Date: 200080110
Docket: IMM-2033-07
Citation: 2008 FC
32
Ottawa, Ontario, January
10, 2008
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Blanchard
BETWEEN:
JOSHUA TAIWO
ADJANI
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMITGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I.
Introduction
[1]
The
Applicant, Joshua Taiwo Adjani, seeks judicial review of the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board;
Immigration Appeal Division (the Board) dated April 2, 2007, denying the his appeal
of a visa officer’s refusal of his son’s sponsorship. The Application is
brought pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the IRPA).
II.
Factual Background
[2]
The Applicant was born on May
1, 1960, in Accra in Ghana. He holds Ghanaian and Canadian citizenships. He
was recognized as a refugee in Canada in 1996. He then applied for and obtained
permanent residence in Canada. He became a Canadian citizen in 1999.
[3]
The Applicant visited Nigeria
on several occasions and had a casual relationship with a girlfriend there in
the late eighties.
[4]
During a trip to Nigeria
in 2003, the Applicant’s sister informed him that his former girlfriend had a
son who looked like him. He then discovered that he had a son with the
girlfriend he was with in the eighties and a DNA test confirmed that he was the
father of the child.
[5]
The Applicant developed a
relationship with the child and sponsored him as member of the family class.
His son applied for a permanent resident visa. The visa officer refused to
grant a permanent visa to his son on October 19, 2006, because he did not meet
the requirements for immigration to Canada. Specifically, because the Applicant, as the sponsor,
had not declared the child as his dependant at the time of his processing or
landing in Canada contrary to paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, (the Regulations). The
visa officer concluded that since the son was not declared and examined at that
time, he could not then, be considered a member of the family class.
[6]
On December 18, 2006, the
Applicant filed an appeal of the visa officer’s decision with the Board
pursuant subsection 63(1) of the IRPA.
[7]
On April 2, 2007, the Board
dismissed the Applicant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Board concluded
that “… the appellant’s non-disclosure of the applicant when he applied for
landing prohibit him from sponsoring him in the future because section 117(9)(d)
of the Regulations is meant to preclude an appellant from sponsoring family
members who were not examination [sic] at the time the application for
permanent residence was made.”
[8]
The Board acknowledged that
the Applicant did not know he was the father until recently, well after he was
landed in Canada. The Board nevertheless found that, “… knowingly
or not, the appellant precluded not only the visa officer from having him
examined, but it also precluded him from sponsoring the applicant at a later
date.”
[9]
The Board further observed
that humanitarian and compassionate considerations, if any, should have been
raised with the visa officer pursuant to s. 25(1) of the IRPA.
[10]
On May 17, 2007, the
Applicant filed the within application for judicial review.
IV.
Issues
[11]
The Applicant raises the
following issues in this application:
A.
Does the application of paragraph 117(9)(d)
of the Regulations violate the Applicant’s Charter rights as provided for under s. 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Schedule B, Part I to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.) 1982 c. 11 (the Charter)?
B.
Is paragraph 117(9)(d) of the
Regulations ultra vires the IRPA?
C. Was
the decision rendered by the Board unreasonable?
V.
Standard of Review
[12]
It is unclear if
the Charter arguments raised on this application were before the Board.
In the circumstances, and to the extent that the determination of a standard of
review is required, the two first issues involve the interpretation of
paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Regulations and related provisions of the
IRPA including a constitutional question. The applicable standard of
review for such questions is correctness. See Azizi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2005
FCA 406 at paragraph 7.
[13]
The third issue
concerns the application of paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Regulations to
the facts. This is a question of mixed fact and law reviewable on the standard
of reasonableness simpliciter. (Woldeselassie v. Canada (Minister of
Immigration and Citizenship), 2006 FC 1540 at para. 14; Dave v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) at para. 4 and Ly v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 527 at paras.
17-20). An
unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by any reasons
that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination (Canada (Director of
Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1
S.C.R. 748 at para. 56).
VI.
Legislative provisions
[14]
The pertinent legislative
provisions have been reproduced in Annex.
VII.
