Date: 20071023
Docket: IMM-5467-06
Citation: 2007 FC 1096
Ottawa, Ontario, October 23,
2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
INDRABALAN
RATNASINGAM
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Appeal
Division (IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated September
20, 2006 allowing the Minister’s appeal and remitting the matter before the
Board’s Immigration Division (ID) for a determination as to whether the
applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 35 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). The case deals with
whether a refugee hearing makes res judicata the issue of the
applicant’s inadmissibility for crimes against humanity.
FACTS
[2]
The
applicant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil descent who arrived in Canada on October
12, 1996 claiming refugee protection. At the time the applicant made his claim
he revealed that he served as a police officer in Sri Lanka. This fact
is reflected in the immigration officer’s Port of Entry notes dated October 12,
1996.
[3]
The
applicant’s refugee claim was subsequently referred to the Convention Refugee
Determination Division (CRDD), where it was heard on April 14, 1997. On July 2,
1997, the applicant was determined to be a Convention refugee.
[4]
On
August 23, 1997, the applicant received notice from Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) that he met the eligibility requirements for permanent resident
status and that a final determination would be made in 18 months.
[5]
On
April 30, 2003, almost six years after first receiving notice from CIC
regarding his application for permanent residence, the applicant was asked to
attend an admissibility interview to address his background as a Sri Lankan
police officer. At the interview, the examining officer stated that the
significant delay between the CIC notice and the admissibility interview was
due to the fact that CIC was given “other priorities” and that interviewing the
applicant was of a “low priority.” Based on the interview, the examining
officer issued a report stating that there were reasonable grounds to believe
that the applicant committed or was complicit in crimes against humanity as
defined in the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c.
24, and that he is therefore inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph
35(1)(a) of the IRPA. The examining officer’s report was forwarded to the ID
for an admissibility hearing.
[6]
On
April 19, 2004, the ID terminated the admissibility hearing on the basis that
the Minister was precluded from pursuing an allegation of inadmissibility by
operation of res judicata, since the issue could have been raised before
the CRDD at the applicant’s refugee hearing. The ID concluded that all of the
preconditions for res judicata had been satisfied, and that there
existed no exceptional circumstances that would warrant refusing to apply the
doctrine in this case. However, in obiter, the ID held at paragraph 43:
¶ 43 There is no evidence before me to
link the person concerned with specific crimes against humanity or war crimes.
The only other way for the Minister to make out the allegation would be to
establish that Mr. Ratnasingam was an accomplice in such (specific) crimes....
There is no evidence before me whatsoever concerning the nature of, or the acts
committed by, the police units in which Mr. Ratnasingam served.
The Minister appealed the decision to the
IAD.
Decision under review
[7]
On
September 20, 2006, the IAD allowed the Minister’s appeal and remitted the
matter to the ID for reconsideration in accordance with the IAD’s reasons. The
IAD’s reasons for allowing the appeal were two-fold:
¶ 15 The panel is of the view that the
appeal should be allowed because the preconditions to the operation of issue
estoppel, a species of res judicata, have not been established and
in any event, even if the preconditions have been met, there are valid reasons
for this panel to exercise its discretion not to apply issue estoppel in
this case. Those reasons also support a finding that an admissibility hearing
to test the allegation against the respondent would not be an abuse of process.
[8]
With
respect to its application of issue estoppel, the IAD concluded that the ID
“erred in finding an identity of interest between the Minister and the CRDD or
the Refugee Hearing Officer.” The IAD held that the CRDD (now the Refugee
Protection Division or RPD) is an independent division of the Board and, as
such, if there was an identification of interest between the CRDD and the
Minister such that the CRDD was a “privy” for the Minister in the refugee
hearing, then the CRDD “would lack institutional independence and its decisions
would be reviewable for that reason.”
[9]
The
IAD went on to state that regardless of whether the preconditions of issue
estoppel had been met, there nevertheless existed valid reasons for the ID to
exercise its discretion to refuse to apply issue estoppel in this case.
