Date: 20080425
Docket: T-1101-06
Citation: 2008
FC 539
Ottawa, Ontario, April
25, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
KHETAM
THAIHER ZEID
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
proceeding is a statutory appeal by way of action brought by Khetam Thaiher
Zeid pursuant to section 30 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and
Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17 (PCMLTFA) against the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Minister). Since this is
a trial de novo, the task of this Court is not to review the record that
was before the Minister when the decision was made, but rather to determine
whether the evidence that is before the Court shows that Mrs. Zeid contravened
the cross border currency reporting requirement.
[2]
The
plaintiff challenges the Minister’s decision that she failed to report
currency, in contravention of section 12 of the PCMLTFA. She submits
that she was unaware of the statutory requirement to report and that she had no
intention to mislead custom officials.
[3]
At
the end of the hearing, I indicated that I would dismiss the appeal. Here are
my reasons for coming to that conclusion.
I. Facts
[4]
The
parties have agreed that the facts set out below are deemed to have been proven
without the necessity of leading any further evidence. Much to their credit,
the parties have also agreed that the documents attached as exhibits to their
partial agreed statement of facts are authentic and constitute proof of the
truth of their contents, thus relieving the defendant from bringing several Custom
officials to the Court to give oral evidence. I shall therefore reproduce in
full the partial agreed statement of facts (the “Agreement”) in the following
paragraphs.
[5]
On
August 28, 2005, the plaintiff had in her possession currency in the following
amounts: $CAN 10,000.00 (Canadian dollars) and $USD 7,910.00 (American dollars)
[hereinafter “the Currency”]. At the prevailing exchange rate, the total value
of the Currency was approximately $19,468.27 Canadian dollars.
[6]
At
that time, the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by her son.
Together, they crossed the border from Canada to the United States located near
Emerson, Manitoba and Pembina, North
Dakota. The Currency was not reported to Canada Customs when it was exported
to the United
States.
[7]
When
the plaintiff’s son was refused entry to the United States by American
border officials because of his criminal record, the plaintiff and her son
decided to return to Canada.
[8]
At
the Canadian border crossing located at Emerson, Manitoba there was a sign
posted in both English and French that advises travellers entering or leaving
Canada with CAN $10,000 or more to report this to Canadian Customs.
Photographs of this sign are attached as exhibit “A” to the Agreement.
[9]
When
the plaintiff and her son arrived at the Canadian border crossing, they were
questioned by a Canadian Customs official about whether they were in possession
of currency worth $10,000.00 or more. The plaintiff’s son answered the
question in the negative. As for the plaintiff, she remained silent when the
question was asked and allowed her son to respond on her behalf.
[10]
Just
prior to the arrival of the plaintiff and her son at the Canadian border
crossing, the Canadian Customs official had been given a Lookout Synopsis
prepared by the Intelligence Division of the Canada Border Services Agency. A
copy of the Lookout Synopsis is attached as exhibit “B” to the Agreement.
[11]
The
Canadian Customs official then referred the plaintiff and her son to a
secondary examination. During the course of this examination, the plaintiff’s
purse was searched, revealing $2,500.00 Canadian Dollars. The plaintiff was
then asked by a Customs official whether she had any other money on her or in
the vehicle. The plaintiff answered “no”.
[12]
The
plaintiff then spontaneously stated that she in fact had her “life savings” on
her and proceeded to remove an envelope she had concealed beneath her shirt.
The plaintiff also indicated that she had $10,000.00 underneath her clothes and
voluntarily removed a money belt she had secured underneath her clothing in the
area of her waist. When asked how much money was in the envelope, the plaintiff
initially stated she did not know and then said there was “about $7,600.00”.
[13]
A
count performed by Customs officials revealed that the envelope in fact
contained $USD 7,910.00 American dollars and the money belt contained $CAD
10,000.00 Canadian dollars.
[14]
As
the Currency, worth over $10,000.00 Canadian dollars, had not been reported to
Customs officials, contrary to subsection 12(1) of the PCMLTFA, it was
seized as forfeit pursuant to subsection 18(1) of the PCMLTFA.
[15]
In
addition, as Customs officials felt they had reasonable grounds to suspect that
the Currency was proceeds of crime, they decided not to return it to the plaintiff
pursuant to subsection 18(2) of the PCMLTFA.
[16]
The
Customs officials involved in the seizure of the Currency prepared narrative reports,
which describe what occurred. These six reports are attached as exhibits “C”
to “H” to the Agreement.
