidentified donors of a registered charitable association without
judicial authorization under section 231.2 of the ITA. I believe this
reinforces the positions my colleagues and I have taken on this subject.
[56]
Therefore, the application must be granted.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1.
The
application be granted;
2.
The
respondent shall comply with the requirement of information issued pursuant to
section 289.1 of the Excise Act, 1985, c. E. 15, required by the
applicant from the respondent on January 20, 2007, to provide in particular the
“name of the individual that holds the primary card for the supplementary card number
3733-202207-31013 (Mohamad Nizam), within thirty (30) days after being served
with this order.
"Orville
Frenette"