In framing its argument around the conclusion that convoking the applicant to
an admissibility hearing would not amount to an abuse of process, the IAD
stated:
¶ 25 In the panel’s opinion, it would be
contrary [to] the purpose of IRPA and Parliament’s approach to war crimes
and crimes against humanity to interpret provisions of IRPA to conclude
that, once a person has been found to be [a] Convention refugee without the
issue of war crimes or crimes against humanity being raised and squarely dealt
with, the issue cannot be raised in subsequent litigation. A review of the
transcript of the refugee hearing establishes that the issue of exclusion was
not raised by the Member hearing the claim or the Refugee Hearing Officer
assisting her….
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[10]
The
legislative context underlying this matter is important. The applicant was
found to be a Convention refugee under the provisions of the former Immigration
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (the former Act). Further, the applicant’s
application for permanent residence was submitted under the former Act. On June
28, 2002, the IRPA came into force. By virtue of section 190 of the IRPA, the
applicant’s permanent residence application was to be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the IRPA after June 28, 2002. Accordingly, the
legislation relevant to this application is the IRPA. The relevant provisions
contained therein have been attached to the end of this judgment as Appendix “A.”
ISSUE
[11]
There
are two issues for the Court to consider in this application:
1. Whether
the IAD erred in finding that the preconditions of issue estoppel were not met;
and
2. Whether
the IAD erred in concluding that even if the preconditions of issue estoppel
were met, there existed sufficient reasons for the IAD to exercise its
discretion in refusing to apply the doctrine.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[12]
In
Rahman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC
1321, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1661 (QL), Mr. Justice Noël considered the standard of
review to be applied to the IAD’s res judicata analysis. Relying on the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc.,
2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, Mr. Justice Noël found that the application
of issue estoppel, the branch of res judicata at issue in both Rahman
and the case at bar, involves a two-step process, with each step attracting a
separate standard of review. I adopt the following passages of Mr. Justice Noël’s
decision, as they also apply to the matter currently before the Court:
¶ 10 In
Danyluk, above, the Supreme Court emphasized that applying issue
estoppel … involves a two-step process. Justice Binnie, writing for a unanimous
court, summarized the proper approach in paragraph 33:
The
first step is to determine whether the moving party (in this case the respondent)
has established the preconditions to the operation of issue estoppel set out by
Dickson J. in Angle, supra. If successful, the court must determine
whether, as a matter of discretion, issue estoppel ought to be applied….
¶ 12 Whether
the preconditions to the operation of issue estoppel were met is a question of
law. The issue affects the individual Applicant’s procedural rights and the IAD
has no greater expertise in applying the doctrine relative to the Court’s
expertise in this area of the law. These factors point toward a strict standard
of review. Therefore, the appropriate standard of review of the IAD’s res
judicata analysis at the first stage is correctness….
¶ 13 Conversely,
the second-step involves an exercise of discretion and a weighing of relevant
factors to determine whether special circumstances warrant the non-application
of issue estoppel in this case. Discretionary factors attract a more
deferential review…. Therefore, patent unreasonableness is the appropriate
standard of review for the second-step.…
[13]
Accordingly,
in the case at bar, the issue of whether the IAD erred in concluding that the preconditions
of issue estoppel were not met will be reviewed on a standard of correctness. However,
the question of whether the IAD erred in exercising its discretion to find that
there was no abuse of process is entitled to greater deference and will be
reviewed on a standard of patent unreasonableness.
ANALYSIS
Issue No. 1: Did the IAD
err in concluding that the preconditions of issue estoppel were not met?