[17]
The
plaintiff then requested a decision of the defendant as to whether subsection
12(1) of the PCMLTFA had been contravened, pursuant to section 25 of the
PCMLTFA. Such a decision was rendered on March 31, 2006, pursuant to section
27 of the PCMLTFA. Specifically, the defendant determined that subsection
12(1) of the PCMLTFA had indeed been contravened by the plaintiff as a
result of her failure to report the Currency to Customs officials.
[18]
On
July 4, 2006, the plaintiff commenced the present statutory appeal by way of
action by having a statement of claim issued in this Court pursuant to section
30 of the PCMLTFA.
[19]
The
plaintiff admits that the Currency in her possession on August 28, 2005 was not
reported to Canadian Customs officials when she exported it to the United
States.
[20]
The
plaintiff admits that the Currency in her possession on August 28, 2005 was not
reported to Canadian Customs officials when she imported it back into Canada.
II. The issue
[21]
The
only issue before the Court, according to counsel for the plaintiff, is whether
or not there was a deliberate and knowledgeable contravention of the
cross-border currency reporting requirements in respect to the Currency.
[22]
The
plaintiff contends that she was unaware of her legal obligation to report the
exportation and importation of money from and to Canada, as she did
not see any sign or notice at the border and did not hear the Custom official’s
questions to her son. She argues that the Court is entitled to consider
whether or not there was a deliberate and knowledgeable contravention of the
cross-border currency reporting requirements in respect of the Currency to
determine if she was in contravention of section 12 of the PCMLTFA.
[23]
On
the other hand, the defendant’s position is that the plaintiff cannot establish
factually, on a balance of probabilities, that her failure to report the
Currency was unintentional. More importantly, however, the defendant submits
that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff’s subjective intention is not relevant
to the question of whether or not she contravened subsection 12(1) of the PCMLTFA.
III. The PCMLTFA
cross-border currency reporting regime
[24]
The
objectives of the PCMLTFA are clearly set out in the statute. They
include the following:
3. The object of this Act is
(a) to implement specific
measures to detect and deter money laundering and the financing of terrorist
activities and to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of money
laundering offences and terrorist activity financing offences, including
(…)
(ii) requiring the reporting of
suspicious financial transactions and of cross-border movements of currency
and monetary instruments,
(…)
(b) to respond to the threat
posed by organized crime by providing law enforcement officials with the
information they need to deprive criminals of the proceeds of their criminal
activities, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are put in place to protect
the privacy of persons with respect to personal information about themselves;
and
(c) to assist in fulfilling Canada’s international commitments
to participate in the fight against transnational crime, particularly money
laundering, and the fight against terrorist activity.
|
3. La
présente loi a pour objet:
a) de mettre en oeuvre des mesures visant à détecter et décourager
le recyclage des produits de la criminalité et le financement des activités
terroristes et à faciliter les enquêtes et les poursuites relatives aux
infractions de recyclage des produits de la criminalité et aux infractions de
financement des activités terroristes, notamment :
(…)
(ii) établir
un régime de déclaration obligatoire des opérations financières douteuses et
des mouvements transfrontaliers d’espèces et d’effets,
(…)
b) de combattre le crime organisé en fournissant aux responsables
de l’application de la loi les renseignements leur permettant de priver les
criminels du produit de leurs activités illicites, tout en assurant la mise
en place des garanties nécessaires à la protection de la vie privée des
personnes à l’égard des renseignements personnels les concernant;
c) d’aider le Canada à
remplir ses engagements internationaux dans la lutte contre le crime transnational,
particulièrement le recyclage des produits de la criminalité, et la lutte
contre les activités terroristes.
|
[25]
In
order to implement the objective specified in section 3(a)(ii), Part 2 of the PCMLTFA
provides for a currency reporting regime whereby importers and exporters of
currency must make a report to a Customs official whenever they import or
export large quantities of currency or monetary instruments into or out of
Canada. My colleague Justice Layden-Stevenson very aptly set out the objectives
and mechanics of the regime in Dokaj v. Canada (Minister of
National Revenue), 2005 FC 1437 [Dokaj], and I need not
repeat that overview here. For ease of understanding, however, I will briefly
highlight the most relevant provisions of that legislative scheme in the
following paragraphs. These provisions can be found attached to these reasons
as Schedule “A”.