Analysis
A. Does
the application of paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Regulations violate the
Applicant’s Charter rights as provided for under s. 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms Schedule B, Part I to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)
1982 c. 11 (the Charter)?
[15]
The Applicant submits that
because his son was born out of wedlock and that he was unaware of the child’s
existence; his son is being treated differently than other children applying
for permanent residence. He argues that such discrimination is a violation of
his s. 15(1) Charter right; namely the right to be treated equally. The
Applicant claims that as a member of a specific group, his son will be excluded
by Canadian law based on his age and lineage. The Applicant contends that the
impugned provision reflects a demeaning and prejudicial view of the child’s worth
simply because he was born out of wedlock.
[16]
The Respondent claims that
the Applicant’s s. 15(1) Charter argument must fail because paragraph
117(9)(d) of the Regulations makes no distinction between a dependent
child born out of wedlock or not. Rather, it contemplates timely disclosure
versus non-disclosure of members of the family class and whether these members
may be examined by the immigration authorities.
[17]
In order to determine whether
an enactment violates a s. 15 Charter right, the Supreme Court teaches
that the following three broad inquiries as outlined in Law v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at paragraph
39, be conducted:
…Does
the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others
on the basis of one or more personal characteristics or (b) fail to take into
account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society
resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimant and
others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? If so, there is
differential treatment for the purpose of s. 15(1). Second, was the claimant
subject to differential treatment on the basis of one or more of the enumerated
and analogous grounds? And third, does the differential treatment discriminate
in a substantive sense, bringing into play the purpose of s. 15(1) of the Charter
in remedying such ills as prejudice, stereotyping, and historical disadvantage?
The second and third inquiries are concerned with whether the differential
treatment constitutes discrimination in the substantive sense intended by s.
15(1).
[18]
The Applicant contends that
the inevitable result that would flow from these inquiries would be that the
impugned provision violates his s. 15 Charter rights and that the
provision would not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.
[19]
As the Supreme Court teaches
in Law, the first step in the required analysis to determine whether
Charter rights have been violated is to identify the comparator group. The
equality guarantee is a comparative concept. Identifying the appropriate
comparator is necessary in assessing differential treatment and the grounds of
the distinction. Several factors are considered to locate the appropriate
comparator. For example, the subject matter of the legislation, the biological,
historical and sociological similarities or dissimilarities may be relevant in
establishing the relevant comparator in particular, and whether the legislation
effects discrimination in a substantive sense more generally.
[20]
The Applicant contends that
the comparator group at issue here would be those children born out of wedlock
versus legitimate children. There is simply no basis for this assertion. The
regulatory scheme makes clear that a dependent child of a sponsor may be a
member of a family class. There is no requirement that the child be born from
parents that are married. There is no prohibition relating to a child born out
of wedlock in the applicable regulations. Paragraph 117(1)(a) of the
Regulations speaks only of “a dependent child of the sponsor”. Here, there is
no dispute; the child at issue is the dependent child of the Applicant, the
sponsor. The proper comparator group is rather the accompanying family members
of the sponsor that may be examined. The differential treatment at issue here
has no nexus with whether the child was born out of wedlock or not. On the
basis of this stated characteristic, there is simply no differential treatment
that would flow from the application of the impugned legislation. In
short, the arguments advanced by the Applicant and the circumstances here do
not support a foundation for a claim of infringement of the Applicant’s s. 15 Charter
rights. Consequently, the Applicant’s s. 15 Charter argument must fail.
B.
Is paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Regulations ultra vires the IRPA
[21]
The Applicant contends that
the Board’s decision does not respect the stated objectives of the IRPA, in
particular the objective “to see that families are reunited in Canada.”
The Applicant further contends that the principle of the protection of the
family and the best interest of the child concerned are violated by a
mechanical application of the impugned regulation. As I understand the
Applicant’s argument, the impugned regulation and its application are in direct
conflict with the above stated objective and the purpose of the IRPA, and is
consequently ultra vires the IRPA.
[22]
Parliament has the right to
adopt immigration policy and to enact legislation prescribing the conditions
under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter and remain in Canada.