Res Judicata and Issue Estoppel
[14]
The
doctrine of res judicata is comprised of two branches, cause of action
estoppel and issue estoppel, and is “founded on public policy so that there may
be an end of litigation, and also to prevent the hardship to the individual of
being twice vexed for the same cause”: Fenerty v. The City of Halifax (1920), 50
D.L.R. 435 (N.S.S.C.). In Al Yamani v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 1162, [2003] 3 F.C. 345, aff’d
2003 FCA 482, I considered the two branches that comprise the doctrine of res
judicata. At paragraphs 20 and 22 I stated:
¶ 20 …
Although the concepts of res judicata, issue estoppel and cause of
action estoppel are often intertwined, they have distinct meanings. The
principles of these two forms of estoppel can be seen in the two-part
definition of res judicata cited above and were recently summarized by
the Federal Court of Appeal in Apotex Inc. v. Merck and Co. (2002), 214
D.L.R. (4th) 429, at paragraphs 24-25:
The
relevant principles behind the doctrine of res judicata were established
in two leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions: Angle v. M.N.R.,
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 248 … and Grandview (Town) v. Doering,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 621 … In Angle, supra, at 254 Dickson J. noted
that res judicata essentially encompasses two forms of estoppel, being
“cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel,” both based on similar
policies. First, there should be an end to litigation, and second, an
individual should not be sued twice for the same cause of action.
These
two estoppels, while identical in policy, have separate applications. Cause
of action estoppel precludes a person from bringing an action against another
where the cause of action was the subject of a final decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Issue estoppel is wider, and applies to separate causes
of action. It is said to arise when the same question has been decided, the
judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel is final, and the
parties to the judicial decision or their privies are the same persons as the
parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised.…[Emphasis
added.] …
¶ 22 The
applicant submits the Minister is barred from commencing a new inquiry by res
judicata based on an inadmissibility ground that was known but not advanced
in the earlier proceedings. Counsel for the applicant requested the adjudicator
stay the proceeding on this basis. The adjudicator ruled the inquiry could
proceed because the allegation in the present inquiry was different than those
raised in prior proceedings. The adjudicator drew a distinction based on the
nature of the inadmissible classes and that both of the earlier proceedings
were brought under pre-amendment provisions.
[15]
The
applicant’s argument is framed around the application of either cause of action
estoppel or issue estoppel. However, the IAD’s decision is limited to the
concept of issue estoppel, which is the broader of the two branches of res
judicata. I agree with the IAD’s analysis to the extent that it is issue
estoppel that applies to the case at bar. The cause of action before the CRDD,
whether the applicant should be granted Convention refugee status, was not the
same as the one that was before the ID, which was whether the applicant was
inadmissible for reasons of human or international rights violations as
described in paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA. A similar finding was made by Mr.
Justice Pinard in Thambiturai v. Canada (Solicitor
General),
2006 FC 750, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 412, where he stated at paragraph 21:
¶
21 It is clear that “cause of action estoppel” is not applicable
here. The cause of action before the RPD, whether the application to vacate the
applicant’s status should be allowed, was not the same as the one that was
before the Immigration Division, which was whether the applicant is a person
described in paragraphs 36(1)(c) and 40(1)(a) of the IRPA, and thereby inadmissible to Canada because
of serious criminality and misrepresentation.
[16]
In considering
the concept of issue estoppel, the question must be whether the IAD was correct
in finding that the preconditions had not been satisfied. The preconditions of
issue estoppel have been addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada on numerous
occasions (Angle v. M.N.R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248; Danyluk, above; Toronto
(City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77). In Al
Yamani, above, I concluded that the three preconditions of issue
estoppel are:
1.
that
the same question has been decided;
2.
that
the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel is final; and
3.
that
the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as
the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their
privies.
Same Question
[17]
The
applicant contends that the issue of whether he is inadmissible under paragraph
35(1)(a) of the IRPA has already been addressed on two separate occasions: 1)
upon his arrival in Canada where an immigration officer at the port of entry
turned his mind to the categories of admission under the former Act; and 2) at
the CRDD hearing where the applicant was determined to be a Convention refugee.