[26]
The
relevant reporting requirements in the case at bar (which involved both an
exportation and an importation of currency) stem from subsections 12(1) and
12(3)(a) of the PCMLTFA along with sections 2, 3, 4 and 11 of the Cross-border
Currency and Monetary Instruments Reporting Regulations, SOR/2002-412.
These provisions require every person who imports to or exports from Canada currency or
monetary instruments worth $10,000.00 or more to report this importation or
exportation to a Customs official.
[27]
In
the event a person imports to or exports from Canada currency worth $10,000.00
or more and fails to report, the currency is subject to seizure as forfeit by a
Customs official pursuant to subsection 18(1) of the PCMLTFA, if that
official believes on reasonable grounds that subsection 12(1) has been
contravened.
[28]
Pursuant
to subsection 18(2) of the PCMLTFA, the Customs official must then
decide whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the currency is
proceeds of crime or funds for terrorist financing. If the official answers to
this question are in the affirmative, the seized currency must remain as
forfeit. If the official answers to this question in the negative, he or she
must return the currency upon receipt of the prescribed penalty, which ranges
from $250.00 to $5,000.00.
[29]
Furthermore,
section 23 of the PCMLTFA provides that currency seized as forfeit
pursuant to subsection 18(1) of the PCMLTFA is automatically forfeited
to Her Majesty in Right of Canada from the time of the contravention of subsection
12(1) in respect of which it was seized, and no act or proceeding after the
forfeiture is necessary to effect the forfeiture.
[30]
As
per section 24 of the PCMLTFA, the forfeiture of seized currency is
final and is not subject to review or to be set aside or otherwise dealt with
except to the extent and in the manner provided by sections 25 to 30 of the PCMLTFA,
which sets out the review and appeal procedure with respect to forfeitures
effected under Part 2 of the PCMLTFA.
[31]
Specifically,
section 25 of the PCMLTFA permits either the person from whom the
currency was seized under section 18 or the lawful owner of the currency to
request a decision of the Minister as to whether subsection 12(1) of the PCMLTFA
was contravened, provided such a request is made in writing within 90 days
after the date of the seizure.
[32]
If
a request for a decision is made by a person entitled thereto pursuant to section
25 of the PCMLTFA, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency is
obliged to serve that person with written notice of the circumstances of the
seizure pursuant to subsection 26(1) of the PCMLTFA. That person is
then entitled, pursuant to subsection 26(2) of the PCMLTFA, to provide
any evidence in the matter that he or she desires to furnish, provided he or
she does so within 30 days of receiving the Commissioner’s written notice. The
Minister must then, pursuant to section 27 of the PCMLTFA, make a
decision with respect to whether subsection 12(1) of the PCMLTFA was
contravened. This decision of the Minister can be termed “the Section 27
Decision”.
[33]
If
the Minister decides that there was no failure to report, the currency or the
assessed penalty must then be returned, pursuant to section 28 of the PCMLTFA.
[34]
If,
on the other hand, the Minister decides that there was a failure to report, the
Minister must then render a second decision, as per section 29 of the PCMLTFA,
with respect to the appropriate sanction for the infraction. This decision is
effectively a review of the quantum of the sanction imposed by the Customs
official pursuant to subsection 18(2) (i.e., full forfeiture or a penalty
ranging from $250.00 to $5,000.00). Section 29 of the PCMLTFA requires
the Minister to either confirm the Customs official’s decision with respect to
the sanction or to reduce it to some lesser penalty. This second decision of
the Minister can be termed “the Section 29 Decision”.
[35]
Section
30 of the PCMLTFA allows the person who requested a decision of the
Minister pursuant to section 25 to appeal that decision by way of an action in
the Federal Court.
[36]
The
scope of a statutory appeal brought pursuant to section 30 of the PCMLTFA
is, however, limited to a review of the Section 27 Decision with respect to
whether subsection 12(1) of the PCMLTFA was contravened. A person who
wishes to challenge a Section 29 Decision must do so by means of a judicial
review application pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7: see Tourki v. Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FCA 186 at para. 18; aff’g 2006 FC
50 at para. 38.
[37]
In
the case at bar, it is common ground that the plaintiff is only disputing the
Minister’s Section 27 Decision. The plaintiff has not sought judicial review
of the Section 29 Decision rendered in her case and she accepts that it cannot
be challenged in the context of this statutory appeal.