This it has done by enacting the IRPA: Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 at paragraph 27. The IRPA and Regulations made
pursuant to paragraphs 14(2)(b) and (d) thereof, set out a
regulatory scheme that essentially controls the admission of foreign nationals
to Canada (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. de
Guzman, 2004 FC 1276 at
paragraph 35).
[23]
Family reunification and the
best interest of children are recognized as valid purposes under the IRPA and
are to be considered when relevant. The legislation also has other purposes,
one of which is the maintenance of the integrity of the Canadian refugee
protection system. The Federal Court of Appeal had to consider whether
paragraph 117 (9)(d) of the regulations was ultra vires the IRPA in Azizi
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FCA 406. Justice Rothstein, writing
for the majority stated the following at paragraphs 28-29 of his
reasons:
[28]
Paragraph 117(9)(d) does not bar family reunification. It
simply provides that non-accompanying family members who have not been examined
for a reason other than a decision by a visa officer will not be
admitted as members of the family class. A humanitarian and compassionate
application under section 25 of the IRPA may be made for Mr. Azizi’s dependants
or they may apply to be admitted under another category in the IRPA.
[29]
Mr. Azizi says these are undesirable alternatives. It is true that they are
less desirable from his point of view than had his dependants been considered
to be members of the family class. But it was Mr. Azizi’s misrepresentation
that has caused the problem. He is the author of this misfortune. He cannot
claim that paragraph 117(9)(d) is ultra vires simply because he
has run afoul of it. (My emphasis)
[24]
The Court of Appeal has
therefore decided that the impugned regulation is not utltra vires the
IRPA particularly in cases where there is a misrepresentation to immigration
authorities. Here, however, the Applicant did not know of his son’s existence
at the time of his application for permanent residence. He cannot, therefore,
be said to have concealed this information or to have misrepresented his circumstances.
In my view, it matters not whether non-disclosure is deliberate or not. The
regulation is clear, paragraph 117(9)(d) makes no distinction as to the
reason for which an non-accompanying family member of the sponsor was not
disclosed in his application for permanent residence. What matters, is the
absence of examination by an officer that necessarily flows from the
non-disclosure. This interpretation is consistent with the findings of my
Colleague, Justice Mosley in Hong Mei Chen v. M.C.I., 2005 FC 678, where
the scope and effect of the impugned regulation were found not to be limited to
cases of fraudulent non-disclosure. At paragraph 11 of his reasons, my
learned colleague wrote, “… Whatever the motive, a failure to disclose which
prevents the immigration officer from examining the dependent precludes future
sponsorship of that person as a member of the family class.”
[25]
The
provisions of paragraph 117(9)(d)
of the Regulations are not inconsistent with the stated purposes and objectives
of the IRPA. I am in agreement with the view expressed by Justice Kelen at
paragraph 38 of his reasons in de Guzman,
above, that “The objective of family
reunification does not override, outweigh, supersede or trump the basic
requirement that the immigration law must be respected, and administered in an
orderly and fair manner.” Further, in exceptional circumstances where humanitarian and compassionate
factors are compelling, an applicant can seek, pursuant to s. 25(1) of the
IRPA, a ministerial exemption to the statutory and regulatory requirements for
admission to Canada. Such an application remains open to the Applicant. If successful, the Applicant
could be reunited with his son. (Chen, above, at para. 18).
[26]
For
the above reasons, I find that the impugned regulation is not ultra vires
the IRPA nor inconsistent with its stated objectives or purposes.
C. Was
the decision rendered by the Board unreasonable?
[27]
The Applicant challenges the reasonableness of the Board’s decision. The
only arguments raised on this application are in respect to the s. 15 Charter
rights and the vires of the impugned regulation. Both of these arguments
were dealt with above.
[28]
As stated earlier, the impugned regulation, in the circumstances
of this case, does not violate the Applicant’s s. 15 Charter rights and
is not ultra vires the IRPA. Given the mandatory nature of the
regulation and its imperative language, the Board had no option but to dismiss
the sponsorship application and in so doing committed no reviewable error. For
the above reasons, this judicial review application will be dismissed.