With respect to the CRDD hearing, the applicant states that he would not have
been determined to be a Convention refugee if he had committed acts described
in paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA, since commission of those acts would have
resulted in his exclusion from the Convention on the basis of article 1(F).
[18]
I
disagree with the applicant’s interpretation. In the refugee hearing before the
CRDD, the issue of whether the applicant was inadmissible to Canada was not
raised, so the concepts of issue estoppel and res judicata do not apply.
The applicant has never been subjected to an admissibility hearing to determine
whether he is inadmissible under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA or, for that
matter, any other ground of inadmissibility contained within the legislation.
Further, while the notice from CIC dated August 23, 1997 makes clear that the
applicant has met the eligibility requirements for permanent resident status, nowhere
does it say that the applicant has been determined to be admissible to Canada. These are
two separate decisions that must be made with respect to the applicant’s
permanent residence application. As well, the determination of whether the
applicant is a Convention refugee – the question before the CRDD – is
substantially different from the determination of whether the applicant is
admissible for the purpose of becoming a permanent resident.
[19]
As
the record shows, at no point between 1997 and 2003 is a final decision made
regarding the applicant’s admissibility for the purposes of his permanent
residence application. Accordingly, the preconditions of issue estoppel have
not been satisfied and the applicant has not established that the IAD erred in
reaching its decision to allow the Minister’s appeal. On this basis alone, this
application for judicial review must be dismissed.
Same Parties
[20]
At
the admissibility hearing, the ID concluded that while the Minister and the
CRDD were not the same parties as defined in Rule 2 of the CRDD Rules (now the Refugee
Protection Division Rules, S.O.R./2002-228), the Minister could
nevertheless be seen as a “privy” to the CRDD decision because there was an
“identification of interest between the Minister and the CRDD … with respect to
matters of exclusion.”
[21]
The
IAD found this reasoning “troublesome,” concluding that it was an error to find
an identity of interest since the CRDD, as a division of the Board, is an
independent tribunal. That independence, the IAD concluded, would be
compromised if it was seen as a “privy” to the Minister.
[22]
The
respondent agrees with the IAD’s conclusion, and submits that the RPD (and the
CRDD before it) has always been an “independent tribunal independent of the
Minister and certainly not bound by the Minister’s position.” The respondent
further submits that no identity of interest exists between the Minister and
the RPD, as the RPD does not represent the interest of any party, but rather,
has a statutory mandate to decide those matters before it on the basis of the
evidence and argument before it.
[23]
The
applicant, however, disagrees with the reasoning of the IAD and argues that the
Minister was a party to the original proceedings because it had the opportunity
to attend those proceedings, even though it chose not to do so. Because the
Minister had a “full and fair opportunity to be heard” at the refugee hearing,
the applicant argues that the Minister is bound by estoppel from subsequently
addressing the applicant’s admissibility before the ID.
[24]
The
applicant further contends that even if the Minister was not a party to the
CRDD hearing, it is at least a privy to the CRDD hearing on account of the fact
that there exists “a clear community or privy of interest between the Minister
and the CRDD regarding whether the Applicant committed the acts described in
section 35(1) of IRPA.”
[25]
I
cannot agree with the applicant’s position that the Minister was either a party
at the refugee hearing, or that the Minister is a privy of the CRDD. As the IAD
made clear in its decision, the Minister “can only intervene in a refugee
hearing to seek the exclusion of a claimant from refugee protection. It is the
CRDD that has jurisdiction to decide [whether] the Minister has made a case for
exclusion”: IAD Decision at paragraph 18. In those situations where the
Minister acts as a party before the RPD, the RPD must consider the Minister’s
evidence and submissions, but no more so than the claimant’s evidence and
submissions.
[26]
Further,
the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly stated that a person cannot be seen as
a party to a previous proceeding even where he or she had an option of
intervening in the matter: London Loan & Savings Co. of Canada v. Osborn,
[1928] S.C.R. 451. This principle was followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Berge v. Langlois (1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 766.