III. Analysis
[38]
I
need not say much about the evidence and the testimony given by the plaintiff
at the hearing with respect to her ignorance of the cross-border currency
reporting obligation, since I agree with the defendant that the subjective
state of mind of the plaintiff has no bearing on the question of whether subsection
12(1) of the PCMLTFA has been contravened or the validity of the
seizure. I shall, nevertheless, venture the following comments.
[39]
The
plaintiff’s contention that she was unaware of her obligation to report the
currency in her possession when she crossed the border is not borne out by the
evidence; indeed, the uncontradicted affidavit evidence of several Custom
officials shows that her attitude bordered on wilful blindness.
[40]
First
of all, it is difficult to believe, as the plaintiff would have it, that the money
she was carrying was her “savings” and that she takes it with her whenever she
leaves her house. Why, if that is the case, would she have precisely $10,000.00
in her money belt and $2,500.00 (all in $50.00 notes) in her purse? Why would
a large proportion of her “savings” be in American dollars? Why would she
split her “savings” in three different locations, that is, in her purse, in a
money belt on her abdomen and in an envelope on her chest? That story, in and
of itself, stretches the imagination.
[41]
I
also note that there were inconsistencies between her story and her son’s as to
the length of their planned trip to the United States, their
purposes in going there and to whom the money belonged.
[42]
More
importantly, the plaintiff has not shown on a balance of probabilities that she
did not know of her obligation to report currency in excess of $10,000.00 or
that she did not hear the Custom officer asking if they had any currency or
monetary instruments valued at over $10,000.00 at the Custom booth.
[43]
When
cross-examined by counsel for the defendant, the plaintiff acknowledged that
she travelled to the Middle East on six or seven occasions since arriving in
Canada in 1973, and that she also went to the United States five or six
times during that same period of time. While it may have been the first time
she went abroad since the coming into force of the PCMLTFA in January
2003, she testified that she knows she has to answer questions asked by Custom
officials truthfully. She may in fact have learned the hard way since it
appears Mrs. Zeid had her jewellery seized upon returning from the Middle East
in 1986, as a result of not reporting it to Custom officials at Pearson Airport.
[44]
The
exhibits attached to the partial agreed statement of facts show that the sign
posted at the Canadian border crossing advising travellers entering or leaving
Canada with more than $10,000.00 that they have to report it is quite visible
and is located right beside the booth where the Custom official proceeds to the
primary check while travellers remain in their car. I find it hard to believe
that the plaintiff would not have seen it.
[45]
Mrs.
Zeid pretends she was not paying attention when the Custom official asked
questions to her son. Again, this claim is most difficult to believe,
especially after having just been refused entry to the United States. How could
she not be interested by what was going on? In any event, she must have heard
what the Custom official was saying as she handed her driving license to her
son when asked for identification of the passenger. How could she then not
hear the Custom official asking if any of them had purchased anything from the
Canadian duty free store, if either of them had any commercial or business
goods, or if either of them had any currency or monetary instruments valued at
over $10,000.00? This affidavit evidence given by the Custom official was not
challenged by way of cross-examination.
[46]
Morever,
two Custom Officers reported that, when asked why she didn’t declare the money,
Mrs. Zeid stated she wasn’t asked the question but her son was asked, as he was
driving. How could she have answered that question if she had not heard what
was going on? I find that Mrs. Zeid has not shown, on a balance of
probabilities, that her failure to report the currency was not deliberate.
[47]
Mrs.
Zeid and her son were then directed to report to the office. It was then
decided to frisk both of them for the safety of the officials. When her purse
was searched for possible weapons, $2,500.00 was found in the side pocket. At
that point, Mrs. Zeid was asked if she had any other money in the vehicle, in
her purse or on her before the search was continued, to which she stated “No”.
This is the affidavit evidence of three Custom officials who were present in
the interview room where all this happened, and as already mentioned they were
not cross-examined by the plaintiff. Indeed, she signed the partial agreed
statement of facts, paragraph 8 of which (paragraph 11 of these reasons) confirms
this version of the events.
[48]
At
the hearing, however, she purported to change her version of what happened
while being examined by her counsel. She testified that she never answered
“No” when asked by a Custom official whether she had any other money on her,
and that she only answered in the negative to the question whether she had any
other money in the vehicle. Needless to say, this denial flatly contradicts
the partial agreed statement of facts that she signed, and at that stage her
lawyer, clearly surprised by her statement, could do no better than putting an
end to his examination.
