Date: 20080602
Docket: IMM-4315-07
Citation: 2008 FC 695
Toronto, Ontario, June 2, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mandamin
BETWEEN:
BIJOYA
CHAKRABARTY
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Pursuant
to section 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
2001, c. 27 (the “IRPA”), the Applicant, Bijoya Chakrabarty, applies for
judicial review of a decision by a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Officer (the
“Officer”) dated August 30, 2007. In that decision, the Officer determined
that the Applicant would not be at risk of persecution, torture, risk to life
or risk of cruel or unusual treatment or punishment if returned to Bangladesh.
[2]
The
Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh and is of the Hindu
faith. She entered Canada in 2005 and made a claim for refugee protection
under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. Her claim for refugee protection was
based on her allegation that as a minority Hindu woman, she was subject to
persecution by extremist members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (the
“BNP”), the political party in power, and the Jamat-e-Islami (the “Jamat”). The
underlying basis of her fear is her husband’s political activities in the local
Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council and other Hindu religious organizations.
She claims that her husband remains in hiding in Bangladesh.
[3]
The
Applicant’s claim for refugee status was denied by the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board on April 12, 2006. Leave for
judicial review to the Federal Court was denied. The Applicant then applied
for a Pre-Risk Removal Assessment and was found not to be at risk. It is this
decision which is being judicially reviewed.
[4]
The
Applicant submits that the Officer erred in applying the section 96 legal test
by requiring the Applicant to prove existence of subjective fear and
personalized risk in order to receive protection under the IRPA. The Applicant
argues that the combination of her identity as a Hindu woman, which was not
challenged, and the objective documentary evidence indicating that religious
minorities are being targeted is sufficient to engage section 96 protection.
That is that there was no requirement to demonstrate personalized risk. The
Applicant asserts that the Officer made a reviewable error in finding that the
Applicant, a Hindu, could obtain state protection. The Applicant also submits
the Officer made a reviewable error by rejecting the sworn evidence of the
Applicant’s daughters.
[5]
The
Respondent maintains that the Applicant did not submit any new evidence as described
by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 at paras. 13-14.
[6]
In
reviewing the record, it is clear that the Officer did accept as new evidence
the Applicant’s daughters’ sworn declarations, the letters from various Hindu
religious organizations and the additional country documents.
[7]
The
Officer accepted the documentary evidence acknowledging the existence of
violence against members of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh. However,
the Officer found in context of the overall situation that the violence did not
establish any personal risk that the Applicant may face or that there was
generalized oppression rising to such a level so as to engage section 96
protection.
[8]
The
Officer concluded that he was not satisfied that the Applicant would be subject
to a risk of persecution, a risk to her life or a risk of torture or cruel and
unusual punishment within the meanings of sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.
[9]
I
find that the Officer did not err in applying the legal test for convention
refugee protection as described in section 96 of the IRPA or harm as described
in section 97(1)(b) IRPA.
[10]
The
issue going to the heart of this judicial review is the Officer’s treatment of
Applicant’s evidence. The burden lies with the Applicant of establishing that
she is at risk. She is in the best position to know the risk upon return.
[11]
While
accepting new evidence from the Applicant, on review the Officer attributed
them little weight. With respect to the statutory declarations made by the
Applicant’s daughters, the Officer found them to be vague. This is
particularly true in regards to the following identical statement contained in
both declarations: “[i]nformation received from my relatives in Bangladesh also
confirmed that the BNP-Jamat terrorists are reiterating their vow to kill my
parents”. The Officer found this evidence to be of little probative value and
self-serving.
[12]
The
Officer also found the letters from the representatives of the Hindu religious
organizations, both in Canada and Bangladesh, to be of
little probative value because they recounted events without precision,
addressed subject matter already evaluated by the RPD and did not demonstrate
the signatories had personal knowledge of the problems experienced by the
Applicant and her family.
[13]
The
general non-specific nature of the Applicant’s evidence does not advance her
claim to any great degree. I find the Officer’s treatment of the evidence,
including the weight attributed to it, to be reasonable.
[14]
Accordingly
I conclude that the application for judicial review should be dismissed. No
general question of importance was proposed for certification.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
1.
This
application for judicial review is dismissed.
2.
No
question of general importance is certified.
“Leonard
S. Mandamin”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-4315-07
STYLE OF CAUSE: Bijoya
Chakrabarty
v.
MPSEP
PLACE OF
HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF
HEARING: May
22, 2008
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND
JUDGMENT: Mandamin,
J.
DATED: June
2, 2008
APPEARANCES:
Rezaur Rahman FOR
THE APPLICANT
Jennifer Francis FOR
THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
Rezaur Rahman FOR
THE APPLICANT
Barrister and
Solicitor
Ottawa, Ontario
John H. Sims,
Q.C. FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney
General of Canada
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