[27]
Accordingly,
since neither the first nor third preconditions for issue estoppel have been met,
the IAD was correct in allowing the Minister’s appeal and remitting the matter to
the ID for reconsideration of the applicant’s admissibility.
Scheme of the IRPA
[28]
Under
the IRPA, once a person is found eligible for permanent resident status, the
person must meet the admissibility requirements of the law, which include both
medical and security screenings. These checks involve investigation and take
time. Accordingly, the logistical scheme of the legislation suggests that
admissibility would not be determined until after the applicant has been
determined to be a Convention refugee in the normal course. Further, just
because the applicant has been found to be a Convention refugee in the normal
course, does not mean that he is entitled to permanent resident status. As
Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson explained in Khalil v. Canada, 2007 FC
923, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1221 (QL) at paragraphs 185-187:
¶
185 The
overarching parliamentary intent of the IRPA is articulated in subsection 3(3)
which states that the act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
furthers the domestic and international interests of Canada.
¶ 186 The
right relied upon by the plaintiffs in subsection 21(2) of the IRPA (that upon
application in accordance with the regulations, a Convention refugee becomes a
permanent resident) is subject to an important qualification. A Convention
refugee is eligible for permanent residence only if the refugee is not
inadmissible. If inadmissible, permanent residence can be granted only by
ministerial exemption. As noted earlier, the power to grant ministerial
exemption is non-delegable.
¶ 187 Parliament
has the right to adopt an immigration policy and to enact legislation
prescribing the conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter
and remain in Canada: Chiarelli v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 711 at pp. 733-734…. In so doing, it is acting in the public interest.
[Emphasis added.]
[29]
In
cases where the refugee claimant is well known for some reason related to
inadmissibility, the Minister may intervene before the CRDD (now the RPD) and
argue that the claimant is not eligible to be a Convention refugee. However,
that is not what happened in the case at bar.
Issue No. 2: Did the IAD
err in concluding that there existed sufficient reasons to exercise its
discretion in refusing to apply issue estoppel?
[30]
The
applicant submits that the administrative decision-maker does have the
discretion to refuse to apply the estoppel. The exercise of that discretion is
to be reviewed by the Court on a standard of patent unreasonableness. In this
case, however, the preconditions of issue estoppel have not been satisfied,
making consideration of this issue unnecessary.
[31]
As
part of the discretion issue, the applicant submits, in any event, that
allowing the ID hearing to proceed would amount to an abuse of process based on
the unconscionable and undue delay associated with the processing of the
applicant’s application for permanent residence. The applicant relies on the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Blencoe v. British
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 307, where it stated at paragraph 154:
¶ 154 Abusive
administrative delay is wrong and it does not matter if it wrecks only your
life and not your hearing. The cases that have been part of this evolution have
sometimes expressed the point differently, but the key consideration is this:
administrative delay that is determined to be unreasonable based on its length,
its causes, and its effects is abusive and contrary to the administrative law
principles that exist and should be applied in a fair and efficient legal
system.
[32]
In
the case at bar, the record discloses that the Minister repeatedly assigned a “low
priority” to interviewing the applicant with respect to his admissibility, and
failed to appear at the Assignment Court hearing before the ID
when this case was originally to be scheduled. In the meantime, the applicant
had been in Canada for six
years from the time he was determined to be a Convention refugee until he was
notified that his admissibility was being questioned. Significant prejudice to
the applicant may be considered in assessing whether further proceedings
constitute an abuse of process. However, the threshold to prove such prejudice
is high. I accept that the applicant has suffered by the delay and that this
delay has been unreasonable. However, in the context of the compelling public
interest that Canada not admit immigrants who have committed crimes against
humanity, the overwhelming priority is that the ID consider the admissibility
of the applicant on the merits: See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Al
Yamani, above, per Rothstein J.A. at paragraphs 34-40.