[49]
In
light of all the evidence before the Court, and of the less than truthful
manner in which the plaintiff testified before the Court, I am drawn to the
inescapable conclusion that Mrs. Zeid either knew of the reporting requirement
or, at the very least, did everything possible to avoid having to answer the Customs
official’s questions. There is no doubt in my mind that wilful blindness can
not be countenanced and is as reprehensible as an outright lie.
[50]
That
being said, I agree with the defendant that the lack of any intention to
circumvent the reporting requirement or to deceive Customs officials is not
relevant to the determination of whether or not the obligation to report has
been contravened. The obligation found in section 12 of the PCMLTFA is
not qualified by any reference to the knowledge or subjective state of mind of
the traveller.
[51]
As
has been recognized by the jurisprudence of this Court, it is evident that
Parliament intended that the seizure, review and appeal mechanisms in the PCMLTFA
mirror and complement those found in the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
1. This can be seen by the striking similarity between the relevant provisions
of the two statutes, as spelled out by Justice Layden-Stevenson in Dokaj
supra at para. 40.
[52]
Furthermore,
it is also noteworthy that Parliament entrusted the administration and
enforcement of the cross-border currency reporting regime in the PCMLTFA
to the same Customs officials who were already entrusted and experienced with
the administration and enforcement of the goods reporting regime in the Customs
Act. Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate to seek guidance for the
interpretation of the provisions of the PCMLTFA at issue from the
jurisprudence that has interpreted the analogous provisions in the Customs
Act.
[53]
That
jurisprudence makes it abundantly clear that a traveller’s subjective intention
when failing to report is irrelevant. It has been unequivocally held that such
intention is not required since the system is one of voluntary reporting and
because strict liability attaches to those who fail to report.
[54]
Perhaps
the clearest statement of this principle is that penned by Mr. Justice Pinard
in He v. Canada (2000), 182 F.T.R. 85, where he stated at
para. 8:
In seizure proceedings such as those at
bar, the onus is on the plaintiffs to establish, on a balance of probabilities,
that the seizures were unlawful. The issue for the Court is simply whether the
goods...were, in fact and law, liable to forfeiture. The Act creates a
voluntary reporting legislative framework in which importers must accurately
declare all goods, must accurately account for the quantity and value of the
goods, and must pay the duty and taxes attracted by all goods imported. (…)
Therefore, the Act is contravened when an incorrect declaration is made by or
on behalf of an importer. Furthermore, the source of that error is
irrelevant. The importer is liable for having failed to meet the obligation to
accurately account for the goods which, from the time of the contravention, are
forfeit to the Crown. A lack of intention on the part of the importer to evade
duty and taxes is irrelevant in a seizure proceeding. Neither the lack of
intent to mislead Customs, nor the presence of an inadvertent error in
reporting goods, affects the validity of a seizure.
[55]
There
is all the more reason to come to that conclusion in the context of the PCMLTFA,
the objectives of which are of the utmost importance. The reporting regime is
a key tool to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorist
activities. Lack of knowledge would not only be difficult to verify, but it
could easily undermine the policy underlying the PCMLTFA. If the PCMLTFA
is to be effective, severe sanctions must be visited upon all those who
fail to report in accordance with section 12, irrespective of their
circumstances.
[56]
This
is indeed the conclusion reached by my colleagues in the only two cases that
have dealt with this issue so far. In Tourki v. Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (2006 FC 50; aff’d on a
different point at 2007 FCA 186), Justice Harrington rejected Mr. Tourki’s
argument that his lack of awareness of the obligation to declare would warrant
overturning the Minister’s decision that he had contravened subsection 12(1).
Similarly, Justice Kelen recognized the irrelevance of the traveller’s
subjective intention when failing to report cross-border currency, further to a
motion for summary judgment brought by the Minister in respect of a section 30 PCMLTFA
statutory appeal: Hoang v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue), 2006 FC 182. I strongly agree with their reasoning and
conclusion.
[57]
For
all of the foregoing reasons, I am therefore of the view that this appeal must
be dismissed, with costs. In light of the plaintiff’s admission that she did
not report the Currency to Canadian Customs officials on August 28, 2005,
either when she exported it to the United States or when she imported it back
into Canada, there is no doubt that the defendant was correct to decide that subsection
12(1) of the PCMLTFA had been contravened in the case at bar.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that
the appeal is dismissed, with costs.
"Yves
de Montigny"