VIII. Question for certification
[29]
The Applicant has submitted the following question for certification:
Does subsection 117(9)(d) of the IRPR apply to
exclude non-accompanying family members from membership from the family class
in circumstances where the sponsor was unaware of their existence at the time
of his/her application for Permanent Residence and Landing in Canada?
[30]
The proposed question suggests that the impugned
regulation be interpreted to read in an element of subjective knowledge by the
Sponsor regarding the non-disclosure so that deliberate or fraudulent
non-disclosure be required for a finding under paragraph 117(9)(d) of
the Regulations.
[31]
In my view the impugned provision does not allow
for such an interpretation. The language is clear and unambiguous, subjective
knowledge of the misrepresentation or non-disclosure is not contemplated in the
regulation. The Court of Appeal in Azizi, above, at paragraph 28 of its
reasons, interpreted the provision as follows: “It simply provides that non-accompanying family members who have not
been examined for a reason other than a decision by a visa officer will
not be admitted as members of the family class.” (My emphasis) This
interpretation is consistent with decisions of the Federal Court. As stated
above, in Chen at paragraph 11, the motive is unimportant, a failure to disclose
which prevents examination of the dependent precludes future sponsorship of
that person as a member of the family class. See also Jean-Jacques v.
M.C.I., 2005 FC 104 at paragraph 9.
[32]
In my view, the meaning, scope, purpose and
application of the impugned regulation have been comprehensively dealt with in
the jurisprudence. The scope of the regulation is not limited to deliberate
or fraudulent non-disclosure but to any non-disclosure which may prevent
examination of a dependent. Non-disclosed, non-accompanying family members
cannot be admitted as members of the family class. The proposed question has
been answered, and is consequently inappropriate for certification.
IX. Conclusion
[33]
This application for judicial review will be dismissed.
I do not propose to certify a question.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1.
The application for judicial review is dismissed.
2.
No question is certified.
“Edmond
P. Blanchard”
ANNEX
The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
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1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under
the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
|
1. La Charte
canadienne des droits et libertés garantit les droits et libertés qui y
sont énoncés. Ils ne peuvent être restreints que par une règle de droit, dans
des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se
démontrer dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique.
15. (1) La
loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique également à tous, et tous ont
droit à la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de
toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race,
l'origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'âge ou les
déficiences mentales ou physiques.
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The Immigration Refugee
Protection Act.
|
Objectives —
immigration
3. (1) The
objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are
(a)
to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural and
economic benefits of immigration;
(b)
to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society,
while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada;
(b.1)
to support and assist the development of minority official languages communities
in Canada;
(c)
to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in
which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada;
(d)
to see that families are reunited in Canada;
(e)
to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual
obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society;
(f)
to support, by means of consistent standards and prompt processing, the
attainment of immigration goals established by the Government of Canada in
consultation with the provinces;
(g)
to facilitate the entry of visitors, students and temporary workers for
purposes such as trade, commerce, tourism, international understanding and
cultural, educational and scientific activities;
(h)
to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of
Canadian society;
(i)
to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human
rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are
criminals or security risks; and
(j)
to work in cooperation with the provinces to secure better recognition of the
foreign credentials of permanent residents and their more rapid integration
into society.
Family
reunification
12. (1) A foreign
national may be selected as a member of the family class on the basis of
their relationship as the spouse, common-law partner, child, parent or other
prescribed family member of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident.
Right to sponsor
family member
13. (1) A
Canadian citizen or permanent resident may, subject to the regulations,
sponsor a foreign national who is a member of the family class.
Regulations
14. (1) The
regulations may provide for any matter relating to the application of this
Division, and may define, for the purposes of this Act, the terms used in
this Division.
Right to appeal —
visa refusal of family class
63. (1) A
person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to sponsor a
foreign national as a member of the family class may appeal to the
Immigration Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign
national a permanent resident visa.
Humanitarian and
compassionate considerations
65. In
an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on
membership in the family class, the Immigration Appeal Division may not
consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations unless it has decided
that the foreign national is a member of the family class and that their
sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations.