[33]
Accordingly,
the IAD was not patently unreasonable in concluding that the “tardiness” of the
Minister does not outweigh the public interest of preventing those convicted of
war crimes or crimes against humanity from being allowed to seek refuge in Canada. The
applicant could have sought mandamus to require the Minister to proceed with
reasonable dispatch on his admissibility.
COSTS
[34]
The
applicant seeks costs for this application in any event of the cause.
Section 22 of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules,
S.O.R./2002-232 provides that the Court may award costs in an immigration
matter if there exists “special reasons.” The Court is not satisfied that
“special reasons” are present that warrant granting costs to the applicant. In
this application, which deals with whether the IAD was correct in not applying
the issue estoppel branch of res judicata, an award of costs would be
inappropriate as the respondent is not responsible for delaying these
proceedings given the nature of the applicant’s argument. I think that a delay
beyond two years, notwithstanding that the applicant was a low priority for the
respondent, may have been inordinate and unreasonable. However, there is
no cause of action for damages in such cases, and the appropriate proactive remedy
is mandamus to require that the respondent make a decision within a reasonable
time period.
Expedite a new hearing before
the ID regarding admissibility
[35]
The
Court, with the concurrence of both parties, urges the ID to expedite a new
admissibility hearing for the applicant. He has waited six years from being
determined to be a Convention refugee until his first admissibility hearing
before the ID, and has now waited an additional three years while the legal
question of res judicata and issue esoppel has been appealed to the IAD
and to this Court.
CERTIFIED QUESTION
[36]
Neither
party had a specific question for certification on appeal. The Court is of the
view that the legal issues involved in this case have been well established in
the jurisprudence, and there is no new serious question of general importance
raised in this application that should be certified for an appeal.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
This application for judicial
review is dismissed.
“Michael
A. Kelen”
APPENDIX “A”
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
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Human or international rights violations
35. (1) A
permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of
violating human or international rights for
(a) committing an act outside Canada
that constitutes an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act;
(b) being a prescribed senior
official in the service of a government that, in the opinion of the Minister,
engages or has engaged in terrorism, systematic or gross human rights
violations, or genocide, a war crime or a crime against humanity within the
meaning of subsections 6(3) to (5) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act; or
(c) being a person, other than
a permanent resident, whose entry into or stay in Canada is restricted
pursuant to a decision, resolution or measure of an international
organization of states or association of states, of which Canada is a member,
that imposes sanctions on a country against which Canada has imposed or has
agreed to impose sanctions in concert with that organization or association.
(2) Paragraphs (1)(b)
and (c) do not apply in the case of a permanent
resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their presence
in Canada would not be detrimental to the
national interest.
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Atteinte aux droits humains ou
internationaux
35 (1) Emportent
interdiction de territoire pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux
les faits suivants :
a) commettre, hors du Canada, une des infractions visées aux
articles 4 à 7 de la Loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de
guerre;
b) occuper un poste de rang supérieur — au sens du règlement — au
sein d’un gouvernement qui, de l’avis du ministre, se livre ou s’est livré au
terrorisme, à des violations graves ou répétées des droits de la personne ou
commet ou a commis un génocide, un crime contre l’humanité ou un crime de
guerre au sens des paragraphes 6(3) à (5) de la Loi sur les crimes contre
l’humanité et les crimes de guerre;
c) être, sauf s’agissant du résident permanent, une personne dont
l’entrée ou le séjour au Canada est limité au titre d’une décision, d’une
résolution ou d’une mesure d’une organisation internationale d’États ou une
association d’États dont le Canada est membre et qui impose des sanctions à
l’égard d’un pays contre lequel le Canada a imposé — ou s’est engagé à
imposer — des sanctions de concert avec cette organisation ou association.
(2) Les faits visés aux alinéas (1)b) et c) n’emportent pas
interdiction de territoire pour le résident permanent ou l’étranger qui
convainc le ministre que sa présence au Canada ne serait nullement préjudiciable
à l’intérêt national.
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