Application
(2) The following provisions
govern an application under subsection (1):
( b) subject to paragraph 169( f), notice of
the application shall be served on the other party and the application shall
be filed in the Registry of the Federal Court (“the Court”) within 15 days,
in the case of a matter arising in Canada, or within 60 days, in the case of
a matter arising outside Canada, after the day on which the applicant is
notified of or otherwise becomes aware of the matter;
( c) a
judge of the Court may, for special reasons, allow an extended time for
filing and serving the application or notice;
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Objet en matière
d’immigration
3. (1) En matière d’immigration, la présente loi
a pour objet :
a) de permettre au Canada de retirer de
l’immigration le maximum d’avantages sociaux, culturels et économiques;
b) d’enrichir et de renforcer le tissu social
et culturel du Canada dans le respect de son caractère fédéral, bilingue et
multiculturel;
b.1) de favoriser le développement des
collectivités de langues officielles minoritaires au Canada;
c) de favoriser le développement économique et
la prospérité du Canada et de faire en sorte que toutes les régions puissent
bénéficier des avantages économiques découlant de l’immigration;
d) de veiller à la réunification des familles
au Canada;
e) de promouvoir l’intégration des résidents
permanents au Canada, compte tenu du fait que cette intégration suppose des
obligations pour les nouveaux arrivants et pour la société canadienne;
f) d’atteindre, par la prise de normes
uniformes et l’application d’un traitement efficace, les objectifs fixés pour
l’immigration par le gouvernement fédéral après consultation des provinces;
g) de faciliter l’entrée des visiteurs,
étudiants et travailleurs temporaires qui viennent au Canada dans le cadre
d’activités commerciales, touristiques, culturelles, éducatives,
scientifiques ou autres, ou pour favoriser la bonne entente à l’échelle
internationale;
h) de protéger la santé des Canadiens et de
garantir leur sécurité;
i) de promouvoir, à l’échelle internationale,
la justice et la sécurité par le respect des droits de la personne et
l’interdiction de territoire aux personnes qui sont des criminels ou
constituent un danger pour la sécurité;
j) de veiller, de concert avec les provinces, à
aider les résidents permanents à mieux faire reconnaître leurs titres de
compétence et à s’intégrer plus rapidement à la société.
Regroupement
familial
12. (1) La sélection des étrangers de la catégorie
« regroupement familial » se fait en fonction de la relation qu’ils
ont avec un citoyen canadien ou un résident permanent, à titre d’époux, de
conjoint de fait, d’enfant ou de père ou mère ou à titre d’autre membre de la
famille prévu par règlement.
Droit au
parrainage : individus
13. (1) Tout citoyen canadien et tout résident
permanent peuvent, sous réserve des règlements, parrainer l’étranger de la
catégorie « regroupement familial ».
Application
générale
14. (1) Les règlements régissent l’application de
la présente section et définissent, pour l’application de la présente loi,
les termes qui y sont employés.
Droit d’appel : visa
63. (1) Quiconque a déposé, conformément au
règlement, une demande de parrainage au titre du regroupement familial peut
interjeter appel du refus de délivrer le visa de résident permanent.
Motifs d’ordre humanitaires
65. Dans le cas de l’appel visé aux paragraphes
63(1) ou (2) d’une décision portant sur une demande au titre du regroupement
familial, les motifs d’ordre humanitaire ne peuvent être pris en
considération que s’il a été statué que l’étranger fait bien partie de cette
catégorie et que le répondant a bien la qualité réglementaire.
Application
(2) Les dispositions suivantes
s’appliquent à la demande d’autorisation :
b) elle doit être signifiée à l’autre
partie puis déposée au greffe de la Cour fédérale — la Cour — dans les quinze
ou soixante jours, selon que la mesure attaquée a été rendue au Canada ou
non, suivant, sous réserve de l’alinéa 169f), la date où le demandeur
en est avisé ou en a eu connaissance;
c) le délai peut toutefois être
prorogé, pour motifs valables, par un juge de la Cour;
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The Immigration
Refugee Protection Regulations.
|
Examination —
permanent residents
51. A
foreign national who holds a permanent resident visa and is seeking to become
a permanent resident at a port of entry must
(a)
inform the officer if
(i) the
foreign national has become a spouse or common-law partner or has ceased to
be a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner after the visa was issued,
or
(ii) material
facts relevant to the issuance of the visa have changed since the visa was
issued or were not divulged when it was issued; and
(b) establish, at the time of
examination, that they and their family members, whether accompanying or not,
meet the requirements of the Act and these Regulations.
74. Judicial review is
subject to the following provisions:
(a) the
judge who grants leave shall fix the day and place for the hearing of the
application;
(b) the
hearing shall be no sooner than 30 days and no later than 90 days after leave
was granted, unless the parties agree to an earlier day;
(c) the
judge shall dispose of the application without delay and in a summary way;
and
(d) an
appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal may be made only if, in rendering
judgment, the judge certifies that a serious question of general importance
is involved and states the question.
Excluded
relationships
117.(9) A foreign national shall not be considered
a member of the family class by virtue of their relationship to a sponsor if:
(d)
subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously made an application for
permanent residence and became a permanent resident and, at the time of that
application, the foreign national was a non-accompanying family member of the
sponsor and was not examined.
Exception
(10) Subject to
subsection (11), paragraph (9)(d) does not apply in respect of a
foreign national referred to in that paragraph who was not examined because
an officer determined that they were not required by the Act or the former
Act, as applicable, to be examined.
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Contrôle :
résident permanent
51.
L’étranger titulaire d’un visa de résident permanent qui, à un point
d’entrée, cherche à devenir un résident permanent doit :
a) le cas échéant, faire part à l’agent de ce
qui suit :
(i) il est
devenu un époux ou conjoint de fait ou il a cessé d’être un époux, un
conjoint de fait ou un partenaire conjugal après la délivrance du visa,
(ii) tout
fait important influant sur la délivrance du visa qui a changé depuis la délivrance
ou n’a pas été révélé au moment de celle-ci;
b) établir, lors du contrôle, que lui et les membres de sa famille,
qu’ils l’accompagnent ou non, satisfont aux exigences de la Loi et du présent
règlement.
74. Les règles suivantes s’appliquent à la demande de contrôle
judiciaire :
a) le juge qui accueille la demande
d’autorisation fixe les date et lieu d’audition de la demande;
b) l’audition ne peut être tenue à
moins de trente jours — sauf consentement des parties — ni à plus de
quatre-vingt-dix jours de la date à laquelle la demande d’autorisation est
accueillie;
c) le juge statue à bref délai et
selon la procédure sommaire;
d) le jugement consécutif au contrôle
judiciaire n’est susceptible d’appel en Cour d’appel fédérale que si le juge
certifie que l’affaire soulève une question grave de portée générale et
énonce celle-ci.
Restrictions
117. (9) Ne sont pas considérées comme appartenant
à la catégorie du regroupement familial du fait de leur relation avec le
répondant les personnes suivantes :
d) sous réserve du paragraphe (10), dans le cas
où le répondant est devenu résident permanent à la suite d’une demande à cet
effet, l’étranger qui, à l’époque où cette demande a été faite, était un
membre de la famille du répondant n’accompagnant pas ce dernier et n’a pas
fait l’objet d’un contrôle.
Exception
(10) Sous réserve du paragraphe (11), l’alinéa (9)d) ne s’applique pas
à l’étranger qui y est visé et qui n’a pas fait l’objet d’un contrôle parce
qu’un agent a décidé que le contrôle n’était pas exigé par la Loi ou
l’ancienne loi, selon le cas.
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The Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules.
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18. (1) Before rendering a judgment in respect of an
application for judicial review, a judge shall give the parties an
opportunity to request that the judge certify that a serious question of
general importance is involved as referred to in paragraph 74(d) of
the Act.
(2) A
party who requests that the judge certify that a serious question of general
importance is involved shall specify the precise question.
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18. (1) Le juge, avant de rendre jugement sur la demande
de contrôle judiciaire, donne aux parties la possibilité de lui demander de
certifier que l’affaire soulève une question grave de portée générale, tel
que le prévoit l’alinéa 74d) de la Loi.
(2) La partie qui demande au juge de
certifier que l’affaire soulève une question grave de portée générale doit
spécifier cette question.
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